Evaluating Major General John Sedgwick

[jackt62]

General Sedgwick is usually best remembered as being the beloved "Uncle John" to his soldiers, and for his tragic death at the hands of a sharpshooter at Spotsylvania Courthouse. But digging deeper, I'm wondering how Sedgwick should be evaluated in terms of his leadership of some of the most important Division/Corps of the AotP. At first glance, two of his most well know engagements were desperate or failed attempts: specifically, his assault on Jackson's position at the West Woods during the battle of Antietam was routed with heavy casualties and no apparent advantage. To be sure, Sedgwick was ordered to carry out that attack by his Corps commander, General Sumner, who recklessly committed Sedgwick's division unsupported and vulnerable. But Sedgwick at least, showed leadership by asserting control over his division and extricating them from a forlorn position.

The second engagement for which Sedgwick is well known is his command of VI Corps during the battle of Chancellorsville. Although he successfully crossed the Rappahannock River and eventually carried Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, his Corps was halted at Salem Church and forced to withdraw across the river. Sedgwick was accused by Army Commander Hooker of slow movements and a failure to close the vise on Lee's forces. But in this case, Sedgwick was again placed in an untenable position by Hooker, whose decision to switch gears from offense to defense, and his need to find scapegoats left Sedgwick's force dangling with fewer options to deal with Lee's gathering force.

Additionally, Sedgwick's Corps was held mostly as a reserve force at Gettysburg, performed competently during the Rappahannock offensive in November 1864, and bore the brunt of a flank attack by John Gordon at the Battle of the Wilderness. Given this history, I would appreciate thoughts on how Sedgwick's standing should be considered individually, and in comparison to other Division and Corps commanders of the AotP.

 

[Belfoured]

General Sedgwick is usually best remembered as being the beloved "Uncle John" to his soldiers, and for his tragic death at the hands of a sharpshooter at Spotsylvania Courthouse. But digging deeper, I'm wondering how Sedgwick should be evaluated in terms of his leadership of some of the most important Division/Corps of the AotP. At first glance, two of his most well know engagements were desperate or failed attempts: specifically, his assault on Jackson's position at the West Woods during the battle of Antietam was routed with heavy casualties and no apparent advantage. To be sure, Sedgwick was ordered to carry out that attack by his Corps commander, General Sumner, who recklessly committed Sedgwick's division unsupported and vulnerable. But Sedgwick at least, showed leadership by asserting control over his division and extricating them from a forlorn position.

The second engagement for which Sedgwick is well known is his command of VI Corps during the battle of Chancellorsville. Although he successfully crossed the Rappahannock River and eventually carried Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, his Corps was halted at Salem Church and forced to withdraw across the river. Sedgwick was accused by Army Commander Hooker of slow movements and a failure to close the vise on Lee's forces. But in this case, Sedgwick was again placed in an untenable position by Hooker, whose decision to switch gears from offense to defense, and his need to find scapegoats left Sedgwick's force dangling with fewer options to deal with Lee's gathering force.

Additionally, Sedgwick's Corps was held mostly as a reserve force at Gettysburg, performed competently during the Rappahannock offensive in November 1864, and bore the brunt of a flank attack by John Gordon at the Battle of the Wilderness. Given this history, I would appreciate thoughts on how Sedgwick's standing should be considered individually, and in comparison to other Division and Corps commanders of the AotP.

I think you've touched on some relevant points. Regarding the West Woods debacle, Marion Armstrong has made a good case that Sumner's role was not as incompetent as has been assumed. That said, any shortcomings weren't Sedgwick's fault and he probably performed competently after things fell apart. At Glendale, he again performed adequately in a limited role (sending in units late to plug a gap). I don't think either performance could be labeled "brilliant" - or "inept". At Second Fredericksburg, while you make some valid points, Sedgwick did not exhibit anything that could be called "dynamic". Hooker overstated the case, but I would use "plodding", "pedestrian" and "uninspired" as an appropriate summary. Gettysburg, as you suggest, didn't provide a meaningful opportunity. As for Rappahannock Station, Jeff Hunt's recent, thorough book blames Sedgwick for the Union failure to make a timely strike at Lee's bridgehead on November 7 and turn that into a significant defeat for the ANV. And at the Wilderness, I think "competent"/"adequate" covers it - nothing more. In short, I'd rate him "fair to middling" in the overall group - and not a guy I'd ever consider for a higher command. Just my opinion, of course.

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

I think you've touched on some relevant points. Regarding the West Woods debacle, Marion Armstrong has made a good case that Sumner's role was not as incompetent as has been assumed. That said, any shortcomings weren't Sedgwick's fault and he probably performed competently after things fell apart. At Glendale, he again performed adequately in a limited role (sending in units late to plug a gap). I don't think either performance could be labeled "brilliant" - or "inept". At Second Fredericksburg, while you make some valid points, Sedgwick did not exhibit anything that could be called "dynamic". Hooker overstated the case, but I would use "plodding", "pedestrian" and "uninspired" as an appropriate summary. Gettysburg, as you suggest, didn't provide a meaningful opportunity. As for Rappahannock Station, Jeff Hunt's recent, thorough book blames Sedgwick for the Union failure to make a timely strike at Lee's bridgehead on November 7 and turn that into a significant defeat for the ANV. And at the Wilderness, I think "competent"/"adequate" covers it - nothing more. In short, I'd rate him "fair to middling" in the overall group - and not a guy I'd ever consider for a higher command. Just my opinion, of course.

