Engineer Operations during the Fredericksburg Campaign

[1SGDan]

I have been researching and documenting engineer operations in the army of the Potomac for nearly 17 years. I have a large collection of letters, diaries and reports from engineer soldiers. Using these I have been putting together a book (now running 345 pages) on the matter for some years, interrupted by three tours in Iraq and two in Afghanistan. I have a very comprehensive chapter on this subject concerning Engineer operations during the Fredericksburg Campaign. It runs about 40 pages. As I have no real plans to ever get the book published I would like present it in serial fashion as I have done many times in the past.

 

[1SGDan]

Prelude to Disaster-Part 1

As the mid-term elections neared and the Democrats gathered strength based on the largely poor showing of Federal forces in the east Lincoln desperately needed a true military success to firm up his weakening support. The failure of McClellan to put away a solid victory over a badly battered Army of Northern Virginia after Antietam caused him no small amount of frustration. He openly accused McClellan of having "the slows" for allowing Lee to disappear into the valley wounded but untamed. This perceived lethargy in the face of an escaping enemy found great disfavor from others in Washington. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton quickly grew tired of the lack of action and pressed President Lincoln to goad McClellan forward. McClellan, however could not be swayed to the advance. As the anticipated movement did not commence and McClellan demanded more and more supplies and reinforcements Halleck began pushing for his removal. The situation became so tense that in October a series of ever more critical correspondence began. In a private letter on October 13th the President upbraided the general for timidity by asking "Are you not over cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing?" On October 18th returns from the Army of the Potomac revealed that McClellan had 104,480 troops present for duty in the field but remained largely stationary. Losing his patience in an October 24th response to a McClellan complaint that his horses were fatigued Lincoln asked pardon "for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?" Defiantly McClellan simply refused to move until he felt fully prepared. With the political situation worsening the administration determined that desperate times called for desperate measures. Like it or not McClellan would have to be pushed into a cold weather campaign. Winter operations were considered a very risky endeavor for Civil War era armies. The dependency on beasts of burden for transportation when feed would be scarce made movement difficult. Additionally most roads were little more than unimproved single width tracks. The wagons and teams were ill equipped to deal with the slippery conditions created by snow, sleet, or ice. Unseasonably warm weather or rain could instantaneously and dangerously soften the roads. Under the constant pounding of the hooves of thousands of animals and the tread of regiments of troops the roads could be rendered useless as sunken mud pits that could swallow heavy equipment like artillery, wagons and pontoon boats. The whole scenario making the maintenance of supplies a tenuous proposition. Nevertheless, the administration was determined and finally pushed McClellan into action in late October.

Preparations for a move into Virginia began on October 24th. A bridge of 61 boats and one trestle span was begun across the Potomac at Berlin, Maryland by the Engineer Battalion and the 50th New York. On October 27th the volunteers departed Harper's Ferry leaving Co. G, under Captain Walker Personius, to care for the bridges and moved to Berlin a distance of some seven miles. They were met there by additional companies from Washington with bridging equipment and threw an additional 1100 foot span across the Potomac. Engineer R.B. Rose reported that completion of the bridge was complicated when the wagons carrying their overcoats and blankets turned over dumping them into the river. "We had to sleep without any blankets as they was all wet" and "you can bet we had a pretty hard time the next morning it was very cold." Despite the unpleasantness, the bridges were complete and the army began crossing into Virginia on October 28th. The Army spent two days crossing and then left the engineers behind. The engineers remained to tend for the bridges thinking they had been forgotten. While awaiting orders the time was spent drilling and filling the unit with new recruits. The additional men brought the 50th New York to strength and justified another slot for Major. That position was awarded to Captain Ira Spaulding.

