Does Burnside get an unfair rap?

[CSA Today]

Valid succinct points all. I tend to agree, but would point out that even if one were capable of spontaneously responding to the need to adapt tactics, there was always the problem with communication of orders.
Stonewall seems to have had his own problems with command and control, especially when he was charged with carrying out time-sensitive instructions.
Few field officers were able to successfully transition from brigade to division, much less overall command.
Both Burnside and Hooker are excellent examples of officers overwhelmed by this challenge.
As good as even Lee was, he had his experience of Gettysburg. His strategic position was based on defense and anticipation of the tactical movements of his opponents was like that of a chess master.

John B. Hood would be another example of good to excellent at one level of leadership to bloody dreadful at a higher level.

 

[Greg Taylor]

Yeah... when things went according to plan, he seems to have done fine. The trouble is that things seldom go exactly according to plan.

To be succulent, in battle things NEVER go exactly to plan and improvisation starts with the very first shot. That is the problem with Burnside. He was a very bad improviser. To make matters worse he was very poor at adapting to changes in the plan made before the first shot, such as at the Crater and at Fredricksburg to name the most egregious examples.

 

[Lost Cause]

Yes, like I mentioned earlier, I think his biggest problem was his inability to adapt to changing conditions. His initial plan at Fredericksburg was sound, and his initial plan at the Crater showed some ingenuity. But once the situation changed he became flustered and could come up with no alternative plan other than to feed more and more men into the meat grinder.

I am in agreement. Another example of this is Burnside's attack on the Rohrbach "Burnside's" Bridge during the battle of Sharpsburg. He certainly did not establish a better crossing and continued to feed the "meat grinder." I previously mentioned with the NC Expedition because he did have success at times.

 

[Jamieva]

von Moltke "no plan survives contact with the enemy"

 

[Rob9641]

[QUOTE="CTH, post: 1129967, member: 10640"... trying to cross that bridge at Antietam when he could easliy have crossed another location with less effort and loss of life[/QUOTE]

Not so, not for a military crossing. Antietam Creek had (and has) steep banks and a muddy bottom, except at a few fording locations where the bottom is more solid rock and the banks not so steep. The AOP engineers said there was a ford just south of the bridge and Rodman was sent to it, but it was not where he was told it was. His men had to keep whacking their way through woods and brush down to Snaveley's Ford, much farther south.

There was nowhere near the bridge to cross men and artillery. A squad from the 11th Conn. tried to wade across next to the bridge and were killed, to a man.

The notion that Burnside could have made an easier crossing probably comes from Kyd Douglas, and he was just wrong. (Can't remember who said it, but some historian said Douglas didn't write "I Rode with Stonewall"; he wrote "Stonewall Rode with Me.")

 

[favedave]

Burnside also lacked the one essential Napoleon prized most in his generals. He was not lucky. What if he'd had three competent officers to chose from to lead the crater attack? Or even one? What if the Army Engineers had gotten the bridges to Fredericksburg only weeks late, instead of a month late? Granted, he was terrible at improvisation, but so are nearly all people in such situations, especially when the information available is so sketchy. Imagine directing troops into downtown Manhattan on September 11th, when all communications have to be done face to face and nobody can see anything farther away than about ten feet for all the smoke.

The black troops assigned to the initial assault had, in fact been given a fair amount of training while the mines were being dug. The project was considered harebrained when it was first championed by Burnside to Meade. The black troops were the only troops Burnside was allowed to "waste" on it. Their white officers consulted directly with the mining engineers as to how to direct their men to follow up what was expected to be the biggest explosion in world history. They told their men what to expect and drilled them in battle formations on a field with similar geography behind the lines. Most importantly they were instructed to under no circumstances go into the crater.

While the black troops and their officers prepared as much as they could for their chance to "really get in the fight" the harebrained project began to gather increasingly enthusiastic supporters. By the time the mines were finished, it was thought that this attack would break the stalemate at Petersburg, cause Lee to surrender or escape to the west, and allow the entire AoP to march into Richmond before the Government of the Confederacy could escape. It was a war winner. It has been suggested that Meade's decision had less to do with protecting 'colored soldiers' from Confederate reprisals when it failed, and more to do with not having the newspapers say that negro troops won the Civil War. Whatever his reason the troops waiting for the explosion were told to "stand down" shortly before the mines blew up. The white troops who took their place were told, if anything that they were leading an attack after a big explosion signaled them to do so.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... Another example of this is Burnside's attack on the Rohrbach "Burnside's" Bridge during the battle of Sharpsburg. He certainly did not establish a better crossing and continued to feed the "meat grinder." ....