It's been a couple years since I read it, but I don't recall Rhea being particularly favorable to Sedgwick's performance at the Wilderness either. Additionally, his efforts when the Morton's Ford fiasco was foisted upon him also don't do any favors.

The questions Hunt and other have raised about the impact of Sedgwick's multiple woundings in 1862 on his mindset upon return seem worth investigating in more detail.

 

[jackt62]

I'd rate him "fair to middling" in the overall group - and not a guy I'd ever consider for a higher command

It does seem that by his record alone, it would be difficult to rate Sedgwick particularly higher. I believe that Meade, when he reorganized the AotP in April 1864 by eliminating I and III Corps, was considering removing Sedgwick from Corps command.

 

[Belfoured]

It does seem that by his record alone, it would be difficult to rate Sedgwick particularly higher. I believe that Meade, when he reorganized the AotP in April 1864 by eliminating I and III Corps, was considering removing Sedgwick from Corps command.

"Better than Blinky French, worse than Gettysburg Hancock" .....

 

[jackt62]

The questions Hunt and other have raised about the impact of Sedgwick's multiple woundings in 1862 on his mindset upon return seem worth investigating in more detail.

That might certainly apply to other senior commanders such as Ewell, Hood, Hooker who sustained wounds that might have effected their performance.

 

[jackt62]

And at the Wilderness, I think "competent"/"adequate" covers it - nothing more

Gordon's flank attack on Sedgwick's VI Corps could have been reminiscent of Jackson's rout of XI Corps at Chancellorsville, had it not been for the late hour of the assault and a quicker reaction on the part of Meade/Grant in bringing up reinforcements. Although the right flank of VI Corps was "in the air" and exposed to such an attack, there does not appear to be significant criticism of Sedgwick's handling even though it resulted in the collapse of General Shaler's brigade. Perhaps the complexity of the fighting along two major roadways and the failure of the Confederate assault to sway the outcome of the battle helped to downplay Sedgwick's role and lessen any impact to his reputation.

 

[Belfoured]

Gordon's flank attack on Sedgwick's VI Corps could have been reminiscent of Jackson's rout of XI Corps at Chancellorsville, had it not been for the late hour of the assault and a quicker reaction on the part of Meade/Grant in bringing up reinforcements. Although the right flank of VI Corps was "in the air" and exposed to such an attack, there does not appear to be significant criticism of Sedgwick's handling even though it resulted in the collapse of General Shaler's brigade. Perhaps the complexity of the fighting along two major roadways and the failure of the Confederate assault to sway the outcome of the battle helped to downplay Sedgwick's role and lessen any impact to his reputation.

Those are fair points. The Wilderness also was one of the toughest settings in the Civil War for exercising command and control at the corps level.

 

[Belfoured]

That might certainly apply to other senior commanders such as Ewell, Hood, Hooker who sustained wounds that might have effected their performance.

I don't think there's much doubt that it had an effect on Ewell. The difference between Ewell before 2 BR and after is pretty stark. I think there's more room for doubt on Hood, especially after Steve Davis started burying the fiction about laudanum. In fact, Hood looks more like a guy who couldn't adapt his instincts from division to higher command.

 

[rpkennedy]

I don't think there's much doubt that it had an effect on Ewell. The difference between Ewell before 2 BR and after is pretty stark. I think there's more room for doubt on Hood, especially after Steve Davis started burying the fiction about laudanum. In fact, Hood looks more like a guy who couldn't adapt his instincts from division to higher command.

Personally, I think that it was less Ewell's wound than it was his marriage to Mrs. Brown.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

I would describe Sedgwick as a solid, dependable officer but one who wasn't going to flash brilliance and should not act independently of army command.

Ryan

 

[jackt62]

Aside from any question about his combat effectiveness, Sedgwick was among the group of AotP officers who were strongly identified with and supportive of McClellan. That fact may not have gained him any favors with the Congressional Republicans and could possibly have caused Hooker, a favorite of the Republicans, to have evaluated Sedgwick's Chancellorsville performance more harshly.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I would describe Sedgwick as a solid, dependable officer but one who wasn't going to flash brilliance and should not act independently of army command.

Unfortunately his seniority put him in command positions above his ability.

He was very popular, as I recall, which probably helped him. He was a McClellanite but not an agitator.

He probably should have been rotated to a non-AOTP command prior to the Overland Campaign.

 

[jackt62]

He probably should have been rotated to a non-AOTP command prior to the Overland Campaign.