 

[1SGDan]

Prelude to Disaster-Part 2
McClellan's move into the area around Warrenton heartened his supporters and at least momentarily silenced his critics. The call for "On to Richmond" was rejuvenated in the Northern press. The crossing of the Potomac presaged, at least in the eyes of the administration, an immediate battle with Confederate forces while the weather remained suitable. Once again Washington was disappointed. McClellan espoused a plan to secure his flanks by seizing the gaps in the Blue Ridge and then moving in the direction of Culpepper Court House, thereby interposing his army between Lee and his capital. Lee's army would then have to come out and give him battle at a place of his own choosing. Separated and on the move he could then be beaten in detail. But in typical McClellan fashion progress was slow. The Army of the Potomac reached Warrenton and stalled as McClellan gathered supplies, consolidated his forces and began the process of deploying them for the anticipated campaign. On November 3rd, the Engineer Battalion was ordered to join the Army. A five day march brought them "together with the bulk of the army, a mile beyond Warrenton, Va." From the 10th until their departure the time was spent maintaining proficiency with daily drill. An order allowing transfers to be accepted from volunteer troops and a vigorous recruiting effort quickly brought the battalion strength to nearly 500 men. A special drill period was also established for the training of the new recruits.

Despite and effort at secrecy Confederate cavalry had kept a close eye on the Union movements and Lee discerned the danger presented by McClellan's ploy. Two divisions of infantry, under Major General Henry Walker and Major General Lafayette McLaws emerged from the valley and by hard marching won the race to Culpepper. They were followed by three additional divisions commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet. McClellan's grand scheme was once again failed without even a fight. A search for a new plan was started. McClellan decided to shift operations further east. The area he selected, around Falmouth, Va., was on the north bank of the Rappahannock River and would give him direct access to the Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac Railroad and easy water borne supply from Aquia Creek and the other riverside supply depots on the Potomac just a short march away. Once established there he proposed to strike out towards Richmond forcing Lee to rush to the defense of the capital. Stretched out in this manner Lee could be defeated piecemeal. As a prelude to operations McClellan, realizing that the Rappahannock River would have to be crossed on November 6th he ordered his chief Engineer, Captain James C. Duane, to have the bridging material to be assembled for the revised campaign.

Unbeknownst to McClellan the Administration had had enough of delay. On November 5th, 1862 the continued lack of activity by the Army of the Potomac caused Lincoln to order McClellan relieved of command of the Army of the Potomac. On November 7th Brigadier General Catharinus Buckingham boarded a train with General Order 182 in hand. His responsibility was to deliver the order relieving McClellan of command after securing Major General Ambrose Burnside's acceptance of the command of the Army of the Potomac. After consultation with staff members Burnside reluctantly agreed to accept the position. McClellan departed the army for the last time a few days later. From there an impatient Cabinet would soon push Burnside into the ill-fated Fredericksburg Campaign.

 

[scooter748driver]

Thanks 1SGDan! I look forward to reading your posts on this very interesting subject and a critical part of the Fredericksburg campaign! I also thank you for seeking approval to post this information is serial format. I'm sure the information will be of great value to all here

 

[Woods-walker]

Thank you so much. I look forward to reading it.

 

[Specster]

Thank you...knee jerk reaction...I thought the problem with the river crossing was always attributed to Washington (poor or non - existant logistics for the pontoon bridge).

I will keep an eye out for your findings and conclusions

 

[1SGDan]

Burnside Takes Over

The new commander, a reluctant Ambrose Burnside, was immediately put under pressure to announce his plans by General in Chief Henry Halleck in afternoon telegram of the same day;

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, November 5, 1862. Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding, &c.:

GENERAL: Immediately on assuming command of the Army of the Potomac you will report the position of your troops and what you purpose doing with them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK,

Burnside submitted a plan that was not radically changed from the course of operations envisioned by the departed McClellan. Once established near Falmouth, he proposed to strike out towards Richmond forcing Lee to rush to the defense of the capital. Stretched out in this manner Burnside believed Lee could be defeated piecemeal. Halleck was doubtful but nevertheless avoided the decision making process by submitting the plan to President Lincoln for approval. An equally dubious President Lincoln, anxious for some action, reluctantly agreed to the proposed course of action. Halleck relayed the approval to Burnside in a telegram on November 14, 1862.

Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE, Commanding Army of the Potomac:
The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not.

H. W HALLECK

Burnside wasted no time moving his forces. By November 17th his vanguard (Sumner's Grand Division) entered Falmouth. The Army of the Potomac had managed to sneak a march on the unsuspecting Confederates. Work on the new supply system was begun and everything seemed to be in motion for a successful campaign … except one thing! The very thing that was expected to improve their supply situation now presented the greatest obstacle to their plans. The move east had taken the army away from the narrow fordable portion of the river and situated it where bridges would be needed to pass over the river. The means to bridge the river was critical and did not go unnoticed by Burnside. The Engineer Battalion, then at Warrenton with the bulk of the army, began its move from Warrenton on November 17th. Moving separately as not to slow the other forces the regular engineers made Catlett's Station that night. The end of the second day of the march found them securing their campsite with pickets as they continued to find themselves alone in unfamiliar territory. By the 20th they had passed through Stafford Court House and were camped two miles from Falmouth. Abutment sills for a bridge was started on the 24th but was abandoned when the other bridging assets failed to appear as expected. After a Thanksgiving that was celebrated "as well as possible" the camp was then moved adjacent to the General Headquarters of the army.

The army still lacked the required bridging material to begin. Burnside was frustrated as he had expected to see the Engineer Brigade bridges waiting for him as he occupied Falmouth. Preliminary orders for the Engineer Brigade to move their bridging material from Berlin, Maryland (opposite Harper's Ferry) by water to Washington had been previously issued by McClellan.

The orders read in part:

The commanding general directs that you will take such steps as you deem advisable to accomplish the following objects: Detail a competent officer and one company from your command to take charge of the pontoon bridges at Harper's Ferry. Send such additional boats and material to Harper's Ferry as may be necessary to secure the maintenance of these bridges and provide for contingencies Send the balance of your bridge material to Washington.

Proceed to Washington with the balance of your command and make up a pontoon train on wheels as speedily as possible, with the necessary transportation, and be prepared to march with the train at a moment's notice. Have the bridge at Berlin dismantled and sent to Washington as soon as practicable.

The pontoon issue was again raised at a November 12th meeting between Burnside and Halleck at Warrenton. Burnside reported that;

"In my interview with General Halleck I represented to him that soon after commencing the movement in the direction of Fredericksburg my telegraphic communication with Washington would be broken, and that I relied upon him to see that such parts of my plan as required action in Washington would be carried out. He told me that everything required by me would receive his attention and that he would at once order, by telegraph, the pontoon trains spoken of in my plan and would, upon his return to Washington, see that they were promptly forwarded."

 

[1SGDan]

Troubles Begin – Part 1

Burnside's hope for the rapid movement suggested by the President hinged on the arrival of these bridges. He followed up his request by having his Chief Engineer, Lieutenant C.B. Comstock, telegraph General Woodbury in Washington for the status of the bridges on the 14th.

"On November 6 Captain Spaulding was directed to move bridge material from Berlin to Washington and mount at once a complete bridge train in Washington. Is that train ready to move with horses and everything supplied? If not how long before it will be ready?"

Failing to get a response to the first telegram Comstock tried again

"In addition to the bridge train which Captain Spaulding has been previously directed to fit out in Washington, General Burnside desires to have one more complete train mounted and horsed as soon as possible and with the other sent with a company at least and Captain Spaulding in command by land to Fredericksburg, Va.; The eight tool wagons from Trowbridge to accompany the trains, Please address me how long before they will be ready and, on their starting, address me of that."

Although he needed "the prompt starting of pontoon from Washington" he was sorely disappointed in the response from the commander of the Engineer Brigade.

