Edwin Vose Sumner

[67th Tigers]

Richardson's division was so far behind because of McClellan. Should Sumner have waited for McClellan to release Richardson? Everyone knew Sumner was anxious to engage. McClellan released him but held back Richardson. I blame McClellan more for that than Sumner.

Sumner's movement was delayed because he got lost. Sumner acknowledges receiving the order to move at 0720 hrs. However McClellan had indicated to Sumner that a dawn movement was planned. So what happened?

In another thread a while back I was able to examine the evidence, including a copy of Sumner's sons letter on the topic. It seems that Sumner went to Hooker's HQ (the Pry House) instead of McClellan's (the Newcomer House). McClellan slept in a bivouac amongst the regulars because his HQ wagons came under artillery fire whilst they were being set up and the junior officer in charge of them panicked and they rode off.

Sumner set his HQ up several miles away, next to the army main (not tactical) HQ at Keedysville. Sumner slept at the German Reformed Church in Keedyville, and rode over to the last place he'd heard from McClellan - Hooker's HQ at the Pry House.

My theory is that when Sumner arrived at the Pry House McClellan was 800 yds north on the high point where the signals station that communicated with Hooker was. I think as he rode south towards the Newcomer House (where he briefed most of his generals at 0700) he picked up Sumner as he passed the Pry House.

So Sumner was ordered to move probably before 0720, with two divisions. Richardson had been detached and was ordered to reattach to Sumner when relieved by Morell (which happened around 0900).

It's worth remembering that McClellan and Sumner both considered 12th Corps under Sumner. McClellan was ordering Sumner to concentrate 4 of his 5 divisions against the Dunker church.

There is a good article on AOTW exploring how the split between Sedgwick and French developed (Fred Ray has a similar one). Sumner, with Sedgwick went exactly where intended, but French went off course. Then Sumner sends his son with a peremptory order to "press the enemy" not knowing where French is, thinking he is much closer.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I agree with what you say but in one respect. At Antietam Sedgwick was separated from French by green troops of the 12th Corps. The Confederates counter attacked at the right time and place. The rookies were routed and Sedgwick too for the most part. French was hit on Max Weber's flank but was able to hold it's ground.
These green rookies should have been replaced by Sedgwick. I wonder if this isn't the misunderstandings spoken off during the battle.

Yes, that is how I understand it too. I believe the 125th Pennsylvania was near the Dunker Church. I believe Sumner intended Sedgwick's division to come in on the 125th's right, with French filling in to the left. I've always thought that the misunderstanding was that French mistook the 125th Pennsylvania for part of Sedgwick's division.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Sumner's movement was delayed because he got lost. Sumner acknowledges receiving the order to move at 0720 hrs. However McClellan had indicated to Sumner that a dawn movement was planned. So what happened?

In another thread a while back I was able to examine the evidence, including a copy of Sumner's sons letter on the topic. It seems that Sumner went to Hooker's HQ (the Pry House) instead of McClellan's (the Newcomer House). McClellan slept in a bivouac amongst the regulars because his HQ wagons came under artillery fire whilst they were being set up and the junior officer in charge of them panicked and they rode off.

Sumner set his HQ up several miles away, next to the army main (not tactical) HQ at Keedysville. Sumner slept at the German Reformed Church in Keedyville, and rode over to the last place he'd heard from McClellan - Hooker's HQ at the Pry House.

My theory is that when Sumner arrived at the Pry House McClellan was 800 yds north on the high point where the signals station that communicated with Hooker was. I think as he rode south towards the Newcomer House (where he briefed most of his generals at 0700) he picked up Sumner as he passed the Pry House.

So Sumner was ordered to move probably before 0720, with two divisions. Richardson had been detached and was ordered to reattach to Sumner when relieved by Morell (which happened around 0900).

It's worth remembering that McClellan and Sumner both considered 12th Corps under Sumner. McClellan was ordering Sumner to concentrate 4 of his 5 divisions against the Dunker church.

There is a good article on AOTW exploring how the split between Sedgwick and French developed (Fred Ray has a similar one). Sumner, with Sedgwick went exactly where intended, but French went off course. Then Sumner sends his son with a peremptory order to "press the enemy" not knowing where French is, thinking he is much closer.