There was some talk about transferring Sedgwick to command in the Shenandoah Valley during the summer of 1864. It didn't happen and the post went to Sigel.

 

[Belfoured]

Personally, I think that it was less Ewell's wound than it was his marriage to Mrs. Brown.

Ryan

My guess is that both played a role. There's little question that something changed after the wound at Brawner's Farm and the long layoff.

 

[Belfoured]

Aside from any question about his combat effectiveness, Sedgwick was among the group of AotP officers who were strongly identified with and supportive of McClellan. That fact may not have gained him any favors with the Congressional Republicans and could possibly have caused Hooker, a favorite of the Republicans, to have evaluated Sedgwick's Chancellorsville performance more harshly.

I have little doubt that Hooker's assessment was less than objective - probably, however, due more to the need for a scapegoat (or three) than to any political issues. That said, Sedgwick's handling of the Fredericksburg front was objectively pedestrian.

 

[FPT]

Is there anything in Sedgwick's pre-Civil War experiences that would help to define his Civil War record?

 

[Tom Elmore]

In the Gettysburg campaign, Sedgwick had the largest corps in the army, and his arrival at Gettysburg following an epic forced march reassured the whole army, from Meade on down. Otherwise his presence on the field is hardly recorded. Here are a few sightings in the Gettysburg campaign that shed just a little light on the general.

June 29. Passed Gen. Sedgwick's headquarters, the old man was sitting in front of his tent enjoying the evening and looking at the long lines of his men marching past; our men carrying fence rails from Maryland farms. Sedgwick sent an aide to have the rails put back, based on a General Order issued the night before. Sedgwick turned his wrath on Gen. Wheaton for allowing it. (from diary of Major John I. Nevin, 93 PA -'On the March Again at Daybreak,' ed. by Dana B. Shoaf, A Journal of the American Civil War, vol. 6, no. 3 (Savas Publishing Company), p. 124)

July 2, about 7:05 p.m. Sedgwick personally posted the 93rd Pennsylvania on a low rocky knoll, the first regiment of the Sixth Corps to go into action, and leading its brigade.

July 2, about 7:20 p.m. Sedgwick standing between two guns (center section) of Battery L/1st Ohio, watching Nevin's brigade. (Memoirs of Lt. James Gildea, Battery L, 1st Ohio)

July 2, around 8:15 p.m. to nearly midnight. Meade calls for a Council of War to convene at the Leister cottage to include Newton, Hancock, Gibbon, Birney, Sykes, Sedgwick, Howard, Slocum and A. S. Williams. (John Gibbon, Personal Recollections of the Civil War, p. 140.) Sedgwick's responses, per Gibbon, to the three questions - whether to stay put; go on offense or stay on defense; and if the latter, how long should we wait: 1. Remain; 2. and await attack; 3. at least one day. Also, "Sedgwick doubtful whether we ought to attack.")

July 3, about 4:40-4:45 p.m. Meade with Wright and Sedgwick on the north slope of Little Round Top. (Correspondence with Crawford, Address Delivered Wednesday, 28th November 1866, in Feller's Hall, Madalin, Township of Red Hook, Duchess Co., New York, by J. Watts De Peyster, p.99)

July 5, late morning. Adjutant F. W. Morse, 121st New York, reported the skirmish situation to Sedgwick, who was sitting on a stump with his staff around him. Sedgwick turned to Colonel Kent and said it was the 119th Pennsylvania that had been ordered out, not the 121st New York. (Personal Experiences in the War of the Great Rebellion, by F. W. Morse, 121 NY)

While one cannot judge the man on these limited examples, I think they suggest him to be competent, personally brave, strict, attentive to detail, and not very aggressive. Some current "armchair generals" (myself included) think a counterattack by a combined Sixth Corps following Pickett's repulse would have broken the back of Lee's army, but Sedgwick may not have been the one to lead it, given his ambivalence and caution.

 

[jackt62]

Some current "armchair generals" (myself included) think a counterattack by a combined Sixth Corps following Pickett's repulse would have broken the back of Lee's army, but Sedgwick may not have been the one to lead it, given his ambivalence and caution.

So the issue here is whether Meade would have given the order to counterattack, which he declined to do based on his own cautious assessment of the state of the AotP, and perhaps his own need to wrap his hands fully around the army he had just inherited. But getting back to Sedgwick, and despite his ambivalence and caution, his professional competence and adherence to orders should have been enough to put his all in on such an effort. After all, Sedgwick carried out Sumner's ill-conceived order to assault through the East Woods at Antietam. Notwithstanding that debacle, perhaps a counterattack after Pickett's Charge had been deranged would have had more promise of success.

 

[jackt62]

Is there anything in Sedgwick's pre-Civil War experiences that would help to define his Civil War record?

Hard to point to anything in particular. Sedgwick followed a fairly common pattern of West Point education, Mexican War and western frontier service, which could be said of many of his colleagues who followed a similar path. I guess it all comes down to personality; he was known as a non-glory seeking and amiable bachelor who probably lacked the passionate drive of a Sheridan or Custer.