I think he gets an unfair rap for the bridge. Cox was in tactical control of the operation. The initial plan involved sending about 1/3 of his force to make a crossing at a ford downstream from the bridge and then turn the flank of the Confederates at the bridge. The remainder would demonstrate in front of the bridge. The flanking force was delayed in finding the ford through no fault of Burnside. Meanwhile McClellan demanded Burnside carry the bridge at all costs, so the demonstrations at the bridge were turned into assaults. Finally the flanking force founds its way across and the bridge was carried. There were losses but it wasnt really that bloody compared to other parts of Antietam like the cornfield.

 

[rhettbutler1865]

Nobody's claiming that combat command was easy, but it was their job. There were officers who did it well, and others who didn't. Burnside was one of the latter.

100% agreement here, brass.

 

[brass napoleon]

Burnside also lacked the one essential Napoleon prized most in his generals. He was not lucky. What if he'd had three competent officers to chose from to lead the crater attack? Or even one?

He actually had two - Orlando B. Willcox and Robert Brown Porter, both of whom were experienced and competent infantry combat officers. He was unable to choose between them, so he instead had all three of his commanders DRAW STRAWS. And when the winning straw was drawn by the commander that everybody knew was inexperienced and incompetent, he went with it. That's not bad luck. That's downright negligence.

The black troops assigned to the initial assault had, in fact been given a fair amount of training while the mines were being dug. The project was considered harebrained when it was first championed by Burnside to Meade. The black troops were the only troops Burnside was allowed to "waste" on it. Their white officers consulted directly with the mining engineers as to how to direct their men to follow up what was expected to be the biggest explosion in world history. They told their men what to expect and drilled them in battle formations on a field with similar geography behind the lines. Most importantly they were instructed to under no circumstances go into the crater.

The extra training that was given SOME of the black troops was entirely at the discretion and initiative of their regimental commanders; Burnside had absolutely nothing to do with it. The decision to go around the crater was the decision of their regimental commanders. Burnside had absolutely nothing to do with that either, and probably didn't even know about it. And some officers of the black regiments maintained that there was no special training at all. What likely happened is that some officers had the foresight to envision a badly cluttered and ruptured battlefield, and realizing that their troops had never seen combat or had even been drilled in complicated battlefield maneuvers, took the opportunity to do it - at their own discretion.

Whatever his reason the troops waiting for the explosion were told to "stand down" shortly before the mines blew up. The white troops who took their place were told, if anything that they were leading an attack after a big explosion signaled them to do so.

I'm sorry, but this is also incorrect. The change in orders was relayed to the front line troops by 11 P.M. the night before the attack. The white troops who took the lead the next morning were given incorrect instructions by their incompetent commander - James Ledlie - who had been chosen by Burnside's drawing of straws. And neither Burnside, Ledlie nor any of his senior officers accompanied the troops onto the battlefield or bothered to tell them not to go into the crater, which would have clearly been seen as a disastrous move by any competent commander on the field.

 

[ole]

Poor Ambrose Ernst Burnside. He knew he wasn't command material, but he got stuck with it again and again by virtue of his seniority. On his behalf, he did do a couple of things right.

Most everyone liked him. He just wasn't a real, competent commander. And he never pretended to be. He just got caught up in the rank wars.

 

[Pvt.Shattuck]

von Moltke "no plan survives contact with the enemy"

Mike Tyson "everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face."

 

[favedave]

The change in orders was relayed to the front line troops by 11 P.M. the night before the attack. The white troops who took the lead the next morning were given incorrect instructions by their incompetent commander - James Ledlie -

I recall that the Black troops were in position the night before because the scheduled blowing of the mines was delayed several times due to technical problems. Were the orders issued at 11PM, or told to all the troops at 11 PM? Did Ledlie provide the instructions himself, or was he too busy drinking and passed the giving of them on to subordinates? Did I claim Burnside did anything but promote the plan to Meade? I believe I gave full credit to his subordinates, who on their own went to the mining engineers for advice. The quality of the training received cannot be evaluated. We were not there. But surely some training was better than none.