Thank you for the resources, they are certainly informative. I particularly liked the article by Fred Ray. I only really began taking a serious look at this part of the battle after my recent trip to Antietam in April. I am still trying to wrap my head around it. I'm sure that will take awhile.

Sumner is someone I've gained an appreciation for over the past few months. I don't believe he was a great general, but he was a solid commander. Personally, I don't think he was necessarily out of place with Sedgwick's division. I believe it is possible that he would have gone back to direct French's division after he had Sedgwick's placed to his satisfaction, but events overtook him. I would blame him for not utilizing his staff better. It seems that a staff officer could have handled the job of making sure French marched to the right place.

Speaking of French, this was his first battle as a division commander, and the bulk of his division were rookies. It's hard to find any instance during the war where French did well. Going against what I said above, it would make some sense for the corps commander to accompany a rookie division commander rather than a trusted, reliable subordinate like Sedgwick, to ensure that the rookie could handle his job. For better or worse, one of Sumner's leading characteristics was to lead from the front and to be in the middle of the action.

 

[Yankeedave]

Yes, that is how I understand it too. I believe the 125th Pennsylvania was near the Dunker Church. I believe Sumner intended Sedgwick's division to come in on the 125th's right, with French filling in to the left. I've always thought that the misunderstanding was that French mistook the 125th Pennsylvania for part of Sedgwick's division.

Being a new regiment it was almost as big as a brigade. I can see the confusion. lol.

 

[67th Tigers]

FWIW: Chapter 6 of Bradley Graham's "The Antietam Effect" (prev. posted) is an examination of Sumner's decision making process. Sumner had no military education, but was a direct Commission. He thus used inductive rather than deductive reasoning - that is he relied entirely on experience and drawing parallels to previous situations rather than a deep understanding of why. As Sumner reached the scene of action at the head of Sedgwick's division he met Williams, the senior officer on the ground. Williams advised Sumner that the rebels were bringing up reinforcements into the West Woods and that if Sumner advanced. Sumner ignored him - he'd been in this situation before...

That was six years earlier at Ottawa Creek. At the head of 50 troopers of the 1st US Cavalry Sumner charged John Brown's wooded camp in the same formation as he charged the West Woods. Brown's radical militia fled before him. On the Chickahominy a few months earlier he'd done much the same, charging into the woods to reinforce Heintzleman and Keyes. Here he got hit in the flank, unlike the last couple of times, and the formation fell apart.

Worth a read.

 

[Yankeedave]

With the flight of the rookies of the 12th and the veteran Sedgwick there are few troops left on the Union right beyond Hooker's troops reforming.
Smith's division of the 6th Corps led by Hancock and his brigade secured the east woods. Irwin's brigade counter attacked s.w. to secure Dunker Church. The 12th Corps withdrew.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Being a new regiment it was almost as big as a brigade. I can see the confusion. lol.

Tyndale's (5th, 7th, 66th Ohio & 28th Pennsylvania) & Stainrook's ( 3rd Maryland, 102nd NY, 111th Pennsylvania) brigades of Greene's division was also in the area -- near the high ground where the visitor's center is currently located -- as Sedgwick's division approached the battlefield. The two brigades had driven D. Hi. Hill's brigades from the Cornfield (between 8:30 & 8:45, approximately the same time that Sumner, with Sedgwick's division, was approaching the East Woods).

