Does Burnside get an unfair rap?

[CTH]

I know Burnside's military career was less, than stellar, with the huge blunder at Fredericksburg, and wasting all that time trying to cross that bridge at Antietam when he could easliy have crossed another location with less effort and loss of life, but still, he had major successes when he was leading smaller numbers of troops against smaller enemy forces (in North Carolina and at Knoxville, for example), and some sources I have read state that he was made a scapegoat for The Crater, while Meade was more to blame for that debacle. Does anybody else feel that he is unfairly maligned?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

In some cases, yes; although I've read that his hands-off command style simply didn't work well when he didn't have subordinates who were accustomed to that sort of thing.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

My own take on the issue is summarized in mythical form under the title "Dancing with the Stars and Stripes":

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 20, 1864.

I have had a hard day to-day. This morning Messrs. Chandler and Harding, of the Senate, and Messrs. Loan and Julian, of the House, all members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, made their appearance to investigate the Mine affair.

I fear their purpose is to exonerate Burnside for the failure of the attack. From the Rapidan down to this place all success has belonged to Grant and none to myself whereas now, despite his support and approval of my dispositions at Petersburg, you may be assured that the responsibility for failure will not be laid at Grant's door.

Burnside had planned to lead the attack with his pet dance-master Ferrero and his colored division. (I do not know how he retained that division when Butler was so busily engaged in gaining all such for him self). I feared that these poor colored soldiers would, in the event of difficulty, be shot down as mercilessly as Gen'l Forrest murdered those at Pillow.

With no wish to bring down the censure of the Committee upon myself, I ordered Burnside to use white troops to absorb the first risk of attack and retain the terpsichorean Ferrero as support. In the event, Burnside tossed a coin and thereby allowed Ledlie, a graduate of John Barleycorn University as is our illustrious commander, to "lead" the attack. Ledlie (whom I have this week removed) and the ballroom brigadier Ferrero took refuge in a bottle and allowed their men to be serially slaughtered.

Thus am I now to be calumniated by Sen. Chandler as "Nathan Bedford Meade". Who will remember that it was Burnside, Ledlie and the eminently unsaltatory Ferrero who created in excess of 5,000 casualties with Grant's full consent? I may never recover from the grief I feel for those boys.

Mrs. Lyman has sent me a Christmas present of a box of nice cigars

 

[brass napoleon]

I know Burnside's military career was less, than stellar, with the huge blunder and Fredericksburg, and wasting all that time trying to cross that bridge at Antietam when he could easliy have crossed another location with less effort and loss of life, but still, he had major successes when he was leading smaller numbers of troops against smaller enemy forces (in North Carolina and at Knoxville, for example), and some sources I have read state that he was made a scapegoat for The Crater, while Meade was more to blame for that debacle. Does anybody else feel that he is unfairly maligned?

Burnside was a big part of the fiasco at the Crater, although Meade and even Grant had a share in it too. His biggest problem seems to me to be the inability to adapt to changing circumstances, like when his pontoon boats didn't show up on time at Fredericksburg and when Meade and Grant changed the lead brigade at the Crater. But of course the ability to adapt is one of the most important characteristics of a general. So while I think it's unfair to give him ALL of the blame, he definitely deserves a huge share of it.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Yeah... when things went according to plan, he seems to have done fine. The trouble is that things seldom go exactly according to plan.

 

[favedave]

The reason for "a plan" is to avoid problems. The reason Burnside's Crater failed is because Meade pulled the troops trained for the job at hand at the last minute and stuck in troops who did not even know there was going to be a very big boom. At Antietam, NOBODY gets good marks. At Fredericksburg, He did not want the job, but was forced to take it because Little Mac was such a miserable combat leader (see Antietam). And worst of all, he did not get the logistical support (the Bridges) he was promised when the river could have been crossed with low losses. Burnside did do well in operations he controlled, he did not when others made arbitrary decisions because they thought they knew better.

 

[Fulton 21 NC]

Valid succinct points all. I tend to agree, but would point out that even if one were capable of spontaneously responding to the need to adapt tactics, there was always the problem with communication of orders.
Stonewall seems to have had his own problems with command and control, especially when he was charged with carrying out time-sensitive instructions.
Few field officers were able to successfully transition from brigade to division, much less overall command.
Both Burnside and Hooker are excellent examples of officers overwhelmed by this challenge.
As good as even Lee was, he had his experience of Gettysburg. His strategic position was based on defense and anticipation of the tactical movements of his opponents was like that of a chess master.

 

[Dave Hull]

No.

Good commanders look for reasons to succeed, great commanders finds ways to win. In my opinion Burnside was not adaptable enough to meet situations which varied from the plans.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

The manner in which Burnside, in a fit of pique, decided to have the alcoholic and incompetent Ledlie "lead" the white troops (after Grant and Meade had agreed it would be bad politics to thrust black soldiers into such an unknown project) is the indictment of failure. Further, he failed to ensure that his two commanders (Ledlie and Ferraro) were actually leading their men - instead, they sat safely at the back quaffing their favourite spirits. Burnside gave up on the project before it started - a real Pilate, he.

 

[Stony]

Gotta love the sideburns though.

