Decisions at Raymond Part 2

[tony_gunter]

McPherson marches to Utica. Other than occasional small unidentified mounted units being chased away by his cavalry, he's in open country along the ridge road from Utica to Raymond. His primary struggle at this point is maintaining proximity to water. He inches forward to within 12 miles of Raymond.

If the plan is for McPherson to push forward to the railroad, it could be critical to maintain a strong cavalry screen. But he suspects that troops from Port Hudson may be reinforcing Jackson. He sends his lone cavalry regiment to strike the railroad at Crystal Springs and gather intel about the operational situation.

Is this a wise use of cavalry? Would it have been better to keep them close at hand until receiving the order to move to Raymond?

 

[alan polk]

McPherson marches to Utica. Other than occasional small unidentified mounted units being chased away by his cavalry, he's in open country along the ridge road from Utica to Raymond. His primary struggle at this point is maintaining proximity to water. He inches forward to within 12 miles of Raymond.

If the plan is for McPherson to push forward to the railroad, it could be critical to maintain a strong cavalry screen. But he suspects that troops from Port Hudson made be reinforcing Jackson. He sends his lone cavalry regiment to strike the railroad at Crystal Springs and gather intel about the operational situation.

Is this a wise use of cavalry? Would it have been better to keep them close at hand until receiving the order to move to Raymond?

Well, regardless of whose idea it initially was to move the cavalry to Crystal Springs, Grant ultimately told him to do it beforehand, so the onus would be on Grant not McPherson.

I think everyone knows that Pemberton's cavalry was so few in number and scattered that they offered little to no threat at all.

The only Confederate forces in the immediate area at that time which could have possibly threatened McPherson's two divisions were on the other side of the Big Black River and/or on the opposite bank of 14-Mile Creek, hemmed in and facing McClernand's large corps. No threat from them.

I'm too lazy to check right now, and I don't remember offhand, but weren't McClernand's/Sherman's cavalry able to take up any slack temporarily made by the move of McPherson's cavalry?

With all this considered, then, the cavalry move to the railroad at Crystal Springs was completely reasonable. Not only to retard Port Hudson troops from moving to Jackson, but making durn sure none of them had unloaded at Crystal Springs and were marching toward Raymond/Utica from that direction.

 

[tony_gunter]

Well, regardless of whose idea it initially was to move the cavalry to Crystal Springs, Grant ultimately told him to do it beforehand, so the onus would be on Grant not McPherson.

Grant instructed McPherson to send his cavalry as far out to the southeast as he could to watch for the enemy.

McPherson sent his cavalry on a 50 mile round trip to break the railroad.

Also, McPherson ordered Wright to undertake the raid around noon, Grant's instruction was written after 4 pm, so McPherson made that call before getting any order from Grant if I'm reading the communications correctly.

I think everyone knows that Pemberton's cavalry was so few in number and scattered that they offered little to no threat at all.

The only Confederate forces in the immediate area at that time which could have possibly threatened McPherson's two divisions were on the other side of the Big Black River and/or on the opposite bank of 14-Mile Creek, hemmed in and facing McClernand's large corps. No threat from them.

I'm too lazy to check right now, and I don't remember offhand, but weren't McClernand's/Sherman's cavalry able to take up any slack temporarily made by the move of McPherson's cavalry?

With all this considered, then, the cavalry move to the railroad at Crystal Springs was completely reasonable. Not only to retard Port Hudson troops from moving to Jackson, but making durn sure none of them had unloaded at Crystal Springs and were marching toward Raymond/Utica from that direction.

If I remember correctly, each corps had a cavalry regiment attached (and maybe two for McClernand? I always lose track of the cavalry). McPherson blew his on the raid, so he screened his move to Raymond by consolidating the escort companies.

The Confederate cavalry (Wirt Adams and the 20th Mississippi Mounted Infantry) was going to be my next decision that I asked about, but maybe not since we're taking about it here. Pemberton ordered them to Raymond to scout the roads leading south / east. Then Bowen ordered them to Edwards. Pemberton, if I remember correctly, told them to split the difference and cover literally everything between Edwards and Raymond.

Wirt Adams then decided to concentrate his force on the halfway point near Dillon's since a movement had been detected there (Sherman pushing up to Fourteen Mile Creek).

It could have been a different fight for Raymond and Jackson I suppose if he had split his force amongst the roads: 400 at Dillon's, 400 exploring the road to Utica?

Pemberton had ordered Gregg to fall back if confronted by a larger force, and Pemberton would attempt to strike Grant in flank when he passed to the east.