The Crater was a brilliant plan that should have ended the siege at Petersburg, and perhaps the war. But it was meddled with at the last minute and that caused the catastrophe it became. Burnside was the perfect scapegoat simply because he'd had failures previously. But then again, who in Command of the AoP had not had failures just as big? Cold Harbor ring a bell?

 

[brass napoleon]

I recall that the Black troops were in position the night before because the scheduled blowing of the mines was delayed several times due to technical problems.

No, the troops were moved into position first thing in the morning. The orders had been changed the night before, offering plenty of time for officers to tell their men "don't go into the crater", if anybody in the high command had bothered to think about it. And the men were all in place in the covered ways waiting for the blast.

The quality of the training received cannot be evaluated. We were not there. But surely some training was better than none.

Yes, some training was better than none, and Burnside chose his least trained and least experienced troops to lead the attack. Fortunately some of the regimental officers took it upon themselves to try to make up that deficiency.

The Crater was a brilliant plan that should have ended the siege at Petersburg, and perhaps the war. But it was meddled with at the last minute and that caused the catastrophe it became. Burnside was the perfect scapegoat simply because he'd had failures previously

The Crater was a long-shot gamble. Blowing a huge whole in the enemy lines does no good at all for your own side if you can't get your own soldiers through the 25 foot deep hole that was created. Furthermore the Confederates were fully aware of the mining attempt and had positioned extra artillery to provide enfilading fire across the field of advance. They also had a secondary line of entrenchments behind the front line. Meade suspected the existence of such a line and advised against attacking at that point:

Meade and Major Duane inspected Burnside's front and advised against leading an assault from there. Troops attacking Elliott's Salient could be enfiladed by artillery fire from other salients to the north and south. Moreover, it seemed most likely that the Confederates had a second fortified line, to which troops could retreat if driven from the front line. No second line had actually been seen, but Meade concluded that from "the evident necessity of there being such a line, I am forced to believe we shall find one there."

- Richard Slotkin, No Quarter: The Battle of the Crater, 1864, p. 129
​

Yet Burnside went ahead anyway. The only advantage the explosion could provide was shock and awe of the Confederate troops to the sides of the crater, and that advantage would only last for minutes. But Burnside and the man he selected by drawing straws to lead the attack did absolutely nothing and gave absolutely no orders to take advantage of that shock and awe. And when it became apparent that the opportunity was lost, Burnside stubbornly, negligently, and insubordinately refused to call the attack off and instead poured more and more men into the slaughter for hours, turning a minor failure into a major catastrophe:

Meade recalled that Burnside pleaded for the opportunity to attack but could not explain how he might capture the ridge. Ord, who accompanied the 9th Corps leader to army headquarters, completely sided with Meade, much to Burnside's irritation. In Meade's words, Ord claimed that "it would be nothing but murder to send any more men forward" into the captured works.

- Earl J. Hess, Into the Crater: The Mine Attack at Petersburg, p. 172​

As it turns out, the attack would have had a better chance (but still been a long shot) if the black troops had led it, but not because of a "last minute" change or because they were better trained than anybody else. It was because the man Burnside chose to lead the attack in their stead was a known incompetent who nobody had any faith in, and because the black troops proved themselves in battle to be more motivated (even though less trained and experienced) than the white troops, who had seen enough of assaulting enemy entrenchments by this point in the war.

 

[Specster]

From what I understand of his authority, I dont think historians have been unfair. Yes, his success early in the Carolinas is rarely mentioned, but the later fiascoes were so great, I think they rightly overshadow his successes. Once given command of the AoP, I am sure he was prodded by Lincoln and Halleck to act before winter. The Fredericksberg battle was suppose to happen in early to mid November. When there were delays and the pontoon bridges had not arrived, and they were well into December, didnt he have the authority to call the campaign off? If the campaign relied upon anything, it was speed and surprise. Burnside lost both of those with the delays. When Lee saw Burnside's plan materializing he thought it was a faint - he did not think Burnside would be stupid enough to try to assail the commanding heights. In the Battle itself Burnside should have know when things were going right or wrong and acted accordingly, and, time and again, didnt. He did not exploit the breach in Jackson's line on day 1, he did not command Franklin to attack, he kept pouring men into Maryes Heights, and had to be talked out of pouring in more, the mud march, the crater. Often the blame can be shared for these failures but I think he too often is the ultimate authority.