According to Ezra Carmen in describing this action, "The fighting in the northeast corner of the corn was now fast and furious and hand to hand, bayonets were used by those who had them, and those who had not used clubbed guns; the 6th Georgia holding the right of the line was almost wiped out of existence, the rest of the brigade was suffering severely, the left wing of the 28th Pennsylvania was swinging up in its rear and it broke and went back leaving many prisoners in the hands of its enemy, and an appalling number of dead and wounded on field, with the victors in close pursuit. When Garland's men stampeded and D. H. Hill ordered Colquitt's and Ripley's men to withdraw and rode to the left to conduct the movement, he succeeded in getting the left of Ripley's started for the Dunkard Church, in good order, but the 3rd North Carolina and part of the First were involved in Colquitt's disaster.... Effort was made to stay the precipitate retreat, and make headway against the enemy, but it was unavailing and the North Carolinians retreated to woods around the Dunkard Church. While the 5th Ohio and right wing of the 28th Pennsylvania went through the woods and into the corn, sweeping everything before them, the left wing of the 28th Pennsylvania and the 111th, on its left, did not make such rapid progress, for the 4th Alabama and the 5th Texas were falling back but a short distance, made a stand and poured in such an annoying fire on the flank of the line, that it was momentarily checked. A short and sharp contest ensued, a half wheel made to the left, Robbins and his men were driven farther toward the southern part of the woods, when they came under the fire of the 3rd Maryland and 102nd New York, and the Pennsylvanians going forward came out of the East Woods and into the open ground south of the corn, as the three Ohio regiments and the right wing of the 28th Pennsylvania broke Colquitt's line and started in pursuit. The brigade was now united, the 111th Pennsylvania still on its left, and advanced; Colquitt's men made a stand at several points to resist them, Moody's two guns, which were near the south edge of the corn, when the break came, fell back sullenly, going into position two or three times and opening full in the face and on the flank of their pursuers; Colquitt made several efforts to rally his men along the fences of the Smoketown road, but was not successful, and the three Ohio regiments crossing the Smoketown Road about midway from the Mumma lane to the Dunkard Church, under a severe artillery fire, took shelter in the low ground between the Mumma house and the Dunkard Church. The 28th and 111th Pennsylvania crossed the Smoketown road between the woods and the Mumma lane, captured the two guns of Woolfolk's Battery, that had fired but two shots and then been abandoned, and, crossing Mumma's lane, joined the Ohio regiments. Here they awaited ammunition, and the 3rd Maryland and 102nd New York came up and formed on their left. While the 28th Pennsylvania was deploying north of the Smoketown road, preparatory to its advance into the East Woods, Stainrook's Brigade was marching on its left to deploy south of the road. After crossing the road the 111th Pennsylvania deployed in good shape, advanced firing, its right on the road, came up to and went forward with the 28th Pennsylvania, but the 3rd Maryland and 102nd New York, on the left, after crossing the road and being ordered to deploy under fire became intermingled and confused. The right of the 102nd New York was run into by the 3rd Maryland, its left came under a severe skirmish fire from the woods and gave back, for a time disorder reigned supreme, but some of the officers sprang to the front, the men were rallied and, on a run, with the 3rd Maryland on its right, the regiment went over the fence and dashed into the East Woods, taking Texans, Georgians, and Alabamians prisoners. The 5th Texas escaped by going down the Smoketown road before the Ohio men reached it; Robbins, with the remnant of the 4th Alabama, went south, beyond the Mumma buildings, and thence to the Dunkard Church, where Stonewall Jackson, D. H. Hill, Hood and others were endeavoring to rally the broken lines to dispute the possession of the woods about the church. After passing through the East Woods the 102nd New York and 3rd Maryland crossed the plowed field, until nearing Mumma's the Maryland regiment moved to the right and joined the 111th Pennsylvania, while the 102nd New York, passing to the left of the burning barn, halted near the burning house, from which a greater part of the men, filled with the ardor of pursuit, followed the retreating enemy to the north fence of Mumma's cornfield and began to tear down the fence, some went into the corn, but the great body of them halted at the fence and opened fire on Patterson's Georgia battery, to the right and front, about 30 yards beyond the corn, playing energetically on the right of Greene's Division line. The battery was soon silenced and driven beyond the Hagerstown road, and the regiment, crossing Mumma's lane, took position on the left of its brigade.

All Confederate forces north of the Sunken Road had been driven west of the Hagerstown Pike. The 125th Pennsylvania was to Tyndale's right and advanced across the Hagerstown Pike to take a position near the Dunker Church. According to Carmen:

"Very soon after the 125th Pennsylvania had assisted Monroe's Battery to cross the Smoketown road, and while lying down in the field, about 350 yards from the Hagerstown road, awaiting orders, Captain E. L. Witman of Crawford's staff rode up with Crawford's order to advance into the West Woods and hold them at all hazards. Why such an order was given to this one regiment, when the entire line was awaiting Sumner's preparations, is not known; it was directed by neither Sumner nor Williams, but it was instantly obeyed. The men sprang to their feet and went forward, double quick, driving before them a few Texans and Georgians, crossed the Hagerstown road at 9 o'clock and halted in the edge of the West Woods, just north of the Dunkard Church. There was very little opposition to this advance, the Confederates, who were on the road in the immediate front, disappearing in the woods beyond the church, some of them to the south, below the church, where, as we have seen, they remained to the great annoyance of Monroe's Battery....