At any rate, McPherson's lack of cavalry made it all but impossible to pursue when Wirt Adams showed up with his Demi-brigade and covered the retreat from Raymond.

 

[tony_gunter]

Well, regardless of whose idea it initially was to move the cavalry to Crystal Springs, Grant ultimately told him to do it beforehand, so the onus would be on Grant not McPherson.

Here are the relevant communications. McClernand writes Grant at 9 a.m. on the 10th, informing him that McClernand's men have reached 5 Mile Creek. Grant doesn't receive it until 4 pm. and responds. Grant then writes McPherson telling him McClernand's position and asking him to send the cavalry out to watch the southeast. McPherson writes back: oopsies, the cavalry already left.

Cayuga, Miss,, May 10, 1863. Maj. Gen. IJ. S. Grant, Comdg. Dept. of the Tennessee:
General : The head of my column is arrived at this place. Its advance guard is at Five-Mile Creek. Various rumors of the enemy's crossing detachments of cavalry and infantry over Big Black are afloat, but as yet are unauthenticated.
I beg to remind you again that my corps is supplied with a very small number of teams, and their cooking utensils in large part are behind. It is but just, both to you and myself, that this fact should be stated. Your most obedient servant,
JOHN A. McCLERNAND.

Cayuga, Miss., May 10, 1863—4 p. m. Maj. Gen. John A. McOlernand, Comdg. Thirteenth Army Corps:
Your note, written at 9 a. m., is just received. My headquarters will remain here to-night aud be removed to Auburn in the morning. You need not move to-morrow, except to better your position on Five-Mile Creek.
Sherman, whose rear will not be able to pass this place to-night, will move up so as to be about the same distance from the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad as yourself. McPherson will also move on to about the same east and west line, starting from Utica.
Your note complains of want of transportation. I have passed one and a part of another of your divisions, and am satisfied that the transportation with them, to say nothing of the large number of mules mounted by soldiers, would carry the essential parts of five days' rations for the command to which they belong, if relieved of the knapsacks, officers, soldiers, and negroes now riding. You should take steps to make the means at hand available for bringing up the articles necessary for your corps. Equal facilities have been given each of the army corps in all respects, no special order having been given to favor any one, except to give the first 30 wagons to the Thirteenth Army Corps.
U. S. GRANT.

Cayuga, Miss., May 10, 1863.
Maj. Gen. J. B. McPherson, Comdg. Seventeenth Army Corps: General McOlernand is now on Five-Mile Creek, on the Telegraph road to Edwards Station. He is directed to move no farther to-morrow, but to reconnoiter the road to Fourteen-Mile Creek. Sherman will not get much past this place to-night. In the morning he will move forward to Auburn, and, if he meets with no resistance, will throw his advance forward to Fourteen-Mile Creek, on the Raymond road.
Move your command forward also, so as to occupy something near the same east and west line with the other army corps. Let me know what point you move to. Send your cavalry out to watch the enemy as far to the southeast as you can.
U. S. GRANT.

Headquarters Seventeenth Army Corps,
Weeks' Plantation, 4 miles east of Utica, May 10, 1863.
Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant,
Commanding Department of the Tennessee :
General : Inclosed please find a sketch of my position.* The road is very dry and dusty following the divide between Big Black and north fork of Bayou Pierre. There are no streams on the road, and the troops have suffered some for want of water.
On my arrival in Utica about noon, I found Colonel Wright, with his cavalry, who reported considerable skirmishing with the enemy, but as no one was hurt, the skirmishing amounted to very little. There were probably 100 rebel cavalry in our front, and a small force reported at the bridge across Tallahala Creek, north fork of Bayou Pierre, on the road to Crystal Springs. I immediately dispatched Colonel Wright, with his whole cavalry force, in a southeast direction, crossing the creek lower down than where this force was said to be stationed, and then to proceed up on the south side and cut them off, if possible. He was also instructed to learn all he could of the movements of the enemy, and as it is only 18 or 20 miles to the Mississippi Central Bailroad, and probably not many troops in that direction, to make a dash over that way, and destroy the telegraph and railroad track, if he should find it j)racticable.
A forward movement of about 5 miles will bring me on an east and wrest line with Auburn, and near one of the branches of Fourteen-Mile Creek.
I had to be guided to-day in selecting camps somewhat by the chances of getting water.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. B. MoPHERSON

 

[tony_gunter]

Here are the relevant communications. McClernand writes Grant at 9 a.m. on the 10th, informing him that McClernand's men have reached 5 Mile Creek. Grant doesn't receive it until 4 pm. and responds. Grant

By the way, is this foreshadowing or what?