 

[67th Tigers]

I think he gets an unfair rap for the bridge. Cox was in tactical control of the operation. The initial plan involved sending about 1/3 of his force to make a crossing at a ford downstream from the bridge and then turn the flank of the Confederates at the bridge. The remainder would demonstrate in front of the bridge. The flanking force was delayed in finding the ford through no fault of Burnside. Meanwhile McClellan demanded Burnside carry the bridge at all costs, so the demonstrations at the bridge were turned into assaults. Finally the flanking force founds its way across and the bridge was carried. There were losses but it wasnt really that bloody compared to other parts of Antietam like the cornfield.

Since McClellan's morning orders on the 16th were for Burnside to be in position to assault the bridge at midday (16th) and his 0630 order of the 17th was to assault over the bridge ASAP, as was his 0800 and 0910 orders I don't see anything to suggest McClellan saw these as demonstrations - McClellan had decided to pay that butchers bill in advance. Ultimately Burnside would take 500 casualties in his 3 brigade attacks on the bridge which was not a huge number to achieve the desired effect.

Cox had taskorged his corps into 3 divisions (Cox's own division was split and a brigade given to Rodman and Sturgis) and his initial report (by far more reliable than his later reconstructed writings) shows at 0900 he sent Sturgis with 3 brigades (plus the 11th CT from Rodman as skirmishers) to assault the bridge whilst Rodman with 3 brigades was supposed to assault the supposed ford, with Willcox in reserve with 2 brigades (and Burnside holding Warren's little brigade of 5th Corps in deep reserve). Sturgis effectively conducted 3 brigade assaults, each with one of his brigades (Crook at 0900, Nagle at 1030 and Ferrero around 1200), and the last carried it. The reason the last charge was successful was probably the Kentucky Battery established a good firing position to support the attack about 400 yards from the reb defenders and literally blew them off the ridge. Thus I'd contend that if the attack was handled better Cox could have gotten over before 1000 hrs.

 

[rhettbutler1865]

To be succulent, in battle things NEVER go exactly to plan and improvisation starts with the very first shot. That is the problem with Burnside. He was a very bad improviser. To make matters worse he was very poor at adapting to changes in the plan made before the first shot, such as at the Crater and at Fredricksburg to name the most egregious examples.

I agree with your egregious examples, however, although few, SOME battle plans have worked out just as the commander wished.

 

[rbasin]

The reason for "a plan" is to avoid problems. The reason Burnside's Crater failed is because Meade pulled the troops trained for the job at hand at the last minute and stuck in troops who did not even know there was going to be a very big boom. At Antietam, NOBODY gets good marks. At Fredericksburg, He did not want the job, but was forced to take it because Little Mac was such a miserable combat leader (see Antietam). And worst of all, he did not get the logistical support (the Bridges) he was promised when the river could have been crossed with low losses. Burnside did do well in operations he controlled, he did not when others made arbitrary decisions because they thought they knew better.

As far as the pontoons go, I believe that Burnside was late in requesting them, as most were at Harper's Ferry.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Since McClellan's morning orders on the 16th were for Burnside to be in position to assault the bridge at midday (16th) and his 0630 order of the 17th was to assault over the bridge ASAP, as was his 0800 and 0910 orders I don't see anything to suggest McClellan saw these as demonstrations - McClellan had decided to pay that butchers bill in advance.

I dont claim that McClellan would have been aware of the details of the plans to carry the bridge.
I am not aware of a 6:30 or 0800 order that said ASAP. I am aware that a later order told Burnside to attack "at all hazards", overruling the hope of waiting for the flanking force to get across the ford.

The reason the last charge was successful was probably the Kentucky Battery established a good firing position to support the attack about 400 yards from the reb defenders and literally blew them off the ridge. Thus I'd contend that if the attack was handled better Cox could have gotten over before 1000 hrs.

Confederate reports refer to the flanking move by the force using the ford (Rodman) in deciding to pull back from the bridge.

 

[67th Tigers]

Confederate reports refer to the flanking move by the force using the ford (Rodman) in deciding to pull back from the bridge.

