Did Doubleday do a good job?

[MikeyB]

How would you rate Doubleday's command performance of the I corps after the death of Reynolds? Should he have gotten a shot, or at least been allowed to command through the rest of the battle? Was John Newton really an upgrade?

 

[rpkennedy]

How would you rate Doubleday's command performance of the I corps after the death of Reynolds? Should he have gotten a shot, or at least been allowed to command through the rest of the battle? Was John Newton really an upgrade?

Doubleday was an able commander but was never going to be flashy. But July 1, 1863 was probably his finest hour of the war. He effectively shuffled his troops around to face crises as they arose and performed about as well as anyone thrown into that position could have.

As for Newton, I would not say that he was an upgrade. He was an ok general but nothing special.

Ryan

 

[rbasin]

Newton was the more professional general.

 

[Scott Brown]

I would just add that Meade chose to replace Doubleday before receiving Hancock's message from Gettysburg with the P. S. that Howard said Doubleday's command gave way. The argument can even be made (based on the placement of the order for Newton to take command in OR vol 51) that Meade made the replacement decision before First Corps even got to Gettysburg.

It is also worth noting that in his account in vol 5 of the Supplement to the Official Records, Doubleday stated that if Meade had told him of the order from Stanton giving Meade permission to assign command without regard to seniority, he would not have given Meade his ultimatum.

 

[Hoplite]

Newton was the more professional general.

What do you mean by more professional?
You have to look at alot of decisions made during the war with both a military and a political eye.
Doubleday was not one of Meade's favorites, and Meade had the authority from Lincoln to replace commanders as he chose.
Newton remember was also involved in the McClellan coup, for which he really should have been dismissed.
Did Meade make a mistake- probably, though I doubt Doubleday could have done any better-not that I Corps had much left or much of a chance after July 1, and vindication of sorts was doled out when Congress refused to confirm Newton as a major general.
Probably Meade's bigger hiccup was choosing French to replace Sickles for III Corps. It is debatable if French's poor performance cost the AOP a chance to catch and destroy Lee before he could cross back into Virginia.

 

[Poorlaggedman]

I'm not really sure how much July 1st had to do with Doubleday. Obviously he was there and in command and made the decisions to hold the line he had, Reynolds having left him with little information. Wadsworth, Rowley, Wainwright, and others didn't seem to think all that much of him. At one point Wainwright was badmouthing Doubleday and Doubleday's choice of a headquarters position near the Seminary grove. His division commanders were more-or-less acting on their own hook.

The soldiers were willing to fight like hell and Doubleday further misunderstood orders from Howard and subsequently massed artillery to hold Seminary ridge at all hazards. That's not a result of tactical mastery, that's just fortune. Without the massed guns, a risky and desperate move, 1st Corps losses might have been even higher. The Confederates made no use of the Fairfield road despite Herr Ridge road providing quick access. There's too much happenstance to form a solid opinion on his performance.

His book is good though and there's a free audio book of it on YouTube if you've got five hours to kill.

 

[121st PA Vols]

@Poorlaggedman, Buford (Gamble) had a major presence on Seminary Ridge after falling back, south of the Fairfield Road and into the fields farther west (well west) that threatened Pender's right (Lane). Point being, Buford denied Pender freedom of movement along the Fairfield Road initially as a blocking element that was then scattered. But every moment counted with Buford again showing well.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Some Doubleday encounters that reinforce what @Poorlaggedman wrote above:

(July 1, early afternoon) Received orders from Doubleday through an aide to move our men over the crest of the hill behind us. Ordered about face, marched back about four rods when Gen. Wadsworth rode up and asked why I was going back. (I told him that I was ordered to.) He asked where Doubleday was, I pointed to the grove in the rear. Speaking to an aide he said, "Give my compliments to Gen. Doubleday and tell him he can't see down there what is going on over here." [Biddle Family Papers, Maj. Alexander Biddle, 121 PA]

(July 1, about 5 p.m.) Commenced laying down head-stones and iron fence [on Cemetery Hill]; this by order of Gen. O. O. Howard, which called out some sharp words from Gen. Doubleday. … Had the advice of Gen. D. been listened to we should not have held the hill thirty minutes. (Sgt. Charles E. Stubbs, 2nd Maine Battery, Bachelder Papers, 2:887)

(July 1, about 5:30 p.m.) [Hancock] directed me to get a brigade from the 1st Corps to occupy the western slope of [Culp's] hill. I delivered my message to the corps commander [Doubleday], informing him of the emergency, who with the beaten demeanor that characterized some persons on that field protested that his men were worn out, cut up, had no ammunition, etc. … It seems General Hancock, who had followed behind me, overheard the conversation, for I heard him roar out, 'General … I want you to understand that I am in command here, send every man you have.' Wadsworth's division was sent … [Lt. Col. Charles H. Morgan, Hancock's inspector general and chief of staff, Bachelder Papers, 3:1351-1352]

(July 1, about 5:45 p.m.) General Doubleday sent me to get some intrenching tools, and as I was coming back with them, I met General Hancock, who told me to send them back. [War Diary and Letters of Stephen Minot Weld, 1861-1865 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1979), p. 231]

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

My first thought was Cutler's line from his OR after the brigade's involvement at the Iverson Pits.