Lieutenant COMSTOCK:
I have received your two telegrams to-day. Captain Spaulding has arrived, and thirty-six pontoons have arrived. Forty more are expected in the morning. Captain Spaulding received Captain Duane's order of the 6th on the afternoon of the 12th. One pontoon train can be got ready to start on Sunday or Monday morning, November 16 or 17, depending somewhat upon the Quartermaster's Department. General Halleck is not inclined to send another train by land, but will allow it, probably, if General Burnside insists. A second train can be sent by water to Aquia Creek, and from thence transported by the teams which carry the first. D. P. WOODBURY, Brigadier-General

The troubles for the trains started from the very beginning. The original November 6th order to move pontoons was not received until the afternoon of 12 November. Fearing that the wire could be tapped or a courier seized the order had been sent by slow moving boat up the Baltimore and Ohio canal to Berlin, Maryland. The courier had received no special orders to speed the delivery of the message. At that time the bridge material at Berlin consisted of a "pontoon bridge over the Potomac at that place, one over the Potomac and one over the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, 56 boats in the canal ready for use, a land train of 20 boats and material mounted on wheels, and a large amount of land transportation." With the order now in hand the engineers at Berlin went to work. Captain Wesley Brainerd described the reaction;

"Like men made of steel we sprang to our work and before the sun cast its shadow across the Potomac our entire command was well under way and moving into the darkness in the direction of Washington."

By 6 p.m. the day they received the order 36 boats were headed down the canal to Washington. At 10:30 the next morning another 40 boats were sent and the wagons and teams started on a march. On the afternoon of the 13th Major Spaulding and a small staff departed by train to the capital leaving Captain James McDonald to supervise the disassembly of the 1100 foot bridge across the Potomac. Spaulding went immediately to meet with Woodbury who inexplicably ordered him to put all the material into depot. Spaulding thought nothing of the apparently contradictory orders. His original order was from McClellan's headquarters and now that Burnside was in command he assumed that the plan had been changed. He sent the boats into storage on the Anacostia River and the men into camp. By the 15th all the materials from Berlin were on hand but had been put into depot. Also on the 15th General Woodbury received orders from Halleck to have two trains prepared for movement to Falmouth. Inexcusably, this order was not issued to the engineers responsible until late in the day. Trains were prepared for two modes of travel. Spaulding would lead an overland train while Major James Magruder, of the 15th New York Engineers would lead a water borne train. The water train consisted of two rafts of 24 boats which were secured to the steamer Hero. The steamer with boats in tow departed on the 16th.

 

[1SGDan]

Troubles Begin – Part 2

The troubles immediately began to mount for the land train as Spaulding attempted to gather the necessary resources for the move. A requisition to the Quartermaster Department for the necessary animals and harnesses to haul the train created a serious problem. The engineers were issued 270 horses and 500 "greene, wild mules" to haul the wagons. To make matters worse all the harness materiel was delivered crated. Each crate had to be opened and the pieces sorted and pieced together and then fitted to the animals.

Woodbury was forced to inform Burnside of the delay.

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE, Washington, D. C., November 17, 1862—7 p. m. Lieutenant COMSTOCK, Engineer, General Burnside's Headquarters, Army of the Potomac: Major Spaulding has not been able to get off to-day. He expects to start at 10 a.m. to-morrow. I will telegraph when he leaves. H. W. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant-General

Unfortunately many of the animals had never been in harness before, and it was difficult to find leaders. The engineers, however, could not handle the unbroken and unruly animals. The entire day of the 18th was spent looking for teamsters as an engineer officer confessed, "our men knew little of the ways of the mule." Yet another unexpected delay was announced by Woodbury.

Lieutenant COMSTOCK, or, in his absence, CHIEF OF GENERAL BURNSIDE'S STAFF:
Major Spaulding has been delayed in obtaining harness, teamsters, &c., for 270 new horses. He expects to start to-night. D. P. WOODBURY, Brigadier- General of Volunteers.

