D. H. Hill

[Bruce Vail]

My understanding from some past readings is that Lee was disappointed in him for South Mountain. Specifically he picked Ripley to lead the counter attack and Lees reasoning was Hill didn't pick the best person for that role and the counter attack went off badly. Ripley was out of the army after Fredericksburg.

Hill would go on after the war to wage a long campaign of vilification against Ripley. He was aided in this by Col. William DeRosset of the 3rd NC Infantry. The two accused Ripley of cowardice in the face of the enemy, and various other personal vices. DeRosset blamed Ripley for botching his assignment at South Mountain and bringing disrepute on the 3rd NC.

In my notes at home I have an example of DH Hill at his very worst. It's a post-war letter he wrote to DeRosset wherein he passes along viscous rumors about Ripley, accusing him of being a "whoremaster," among other things.

 

[Bruce Vail]

I do not disagree with this, except to ask if we know whether Lee's dissatisfaction with Hill's performance was either accurate or fair?

After Shiloh Halleck was very critical of Grant's performance and found lacking in many qualities required of a good commander and yet found himself in almost complete agreement and was satisfied with Meade's conduct of the AoP pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg, except, of course, when he found it necessary to express Lincoln's dissatisfaction.

"Accurate or fair?" No, I don't think we can know this, especially if you suspect (as I do) that Lee's views were colored by Hill's sharp criticisms of his fellow officers (especially some of Lee's favorites) or other factors, such as the belief by some that Hill was at fault in the Lost Order affair.

 

[Cycom]

"Accurate or fair?" No, I don't think we can know this, especially if you suspect (as I do) that Lee's views were colored by Hill's sharp criticisms of his fellow officers (especially some of Lee's favorites) or other factors, such as the belief by some that Hill was at fault in the Lost Order affair.

Is there definitive proof that the fault laid with Hill?

 

[Bruce Vail]

Is there definitive proof that the fault laid with Hill?

None that I know of.

Perhaps more important is whether Lee and his circle of close associates believed that to be the case. There is some evidence to think they did.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Thanks to all for this great discussion of Harvey Hill!

If he could read it today, he would probably croak about our failure to discuss Jesus, or about the the injustices he (Hill) suffered at the hands of Confederate high command.

 

[Cycom]

None that I know of.

Perhaps more important is whether Lee and his circle of close associates believed that to be the case. There is some evidence to think they did.

Ok, thanks. Thought as much from the different narratives I read about the Lost Orders.

 

[Bryce]

Another thread started discussing D. H. Hill, so to avoid a hijack I thought I would start a new one, asking for opinions on the "other" Hill. I have not studied him much at all, so my thoughts are most probably wrong, but I always thought he got a bit of a bad rap. My understanding is that his relationship with Lee went south over the Lost Order fiasco, but was otherwise a hard fighter. Someone in the other thread mentioned he bungled South Mountain, but I always thought that was a highpoint in his career and deserved credit for helping to save the ANV while Lee consolidated on the other side of the mountain. Perhaps a low point in his career was his actions under Bragg as a leader in the cabal against him, but to my thinking he and the other generals were just responding to the fact that Braggs generals had lost confidence in him, so Bragg had to go for the good of the cause. Its a recipe for disaster to have in place a general who does have the confidence of his leadership.

Would love to hear other's thoughts on Hill.

You need to pick up a copy of William Glenn Robertson's book on Chickamauga. It's gonna be a two volume work and volume one is out now.

 

[Bryce]

Good analysis. Hadn't really thought of him in those terms before, but you make a valid point. As for his personality, apparently he had a sharp tongue, but so did other generals in the ANV. The other Hill, just to name one, who seemed to want to fight every other officer in the army. I find it hard to believe that that, and that alone, was the reason Lee wanted to get rid of an otherwise competent and hard fighter. It seems to me something more was at play.

If you get a chance, pick up a copy of back door to Richmond by William Glenn Robertson. He talks a lot about D. H. Hill

 

[Hoplite]

If you get a chance, pick up a copy of back door to Richmond by William Glenn Robertson. He talks a lot about D. H. Hill

That is a good book!

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Respectfully, pieces of this need correction. To wit ...

"During the Maryland campaign, Hill was mistakenly sent two copies of Lee's Special Orders No. 191, which detailed the divided positions of Confederate forces as it attempted to march north towards Pennsylvania."

Incorrect. There is no evidence that two copies of the orders were sent to Hill. Hill himself said he never received a second copy sent by army HQ, and he retained the copy sent to him by Jackson. It is available online in fact. Secondly, the ANV was no longer headed to Pennsylvania as of noon on Sept. 8. Toward it, yes. Into it, no. Reports that Federal troops still occupied Harpers Ferry and that the Army of the Potomac had begun marching toward Frederick stymied that part of Lee's plan. Even before the lost orders were lost, McClellan was moving faster than Lee found convenient. Whereas Lee had anticipated being able to operate on the Confederacy's "norther frontier" until winter, he now found that he needed to engage the Federals within days.

