Ewell Moves To The Right

[Hoplite]

From Pfanz:
'Lee and the generals discussed matters relating primarily to July 2nd and the possibility of Ewell making an attack on his front. Ewell and his generals were reluctant to do this and Lee suggested that Ewell's corps might be moved to the right, they opposed that too.
Lee later sent word by Col. Marshall that unless Ewell could carry the position to his front, he intended to move Ewell's corps to the right.'

Ewell then visited Lee and argued that it was his hope that Johnson's division would be able to occupy Culp's Hill and force the enemy from his position on Cemetary Hill. Ewell was persuasive, and Lee permitted his corps to remain in place.

Of course Johnson did not occupy Culp's Hill, the Iron Brigade was there, and a Union courier was captured indicating the closeness of AOP V Corps.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Question: Did Lee order Ewell to make the suicidal attack on Culp's Hill on July 3? Did the actual order survive, or are there are any post-war memoirs that describe the order?

 

[rpkennedy]

Question: Did Lee order Ewell to make the suicidal attack on Culp's Hill on July 3? Did the actual order survive, or are there are any post-war memoirs that describe the order?

The fighting on July 3 was initially driven by the Union troops attempting to retake their lost entrenchments. It just grew out of Ewell's control really quickly and drew in troops as reinforcements for both sides joined the fight.

Ryan

 

[infomanpa]

From Pfanz:
'Lee and the generals discussed matters relating primarily to July 2nd and the possibility of Ewell making an attack on his front. Ewell and his generals were reluctant to do this and Lee suggested that Ewell's corps might be moved to the right, they opposed that too.
Lee later sent word by Col. Marshall that unless Ewell could carry the position to his front, he intended to move Ewell's corps to the right.'

Ewell then visited Lee and argued that it was his hope that Johnson's division would be able to occupy Culp's Hill and force the enemy from his position on Cemetary Hill. Ewell was persuasive, and Lee permitted his corps to remain in place.

Of course Johnson did not occupy Culp's Hill, the Iron Brigade was there, and a Union courier was captured indicating the closeness of AOP V Corps.

Are you asking a question or is this simply information?

 

[RedRover]

Question: Did Lee order Ewell to make the suicidal attack on Culp's Hill on July 3? Did the actual order survive, or are there are any post-war memoirs that describe the order?

From Gen. Lee's July 31 preliminary official report, regarding the 2nd and plan for Ewell to continue his attack on the 3rd:

"The preparations for attack were not completed until the afternoon of the 2d. The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery. . . In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark."

Lee's January, 1864 report suggests the main attack on the 2nd was Longstreet's, but regarding Ewell:

"General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer."

"The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early 's division."

Campbell Brown, of General Ewell's staff, wrote extensively on the subject of his commander at Gettysburg. His memoir, etc. was published in 2001.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Since Walker was moved into position at midnight on July 2, Smith reported by daylight, and O'Neal and Daniel arrived close behind Smith (having been ordered to Culp's Hill from the town), it's safe to assume the Confederates had every intention of renewing the fight on Culp's Hill at daybreak on July 3, as did the Federals.

The night before (July 1/2), it was Cutler's large and fresh 7th Indiana that posed a bigger and more immediate obstacle to the Confederates on Culp's Hill, than the Iron Brigade. The latter was posted down the west side of the north summit and was badly damaged from the first day's fighting.

Add: You are spot on to mention that captured courier. With the Union Fifth Corps potentially lurking nearby and suspicious activity reported beyond Wolf Hill, it might not be prudent to send Johnson to occupy Culp's Hill and leave his left and rear exposed. Walker was detached as a precaution, which might have represented a lot of extra straw to break the back of Greene's brigade the early evening of July 2.

 

[RedRover]

From Pfanz:
'Lee and the generals discussed matters relating primarily to July 2nd and the possibility of Ewell making an attack on his front. Ewell and his generals were reluctant to do this and Lee suggested that Ewell's corps might be moved to the right, they opposed that too.
Lee later sent word by Col. Marshall that unless Ewell could carry the position to his front, he intended to move Ewell's corps to the right.'