Besides this labor, the bridge train had to be loaded, teamsters assigned, and rations and forage drawn. It was only by the most incessant labor that the train was prepared to move on the afternoon of the 19th. Late in the afternoon the 50th Engineers left Washington with a small escort from the 1st Maine Cavalry and:

20 Pontoon wagons with boats
40 Pontoon wagons empty
15 Chess wagons
4 Trestle wagons
4 Abutment wagons
4 Tool wagons
2 Traveling forges

No sooner had the monstrous train started its journey than the rain started. The travel became difficult with the heavy, cumbersome wagons as the rain and sleet continued to pour down. The narrow wheels bore considerable weight and sank easily into the muddy soil. The move slowed to a crawl making only eight miles the first day. The pace continued to decline until the train reached Occoquan Creek on the night of the 21st. Darkness and the badly swollen river postponed operations until daylight. On 22 November the engineers were forced to unpack a portion of the train to bridge the obstacle. A 289 foot span was thrown over the swollen creek. Once on the southern side of the creek they found the roads had "become unpassable to pontoon trains." When the "obstacles seemed to accumulate" beyond their ability to cope a decision was made to float the boats to Belle Plain while the empty wagons continued on. Major James McDonald was dispatched back to Alexandria to locate a steamer to act as a tow for the boats. The engineers at the Occoquan disassembled the bridge formed the boats into rafts and waited. When the steamer arrived they discovered that the river had fallen and a sand bar blocked the rafts from entering the river. They waited until 4 a.m. on the 24th when the tidal surge gave them enough water to make the connection with the waiting steamer. Spaulding then split his command. One half accompanied him and the rafted boats while Captain Wesley Brainerd continued on with the animals and the now empty wagons. Brainerd thought the move to river transportation "our salvation for had we started into the country beyond the Occoquan with our train as originally made up we would not have worked through in a fortnight." Spaulding arrived at Belle Plain late on the 24th only to find the water too shallow for the steamer to enter. A tug had to be arranged and the boats finally put ashore at sunset.

 

[1SGDan]

Troubles Continue

Burnside was furious no one had told him of the need for wagons at Belle Plain. Seeking to cast blame on someone for the delays he had Woodbury arrested. A victim of a clumsy command chain, slow communications, and sudden change of command Woodbury responded to his arrest with a November 24th letter of explanation concluding;

"I will state that I have never before been under arrest, and that I greatly regret the occurrence."

He was later released when Halleck admitted to Burnside that he "ought not to have trusted them in Washington for the details" of the engineers move. Ultimately Miegs, Halleck, Woodbury and Burnside all accepted their roles in the oversight.

The 15th Engineers accompanying the waterborne train had no better luck. The steamers, with boats in tow, ran aground and did not arrive at Aquia Creek until late in the afternoon of the 18th. The base was deserted and partially destroyed so the civilian engineers immediately began repairs while the 15th conducted a survey of the rail line. A new dock, that extended 1000 feet was built, shops and forges worked with "superhuman exertions" but still supplies for Burnside could only reach him in a trickle because the railroad and bridges had been destroyed. Two railroad bridges and the line were repaired and opened on 27 November. The plan as originally envisioned had the teams from the overland train being used to forward the pontoons on to Falmouth. Since that train had not yet arrived and no other plan made for their movement these boats were also delayed.

With the lighter wagons Brainerd managed 12 miles before stopping on the 23rd. Another 16 miles were made on the 24th. Another early start put them in Belle Plain on 25 November. Spaulding had arrived earlier but had no means to transport the boats the final distance without the wagons. Because no one had foreseen the difficulties with the weather there was nothing waiting for them to move on to Falmouth. After a brief rest the boats were loaded and trains assembled. They finally hustled onto Falmouth.

 

[Woods-walker]

Thank you so much for this great accounting. All I had ever heard was "there was a delay in the pontoon boat's arriving ". As Paul Harvey used to say "Now you know the rest of the story."

 

[1SGDan]

Thank you so much for this great accounting. All I had ever heard was "there was a delay in the pontoon boat's arriving ". As Paul Harvey used to say "Now you know the rest of the story."