"After waiting about twenty minutes, I moved the brigade to the railroad, with a view to forming under cover of its bank and trying to hold him [the Confederates] in check there..." (OR Volume 27)

Brigade commanders acting under their own initiative while being hard pressed by the enemy is not an indicator that Doubleday had control over the field.

 

[Hoplite]

My first thought was Cutler's line from his OR after the brigade's involvement at the Iverson Pits.

"After waiting about twenty minutes, I moved the brigade to the railroad, with a view to forming under cover of its bank and trying to hold him [the Confederates] in check there..." (OR Volume 27)

Brigade commanders acting under their own initiative while being hard pressed by the enemy is not an indicator that Doubleday had control over the field.

I thought the issue was Doubleday vs Newton?
Meade was a strong personality, well known and had strong opinions about officers, and was West Point thru and thru.
Lincoln had given him almost carte blanche to change officers as he saw fit.
I do not know enough about the Howard 'tattling' on Doubleday supposition, but I don't think that made much of a difference.
Meade did not like Doubleday from years before, so putting someone else in command of I Corps was most likely going to happen no matter what. Meade had grown up in the AOP and knew the officer corps and had formulated strong opinions about them.

The issue is WHO Meade chose.
I pointed out before that Meade made some questionable decisions as regards commanders, based on his bias toward seniority (why else would you put French in command of anything), political leanings (Birney was an abolitionist) and simply personal antipathy.
Was Newton really an upgrade or was it a lateral move?

I still cannot fathom why Meade would have chosen to promote Newton- a man who clearly had violated most of the principals professional officers lived by and that Meade seemingly believed in. Yes Meade carped about Hooker and others, heck you had to look long and hard to find an AOP general who didn't at some point, but what Newton did by going directly to DC and the president, that was egregious and baffling why it was not dealt with right away. Yes Newton got his when Congress refused to ratify his promotion- I guess pay back.

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

@Hoplite I'm adding to @Tom Elmore's point. I have no opinion on Doubleday vs. Newton.

 

[Hoplite]

@Hoplite I'm adding to @Tom Elmore's point. I have no opinion on Doubleday vs. Newton.

Beg your pardon, did not mean to imply anything, just added my reply on top, sorry!

 

[121st PA Vols]

I believe we did this topic a week or two ago so here's a shorter version since I of course lost those notes.

Although the question is "rating his command performance of the 1st Corps after the death of Rynolds", I'd like to 'break ranks' a moment with his performance before Reynolds death as he was the corps commander since Reynolds elevation to Wing Command.
* He got artillery (Wainwright) moving on the morning of the first day from Marsh Creek and the divisions gathered for march in good order, evidently functioning well in that role albeit with Reynold's close supervision early on.
* He was competent enough to have a reserve ready in the form of the 6th Wis (344 men) and the Brigade Guard (Iron, 100 men) in area of Seminary Bldgs that was a game changer when Davis broke through at the cut, ordered there by Doubleday.
* Ordered a brigade to cover Cutler's right (lull), eventually forwarding entire div of Robinson to the corps line right at Mummasburg Rd.
* Oversaw/shared troop realignment during lull.
* Said he posted Buford to the left to watch approaches down Fairfield (Hagerstown) Rd. (No source, general's word on this).
* Assisted in artillery placement along Seminary Ridge at withdraw to Wainwright's displeasure!

Other than Newton being same class at West Point, I don't know anything about the man. Closing on Doubleday, he was a West Point grad who worked his way up the ranks regardless of any personality issues. When the action started, Doubleday was there, in the thick of it, never shirking, always brave, doing his duty.

 

[Poorlaggedman]

/\ You demonstrate that he was active. How does it compare to what other Corps commanders did? Certainly Doubleday messed up by massing artillery on Seminary Ridge, both he and Wainwright claim that they both were present and both misunderstood what the German courier from Howard was saying (Hold Cemetery Hill vs Seminary Hill). That was why they tried to hold it by massing guns.

It's a matter of opinion. Everyone has their abilities and flaws but the circumstances are too influential. I'm not sure if we're capable (as a species) to really judge with accuracy the ability of people we've never met or dealt with. All these battles hedge on the tiniest things and smallest decisions from the Battle of Cannae to Midway. Maybe if Rodes' division (CSA) didn't get so trashed at Carlisle June 30th then they would have been more effective July 1st. The slightest change makes a world of difference so how can you judge someone's overall military prowess off a few hours of command?

Doubleday thought that Herbst Woods had all the advantages of a 'redoubt' which could stop any on the Fairfield or Chambersburg roads. The officers of the Iron brigade didn't think so, they wanted to get the heck out of there and asked permission more than once to fall back. Who was right? Victory vs defeat makes all the difference and in a victory everyone's willing to forgive any missteps.

 

[121st PA Vols]

/\ You demonstrate that he was active. How does it compare to what other Corps commanders did? Certainly Doubleday messed up by massing artillery on Seminary Ridge, both he and Wainwright claim that they both were present and both misunderstood what the German courier from Howard was saying (Hold Cemetery Hill vs Seminary Hill). That was why they tried to hold it by massing guns.