Grant and McClernand's messengers have a tough time finding the other. Hijinks to ensue?

 

[tony_gunter]

Isn't @Rhea Cole currently reading Bearss' three-volume set? I don't remember, what does Bearss say about McPherson's raid on Crystal Springs?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Isn't @Rhea Cole currently reading Bearss' three-volume set? I don't remember, what does Bearss say about McPherson's raid on Crystal Springs?

Actually I read it some time ago. It is still on my bedside table… dealing with Ed Bearss is a lot like cub pilot Sam Clemens' reaction to learning the river, "..,, need a wheelbarrow to carry my brain around…" to fully comprehend the content.

I won't comment without rereading the text.

 

[tony_gunter]

Actually I read it some time ago. It is still on my bedside table… dealing with Ed Bearss is a lot like cub pilot Sam Clemens' reaction to learning the river, "..,, need a wheelbarrow to carry my brain around…" to fully comprehend the content.

I won't comment without rereading the text.

Confession: I'm yanking your chain a bit. IIRC Bearss didn't really cover the Crystal Springs Raid, possibly because of his extreme anti-McPherson bias?

Don't have my copy with me or I would check.

 

[RedRover]

McPherson marches to Utica. Other than occasional small unidentified mounted units being chased away by his cavalry, he's in open country along the ridge road from Utica to Raymond. His primary struggle at this point is maintaining proximity to water. He inches forward to within 12 miles of Raymond.

If the plan is for McPherson to push forward to the railroad, it could be critical to maintain a strong cavalry screen. But he suspects that troops from Port Hudson may be reinforcing Jackson. He sends his lone cavalry regiment to strike the railroad at Crystal Springs and gather intel about the operational situation.

I don't see much criticism from the period relative to this movement of McPherson's very limited cavalry force.

General Grant, in his memoirs, vol. I, p. 501, states that McPherson and Sherman, and McClernand were moving generally in tandem, McPherson headed for the railroad at Clinton, past Raymond, and that it was expected that since they were moving out of immediate supporting distances, they keep up "reconnoissances" in order to move with rapidity to the other's aid should it become necessary...

and during the campaign...

As you mention, by the afternoon of the 10th, Gen. Grant wanted McPherson to send his cavalry, namely the 6th Missouri Cavalry, scouting toward the Southeast, and orders cut. And, as you mention, Gen. McPherson indeed had sent the 6th Missouri Cavalry in that direction on that afternoon to sweep up the south side of the Tallahala creek, and scout for the enemy in that general direction.

Grant's orders consequently seemed to have been abided.

Col. Wright and the 6th Missouri Cavalry only commenced his movement all the way to Crystal Springs early on the next morning, on the 11th. He mentions a circuitous route, which I suppose regards some degree of scouting the vicinity, rather than moving direct on Crystal Springs.

The Southern reports confirm the destruction of the railroad, etc. at Crystal Springs:

And it appears to have done a good bit of mischief, as Gen. Adams at Jackson informing Pemberton that the break in the road had indeed impeded the trains to Jackson...

Gen. McPherson reports about May 10-11:

Here's a map from the time, showing the Tallahala Creek south of Utica, and Gallatin toward the southeast, and toward the railroad...

Here's a modern map, also showing Roach's plantation, from which point the 6th Missouri Cavalry set off on the 11th to strike at Crystal Springs... and to which they returned that night:

The official report of the 6th Missouri relative to the movement upon Crystal Springs on the 11th;

Is this a wise use of cavalry? Would it have been better to keep them close at hand until receiving the order to move to Raymond?

I would think so.

While the 6th Missouri was raiding Crystal Springs on the 11th, McPherson still had cavalry on hand to scout his advance, namely the several companies attached to the various corps/division headquarters, etc. These were assembled into an ad hoc battalion, to continue mounted scouting ahead of or on the flanks of McPherson's commands advancing northwards toward Raymond.

From McPherson's report:

And, as noted, once these cavalry scouts found the enemy in some force, a large screen of infantry skirmishers was advanced at the head of the column of march, subsequently engaged at Raymond:

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't see much criticism from the period relative to this movement of McPherson's very limited cavalry force.

General Grant, in his memoirs, vol. I, p. 501, states that McPherson and Sherman, and McClernand were moving generally in tandem, McPherson headed for the railroad at Clinton, past Raymond, and that it was expected that since they were moving out of immediate supporting distances, they keep up "reconnoissances" in order to move with rapidity to the other's aid should it become necessary...

