Did The West Matter?

[Glorybound]

by Larry:

Bringing the embryo of freedom to a few hundred thousand folks was perhaps worth the cost, but it's a shame that result couldn't have been achieved by less destructive means.

I can't add anything to that except "Amen".



Lee

 

[ole]

I'd say Donelson opened the wound that was a slow bleed and eventually killed the South. It opened the door to Middle Tennessee and all it contained. It allowed the eventual advance to Chattanoga and that split the Confederacy in two. Chattanoga began the long death knell.

An apt analogy. Battles in 1861 were bloody noses. The first real damage done to Rebel troops was delivered at Ft. Donelson. It delivered up Nashville and Kentucky, and opened the door to Shiloh, Memphis, and Columbus.

 

[Elennsar]

I am strongly inclined to agree that it was the first step on a long road of disappointment and defeat, but if other things had turned out differently, the war on the whole might have turned out differently as well.

Would have been quite hard to reverse course, though. Donelson in and of itself was not major, though losing so many men (even if only temporally) was a grevious blow. Nashville and Kentucky...now we have a true disaster.

In my opinion, at least.

 

[trice]

If it lost the war at Fort Donelson, it is rather impressive (or crazy) that it continued for two plus years with a fighting chance of getting the North to give up.

Having not read Gott's book, I can't say how good it is, but I find it very hard to believe any event that happened in 1862 "cost" the South the war. It may have put the South in a very bad position and it may have been the first step on one (or more) of the paths that lead to Southern defeat, but "the war was lost when Fort Donelson fell" seems exagerated at best.

If it is late April, 1861 and you are trying to figure out a plan to defend the South, here's what you would come up with:
1) defend and control Richmond
2) defend and control the northern Mississippi (i.e., Memphis and above)
3) defend and control the southern Mississippi (i.e., New Orleans and below)
4) defend and control access to the Tennessee/Cumberland River system
5) defend and control the RR approach through Nashville into the heartland.
6) defend and control the major seaports (i.e., Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile in addition to New Orleans)

Other areas are important, perhaps, but not essential. Any attempt to actually defeat and conquer the rebellion must pass through one or more of those areas. Any campaigns that don't pass through those points will always be secondary and cannot achieve major results by themselves.

As long as the South can accomplish the six points above, they will win the war. For reasons that Whitworth reminds us of quite rightly, any successful Union effort will have to come through them. Logistics and transportaion realities will dictate this. My only difference with Whitworth on that issue is in the immediacy of the impact (i.e., I think short-term tactical and operational movements are not as controlled by them as he does).

Between February and May of 1862, the South:
1) lost control of the Tennessee/Cumberland river system at Ft. Henry and Ft. Donelson
2) lost control of the RR route into the TN heartland at Nashville.
3) lost control of the northern Mississippi River (Pope's campaign, naval defeat on river, Shiloh, fall of Corinth and Memphis)
4) lost control of the entrance to the Mississippi and New Orleans (Farragut).

All of that was in the West. The South managed to hold the seaports and Richmond until late 1864 and early 1865. Losing these essential points so early is the reason the South remained constantly on the defensive thereafter, and why the Union armies in the West had so much success thereafter.

Saying the Confederacy was doomed at that point is too strong. But this is the equivalent of a pro basketball team being swept on their home court in the first two games of a seven-game playoff series. It is still possible for them to win, but which way would you bet?

Tim

 

[5fish]

Lives--

The West must of matter for a lot of lives were lost by both sides with one trying to conquer it while he other defended it.

To many lives lost for the west not to matter....

 

[trice]

I am strongly inclined to agree that it was the first step on a long road of disappointment and defeat, but if other things had turned out differently, the war on the whole might have turned out differently as well.

Would have been quite hard to reverse course, though. Donelson in and of itself was not major, though losing so many men (even if only temporally) was a grevious blow. Nashville and Kentucky...now we have a true disaster.

In my opinion, at least.