It's a matter of opinion. Everyone has their abilities and flaws but the circumstances are too influential. I'm not sure if we're capable (as a species) to really judge with accuracy the ability of people we've never met or dealt with. All these battles hedge on the tiniest things and smallest decisions from the Battle of Cannae to Midway. Maybe if Rodes' division (CSA) didn't get so trashed at Carlisle June 30th then they would have been more effective July 1st. The slightest change makes a world of difference so how can you judge someone's overall military prowess off a few hours of command?

Doubleday thought that Herbst Woods had all the advantages of a 'redoubt' which could stop any on the Fairfield or Chambersburg roads. The officers of the Iron brigade didn't think so, they wanted to get the heck out of there and asked permission more than once to fall back. Who was right? Victory vs defeat makes all the difference and in a victory everyone's willing to forgive any missteps.

@Poorlaggedman, didn't see your good response. Here goes belatedly with a few thoughts by paragraph.

Para#1; I don't think you can compare Doubleday's reign of a few hours (on field) to other corps commanders. I believe you said as much in you second paragraph at the end as well. And that's an excellent reminder of the language barrier that likely reared its head in other unrecorded events throughout the battle and war.
I don't know how you measure if Doubleday messed up maintaining an artillery line on Seminary Ridge. How many guns/men did they lose? How many escaped because of the guns? They inflicted sever casualties, especially Scales. We know he was in a quandary as to the value Reynolds placed on the ground including Herbst Woods. The place obviously had value or he wouldn't have fought there. But how much?

Para#2; Agree wholeheartedly. As you said "The slightest change makes all the difference...." This particular 'vagary' (Doubleday replacing Reynolds) hinged on a matter of inches and timing with General Reynolds falling as he did; had he lingered here or there a few moments reviewing orders with Howard at the tavern?, Rodes and the boys imbibing just a little less, Howard 'up' a half hour earlier securing Oak Hill?....on and on.
I also think we're not capable of judging with accuracy the ability of people we've never met or dealt with. I'll take it a step further that I personally don't feel comfortable with harsh criticism of these men and their decisions. We can talk about it but hopefully with a level of restraint and respect. We're sitting back with the aid of hindsight benefitted and bolstered by scholarship telling us this and that while they were making split decisions with the scantest of information while all hell was breaking loose around them.

Para#3; I guess the issue with Herbst Woods is while it had value, it didn't have enough men to hold it or make it a viable redoubt. And you can't blame the officers wanting to withdraw anymore in my view than you can Doubleday for wanting to hold it knowing he was operating under assumptions the ground was to be held.

 

[Scott Brown]

@Poorlaggedman, didn't see your good response. Here goes belatedly with a few thoughts by paragraph.

Para#1; I don't think you can compare Doubleday's reign of a few hours (on field) to other corps commanders. I believe you said as much in you second paragraph at the end as well. And that's an excellent reminder of the language barrier that likely reared its head in other unrecorded events throughout the battle and war.
I don't know how you measure if Doubleday messed up maintaining an artillery line on Seminary Ridge. How many guns/men did they lose? How many escaped because of the guns? They inflicted sever casualties, especially Scales. We know he was in a quandary as to the value Reynolds placed on the ground including Herbst Woods. The place obviously had value or he wouldn't have fought there. But how much?

Para#2; Agree wholeheartedly. As you said "The slightest change makes all the difference...." This particular 'vagary' (Doubleday replacing Reynolds) hinged on a matter of inches and timing with General Reynolds falling as he did; had he lingered here or there a few moments reviewing orders with Howard at the tavern?, Rodes and the boys imbibing just a little less, Howard 'up' a half hour earlier securing Oak Hill?....on and on.
I also think we're not capable of judging with accuracy the ability of people we've never met or dealt with. I'll take it a step further that I personally don't feel comfortable with harsh criticism of these men and their decisions. We can talk about it but hopefully with a level of restraint and respect. We're sitting back with the aid of hindsight benefitted and bolstered by scholarship telling us this and that while they were making split decisions with the scantest of information while all hell was breaking loose around them.

Para#3; I guess the issue with Herbst Woods is while it had value, it didn't have enough men to hold it or make it a viable redoubt. And you can't blame the officers wanting to withdraw anymore in my view than you can Doubleday for wanting to hold it knowing he was operating under assumptions the ground was to be held.

Great post. I especially liked your second para in Para#2

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Interestingly, Newton and Doubleday were in the same West Point class (1842). Newton finished 2nd and became a career engineer. Doubleday finished in the middle and spent his career in artillery.

Doubleday's military career was sidelined for the rest of the war because of Gettysburg. Methinks Meade wasn't the only one who disliked him.

Meade did not like Doubleday from years before,

What was their beef?

 

[rpkennedy]

What was their beef?

I don't know of any particular incident that led to the animosity between Meade and Doubleday but Meade had criticized Doubleday's leadership as far back as the Antietam Campaign. Plus, both had rather prickly personalities so a character conflict shouldn't be all that surprising.

Ryan