Bryce
Sergeant
- Joined
- Jun 2, 2011
- Location
- Washington, D.C.
Part 1 Sheridan's Battle Plan and it fails miserably.
Sheridan's battle plan for Five Forks was unique. His cavalry would deploy in the woods in front of Pickett's infantry and by skirmishing, they would hold them in place. Meanwhile the infantry of Warren's V Corps would attack the Confederate left flank and roll up their line. As soon as the cavalry heard the guns of the V Corps they were ordered to assault the Confederate breastworks which were formidable and carry their line. Sheridan believed that between the flank attack by the infantry and the frontal attack by the dismounted cavalry attack he would win the battle.
Sheridan assigned the job of pinning down Pickett's men to the two divisions under Wesley Meritt, the divisions of Thomas Devin and George Armstrong Custer. Initially, Custer had only two brigades on the field, a third brigade was in the rear with the wagon train. Custer's left flank was on the western edge of the forest that marked the eastern boundary of the Gilliam property. His right flank rested on the Scott Road. Col Alexander Pennington's 1st brigade was on the right, and Capehart's 3rd brigade was on the left. Gen. Thomas Devins division stretched from the Scott Road on its left to the Gravelly Run Church Road on its right. From left to right his brigades were: Col. Charles Fitzhugh's brigade, the reserve brigade under Col Alfred Gibbs, and Col. Peter Stagg's Michigan brigade.
The two divisions were small to begin with (only 5700 strong) but fighting on foot reduced the already small force by an additional 1/4. (A quarter of the troopers were removed from the firing line to hold the horses).
Merritt began skirmishing with the rebels about noon and the fighting continued for the next four hours. It is well known Sheridan's renaissance failed to locate the Confederate left flank which was several hundred yards east of the Gravely Run Church Road. Consequently, the V Corps attacked but could not find the rebel left flank. This led to incalculable confusion. Eventually Sheridan did attack the left flank of Pickett's line with the division of Romeyn Ayres and carried a formidable line built at right angles to the main trench line. But when Ayres tried to continue rolling up the Confederate line by continuing his attack Sheridan stopped him claiming he was firing on the cavalry. Meanwhile the Confederates built a second line at right angles to their main line and Sheridan could not budge it. General Joshua Chamberlain of Griffin's Division followed a ravine into the rear of this new line and routed the rebs causing them to vacate this second line. But when Chamberlain tried to roll up the Confederate line Sheridan stopped him, claiming he was firing into the cavalry. This last attack put an end to Sheridan's flank attacks while most of the confederate line was still intact.
Sheridan's plan called for the dismounted cavalry to charge when they heard the gunfire of the V Army Corps attack. He anticipated that the cavalry would assault the works and carry them while the V Corps was still attacking the far left of the rebels. When they did not do their job, he bought them additional time by halting the advance of the V Corps.
But Sheridan made a serious mistake, The dismounted cavalry's task was to carry the rebel earthworks. Sheridan stated at the court of inquiry that he did not examine the confederate breastworks before the battle. He was not aware that the rebel abatis blocked the way to the breastworks. Merritt did not know about them either Thus Sheridan's plan was doomed from the start.
Pennington's Brigade suffered the highest casualties of any of the four dismounted cavalry brigades. After the war Pennington spoke to the sculptor James E. Kelly of the travails of his brigade in the woods at Five Forks, "It was a terrible place. Woods full of smoke. The men exhausted from thirst and canteens empty, Two field guns immediately on my front and the infantry fire of the enemy, added to the smoke of our own guns, made it unbearable as one could hardly breathe,. Generals in Bronze edited by William Styple Belle Grove Publishing company 2005 page 264.
Describing the battle in the woods Roger Hanaford of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry wrote, ". . . . calling on their men to charge away, the whole line went up into the most infernal fire it was ever in my lot to be under. While dashing forward I did not mind it but when I found myself away in front and no one following me I dropped behind a big pine. Never did I hug the ground closer. The rebel musketry was deadly and terrific yet it seemed as nothing to the grape and canister that swept thru the woods just skimming the ground. Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks: Reminiscences of roger Hannaford second Ohio volunteer cavalry Virginia magazine of history and biography volume 87 number 4, October 1979, Page 428
This historian believes Sheridan had a hidden agenda. He stopped the advance of the V Army Corps because he wanted Wesley Meriritt's dismounted cavalry to win the glory of taking the rebel earthworks. He did not particularly like the V army Corps but Merritt, Devin and Custer were his favorite generals. It is certain that Chamberlain and Ayres could not make sense of Sheridan's decisions.
The dismounted cavalry assaults by Devin's Division also failed. The abatis and the breastworks stopped the cavalry,
Within an hour Sheridan's battle plan was in ruins. The Confederates still held their lines, and the infantry under Sheridan were held in checkmate at the eastern end of the Confederate line..
