Do you agree or disagree ?

[A. Roy]

I'll not watch the video, I come here to read. But I'll say this for Pope, after his comeuppance in Virginia he served his country well in Minnesota and in the plains Indian wars.

From the discussion here, I've gotten a sense of the rankings given -- but I come here to read also. I'll rarely look at a video that is linked here, but I do find it helpful if someone who appreciates the video gives an overview or summary.
AR

 

[Caddo Militia]

How can they leave out Nathaniel P. Banks? He was pretty abysmal.

 

[7th Mississippi Infantry]

How can they leave out Nathaniel P. Banks? He was pretty abysmal.

I wasn't even thinking about Banks, but you are not wrong.

But I'm deviating from my original post.

I didn't start this thread about my opinions, only what others think.

 

[observator]

Bragg would have made a good drillmaster general for training
Hood was best as a brigade/divisional leader....
McClellan could build up a army and inspire them....but as to winning battles....he got the "slows"
Burnside would have made a good Colonel of a regiment.....and could win battles such as the expedionary force on Cape Hatteras or when in Tennessee Defending Fort Sanders against Confederate attacks...ironically this was a reversal of his Fredericksburg Campaig when his armies were attacking and CS was defending,,,,
As for Dan Sickles...who was successful could raise a Brigade.....provided someone else payed bills!

 

[archieclement]

Perhaps minor quibble, but always find inclusion of Hood and McClellan curious.

What ever boths failing as offensive army commanders. McClellan organizational skills would think helped the Union not lose the war early, the same could be said of Hood as brigade/corps commander, his performance helped the Confederacy to not lose early.

Would think as much as you could argue bad for the two, one could argue a host of generals didn't make any as significant positive contributions during war, why never heard of most of them............

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Thought Hood's wartime command performance could be considered in two distinct phases - '61 to '63 and '64 to '65.

In my view, Hood's poor leadership during the Atlanta and Tennessee Campaigns in '64 far outweighed any of his positive performances (if casualty counts don't matter) during the first half of the war. Accordingly, would definitely include him among the lowest rankings of senior commanders over the duration of the conflict.

 

[archieclement]

Thought Hood's wartime command performance could be considered in two distinct phases - '61 to '63 and '64 to '65.

In my view, Hood's poor leadership during the Atlanta and Tennessee Campaigns in '64 far outweighed any of his positive performances (if casualty counts don't matter) during the first half of the war. Accordingly, would definitely include him among the lowest rankings of senior commanders over the
duration of the conflict.

Personally I tend to think that's even overblown.

Who was going to have done better? Certainly not JJ who hadn't stopped Sherman before Atlanta. Nor stopped Sherman in the Carolinas. Making an effort that was required to be made, isn't really a fault, it's what's actually expected of commanders.

So who was realisticly going to counterattack with much a realistic chance of better success? JJ shown he couldn't, Hardee himself didn't think he was up to job, Forrest was realisticly too junior and lacked combined arm experience. Perhaps bring Beuragard or Bragg back......?

Realisticly someone had to offer battle, the bad odds and likely outcome, I would think remain regardless of who it fell to.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

These are fair points made.

But the issue is not who else could have been appointed or done better. The question examined here is who is thought to be among the senior (high) commanders who performed poorest during the war, regardless of whether or not there were other candidates available for the command role.

Thought Hood by most measures (without going into the reasons or particular circumstances, or considering questions of zeal), performed poorly in execution of his field leadership in '64 (and '65). My argument is that his performances during this phase relegated him to be among the conflict's worst high commanders. (Field defeats are one thing. But Hood's decisions and actions destroyed an army, rather than preserve/maintain it as an effective fighting force).

 

[tony_gunter]

Any discussion of top ten worst commanders on the federal side that doesn't include Lincoln is remiss.

 

[Scott1967]

Skill set aside- some of these guys just keep getting trounced because they're not particularly likable.

Dan Sickles causes bile to rise in my throat- but he no way deserves this list.

Top 10 worst- no. Humongous turd- yes.

All his men liked him and after the war he would very rarely miss veteran meetings in fact he was always thought of very highly by the veterans for his kindness towards them.

I have a soft spot for Uncle Dan.

 

[JerryD]

Any discussion of top ten worst commanders on the federal side that doesn't include Lincoln is remiss.