"One of these copies was accidentally left (likely never delivered) in a field near Frederick, Maryland wrapped around three cigars, where a Union soldier, Corporal Barton W. Mitchell of the 27th Indiana Volunteers (who would later be wounded at the subsequent Battle of Sharpsburg), discovered it on September 13th."

Correct - the copy was never delivered. This contradicts the previous statement about two copies sent to Hill.

"Realizing that Lee's divided army was now vulnerable, McClellan pursued the Confederates with uncharacteristic speed."

Incorrect. McClellan had marched portions of his army as far as 40 miles in order to put troops in between the ANV and Washington. McClellan then began advancing on September 8, while covering the route to Baltimore and DC, with some brigades making 15 miles per day. As of the morning on September 13, Lee knew McClellan had occupied Frederick City. What he did not know, because Jeb Stuart failed to tell him, is that McClellan had also pushed an entire army corps into Middletown Valley. D. H. Hill reported this after dark on that day.

It is incorrect to say that the facts support the claim "Lee anticipated operating [north of the Potomac] until winter. Indeed, it is silly to say it. Read Lee's two letters dated June 25 1863, to Davis, to understand the reality.

It is incorrect to say, similarly, that "Lee needed to engage the [enemy] within days." Lee's plan, upon arriving at Frederick, was to draw the enemy into a general battle at the Antietam, which he could not do unless his line of retreat was secure, which it could not be with 12,000 enemy solders squating at the Ferry.

It is a triable issue of fact whether the Order was intentionally left in the field, or accidentially left in the field.

It is silly to say Lee did not know "an entire corps" entered Mdiddletown Valley during the day. One need only stand at the Washington Mouument and watch the column crest the Catoctin. In fact, an "entire corps" did not enter the valley on Sept. 13. Franklin was at Jefferson, and it was Pleasanton's cavalry, supported by Burnside's advance, that reached as far as the stream running through the vally by night fall.

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Lee's opinion of Hill went south - pun intended - after Harvey had the temerity to criticize the general in his after-action report on the fight at South Mountain. Writing "Had Longstreet's division been with mine at daylight in the morning, the Yankees would have been disastrously repulsed," Hill implied that Lee's delay in returning to South Mountain led to the disaster at Boonsboro, the Confederate name for the battle. Lee did not take kindly to this, even though Hill's comment was accurate. Lee did indeed delay Longstreet's and Shanks Evans's return to South Mountain until the gunfire erupted on Hill's front shortly after 8:00 a.m. on September 14. It then took six to eight hours for reinforcements to reach Hill.

The connection of Hill's transfer out of the ANV by Lee to the loss of Special Orders No. 191 is inaccurate. Lee himself stated in a letter to Hill in February 1868, "I do not know how the order was lost, nor until I saw McClellan's published report after the termination of the war did I know certainly that it was the copy addressed to you." In short, while Lee may have heard rumors that the copy of the orders had been addressed to Hill, he did not have confirmation of that fact while Hill was still with the ANV. In fact, Lee did not know at all until well after the campaign that a copy of his orders had gone astray.

Actions speak louder than words, a principle ignored by the writer here. What witnesses say Lee said is not probative of the fact he said it, much less the fact that he did it. Yes, Lee wrote the line quoted to Hill in February 1868, in response to learning Hill had published to the public his view of things in the piece titled The Lost Dispatch. The fact Lee denied knowing how the Order was lost, or that it was addressed to Hill, does not mean Lee did not know the Order addressed by someone to Hill was lost. A serious student who objectively considers the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence will be hard pressed not to recognize Lee designed the plan of losing the Order, to gain time to secure his line of retreat before meeting the enemy in battle at the Antietam.

 

[SWS]

Hill would go on after the war to wage a long campaign of vilification against Ripley. He was aided in this by Col. William DeRosset of the 3rd NC Infantry. The two accused Ripley of cowardice in the face of the enemy, and various other personal vices. DeRosset blamed Ripley for botching his assignment at South Mountain and bringing disrepute on the 3rd NC.

In my notes at home I have an example of DH Hill at his very worst. It's a post-war letter he wrote to DeRosset wherein he passes along viscous rumors about Ripley, accusing him of being a "whoremaster," among other things.

Interesting. Perhaps that is also a reason why Hill refused the Charleston command in March 1864.

 

[RevJohnRoss]

McClellan capitalized on the orders by using them to develop an en echelon attack on the gaps of South Mountain. The northern attack - the main one, if you will - was intended to pin Longstreet and Hill to the gaps near Boonsboro while Franklin's attack punched a hole through the center of the Rebel position at Crampton's Gap. The overall objective was to relieve Harpers Ferry. These attacks had the knock on effect of inflicting serious casualties on Lee's dispersed force. They also ended Lee's dream of fighting the Federals on the heights 5 miles north of Boosnboro - on ground Lee specifically chose for that purpose. Finally, Lee retiring in the direction of Virginia forced him to stand at Sharpsburg to save his campaign and ensure a "military success" in Maryland encouraged the state's secessionists to rise up in rebellion. The Sharpsburg position was a bad one - Lee knew it too. It offered too much territory to defend on the left, which McClellan took advantage off. Standing at Sharpsburg also forced Lee to bring his army back together faster than he had planned. Forced marches caused tremendous straggling that weakened the ANV. This, in turn, gave an even more decided battlefield advantage to McClellan. To recapitulate, McC reading the Lost Orders

1. Forced Lee to abandon a favorable defensive position in favor of a less favorable one
2. Force Lee to fight at South Mountain, which he had never planned to do.
3. Inflicted heavy casualties on Lee's army even before Sharpsburg.
4. Weakened the ANV before the Battle of Antietam.
5. Gave the AoP more favorable terrain to fight on at Antietam.