None of them do. Both Cox's initial report and Benning's report (commanding the defenders) say it was the movement of the Kentucky Light Battery to an enfilading position close to the bridge that was decisive:

Benning, commanding brigade:

"The next morning early (that of the 17th) the skirmishing was renewed. It continued, constantly growing heavier on the part of the enemy, till about 9 o'clock, when our skirmishers were driven in. At about 8 o'clock Captain Eubank discovered a large body of the enemy opposite to him in a wood within range of his guns. He opened fire on them and drove them in confusion from the wood, and with loss, to judge from the movement of their ambulances. Not long after his battery had finished this work it was ordered away. Thus the two regiments were left at the bridge without army artillery supports whatever. The general line of battle of our army was nearly, if not quite, three-quarters of a mile in their rear, and not a soldier was between them and that line. The intervening ground for a great part of the way was a long slope facing the enemy's batteries, and thus commanded by those batteries, so that re-enforcements, if they had been sent, would have been cut up by shells before they could have reached their destination. A regiment had been posted on the right further down the creek, but this soon after the battle commenced abandoned its post and went to the rear. Thus the two regiments were also without infantry supports, and without the expectation of receiving any re-enforcements. The two together numbered not more than 350 men and officers, the Second having only 97, and the Twentieth not more than 250. In their front was Burnside's whole corps of not fewer than 12,000 or 15,000 of the enemy's best men, with a numerous artillery. In this forlorn condition were the two regiments at about 9 o'clock, when the fight opened in earnest. At this time the enemy's infantry, aided by the fire of many pieces of artillery, advanced in heavy force to the attack; and soon the attack opened on our whole line as far up as the bridge. It was bold and persevering. The enemy came to the creek. The fire not only from their infantry, but from the artillery, was incessant, the artillery being so placed that it could fire over the heads of the infantry. It was met by a rapid, well-directed, and unflinching fire from our men, under which the enemy, after a vain struggle, broke and fell back. This attack was succeeded by two similar ones from apparently fresh bodies of troops, and with like results, the last of the two extending above the bridge to the upper part of our line. At length, toward 12 o'clock, the enemy made preparations for a still more formidable attack. A battery was placed in position from which it could command at almost an enfilade the whole face of the hill occupied by our troops. Soon it opened fire, and the infantry, in much heavier force than at any time before, extending far above as well as below the bridge, again advanced to the attack. The combined fire of infantry and artillery was terrific. It was, however, withstood by our men until their ammunition was quite exhausted, and until the enemy had got upon the bridge and were above and below it fording the creek. I then gave the order to fall back. Colonel Cumming, with two companies which had a few rounds of ammunition left, remained near the bridge as a little rear guard, and was, with these, the last to leave the ground. When he left it the enemy had crossed above and below him, and were coming up on both his flanks. They indeed cut off a few of his men by getting to his rear. The men of both regiments, though retreating different ways, were exposed for a long distance to the shells of the enemy. Under an order received from General Toombs they retired to a position near the right of the general line of battle. Thus at near 1 o'clock we were driven from the bridge, but we had held it long enough to enable the advance troops of General A. P. Hill to reach their position in the line of battle; and this, I suppose, was attaining the great object of defending a place so far in front of that line - a place so untenable as was the bridge."

Cumming, 20th Ga:

"On the 15th instant I was stationed at a post as picket guard, which post was the scene of action on the 17th, so far as my regiment was concerned. On the evening of the 16th instant, the enemy appearing in force, I sent out a body of skirmishers, who were driven back. Early the next morning the enemy showed in great force - at least three brigades, supported by artillery, among which were some mountain howitzers. They poured a heavy fire upon us, which continued almost uninterruptedly for nearly five hours. My regiment, about 200 strong, maintained its position, inflicting a heavy loss to the enemy, killing and wounding, according to statements of some members of my command who were taken prisoners, nearly 1,000. The fire of the enemy continued in undiminished force, and as all the ammunition available on the ground from the boxes of the dead and wounded men had been expended, and being enfiladed by a battery which the enemy had planted on our left, I deemed it proper to withdraw my command. This order was not given until the advancing enemy were within six or seven yards of my line."