View attachment 523421

and during the campaign...

View attachment 523468


As you mention, by the afternoon of the 10th, Gen. Grant wanted McPherson to send his cavalry, namely the 6th Missouri Cavalry, scouting toward the Southeast, and orders cut. And, as you mention, Gen. McPherson indeed had sent the 6th Missouri Cavalry in that direction on that afternoon to sweep up the south side of the Tallahala creek, and scout for the enemy in that general direction.

Grant's orders consequently seemed to have been abided.

Col. Wright and the 6th Missouri Cavalry only commenced his movement all the way to Crystal Springs early on the next morning, on the 11th. He mentions a circuitous route, which I suppose regards some degree of scouting the vicinity, rather than moving direct on Crystal Springs.

The Southern reports confirm the destruction of the railroad, etc. at Crystal Springs:

View attachment 523454

And it appears to have done a good bit of mischief, as Gen. Adams at Jackson informing Pemberton that the break in the road had indeed impeded the trains to Jackson...

View attachment 523489


Gen. McPherson reports about May 10-11:

View attachment 523456

Here's a map from the time, showing the Tallahala Creek south of Utica, and Gallatin toward the southeast, and toward the railroad...

View attachment 523459

Here's a modern map, also showing Roach's plantation, from which point the 6th Missouri Cavalry set off on the 11th to strike at Crystal Springs... and to which they returned that night:

View attachment 523491

The official report of the 6th Missouri relative to the movement upon Crystal Springs on the 11th;

View attachment 523455




I would think so.

While the 6th Missouri was raiding Crystal Springs on the 11th, McPherson still had cavalry on hand to scout his advance, namely the several companies attached to the various corps/division headquarters, etc. These were assembled into an ad hoc battalion, to continue mounted scouting ahead of or on the flanks of McPherson's commands advancing northwards toward Raymond.

From McPherson's report:

View attachment 523457
View attachment 523458

And, as noted, once these cavalry scouts found the enemy in some force, a large screen of infantry skirmishers was advanced at the head of the column of march, subsequently engaged at Raymond:

View attachment 523424

Nice, where did you find that map!

 

[Belfoured]

Actually I read it some time ago. It is still on my bedside table… dealing with Ed Bearss is a lot like cub pilot Sam Clemens' reaction to learning the river, "..,, need a wheelbarrow to carry my brain around…" to fully comprehend the content.

I won't comment without rereading the text.

At the risk of causing an uproar, I think the bedside table is an excellent location for Bearss if you suffer from insomnia.

 

[RedRover]

Nice, where did you find that map!

Library of Congress:

[Map of the environs of Vicksburg and Jackson, Mississippi.].

Title and date from Stephenson's Civil War Maps, 1989. Pencil sketch showing towns, railroads, roads, and drainage. LC Civil War maps (2nd ed.), S116 Available also through the Library of Congress web site as raster image.

www.loc.gov

They have several interesting Vicksburg campaign maps.

Map illustrating the operations of U.S. Forces against Vicksburg

Also shows the tracks of Genl. Grant, General Blair, and Admiral Porter, and sites of Union victories. Relief shown by hachures. LC Civil War maps (2nd ed.) 289 This issue of the map includes a U.S. flag at Vicksburg, denoted the U.S. victory. Available also through the Library of Congress Web...

www.loc.gov

[Map of the Big Black River, Mississippi, in the vicinity of Bush and Birdsong's ferries, 1863]

Pencil sketch showing drainage, roads, houses, and names of residents. Small flags apparently indicate campsites. Description derived from published bibliography. LC Civil War maps (2nd ed.), S114, 263 Available also through the Library of Congress web site as raster image.

www.loc.gov

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't see much criticism from the period relative to this movement of McPherson's very limited cavalry force.

General Grant, in his memoirs, vol. I, p. 501, states that McPherson and Sherman, and McClernand were moving generally in tandem, McPherson headed for the railroad at Clinton, past Raymond, and that it was expected that since they were moving out of immediate supporting distances, they keep up "reconnoissances" in order to move with rapidity to the other's aid should it become necessary...

View attachment 523421

and during the campaign...

View attachment 523468


As you mention, by the afternoon of the 10th, Gen. Grant wanted McPherson to send his cavalry, namely the 6th Missouri Cavalry, scouting toward the Southeast, and orders cut. And, as you mention, Gen. McPherson indeed had sent the 6th Missouri Cavalry in that direction on that afternoon to sweep up the south side of the Tallahala creek, and scout for the enemy in that general direction.