Given the state of affairs in early 1862, the Confederates needed to hold both Ft. Donelson and Bowling Green to keep Nashville. Holding just one of the two was no good.

If Ft. Donelson falls, Johnston must immediately abandon Bowling Green to withdraw to Nashville, or he will be cut off by an advance along the Cumberland River.

If Buell were to drive Johnston (Hardee) from Bowling Green, he would follow it up with a drive on Nashville along the RR. The force at Ft. Donelson would then have to abandon the place to avoid being cut off.

If the Confederates try to pull back both forces to Nashville and unite to fight a battle, the combined pursuing forces of Buell and Grant will greatly outnumber them, and Union gunboats will enable the Union to command the river and get Buell's troops across.

As a result, the Confederates need success on both fronts to hold Nashville. The Union only needs success on one front to make the entire Confederate position collapse.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

Agreed. What I meant was, simply "hold Fort Donelson" was not vital one way or another.

The actual ground of Fort Donelson is not particularly valuable. The defense of Nashville is very important. So "hold the fort" is only relevant to the extent that it helps Nashville is what I meant. If you could ignore Donelson (Ninja stealth movement by Grant! :laugh1: ), it would be kind of useless to be able to hold it.

And agreed on the baseball metaphor. That sums it up quite well.

 

[ole]

Agreed. What I meant was, simply "hold Fort Donelson" was not vital one way or another.

No, no, no. Without Donelson, Nashville was open to invasion via the Cumberland. Remember that Nashville was, at the time, virtually without fortification. (The old NIMBY routine.) Troops and gunboats coming upriver couldn't readily be resisted. Without Nashville, Bowling Green is cut off.

Donelson was the first domino in the sting -- hence Gott's premise that here was where the south lost. The Federals had to have Donelson or fight a costly overland campaign to drive the Rebs from Kentucky first, and from Nashville second. Donelson accomplished both.

 

[Elennsar]

Eeeek, being clear as mud, I am.

What I mean is, the area directly commanded by Fort Donelson's guns was not important.

So if Grant could just teleport around the fort, it wouldn't matter if it held until the end of the world.

But yes, holding the passage that it guarded was extremely important. Either it had to be held there or somewhere else, and there was no prepared (even half prepared) "somewhere else".

 

[larry_cockerham]

Eeeek, being clear as mud, I am.

What I mean is, the area directly commanded by Fort Donelson's guns was not important.

So if Grant could just teleport around the fort, it wouldn't matter if it held until the end of the world.

But yes, holding the passage that it guarded was extremely important. Either it had to be held there or somewhere else, and there was no prepared (even half prepared) "somewhere else".

The one limitation to forts is that they are stationary. In Ft. Donelson's case the gun implacements held one superb view of the river and populated what amounted to a shooting gallery for approaching vessels. Once those guns were removed, the only obstacle to Nashville was low water during the summer months. The railroad runing east-west from Cumberland City would have just as easily served as a by-pass route for the US Army. Grant could have taken Nashville, either way. As has been pointed out, there simply weren't enough Confederates in place to defend Nashville for more than a token resistance. Once the supply line from Nashville down the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad was occupied by the US Army, it was like giving Boardwalk and Park Place away at the start of the game. A better managed Confederate war effort could certainly have made a better 'game' of it and did, for the most part. Population was the key to the war. Even if the Confederacy drafted Granny to swell the ranks, it was an uphill battle in the long run.

 

[Elennsar]

And with the need to hold so many places, the tactical advantage of the defense could easily be negated, one way or another.

I would not say the South was facing a hopeless fight. But even if it hadn't lost what it did in early 1862, it was fighting with only one arm.

It had a few chances to "force the North to give up", or push the war in that direction, but I truly cannot think of anywhere it had any true possibility of a chance to dictate peace on its terms.

 

[trice]

Eeeek, being clear as mud, I am.

What I mean is, the area directly commanded by Fort Donelson's guns was not important.

So if Grant could just teleport around the fort, it wouldn't matter if it held until the end of the world.