 

[brass napoleon]

The manner in which Burnside, in a fit of pique, decided to have the alcoholic and incompetent Ledlie "lead" the white troops (after Grant and Meade had agreed it would be bad politics to thrust black soldiers into such an unknown project) is the indictment of failure. Further, he failed to ensure that his two commanders (Ledlie and Ferraro) were actually leading their men - instead, they sat safely at the back quaffing their favourite spirits. Burnside gave up on the project before it started - a real Pilate, he.

Exactly. And it's not as if the black troops had any special training either. Any extra training they had was most likely to make up for the deficiency of combat training they had been given because they were never expected to be used in combat in the first place.

In addition to all of that, Burnside refused to call the attack off when it became apparent, rather early on, that the whole thing was an abysmal failure. Instead, just like at Marye's Heights, he kept pouring in more and more troops to be slaughtered, with absolutely no plan on what to do with them. Finally, his failure to apprise his superior officer (Meade) of the progress (or lack thereof) of the battle was downright insubordinate (not that Meade bothered to get off his *** and check it out for himself either, for that matter. Er, no offense, MajGenl ).

 

[Fulton 21 NC]

Ok, Burnside really f'ed up when he crossed the Rappahannock.
Wow. My timing is off. If you take as long as I do to post, and you end up following a post with a different point of view, it gets confusing.
My intention was to point out how difficult it would be for anyone to command under the CW conditions. Coordinated movement of such large groups without modern communication is nearly impossible even if the field of battle was wide open and treeless.
As armchair generals and Monday night quarterbacks, it's hard to realize how challenging command is. Unless you are a teacher or maybe a veteran.

 

[brass napoleon]

As armchair generals and Monday night quarterbacks, it's hard to realize how challenging command is.

Nobody's claiming that combat command was easy, but it was their job. There were officers who did it well, and others who didn't. Burnside was one of the latter.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I think modern historians give him a 'fair' rap. IMO, he was much too honest and straightforward to be very successful where being PC was paramount in getting the benefit of the Doubt.
Only the astute Lincoln recognized, appreciated Burnsides honesty and tried not to pass unfair blame on him.

 

[Lost Cause]

The manner in which Burnside, in a fit of pique, decided to have the alcoholic and incompetent Ledlie "lead" the white troops (after Grant and Meade had agreed it would be bad politics to thrust black soldiers into such an unknown project) is the indictment of failure. Further, he failed to ensure that his two commanders (Ledlie and Ferraro) were actually leading their men - instead, they sat safely at the back quaffing their favourite spirits. Burnside gave up on the project before it started - a real Pilate, he.

There was also Ledlie's ill fated and alcohol induced attack upon the inverted V position, near Ox Ford, during the battle of North Anna River.

 

[Jamieva]

Exactly. And it's not as if the black troops had any special training either. Any extra training they had was most likely to make up for the deficiency of combat training they had been given because they were never expected to be used in combat in the first place.

In addition to all of that, Burnside refused to call the attack off when it became apparent, rather early on, that the whole thing was an abysmal failure. Instead, just like at Marye's Heights, he kept pouring in more and more troops to be slaughtered, with absolutely no plan on what to do with them. Finally, his failure to apprise his superior officer (Meade) of the progress (or lack thereof) of the battle was downright insubordinate (not that Meade bothered to get off his *** and check it out for himself either, for that matter. Er, no offense, MajGenl ).

His "plan" at Fredericksburg was to continue the same attacks on December 14 on Marye's heights that had failed miserably the day before. No change, just keep plowing ahead. Thankfully for his troops the subordinates talked him out of it.

 

[brass napoleon]

There was also Ledlie's ill fated and alcohol induced attack upon the inverted V position, near Ox Ford, during the battle of North Anna River.

Which happened to be his only infantry command experience prior to leading the attack on the Crater. A more abysmal failure couldn't have been put in the lead position, but Burnside lacked the decisiveness to select any of his competent commanders.

 

[brass napoleon]

His "plan" at Fredericksburg was to continue the same attacks on December 14 on Marye's heights that had failed miserably the day before. No change, just keep plowing ahead. Thankfully for his troops the subordinates talked him out of it.

Which is exactly what his "plan" was at the Crater - to keep dumping more and more men into the Crater, where they were like fish in a barrel, despite the fact that officers on the field were pleading with him to stop.

 

[Lost Cause]

Which happened to be his only infantry command experience prior to leading the attack on the Crater. A more abysmal failure couldn't have been put in the lead position, but Burnside lacked the decisiveness to select any of his competent commanders.

Going back, Burnside did successfully coordinate 3 brigades during the North Carolina Expedition, closing off a substantial portion of the North Carolina coast from the Confederates.

 

[brass napoleon]

Going back, Burnside did successfully coordinate 3 brigades during the North Carolina Expedition, closing off a substantial portion of the North Carolina coast from the Confederates.

Yes, like I mentioned earlier, I think his biggest problem was his inability to adapt to changing conditions. His initial plan at Fredericksburg was sound, and his initial plan at the Crater showed some ingenuity. But once the situation changed he became flustered and could come up with no alternative plan other than to feed more and more men into the meat grinder.