"When the 125th Pennsylvania had crossed the Hagerstown road Captain John McKeage was ordered to deploy his company as skirmishers and advance cautiously to a ridge in front, and company B was formed, facing south, about 20 yards north of the church, its left opposite the northwest corner of it. The regiment then advanced about 20 yards and halted. As soon as Colonel Higgins entered the woods he saw that he was without support in rear and on his right; he was aware that an enemy was on his right front, and gave his horse to one of his officers, with instructions to ride back to Crawford, inform him of the situation, and ask for support, as, without it, he would be unable to hold his position, and that the enemy would certainly flank him and cut him off, as he was far in advance of the corps. The regiment then advanced and halted on the crest of a ridge about 120 yards from the road, its left west of and about 20 yards to the right of the church, its right beyond a ravine, which, about 200 yards north of the church, crosses the Hagerstown road and runs west through the woods. The line was nearly parallel to the Hagerstown road. Captain McKeage, who had halted his skirmishers on the ridge, was now ordered to advance and see what was in front. With little or no opposition the skirmishers went to within 20 yards of the west edge of the West Woods, where fire was opened upon them by the 49th Virginia of Early's Brigade, from a ravine on the right, and Early, gaining the open ground in their front, advanced firing, the Pennsylvanians falling back, firing. While at the front they saw not only Early's men, but some troops—George T. Anderson's—advancing on their left from the direction of Sharpsburg, and from them, also, they received fire, which was returned."

This was the situation as Sedgwick's division reached the field.

(Photo from http://walkingthewestwoods.blogspot.com/2012/11/?m=1)

 

[Yankeedave]

Can you imagine. Green troops fighting it's first fight with imperfect knowledge of their weapons fighting jackson's veteran troops in the woods on a battlefield whose name ranks amongst the nations epic fights. I'm running just from the description.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Can you imagine. Green troops fighting it's first fight with imperfect knowledge of their weapons fighting jackson's veteran troops in the woods on a battlefield whose name ranks amongst the nations epic fights. I'm running just from the description.

Yes, hard to believe. I'm sure somebody has done a numerical study of it, but a good chunk of the 12th corps & most of French's division were completely green. Some units had not even had time to drill properly. The Army of the Potomac may have outnumbered Lee's army by a significant margin, bit if you count 2 veteran soldiers as worth the same as 1 raw recruit, the odds are much closer to even.

 

[Yankeedave]

Sears does a count. He figures 65,000 w 5,000 being raw. It may not be this low but i think it's close to the truth.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Just downloaded a book of essays from Amazon about the Antietam campaign. Here is what D. Scott Hartwig says:

"Green troops innocent of the training and discipline vital to perform effectively on a battlefield made up nearly one-quarter of McClellan's infantry."

Here is his conclusion:

"Apart from their generally good performance in the fighting at the Sunken Lane, McClellan's green regiments had been little more than cannon and musketry fodder on September 17. Thirteen brand new regiments had been committed to battle. They lost 1,737 killed, wounded, and missing (most of them killed or wounded), or 14 percent of the army's entire loss at Antietam.

Here is a modified table by Hartwig:

GREEN REGIMENTS ENGAGED AT ANTIETAM
Regiment Corps Strength Killed Wounded Missing Total

132nd Pa. 2nd 985 30k 114w 8m 152 total

14th Conn. 2nd 957 20k 41w 48m 156total

108th N.Y. 2nd 952 26k 122w 47m 195total

130th Pa. 2nd 1,005 32k 146w 178total

17th Mich. 9th 966 18k 89w 107 total

9th N.H. 9th 964 10k 49w 59total

35th Mass. 9th 1,018 48k 160w 6m 214total

16th Conn. 9th 949 42k 143w 185 total

124th Pa. 12th 974 5k 42w 17m 64total

125th Pa. 12th 963 28k 115w 2m 145total

128th Pa. 12th 950 24k 86w 6m 118total

13th N.J. 12th 899 7k 75w 19m 101total

107th N.Y. 12th 1,031 7k 51w 5m 63 total

Source: OR, ser. 3, 3: 204–5, 760–79.

Strength is regiment's muster-in strength. All carried fewer men into action on September 17; therefore, the percentage loss would be higher in each case.