Grant's orders consequently seemed to have been abided.

Col. Wright and the 6th Missouri Cavalry only commenced his movement all the way to Crystal Springs early on the next morning, on the 11th. He mentions a circuitous route, which I suppose regards some degree of scouting the vicinity, rather than moving direct on Crystal Springs.

The Southern reports confirm the destruction of the railroad, etc. at Crystal Springs:

View attachment 523454

And it appears to have done a good bit of mischief, as Gen. Adams at Jackson informing Pemberton that the break in the road had indeed impeded the trains to Jackson...

View attachment 523489


Gen. McPherson reports about May 10-11:

View attachment 523456

Here's a map from the time, showing the Tallahala Creek south of Utica, and Gallatin toward the southeast, and toward the railroad...

View attachment 523459

Here's a modern map, also showing Roach's plantation, from which point the 6th Missouri Cavalry set off on the 11th to strike at Crystal Springs... and to which they returned that night:

View attachment 523491

The official report of the 6th Missouri relative to the movement upon Crystal Springs on the 11th;

View attachment 523455




I would think so.

While the 6th Missouri was raiding Crystal Springs on the 11th, McPherson still had cavalry on hand to scout his advance, namely the several companies attached to the various corps/division headquarters, etc. These were assembled into an ad hoc battalion, to continue mounted scouting ahead of or on the flanks of McPherson's commands advancing northwards toward Raymond.

From McPherson's report:

View attachment 523457
View attachment 523458

And, as noted, once these cavalry scouts found the enemy in some force, a large screen of infantry skirmishers was advanced at the head of the column of march, subsequently engaged at Raymond:

View attachment 523424

The way I see it, there are pros and cons to either.

Pro:

Absolute Best case - Wright catches cars of the railroad and destroys them. Railroad is cut, telegraph is cut, specific intel is gathered on dispositions of troops in the area.

What actually happened is close to the absolute best case. The cars of the railroad had already passed but were now trapped south of the cut in Brookhaven. Minor railroad culverts and bridges destroyed, telegraph torn down. General information obtained on the troops that had passed through town (14,000 … in reality about 5,000) on the way to Jackson.

Cons:

Absolute worst case - McPherson has to march against the enemy with no cavalry screen and gets no advanced warning what size force he is facing. In the event of a victory, ability to pursue will be impaired. Some type of force will need to be detached from the main body to watch the flanks / wagon trains.

McPherson mitigated this by consolidating the escort companies of XVII corps, Logan's Division, and Crocker's Division into a frankenbattalion. Gregg's lack of cavalry allows this small force to develop the infantry pickets on Fourteen Mile Creek two miles in advance of the main body.

Pursuit is nigh impossible after the battle, but even if Wright was on hand he would have been outmatched against the three mounted regiments of Wirt Adams (Wirt Adams' Regiment, 20th Mississippi Mtd, 3rd Kentucky Mtd) so pursuit was off the table anyway.

The downside of utilizing escort as a fighting force is you're exposing your commanders to risk and your ready source of couriers for messages is absent, so your command and control is going to suffer.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The way I see it, there are pros and cons to either.

Pro:

Absolute Best case - Wright catches cars of the railroad and destroys them. Railroad is cut, telegraph is cut, specific intel is gathered on dispositions of troops in the area.

What actually happened is close to the absolute best case. The cars of the railroad had already passed but were now trapped south of the cut in Brookhaven. Minor railroad culverts and bridges destroyed, telegraph torn down. General information obtained on the troops that had passed through town (14,000 … in reality about 5,000) on the way to Jackson.

Cons:

Absolute worst case - McPherson has to march against the enemy with no cavalry screen and gets no advanced warning what size force he is facing. In the event of a victory, ability to pursue will be impaired. Some type of force will need to be detached from the main body to watch the flanks / wagon trains.

McPherson mitigated this by consolidating the escort companies of XVII corps, Logan's Division, and Crocker's Division into a frankenbattalion. Gregg's lack of cavalry allows this small force to develop the infantry pickets on Fourteen Mile Creek two miles in advance of the main body.

Pursuit is nigh impossible after the battle, but even if Wright was on hand he would have been outmatched against the three mounted regiments of Wirt Adams (Wirt Adams' Regiment, 20th Mississippi Mtd, 3rd Kentucky Mtd) so pursuit was off the table anyway.