Ewell then visited Lee and argued that it was his hope that Johnson's division would be able to occupy Culp's Hill and force the enemy from his position on Cemetary Hill. Ewell was persuasive, and Lee permitted his corps to remain in place.

Of course Johnson did not occupy Culp's Hill, the Iron Brigade was there, and a Union courier was captured indicating the closeness of AOP V Corps.

Campbell Brown of Gen. Ewell's staff noted that Major A.R. Venable of Gen. Stuart's staff had come up to Gen. Ewell during the afternoon of July 1, and Ewell forwarded him, and Gen. Stuart's intelligence, to Gen. Lee. From Venable's obituary, 1909:

Lt. Col. E.V. "Lige" White of the 35th VA Cavalry Battalion, attached to Ewell, much later noted his understanding that Lee made a suggestion to move Ewell's command rightward...

 

[Drumfish420]

Let's say Ewell did indeed move his corps to the right of Longstreet; would the town of Gettysburg have provided enough of an anchor to protect Hill's left? Mead had the high ground and most likely wouldn't have come off of it, but the flanks are always the question. Having not really considered this move before, it would seem to have made operational sense, since the lines of communication would've been shorter for the ANV. The move may also have been extended the line well beyond the Federal left, or created a reserve for Longstreet's attacks on July 2nd that could've aided in ramming those strikes home.

 

[jackt62]

Wasn't an important reason for keeping Ewell on the Confederate left to threaten the AotP's rail and road communications?

 

[Hoplite]

Let's say Ewell did indeed move his corps to the right of Longstreet; would the town of Gettysburg have provided enough of an anchor to protect Hill's left? Mead had the high ground and most likely wouldn't have come off of it, but the flanks are always the question. Having not really considered this move before, it would seem to have made operational sense, since the lines of communication would've been shorter for the ANV. The move may also have been extended the line well beyond the Federal left, or created a reserve for Longstreet's attacks on July 2nd that could've aided in ramming those strikes home.

Correct me if I am wrong but Early's division had suffered relatively minor casualties and Johnson was fresh. Rodes had casualties but certainly nothing like III Corps divisions- Heth and Pender.
So assume you leave Rodes to occupy the town- as a flank guard so to speak, you have two fresh divisions over 10K for use elsewhere.

 

[Drumfish420]

That's what I'm getting at. It's possible they could have moved on the night of the 1st before the majority of the Federal Army got onto the field. After that though I would think they would have had more difficulty slipping away with so many eyes on them from Culp's and Cemetery Hills.

 

[Peter r]

Correct me if I am wrong but Early's division had suffered relatively minor casualties and Johnson was fresh. Rodes had casualties but certainly nothing like III Corps divisions- Heth and Pender.
So assume you leave Rodes to occupy the town- as a flank guard so to speak, you have two fresh divisions over 10K for use elsewhere.

Just to point out early,s division is the smallest in the ANV,

 

[FZ11]

Campbell Brown of Gen. Ewell's staff noted that Major A.R. Venable of Gen. Stuart's staff had come up to Gen. Ewell during the afternoon of July 1, and Ewell forwarded him, and Gen. Stuart's intelligence, to Gen. Lee. From Venable's obituary, 1909:

View attachment 481545

Lt. Col. E.V. "Lige" White of the 35th VA Cavalry Battalion, attached to Ewell, much later noted his understanding that Lee made a suggestion to move Ewell's command rightward...

View attachment 481560
View attachment 481561

Lee's instinct to instruct Ewell to "to swing around to the right on Longstreet", after Day 1, would have shortened Lee's lines and offered a flanking attack to Meade. Inviting Meade to come off Cemetary Hill and attack Lee's left, on even ground, was Lee's best opportunity for Day 2.

 

[jackt62]

Lee's instinct to instruct Ewell to "to swing around to the right on Longstreet", after Day 1, would have shortened Lee's lines and offered a flanking attack to Meade. Inviting Meade to come off Cemetary Hill and attack Lee's left, on even ground, was Lee's best opportunity for Day 2.

Aside from the complex logistical problems involved with "swinging" Ewell's Corp to the right, Lee had fixated on using Ewell to tie down AotP reinforcements on its extreme right flank to ensure the success of Longstreet's attack up the Emmittsburg Road.