Well, of course, the question was about worst generals on either side. But if we ignore that, do you feel the same about Davis on the CSA side?

 

[tony_gunter]

Well, of course, the question was about worst generals on either side. But if we ignore that, do you feel the same about Davis on the CSA side?

Oh definitely, Lincoln's saving grace is that Davis was just as bad if not worse in the commander in chief role.

 

[tony_gunter]

Well, of course, the question was about worst generals on either side. But if we ignore that, do you feel the same about Davis on the CSA side?

So … does a commander in chief who gets directly involved in directing military operations not count as a general of sorts?

Both Davis and Lincoln got pretty far down into the weeds at points in the war. We see both at Vicksburg, Lincoln appointing not only the commanders of the effort to take Vicksburg but the avenue of approach, while Davis superseded Johnston in directing Pemberton's course of action.

 

[121st PA Vols]

So … does a commander in chief who gets directly involved in directing military operations not count as a general of sorts?

Both Davis and Lincoln got pretty far down into the weeds at points in the war. We see both at Vicksburg, Lincoln appointing not only the commanders of the effort to take Vicksburg but the avenue of approach, while Davis superseded Johnston in directing Pemberton's course of action.

What's surprising is a man of Davis's background did not do better in his capacity of Commander in Chief. Then again, maybe he did ok given the challenge of defending such a HUGE area relative to the North. Those are much different challenges (offense vs defense) that may be hard to balance doing a comparison of the two.

 

[JerryD]

So … does a commander in chief who gets directly involved in directing military operations not count as a general of sorts?

Both Davis and Lincoln got pretty far down into the weeds at points in the war. We see both at Vicksburg, Lincoln appointing not only the commanders of the effort to take Vicksburg but the avenue of approach, while Davis superseded Johnston in directing Pemberton's course of action.

I mean, Presidents are just not generals. They have a whole host of other responsibilities and resources that generals dont, so I dont think its appropriate to lump them together with generals. They have a clearly defined and understood role, so I think they should be judged on how they performed in that role. Not, for example, comparing the relative merits of Hood vs. Lincoln. Its apples and oranges, or perhaps more accurately, apples and coffee or some other non-fruit. Davis vs. Lincoln is the appropriate comparison.

 

[tony_gunter]

I mean, Presidents are just not generals. They have a whole host of other responsibilities and resources that generals dont, so I dont think its appropriate to lump them together with generals. They have a clearly defined and understood role,

I don't think anyone really understood the commander in chief role in 1860, Lincoln and Davis among them.

When Lincoln, instead of discussing strategy with McClellan or even responding to his plan, issues an order for all federal forces to attack simultaneously on February 17th 1862, he's most certainly stepping into the top general role.

 

[JerryD]

I don't think anyone really understood the commander in chief role in 1860, Lincoln and Davis among them.

When Lincoln, instead of discussing strategy with McClellan or even responding to his plan, issues an order for all federal forces to attack simultaneously on February 17th 1862, he's most certainly stepping into the top general role.

Naw, I think that was just him expressing his frustration that Little Mac wouldnt budge or even share his plans.

 

[tony_gunter]

Naw, I think that was just him expressing his frustration that Little Mac wouldnt budge or even share his plans.

McClellan shared his plan, then began building the army. Lincoln never responded to the plan.

It was a dumb plan IMO, but it's somewhat incumbent on Lincoln to approve or disapprove the plan of his top general before ordering some random order to attack.

 

[archieclement]

There's one omission I find a little curious......

Lee in no small part cemented his place on list of great generals with his performance defying rather steep odds with his Chancellorsville performance.......

So how does Hooker who manages to lose Chancellorsville campaign despite having substantial numerical advantage not be included on list?

 

[JerryD]

McClellan shared his plan, then began building the army. Lincoln never responded to the plan.

It was a dumb plan IMO, but it's somewhat incumbent on Lincoln to approve or disapprove the plan of his top general before ordering some random order to attack.

Not sure I remember it the same way. My memory is that Mac did not reveal to Lincoln his plan to go by water until after General Order No. 1. On Jan 12, 1862 was first time he mentioned moving by water, but would give no details or answer any questions. On January 27 Lincoln issued orders to move by 2/22, and to take Overland Route. On Jan 31 Mac replied and gave detailed plans for the Peninsula Campaign.