We have a ways to go yet!

 

[1SGDan]

Harper's Ferry Detachment

While the bulk of the regiment struggled to get their bridging assets to Falmouth the detachment of the 50th New York (Co. G) located at Harper's Ferry attended to more leisurely pursuits. After travelling from Washington by train the detachment took up the bridge at Berlin, Maryland for shipment back to the capital. The disassembled bridge was loaded and escorted to the capital by Captain William Smalley and Company B. The remaining soldiers of Company G continued on to Harper's Ferry. Located at the important confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers the engineers were assigned to the maintenance of the two bridges there. A corporal's guard of six to eight men were always present to perform any necessary repairs to the bridges. Otherwise, the light duty left plenty of time to explore the city and local environs as well as using their skills to provide a more comfortable existence. Writing home on November 19th Engineer Charles Personius explained "we have been very busy building bunks to sleep on for the past two days and have not finished yet. Will finish in one day more if we get lumber enough." His brother, Captain Walker Personius, commander of Company G confirmed the ease of the assignment writing that they were "as comfortable as any troops could be in the best of barracks."

When not at work on the bridges or attending to their personal comfort the men found time to visit the points of obvious interest. The sites relating to John Brown's raid sparked much curiosity but other spots were not ignored. Personius reported that "last Sunday afternoon a lot of the boys, myself among them, went up the Potomac about two miles to take a peep into a cave." The episode left the explorers muddied but much amused. The duty at Harper's Ferry maintained the bridge guards and a regular drill schedule that was broken up on December 6th when the men were called out to fight a fire that broke out in town. Lieutenant William Folwell described their actions in this incident in his diary.

"Our first business was to tear down a small wooden building to prevent the spread of the fire….then we stripped the balconies from a large building next to that on fire and fought the fire till we saved it almost without damage."

After this brief excitement the men returned to their regular schedule.

 

[1SGDan]

The First Reconnaissance

With the pontoon trains finally arriving at Falmouth the emphasis of operations shifted to selecting the sites for the bridges. On November 26th Brigadier-General Woodbury gathered up Major Ira Spaulding and Captain Wesley Brainerd and set out on a reconnaissance of the river below Fredericksburg. Under the watchful eye of a ten man detail from the 4th United States Cavalry the small group of engineer officers and orderlies set out to find a suitable bridging location. Late in the afternoon the party arrived at the riverside side home of a Mr. Walker about ten miles below Falmouth. During the brief interview with the owner Woodbury asked the man if he enjoyed hunting ducks. Perplexed by the seemingly odd inquiry Brainerd, Spaulding and the rest of the patrol departed for a return to Falmouth. A few miles upriver Woodbury pulled Brainerd aside and instructed him to return to the house with six troopers and demand the man's boat, explaining that he must have one if he hunted ducks. Brainerd accepted the mission and started back downstream. The patrol arrived at Walker's residence at sunset and as Mrs. Walker prepared dinner Brainerd took Walker aside and asked for the boat. After some delay the man begrudgingly led Brainerd to his hidden boat. The tiny little craft was barely large enough to hold three men but Brainerd insisted on making the effort to scour the far bank. At 11 p.m. Brainerd left the family under guard and rowed across the river using makeshift oars with two escorts.

In his memoir of the war Brainerd reports that when they landed on the far shore he could plainly see men standing by a fire. Finding a covered spot on the bank to hide the boat Brainerd, revolver in hand, and one escort (the other man was left to guard the boat) advanced to investigate the proposed location. The site proved unacceptable as the tidal rush had swamped the landing area and the two men turned to go back. As they crept along a challenge was shouted out followed by the metallic click of a musket being prepared to fire. The pair froze in the darkness and waited but no further warnings were issued. After a seemingly lengthy time the two men slowly backed away and rejoined the third at the boat. They returned to the Walker House at 4 a.m. where they destroyed the boat to prevent Mr. Walker from using it to report their activities to the enemy, and then returned to camp. At 6 a.m. Brainerd issued his negative report to Woodbury who insisted that he go immediately to Burnside's headquarters to brief the general, giving him a pass that read;