But yes, holding the passage that it guarded was extremely important. Either it had to be held there or somewhere else, and there was no prepared (even half prepared) "somewhere else".

The importance of the ground at Fort Donelson is the reason they built the fort there: high ground near a sharp bend in the river. This is the ideal position to build a fort to control river traffic, because the approaching boats, moving against the current, will have to slow and maneuver around the bend while under the fire of your guns. Ideally, you have one or more batteries on high ground to deliver a plunging fire, and one or more at river level to deliver a flat-trajectory fire, and you want to extend the time the gunboats are caught in their crossfire (which is why you weant to make them maneuver around a bend while you are shooting at them).

While Ft. Donelson's location was good for defending the river, Ft. Henry was bad -- so bad it was flooded by the rising Tennessee River when attacked. It would have been better to build the defenses a few miles further north, where the rivers were closer together and a single complex of mutually supporting forts could have protected both. But when the construction started, that would have meant invading "neutral" KY, so the forts had to be built below the TN-KY line.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

Yeah. But if it wasn't for Nashville (and Johnston's whol defense line, such as it was), holding Fort Donelson would not have been very important.

It was ground vital to hold to prevent a stab elsewhere, but whether or not Confederate soldiers occupied Fort Donelson or kept Union soldiers from being anywhere near the place, as long as that avenue was closed it was good.

That's what I mean by the "area directly commanded by the fort's guns". The area literally within range of them was not vital. The area that the fort was built to block (enemy) access to, yes.

 

[trice]

The one limitation to forts is that they are stationary. In Ft. Donelson's case the gun implacements held one superb view of the river and populated what amounted to a shooting gallery for approaching vessels. Once those guns were removed, the only obstacle to Nashville was low water during the summer months. The railroad runing east-west from Cumberland City would have just as easily served as a by-pass route for the US Army. Grant could have taken Nashville, either way. As has been pointed out, there simply weren't enough Confederates in place to defend Nashville for more than a token resistance. Once the supply line from Nashville down the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad was occupied by the US Army, it was like giving Boardwalk and Park Place away at the start of the game. A better managed Confederate war effort could certainly have made a better 'game' of it and did, for the most part. Population was the key to the war. Even if the Confederacy drafted Granny to swell the ranks, it was an uphill battle in the long run.

Larry,

Assuming we are talking about the same RR, the Nashville & Northwestern RR did not reach as far as Cumberland City in early 1862. It was started before the war, but only extended to Kingston Springs, about 24 miles of track from Nashville. Another section from the Mississippi River to McKenzie on the Tennessee had also been completed. There was a gap in the middle.

After Nashville fell, the Union took the line over and built it out to what is now Johnsonville. Sherman used this as a way to get supplies to Nashville in 1864, and Forrest destroyed that place in late October of 1864.

Tim

 

[larry_cockerham]

Tim, thanks for filling in the important details. Gaps in railroads were a problem in all the Confederate states which plagued the CSA all through the war. The nation was building as the war was tearing it down. Clinton, Tennessee also proved to be a valuable 'drop off' point for federal supplies. Mules and wagons were the great complement to under-developed railroads.

 

[whitworth]

Most Battle Historians Cover the East and Virginia

The Confederacy was losing in the west from 1862. The Confederacy was unable to properly defend its territory. Attrition slowly killed the Confederacy, that by late 1864, it could claim only most of Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina and South Carolina, Florida, Texas, and eastern Virginia.

If historians stressed the west, instead of the Army of Northern Virginia, the attitude of future generations about the war might have been different.

 

[whitworth]

Grant made brilliant use of Union Steamboat Superiority

Grant's Memoirs

"None of the reinforcements from Buell's army arrived until the 24th of February. Then General Nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo. I knew General Buell was advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the South. I had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelson to proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson. I sent a gunboat also as a convoy. The Cumberland River was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. Nashville is on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching from the east. I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of Buell's forces across. I ordered Nelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to return below the city and await orders. Buell, however, had already arrived in person at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possession of the city."