See https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0807858943/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I should have added that the total strength of the rookie regiments adds up to 12,613.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

A question for your consideration: What would have been the results of the battle had Sumner, instead of being at the head of the column with Sedgwick's Division, been further to the rear and in a position to direct French and Richardson toward the West Woods instead of those commands diverting toward the Sunken Road?

The more I have read & thought about it, the more I have come to the conclusion that Sumner should have been at the front as his corps approached the field -- at least initially. Here are my reasons:

1. The 2nd Corps was marching into a unknown and fluid situation. No one at headquarters had a clear idea of what was happening at the front. Neither did Sumner nor his commanders.

2. The two commanders on the field, Hooker & Mansfield, were out of action. Sumner did meet Hooker being carried from the field, but what he learned from Hooker is unclear. Hooker certainly couldn't show him anything.

3. The 1st Corps was more or less out of the fight. Sumner did have some communication with Williams of the 12th Corps. Williams was critical of Sumner. However, the 12th Corps was spread all over the place and Williams did not have command and control over the field at that time.

4. Sumner had to see for himself what the situation was before committing his troops and deciding how to continue the attack.

5. Once he determined the situation and how to proceed, he may have intended do go back to direct French. If that was his intention (there is no way to know), events overtook him as the Confederate counterattack in the West Woods erupted very quickly. Sumner was forced to try to extricate his lead division instead.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I have been reading Disaster in the West Woods which is the most concise account I have found regarding Sumner's decisions at Antietam. It is in reality a condensed version of Unfurl Those Colors but is focused exclusively on the West Woods.

Here is what Armstrong has to say (p. 43): "What impressed Sumner most, however, and what would become the basis of his decision regarding Sedgwick, was the Federal situation on the right flank of the army. He could see and later learned that Hooker's I Corps was used up and effectively out of the fight, and the XII Corps had reached, at least for the time being, the acme of it's advance. But that advance represented a significant Federal tactical advantage, for it advanced the Federal right wing to within a mile of Sharpsburg and gave the Federals possession of the high plateau north of the town which could be used as a platform for a continuation of the attack. He could not abandon this accomplishment any more than he could abandon the army commander's plan of battle. The one flaw in the tactical situation that Sumner could discern was the gap in the Federal lines between the Federal troops around the Dunker Church and those in the vicinity of the northern end of the West Woods. This interval, which essentially encompassed the West Woods, was extremely dangerous since it gave the Confederates a concealed avenue of approach into the Federal rear. The gap had to be plugged with troops, and it had to be plugged immediately. Sumner utilized Sedgwick's division, the only available body of troops capable of accomplishing the task."

 

[ErnieMac]

I don't fault Sumner for being at the front. It was not an uncommon occurrence for corps commanders to be at or near the front, and on more than a few occasions resulted in their death or wounding. There is also no doubt Sumner performed courageously in the West Woods. My point is that the corps commander was responsible for all the divisions in his corps and IMO Sumner missed an opportunity because he failed to keep track of his other divisions while watching over Sedgwick's. Sumner did not have to personally be present, he had a staff which could perform those duties. French and Richardson were left to their own devices, and fulfilled their orders to the best of their abilities. The problem was Sumner didn't know where they were and exercised no command over them. Nor, so far as I can see, does he appear to have exercised any control of the Twelfth Corps, which had been placed under his command.

 

[Mr. King]

You can say whatever you want about him, but you cannot take away from the fact that he looks more like a hard fighting general more than just about any other in his army. That stern look of indifference on his face... The glassy eyes and his sharp, direct nose... He bears the same expression that I imagine Leonadis I bore prior to the Battle of Thermopylae.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I don't fault Sumner for being at the front. It was not an uncommon occurrence for corps commanders to be at or near the front, and on more than a few occasions resulted in their death or wounding. There is also no doubt Sumner performed courageously in the West Woods. My point is that the corps commander was responsible for all the divisions in his corps and IMO Sumner missed an opportunity because he failed to keep track of his other divisions while watching over Sedgwick's. Sumner did not have to personally be present, he had a staff which could perform those duties. French and Richardson were left to their own devices, and fulfilled their orders to the best of their abilities. The problem was Sumner didn't know where they were and exercised no command over them. Nor, so far as I can see, does he appear to have exercised any control of the Twelfth Corps, which had been placed under his command.