Dear General, This is the Engineer Officer (Cpt. Brainerd) who visited the position within the enemy's lines last night. I send him to you as requested "at once." Woodbury

 

[Woods-walker]

The First Reconnaissance

With the pontoon trains finally arriving at Falmouth the emphasis of operations shifted to selecting the sites for the bridges. On November 26th Brigadier-General Woodbury gathered up Major Ira Spaulding and Captain Wesley Brainerd and set out on a reconnaissance of the river below Fredericksburg. Under the watchful eye of a ten man detail from the 4th United States Cavalry the small group of engineer officers and orderlies set out to find a suitable bridging location. Late in the afternoon the party arrived at the riverside side home of a Mr. Walker about ten miles below Falmouth. During the brief interview with the owner Woodbury asked the man if he enjoyed hunting ducks. Perplexed by the seemingly odd inquiry Brainerd, Spaulding and the rest of the patrol departed for a return to Falmouth. A few miles upriver Woodbury pulled Brainerd aside and instructed him to return to the house with six troopers and demand the man's boat, explaining that he must have one if he hunted ducks. Brainerd accepted the mission and started back downstream. The patrol arrived at Walker's residence at sunset and as Mrs. Walker prepared dinner Brainerd took Walker aside and asked for the boat. After some delay the man begrudgingly led Brainerd to his hidden boat. The tiny little craft was barely large enough to hold three men but Brainerd insisted on making the effort to scour the far bank. At 11 p.m. Brainerd left the family under guard and rowed across the river using makeshift oars with two escorts.

In his memoir of the war Brainerd reports that when they landed on the far shore he could plainly see men standing by a fire. Finding a covered spot on the bank to hide the boat Brainerd, revolver in hand, and one escort (the other man was left to guard the boat) advanced to investigate the proposed location. The site proved unacceptable as the tidal rush had swamped the landing area and the two men turned to go back. As they crept along a challenge was shouted out followed by the metallic click of a musket being prepared to fire. The pair froze in the darkness and waited but no further warnings were issued. After a seemingly lengthy time the two men slowly backed away and rejoined the third at the boat. They returned to the Walker House at 4 a.m. where they destroyed the boat to prevent Mr. Walker from using it to report their activities to the enemy, and then returned to camp. At 6 a.m. Brainerd issued his negative report to Woodbury who insisted that he go immediately to Burnside's headquarters to brief the general, giving him a pass that read;

Dear General, This is the Engineer Officer (Cpt. Brainerd) who visited the position within the enemy's lines last night. I send him to you as requested "at once." Woodbury

Seems to be senseless to have destroyed the small boat. The river at that point is still narrow enough to communicate across by speaking loudly. There were Southern picketts all along the shore line all the way to Port Royal- maybe as far as Tapphannock.
I am really enjoying your posts

 

[1SGDan]

Seems to be senseless to have destroyed the small boat. The river at that point is still narrow enough to communicate across by speaking loudly. There were Southern picketts all along the shore line all the way to Port Royal- maybe as far as Tapphannock.
I am really enjoying your posts

Operational Security (Opsec) seems to have demanded it.

 

[1SGDan]

The Second Reconnaissance

The exhausted Brainerd was fairly awestruck by his audience with the commander of the Army of the Potomac declaring him frank, generous, and unassuming. The news of failure to find a crossing point below the town was passed and the interview was done. Brainerd slept away the remainder of the day. But Burnside had not given up hope of finding a site at his preferred location. The following day Brainerd was ordered on another reconnaissance still further down the river. This expedition was well equipped with a "regular life boat" drawn on a camouflaged wagon pulled by a four mule team and escorted by nine troopers of the 4th United States Cavalry. The party was joined by Brigadier-General Woodbury (with staff members) and General Henry Hunt, chief of artillery.