Lewis, 2nd Ga:

"On the morning of the 14th [15th] we were ordered to take position on the banks of the Antietam River, to the right of the bridge. The Twentieth Georgia was on our left and directly in front and to the left of the bridge. We remained in this position, after having deployed the regiment behind trees and barricades made of fence rails, until the morning of the 16th [17th] when our pickets were driven in. The enemy commenced an attack upon the center of the regiment at 9 o'clock then immediately afterward upon the left, with how many regiments we are unable to ascertain. They were repulsed several times, but their re-enforcements continually came pouring in; and besides, all the while a battery completely enfilading our lines was playing upon us. We held the position until our last round of ammunition was exhausted. At this time Lient. Col. William R. Holmes, commanding, was killed, the command falling upon Maj. W. T. Harris. He, seeing the condition of affairs, ordered the regiment to retire by the left flank, which was done in good order."

There's a good reason why none of the principles mention Rodman's crossing - it happened after they fell back. Rodman's crossing was enabled when the 50th Georgia, trying to cover both fords in the area withdrew because Sturgis had forced the bridge.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Benning says the fire of the battery was "withstood by our men" and while Lewis mention the battery he doesnt say it ws was decisive. So I dont see how they support your view; only Cumming mentions the battery having much impact. Benning does refer to the enemy " below it fording the creek" and "the enemy had crossed above and below him, and were coming up on both his flanks".

You dont quote Toombs. He wrote "After these repeated disastrous repulses, the enemy, despairing of wresting the bridge from the grasp of its heroic defenders, and thus forcing his passage across the river at this point, turned his attention to the fords before referred to, and commenced moving fresh troops in that direction by his left flank. The old road, by the upper of the two fords referred to, led over a hill on my right and in my rear, which completely commanded my position and all ingress and egress to and from it below the bridge. ... Not being able to get any re-enforcements for the defense of these two fords, and seeing that the enemy was moving upon them to cross, thus enabling him to attack my small force in front, right flank, and rear, and my two regiments having been constantly engaged from early in the morning up to 1 o'clock with a vastly superior force of the enemy, aided by three heavy batteries, the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, of the Second, having been killed in the action, and the only remaining field officer, Major [Skidmore] Harris, being painfully wounded, and fully one half of this regiment being killed or wounded, and the Twentieth having also suffered severely in killed and wounded, and the ammunition of both regiments being nearly exhausted, and Eubank's battery having been withdrawn to the rear nearly two hours before, I deemed it my duty, in pursuance of your original order, to withdraw my command and place it in the position designated by you opposite the two lower fords, some half a mile to the right and front of your line of battle."

From William Allan's book The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862: "The Federals once over at the fords, Toombs's position was no longer tenable, and his handful of brave men must have been all sacrificed. The only troops to whom he might look for succor were D. R. Jones's division, and they were on the hills in his rear, near the town, and entirely out of his reach. In the event of being forced to yield the bridge, his orders were to move to his right and take position before the lower fords. Toombs saw that the moment had come for him to retire, if he would save the remnant of his command. He acted with judgment and coolness. Sturgis, who had received reiterated orders to carry the bridge, regardless of cost, was preparing a final assault on it. He had selected the 51st Pennsylvania and the 51st New York for the perilous and bloody task. But while they were advancing, Toombs withdrew his men, and by a well-executed movement threw them to the right in front of Rodman, and left the bridge he had held so bravely for hours to fall into the hands of his enemies."

You assertion abut timing is the opposite of sources I am familiar with. For example in his memoirs, EP Alexander stated that Rodman was over the ford before Sturgis charge.

Rodman's flank move unhinged Toombs defense, giving Sturgis chance the chance to work.

None of them do. Both Cox's initial report and Benning's report (commanding the defenders) say it was the movement of the Kentucky Light Battery to an enfilading position close to the bridge that was decisive:

Benning, commanding brigade:

"The next morning early (that of the 17th) the skirmishing was renewed. It continued, constantly growing heavier on the part of the enemy, till about 9 o'clock, when our skirmishers were driven in. At about 8 o'clock Captain Eubank discovered a large body of the enemy opposite to him in a wood within range of his guns. He opened fire on them and drove them in confusion from the wood, and with loss, to judge from the movement of their ambulances. Not long after his battery had finished this work it was ordered away. Thus the two regiments were left at the bridge without army artillery supports whatever. The general line of battle of our army was nearly, if not quite, three-quarters of a mile in their rear, and not a soldier was between them and that line. The intervening ground for a great part of the way was a long slope facing the enemy's batteries, and thus commanded by those batteries, so that re-enforcements, if they had been sent, would have been cut up by shells before they could have reached their destination. A regiment had been posted on the right further down the creek, but this soon after the battle commenced abandoned its post and went to the rear. Thus the two regiments were also without infantry supports, and without the expectation of receiving any re-enforcements. The two together numbered not more than 350 men and officers, the Second having only 97, and the Twentieth not more than 250. In their front was Burnside's whole corps of not fewer than 12,000 or 15,000 of the enemy's best men, with a numerous artillery. In this forlorn condition were the two regiments at about 9 o'clock, when the fight opened in earnest. At this time the enemy's infantry, aided by the fire of many pieces of artillery, advanced in heavy force to the attack; and soon the attack opened on our whole line as far up as the bridge. It was bold and persevering. The enemy came to the creek. The fire not only from their infantry, but from the artillery, was incessant, the artillery being so placed that it could fire over the heads of the infantry. It was met by a rapid, well-directed, and unflinching fire from our men, under which the enemy, after a vain struggle, broke and fell back. This attack was succeeded by two similar ones from apparently fresh bodies of troops, and with like results, the last of the two extending above the bridge to the upper part of our line. At length, toward 12 o'clock, the enemy made preparations for a still more formidable attack. A battery was placed in position from which it could command at almost an enfilade the whole face of the hill occupied by our troops. Soon it opened fire, and the infantry, in much heavier force than at any time before, extending far above as well as below the bridge, again advanced to the attack. The combined fire of infantry and artillery was terrific. It was, however, withstood by our men until their ammunition was quite exhausted, and until the enemy had got upon the bridge and were above and below it fording the creek. I then gave the order to fall back. Colonel Cumming, with two companies which had a few rounds of ammunition left, remained near the bridge as a little rear guard, and was, with these, the last to leave the ground. When he left it the enemy had crossed above and below him, and were coming up on both his flanks. They indeed cut off a few of his men by getting to his rear. The men of both regiments, though retreating different ways, were exposed for a long distance to the shells of the enemy. Under an order received from General Toombs they retired to a position near the right of the general line of battle. Thus at near 1 o'clock we were driven from the bridge, but we had held it long enough to enable the advance troops of General A. P. Hill to reach their position in the line of battle; and this, I suppose, was attaining the great object of defending a place so far in front of that line - a place so untenable as was the bridge."

Cumming, 20th Ga:

"On the 15th instant I was stationed at a post as picket guard, which post was the scene of action on the 17th, so far as my regiment was concerned. On the evening of the 16th instant, the enemy appearing in force, I sent out a body of skirmishers, who were driven back. Early the next morning the enemy showed in great force - at least three brigades, supported by artillery, among which were some mountain howitzers. They poured a heavy fire upon us, which continued almost uninterruptedly for nearly five hours. My regiment, about 200 strong, maintained its position, inflicting a heavy loss to the enemy, killing and wounding, according to statements of some members of my command who were taken prisoners, nearly 1,000. The fire of the enemy continued in undiminished force, and as all the ammunition available on the ground from the boxes of the dead and wounded men had been expended, and being enfiladed by a battery which the enemy had planted on our left, I deemed it proper to withdraw my command. This order was not given until the advancing enemy were within six or seven yards of my line."

Lewis, 2nd Ga:

"On the morning of the 14th [15th] we were ordered to take position on the banks of the Antietam River, to the right of the bridge. The Twentieth Georgia was on our left and directly in front and to the left of the bridge. We remained in this position, after having deployed the regiment behind trees and barricades made of fence rails, until the morning of the 16th [17th] when our pickets were driven in. The enemy commenced an attack upon the center of the regiment at 9 o'clock then immediately afterward upon the left, with how many regiments we are unable to ascertain. They were repulsed several times, but their re-enforcements continually came pouring in; and besides, all the while a battery completely enfilading our lines was playing upon us. We held the position until our last round of ammunition was exhausted. At this time Lient. Col. William R. Holmes, commanding, was killed, the command falling upon Maj. W. T. Harris. He, seeing the condition of affairs, ordered the regiment to retire by the left flank, which was done in good order."

There's a good reason why none of the principles mention Rodman's crossing - it happened after they fell back. Rodman's crossing was enabled when the 50th Georgia, trying to cover both fords in the area withdrew because Sturgis had forced the bridge.