I don't disagree with you there. It seems he didn't use his staff effectively, but then I have a feeling that at that stage of the war very few commanders did.

I still am unclear on how much of the issue with French was Sumner's fault, and how much was French's. French crossed the Ford immediately after Sedgwick I believe. How did he fall so far behind? Having said that, it would have made sense for Sumner to detail a staff officer to guide French to the desired position.

Who were Sumner's staff? I know his son was one. Other than that I don't know. And is there any idea of what they were doing during the battle? I know Armstrong writes about it some.

It is interesting that not only did Sumner lose track of French's division following Sedgwick, but Sumner/Sedgwick momentarily lost track of Dana & Howard who were following Gorman.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

You can say whatever you want about him, but you cannot take away from the fact that he looks more like a hard fighting general more than just about any other in his army. That stern look of indifference on his face... The glassy eyes and his sharp, direct nose... He bears the same expression that I imagine Leonadis I bore prior to the Battle of Thermopylae.

There was a saying in the army something to the effect that if McClellan was at the front, expect a day off, but if Sumner was at the front expect to fight.

 

[ErnieMac]

I don't disagree with you there. It seems he didn't use his staff effectively, but then I have a feeling that at that stage of the war very few commanders did.

I still am unclear on how much of the issue with French was Sumner's fault, and how much was French's. French crossed the Ford immediately after Sedgwick I believe. How did he fall so far behind? Having said that, it would have made sense for Sumner to detail a staff officer to guide French to the desired position.

Who were Sumner's staff? I know his son was one. Other than that I don't know. And is there any idea of what they were doing during the battle? I know Armstrong writes about it some.

It is interesting that not only did Sumner lose track of French's division following Sedgwick, but Sumner/Sedgwick momentarily lost track of Dana & Howard who were following Gorman.

I've attached one of the Antietam Battlefield Board's maps showing troop positions at about the time Jackson and McLaws were slamming into Sedgwick's left flank and French was moving into position along the Sunken Road. IMO this gives indications of what happened with the Second Corps attack. Sedgwick's Division (with Sumner) is to the left (west) of the Hagerstown Pike and above the Dunker Church. The church is represented by the black dot below the 34th NY and 72nd PA regiments. To the right (east) of the Hagerstown Pike and slightly above (north) of Sedgwick is Williams Twelfth Corps division which had been withdrawn to replenish ammunition as Sedgwick advanced. Below Williams and behind (east) of Sedgwick's left (south) flank is Greene's Twelfth Corps division which maintained its position thru the debacle. The three brigades (Weber, Morris & Kimball) of French's Second Corps division is shown east and south of Greene and about to engage Confederates along the Sunken Road. Richardson's division does not appear on the map.

It seems likely French was ordered to advance on Sedgwick's left. Sumner's report does not say that, but French makes it a point to state "When my left flank had cleared the ford a mile, the division faced to the left, forming three lines of battle adjacent to and contiguous with Sedgwick's, and immediately moved to the front." One of his brigade commanders, Brigadier General Nathan Kimball also mentions forming on the left of Sedgwick. Neither were correct, they were adjacent to Greene's Division. Whatever fault is to be assigned IMO should be shared between Sumner and French, Sumner for not keep track of two thirds of his command and French for not being aware of the troops on his flank. While Sumner never directly criticized French, I think the fact that he praised his division commanders Sedgwick and Richardson and Twelfth Corps commander Williams, but did not mention French explains what he thought.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Great map! I'm familiar with Cope maps. Can you find them online?

I agree with what you are saying. Certainly Sumner bears some responsibility as he was in charge. It would be interesting to know more about French that day. "Old Blinky" does not have a very good reputation, although most of his really bad days were still ahead of him.

Ethan Rafuse writes that had Sumner/Sedgwick arrived at the West Woods 15 minutes earlier or 15 minutes later, the disaster would not have happened. I'm not sure if that's going too far, but it is true that Sedgwick's division entered the West Woods at absolutely the worst time. I'm not sure anyone is to blame for that, I tend to believe it was unfortunate timing. However, I still contend that if Sumner/Sedgwick had entered the West Woods and not come under almost an immediate attack, Sumner would have kept better control over French's division. He was a hands on commander. Once Sedgwick's line was securely established, I believe he would have ridden back to French.