Sheridan's battle plan for Five Forks was unique. His cavalry would deploy in the woods in front of Pickett's infantry and by skirmishing, they would hold them in place. Meanwhile the infantry of Warren's V Corps would attack the Confederate left flank and roll up their line. As soon as the cavalry heard the guns of the V Corps they were ordered to assault the Confederate breastworks which were formidable and carry their line. Sheridan believed that between the flank attack by the infantry and the frontal attack by the dismounted cavalry attack he would win the battle.
Sheridan assigned the job of pinning down Pickett's men to the two divisions under Wesley Meritt, the divisions of Thomas Devin and George Armstrong Custer. Initially, Custer had only two brigades on the field, a third brigade was in the rear with the wagon train. Custer's left flank was on the western edge of the forest that marked the eastern boundary of the Gilliam property. His right flank rested on the Scott Road. Col Alexander Pennington's 1st brigade was on the right, and Capehart's 3rd brigade was on the left. Gen. Thomas Devins division stretched from the Scott Road on its left to the Gravelly Run Church Road on its right. From left to right his brigades were: Col. Charles Fitzhugh's brigade, the reserve brigade under Col Alfred Gibbs, and Col. Peter Stagg's Michigan brigade.
The two divisions were small to begin with (only 5700 strong) but fighting on foot reduced the already small force by an additional 1/4. (A quarter of the troopers were removed from the firing line to hold the horses).
Merritt began skirmishing with the rebels about noon and the fighting continued for the next four hours. It is well known Sheridan's renaissance failed to locate the Confederate left flank which was several hundred yards east of the Gravely Run Church Road. Consequently, the V Corps attacked but could not find the rebel left flank. This led to incalculable confusion. Eventually Sheridan did attack the left flank of Pickett's line with the division of Romeyn Ayres and carried a formidable line built at right angles to the main trench line. But when Ayres tried to continue rolling up the Confederate line by continuing his attack Sheridan stopped him claiming he was firing on the cavalry. Meanwhile the Confederates built a second line at right angles to their main line and Sheridan could not budge it. General Joshua Chamberlain of Griffin's Division followed a ravine into the rear of this new line and routed the rebs causing them to vacate this second line. But when Chamberlain tried to roll up the Confederate line Sheridan stopped him, claiming he was firing into the cavalry. This last attack put an end to Sheridan's flank attacks while most of the confederate line was still intact.
Sheridan's plan called for the dismounted cavalry to charge when they heard the gunfire of the V Army Corps attack. He anticipated that the cavalry would assault the works and carry them while the V Corps was still attacking the far left of the rebels. When they did not do their job, he bought them additional time by halting the advance of the V Corps.
But Sheridan made a serious mistake, The dismounted cavalry's task was to carry the rebel earthworks. Sheridan stated at the court of inquiry that he did not examine the confederate breastworks before the battle. He was not aware that the rebel abatis blocked the way to the breastworks. Merritt did not know about them either Thus Sheridan's plan was doomed from the start.
Pennington's Brigade suffered the highest casualties of any of the four dismounted cavalry brigades. After the war Pennington spoke to the sculptor James E. Kelly of the travails of his brigade in the woods at Five Forks, "It was a terrible place. Woods full of smoke. The men exhausted from thirst and canteens empty, Two field guns immediately on my front and the infantry fire of the enemy, added to the smoke of our own guns, made it unbearable as one could hardly breathe,. Generals in Bronze edited by William Styple Belle Grove Publishing company 2005 page 264.
Describing the battle in the woods Roger Hanaford of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry wrote, ". . . . calling on their men to charge away, the whole line went up into the most infernal fire it was ever in my lot to be under. While dashing forward I did not mind it but when I found myself away in front and no one following me I dropped behind a big pine. Never did I hug the ground closer. The rebel musketry was deadly and terrific yet it seemed as nothing to the grape and canister that swept thru the woods just skimming the ground. Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks: Reminiscences of roger Hannaford second Ohio volunteer cavalry Virginia magazine of history and biography volume 87 number 4, October 1979, Page 428
This historian believes Sheridan had a hidden agenda. He stopped the advance of the V Army Corps because he wanted Wesley Meriritt's dismounted cavalry to win the glory of taking the rebel earthworks. He did not particularly like the V army Corps but Merritt, Devin and Custer were his favorite generals. It is certain that Chamberlain and Ayres could not make sense of Sheridan's decisions.
The dismounted cavalry assaults by Devin's Division also failed. The abatis and the breastworks stopped the cavalry,
Within an hour Sheridan's battle plan was in ruins. The Confederates still held their lines, and the infantry under Sheridan were held in checkmate at the eastern end of the Confederate line..
Bringing the