The downside of utilizing escort as a fighting force is you're exposing your commanders to risk and your ready source of couriers for messages is absent, so your command and control is going to suffer.

No better example of the reason tony_gunter cited about keeping contact with escorts was General McPherson's fate.

Also, he did not have a war gamer's God's eye view of the battle space. It was staff officers & couriers that gave McPherson his situational awareness & carried his orders. His HQ guard was more than just bodyguards. Loosing them would have deprived him of essential command & control assets. Without his escort McPherson would have compromised his ability to react to subsequent events.

 

[Belfoured]

No better example of the reason tony_gunter cited about keeping contact with escorts was General McPherson's fate.

Also, he did not have a war gamer's God's eye view of the battle space. It was staff officers & couriers that gave McPherson his situational awareness & carried his orders. His HQ guard was more than just bodyguards. Loosing them would have deprived him of essential command & control assets. Without his escort McPherson would have compromised his ability to react to subsequent events.

This thread is another illustration of why I keep hounding @tony_gunter about putting together the [ ] book on Raymond.

Good point about the helicopter view gamers have that 19th century officers did not have. Occasionally, designers/developers try to build in rules that allow for things like Howe's flank movement at Brandywine (the Battles in the Age of Reason sim has a scenario for this that is pretty well done) but it's still not the same.

 

[tony_gunter]

No better example of the reason tony_gunter cited about keeping contact with escorts was General McPherson's fate.

Also, he did not have a war gamer's God's eye view of the battle space. It was staff officers & couriers that gave McPherson his situational awareness & carried his orders. His HQ guard was more than just bodyguards. Loosing them would have deprived him of essential command & control assets. Without his escort McPherson would have compromised his ability to react to subsequent events.

He may have mitigated this (debatable) by purposely limiting the size of the force on the field. There's a screaming match between Logan and McPherson recorded by Hickenlooper that I have yet to travel to see first-hand where apparently Logan is demanding McPherson bring up his whole force ASAP and push across the creek en masse while McPherson instead is very carefully deploying only Logan's Division. It ends with Logan screaming I TOLD YOU SO, I TOLD YOU SO and McPherson calmly telling him "it'll be alright."

There's a sketch of the battlefield mid-battle by Theodore Davis that shows McPherson sitting atop his horse in the field behind the battle attended by only one aide.

 

[Rhea Cole]

He may have mitigated this (debatable) by purposely limiting the size of the force on the field. There's a screaming match between Logan and McPherson recorded by Hickenlooper that I have yet to travel to see first-hand where apparently Logan is demanding McPherson bring up his whole force ASAP and push across the creek en masse while McPherson instead is very carefully deploying only Logan's Division. It ends with Logan screaming I TOLD YOU SO, I TOLD YOU SO and McPherson calmly telling him "it'll be alright."

There's a sketch of the battlefield mid-battle by Theodore Davis that shows McPherson sitting atop his horse in the field behind the battle attended by only one aide.

This is a perfect illustration of the conflict between a trained professional & Black Jack Logan, The Magnificent Egyptian, a gifted amateur.

 

[Belfoured]

This is a perfect illustration of the conflict between a trained professional & Black Jack Logan, The Magnificent Egyptian, a gifted amateur.

The "Ride to the Sound of the Guns" guys had their place but tactics/logistics/command and control weren't always in the tool kit.

 

[RedRover]

There's a sketch of the battlefield mid-battle by Theodore Davis that shows McPherson sitting atop his horse in the field behind the battle attended by only one aide.

Staff and couriers, etc. were always busy and riding about.

General Meade, on July 2, 1863 at Gettysburg, during Anderson's attack on his center, etc. was found alone at his headquarters by J.C. Tidball.

The next day, his antagonist Lee was entirely alone, attended by none, (according to E. Porter Alexander)...

Others mention his staff and attendants were busy aiding in the reorganization of the broken divisions, etc.

Point being, outside of a parade/review, etc., a general in the field, especially in action, surrounded by his whole staff might have been an oddity.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The "Ride to the Sound of the Guns" guys had their place but tactics/logistics/command and control weren't always in the tool kit.

Exactly. After McPherson was killed Logan assumed command & rode between the lines of men. Fighting back to back as the troops chanted, "Black Jack! Black Jack! Black Jack!" What more could anyone ask of a leader?

By the same token, Sherman placed Howard into the vacant army command. There was a vast chasm between a gifted leader & an educated professional manager in time of war.

Note: "Black Jack the Magnificent Egyptian" has gotta be one of the premier nom de guerre of all time.