This stuff is silliness. Lee lost the Order so that the enemy commander might, in reading it, recognize that Lee meant to use his "main body," concentrated at Boonsboro, to attack the Union army moving in mass toward the Ferry, and this fact induced the enemy commander to move his main body directly toward Boonsboro to meet the anticipated attack head on.

McClellan wrote words to Franklin, but he did not back the words up with the divisions Franklin would need to do more that gain possession of Crampton's Gap. While McClellan is using four fifths of his army to meet what he thinks is waiting for him behind Turner's Gap, Franklin has two divisions at hand to attack what the Order tells us is two Confederate divisions. Not enough force to do it. Franklin needs not only Couch's divisions at hand and deployed, but a fourth to give him the weight he needs to break the resistance Anderson and McLaws can put up at Rohrersville. As it stood, if Franklin had attacked Anderson's force in his front, he had to be rightly fearful, given the text of the Order, that Jackson might appear from the direction of Keedysville to attack his rear, while the main bodies of both armies were colliding at Boonsboro. A dicy situation Franklin did not have the backbone to deal with, so he sat on his hands.

The amazing thing about Lee's risk-taking, is, first, that he thought there was a chance that somehow Jackson's presence in front of Bolivar Hts might result in the enemy garrison being neutralized, but he had to know the "chance" was as slim as chance can be. And, second, he knew that with Jackson positioned as he was, if the garrison held its ground, it was still fixed where it was, so that Lee's army could retreat over the Potomac before the enemy could seriously interfere with the movement. Retreating, however, was the last thing Lee wanted to do, because if he did it without a battle the enemy would be pursuing him up the Valley and his army was completely exhausted and out of breath. The best it could do, was stand on the defensive and take the blows, giving as much damage as it absorbed. So that when it retreated, the enemy as exausted would not follow.

 

[JerryD]

Lee lost the Order so that the enemy commander might, in reading it, recognize that Lee meant to use his "main body," concentrated at Boonsboro, to attack the Union army moving in mass toward the Ferry, and this fact induced the enemy commander to move his main body directly toward Boonsboro to meet the anticipated attack head on.

Am I reading this right? Are you suggesting Lee intentionally lost Special Order 191?

 

[RevJohnRoss]

This is hardly news.

 

[Piedone]

This is hardly news.

Well I deem it indeed news - what makes you so sure about it ?

There is - at least as far as I know - nothing to be found in letters of all the participiants (including Lee)
about an intention of Lee to place the orders as a ruse.

And given the situation an intentional losing of the orders would have been even disadvantageous
(as Jackson was behind schedule making it hard for him to reunite with Lee in time).

 

[JerryD]

This is hardly news.

False. And all available evidence indicates your assertion is also false.

 

[RevJohnRoss]

False. And all available evidence indicates your assertion is also false.

 

[Piedone]

Interesting.

But I cannot help:

1. In the video it is clamoured how "representants of a historician's clique" are reading words into McClellan's letters and orders (which are not contained therein) -
and then words are read into McClellan's orders to Franklin (which are also not contained therein)…

2. Also the motivation of this theory is somehow unclear to me - I thought it established that Sharpsburg wasn't a favourable position for the ANV to give battle there (with a river in it's back, without clear topographical advantages), also the time of the battle I always thought unfortunate (with the troops not completely concentrated) - if Lee had construed this ruse to have a pitched battle at Sharpsburg at the 17th of September it wouldn't really have been one of his brightest ideas…

3. Somewhere in the video we are told that the S.O. were found in an envelope highly uncommon to the ANV and hardly available in the South. Are we to believe that someone else (the federals?) planted the S.O. in that field?
Wouldn't this be contradicting to 2.?

Instead of "historians clique"
(what is this meant to be? In history there are "schools" with a certain perspective on things, mostoften different ones - which is just normal in academic research…)

It would be much better to talk about
a currently predominating interpretation of events
(and it well might be that there are mistakes and misininterpretations contained -
which is also just normal in history given the distant time and the limitations of sources).

It is of course possible, even necessary (and sometimes indeed successful) to challenge established ideas -
but a bit more evidence would be necessary here (at least in my eyes).

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Well I deem it indeed news - what makes you so sure about it ?

There is - at least as far as I know - nothing to be found in letters of all the participiants (including Lee)
about an intention of Lee to place the orders as a ruse.

And given the situation an intentional losing of the orders would have been even disadvantageous
(as Jackson was behind schedule making it hard for him to reunite with Lee in time).

For the presentation of the case, which has been available on the internet since 2012, see Special Order 191: Ruse of War (AMZ Publishing Co., Revised Edition 2024).