The expedition arrived at Skinker's Neck in the early afternoon. According to Brainerd it was obvious by "casual glance" that this was the location they had been looking for. It was ideal for bridging operations. Once across, the area was commanded by high ground and the river could support the extra firepower of the gunboats downstream. A cross river trip was deemed necessary however to check the stability of the soil to handle the weight of the artillery pieces that would be crossing with the infantry. The threat of enemy pickets demanded that the reconnaissance be conducted under the cover of darkness so the men helped themselves to some sheep grazing nearby and had a fine dinner. The thick wool coats also made excellent oar wraps to muffle the sound of the rowing.

At 10 p.m. Brainerd and eight troopers manned the boat and pulled silently for the far shore. Two men were left to guard the boat while seven pistol wielding soldiers made their way quietly across the fields. After stumbling upon a pair of shanties and nearly giving themselves away to an unseen guard dog the men stopped outside one of the shacks where they heard voices inside. Fortunately, no one responded to the dogs warning growls and the men moved closer with the idea of snatching one of the residents as a guide. After waiting an hour for someone to emerge from the shack they gave up and proceeded on their own, pleased enough just not to be discovered. They found no enemy presence all the way to the main road about three quarters of a mile from the river. Satisfied that the roads could bear the required weight and that this was the ideal place to cross they returned the way they had come and by 6 a.m. were on their way back to headquarters.

 

[1SGDan]

The Third Reconnaissance

A second overnight trip to the area with General Hunt and staffers was enough to conclude that this was indeed the area for crossing. The return trip however was interrupted by the appearance of a mounted man trailing the patrol. Challenged by Brainerd the man provided identification and a protective pass from General Marsena Patrick, the Provost Marshal of the Army of the Potomac. The man was Dr. Taylor, a nearby home owner and noted rebel sympathizer, but under the protection of Patrick's pass he was allowed to continue on although Brainerd felt certain that they would be betrayed.

After examining other options Burnside selected the Skinker's Neck site for the crossing. He also arranged with Commodore Andrew Harwood for gunboats to cover the crossing. Four shallow draft boats started up the Rappahannock on December 4th and were harassed the entire distance by Confederate artillery. Unaware of the Navy's premature arrival or their brushes with the newly arrived enemy forces Burnside began movement to the site on December 5th. The column braved severe weather as they marched the 14 miles to the crossing. A countermarch was ordered on the 6th when news of the enemy consolidation in the area of the proposed crossing reached him. He wrote of the decision;

"I determined to make preparations to cross the river at Skinker's Neck, about 14 miles below Fredericksburg, and, if the movements of the enemy favored the crossing at that point, to avail myself of such preparations; otherwise, to adopt such a course as his movements rendered necessary. The ground at this point was favorable for crossing, but our preparations attracted the attention of the enemy, after which he made formidable arrangements to meet us at that place."

Was it the Navy's early arrival that focused the enemy's attention on Skinker's Neck? Or was it a report from the rider that Brainerd had confronted on his reconnaissance? Reports of the Confederate commanders give no indication of why that area was defended. Perhaps Lee, as an engineer, understood the possibilities of the area. Whatever the reason Burnside's primary plan was scrapped. Burnside, realizing he had lost the initiative became skeptical of success. Lee had concentrated his army across the river in excellent defensive positions but he was being pushed into the fight by Halleck who supposedly issued the edict "fight a battle NOW."

 

[Woods-walker]

Skinker's neck is directly down river from Moss neck. Moss neck was the winter camp for the Army of Northern Virginia's II Coprs - Thomas "Stonewall"Jackson. That's why they found the area so heavily defended.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

As I have no real plans to ever get the book published I would like present it in serial fashion as I have done many times in the past.

Have you looked into publication? If Savas Beatle thinks it's too niche what about whatever the Army equivalent to the US Naval Institute?