Economic Warfare

[wausaubob]

Commander Schuck's summary: https://www.usni.org/magazines/nava...ber/economic-warfare-union-blockade-civil-war
The structure of the Confederate economy was as he described, with a few additional details.
The economy of the western Confederate states was heavily dependent on New Orleans. New Orleans was partly dependent on Texas beef and on down river traffic from the Midwest. New Orleans was in trouble as soon as traffic was blocked on the Mississippi River and sailing vessels stopped testing the US blockade.
The state of Kentucky was already linked to Cincinnati and Chicago. Tennessee also depended on trade with Cincinnati. From Cincinnati pork, and pork by products, candles and soap were distributed.
The cotton areas of the deep south were already dependent on Kentucky and Tennessee for mules and horses. The southern states concentrated on cotton. They had a huge comparative advantage in cotton over the entire world. Everything else could be purchased elsewhere.
Its also the case that Cincinnati was a national leader in the mass production of wagons. Wagons were the jeeps and trucks of 1861.
Commander Schuck said it a different way. But an export/import economy like the potential Confederacy is dependent on competition among its outside vendors. If the blockade ends that competition the blockaded nation is likely to face ruinous prices and shortages at the same time.
Rifles are compact items with a high value per lb. The Confederate could afford to bring in rifles in exchange for the cotton that could get out.
The Confederacy was going to have problems with marine steam engines, locomotive equipment, 50,000 tons of rails annually, but also wagons, mules and horses.
When the US opportunistically broke through on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers it was like poking a hole in a bucket of water.

 

[wausaubob]

Schuck's brief article points out the US blockade had three essential tasks. It had to be respected well enough in New York City that direct traffic between New York and the new Confederacy did not occur. Indirect traffic, through various contrivances could not be stopped. As soon as indirect traffic becomes a substitute for direct shipments, costs go up and credit availability goes down.
If the US first blockades, then captures New Orleans, the economies of the four Confederate southwest states are already partly cut off from the rest of the Confederacy.
The US then has to maintain control of the Ohio and Missouri Rivers and extend control southward on the Mississippi River as soon as possible. If the US controls these rivers, the Confederacy is going to rely on railroads and as Schuck pointed out, the southern railroads did not have the double tracks, the sidings, the telegraph operators and the engine rebuild shops, to perform in that role.
But the US achieved more than that. Using combined arms operations, the US cracked the Confederate defensive line in the west, gained control of Nashville and Memphis. After that the Confederacy was going to have to win the war with the resources gathered during the initial mobilization. The war of attrition began in earnest when the US occupied Memphis in June of 1862.

 

[atlantis]

Schuck's brief article points out the US blockade had three essential tasks. It had to be respected well enough in New York City that direct traffic between New York and the new Confederacy did not occur. Indirect traffic, through various contrivances could not be stopped. As soon as indirect traffic becomes a substitute for direct shipments, costs go up and credit availability goes down.
If the US first blockades, then captures New Orleans, the economies of the four Confederate southwest states are already partly cut off from the rest of the Confederacy.
The US then has to maintain control of the Ohio and Missouri Rivers and extend control southward on the Mississippi River as soon as possible. If the US controls these rivers, the Confederacy is going to rely on railroads and as Schuck pointed out, the southern railroads did not have the double tracks, the sidings, the telegraph operators and the engine rebuild shops, to perform in that role.
But the US achieved more than that. Using combined arms operations, the US cracked the Confederate defensive line in the west, gained control of Nashville and Memphis. After that the Confederacy was going to have to win the war with the resources gathered during the initial mobilization. The war of attrition began in earnest when the US occupied Memphis in June of 1862.

Would a federal order closing southern ports not be sounder as declaring a blockade could be interpreted as acknowledgement of confederate independence.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Would a federal order closing southern ports not be sounder as declaring a blockade could be interpreted as acknowledgement of confederate independence.

Sir, please see https://civilwartalk.com/threads/blockade-vs-closed-ports.195961/

HTHs,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

Would a federal order closing southern ports not be sounder as declaring a blockade could be interpreted as acknowledgement of confederate independence.

The whole war was fought in the field under the theory that the Confederacy was a foreign belligerent. Captured soldiers were not treated as traitors and captured sailors, including those taken on blockade smugglers, were treated as prisoners, not pirates. This significantly avoided a war of reprisals and retaliation, which was a gain for both sides, but in the end a huge gain for the US.

 

[atlantis]

The whole war was fought in the field under the theory that the Confederacy was a foreign belligerent. Captured soldiers were not treated as traitors and captured sailors, including those taken on blockade smugglers, were treated as prisoners, not pirates. This significantly avoided a war of reprisals and retaliation, which was a gain for both sides, but in the end a huge gain for the US.

Do you think the blockade was undermined by the trade that continued between confederate territory and union territory.
I also wonder if the confederate blockade running effort could have produced better results.

 

[wausaubob]

Do you think the blockade was undermined by the trade that continued between confederate territory and union territory.
I also wonder if the confederate blockade running effort could have produced better results.

I think it likely that there was considerable trade from NYC to Canada to Bermuda and then into the Confederacy.
But at what credit terms and at what prices?
Counting ships creates a rhetorical claim, but what was the tonnage and what was the cost? Only Surdam attempted to answer the question, and he worked on the export numbers. Approximately 1/9th of the pre war amount of shipments of cotton made it to the northern US or to Liverpool. And some of that was permitted trade at Memphis, New Orleans and Norfolk.
Sealing off the Confederacy was not possible until very near the end of the war. Bankrupting an export based economy like the Confederacy was not difficult.

 

[leftyhunter]

Do you think the blockade was undermined by the trade that continued between confederate territory and union territory.
I also wonder if the confederate blockade running effort could have produced better results.

Lancashire Cotton Famine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There was nothing the Confederacy could do to aid blockade running. No nation sent it's Navy to escort it's cargo vessels to Confederate ports. In order to economically export cotton big heavy slow ships are needed not small fast ship that if captured result in the ship and it's cargo being taken to a prize court.
Leftyhunter

 

[Lubliner]

Mexico should be considered in this discussion not only by sea but also border crossings. Diplomacy there was not off the rails, so to speak. I think it was 1964 when the Union discovered profiteering from their own ranks.
Lubliner.