 

[FZ11]

Aside from the complex logistical problems involved with "swinging" Ewell's Corp to the right, Lee had fixated on using Ewell to tie down AotP reinforcements on its extreme right flank to ensure the success of Longstreet's attack up the Emmittsburg Road.

Doesn't seem as complex as attacking Meade's defensive positions on Cemetary Hill. Please read the attachment (above) as to what Lee's instruction to Ewell said. By moving Ewell, "around, to the right", Lee can "invite" Meade's right flank to come down off Cemetary Hill to flank, and attack, Lee's left flank . Lee has a chance in a moving battle, on open ground, on Day 2. Lee, as usual, has issued a confusing set of circumstantial orders.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I think the way to do this after dark on July 1 is similar to what happened late on July 3, after failure of Pickett's Charge: pull Ewell back to Seminary Ridge. Although in this situation probably keep a brigade in Gettysburg town to secure it.

Ewell and Hill slide down Seminary Ridge.

When Longstreet arrives, he's swing around the Confederate right flank and probably in a better position to roll up the Union left.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Correct me if I am wrong but Early's division had suffered relatively minor casualties and Johnson was fresh. Rodes had casualties but certainly nothing like III Corps divisions- Heth and Pender.
So assume you leave Rodes to occupy the town- as a flank guard so to speak, you have two fresh divisions over 10K for use elsewhere.

Us former guides discussed that one at some length (years!) in the early 70s as it's so obvious the hill was not likely to be taken. I'm not trying to sound cocky and should clarify many of us are Gettysburg natives, knowing the ground intimately.
I'd add that Park Historians of some reputation felt the same way. Knowing the ratio of attacking troops to defending, Lee/Ewell would have to send another division or two to take the hill while employing the entirety of Ewell's corps against Slocum's 12th without getting into other troops that would come to their support.

So the puzzler to us was and is why Lee didn't just order Ewell to the right. That would not have gone unnoticed any more than Longstreet's move did on the 2nd. But it would have made for a much different battle.

 

[FZ11]

I think the way to do this after dark on July 1 is similar to what happened late on July 3, after failure of Pickett's Charge: pull Ewell back to Seminary Ridge. Although in this situation probably keep a brigade in Gettysburg town to secure it.

Ewell and Hill slide down Seminary Ridge.

When Longstreet arrives, he's swing around the Confederate right flank and probably in a better position to roll up the Union left.

Lee would have been more, clear to have told Ewell to "shift his troops around to the right" vs. "swing around" his troops to the right.
Maybe Lee did mean to swing all around the position extending Hood's right? The order was, and is, confusing. Ewell rode to Lee's tent to argue the order. So, on Day 1 Ewell was right to not attack Cemetary Hill but wrong not to, somehow, shift his troops to the right as Lee envisioned.

 

[FZ11]

O.K. Slightly different info re Lee and Ewell on July 1 in Pfanz's Culps Hill & Cemetery Hill written in 1993. Page 84. Lee "intended to move Longstreet around the enemy's left & draw Hill after Longstreet, directing Genl. Ewell to follow Hill." (to the right). Interesting prospect. Not likely to work when you are outnumbered 100,000 to 70,000 in Pennsylvania but a better shot than Day 2 actual.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

From Pfanz:
'Lee and the generals discussed matters relating primarily to July 2nd and the possibility of Ewell making an attack on his front. Ewell and his generals were reluctant to do this and Lee suggested that Ewell's corps might be moved to the right, they opposed that too.
Lee later sent word by Col. Marshall that unless Ewell could carry the position to his front, he intended to move Ewell's corps to the right.'

Ewell then visited Lee and argued that it was his hope that Johnson's division would be able to occupy Culp's Hill and force the enemy from his position on Cemetary Hill. Ewell was persuasive, and Lee permitted his corps to remain in place.

Of course Johnson did not occupy Culp's Hill, the Iron Brigade was there, and a Union courier was captured indicating the closeness of AOP V Corps.

This is a case in which Lee should have gone with his gut feelings and judgement. Of course it's easy for me to say this in retrospect.