Confederate Strategy Conference

[OpnOlympic]

Pretty close to my estimate Scribe, except Beauregard would probably have favored a two prongeed offensive one in the East and one in the West, with both armies meeting somewhere in Ohio or Pa, then the combined armies to turn back to besiege and take Washingt D.C.
and after it being rejected, then supporting Johnston.

 

[Elennsar]

One thing that has to be noted in regards to Lee's influence.

Lee was not able to convince Davis to let him keep all five of Pickett's brigades as of the Gettysburg campaign.

Lee was not able to get Cooke and Ransom - instead getting two inexperienced brigades under in his words "uninstructed" commanders.

So while Lee would undoubtedly argue for concentrating more with his army, one has to remember his actual success at convincing Davis to do so.

In my opinion, what the conference needs is not so much to hammer out overall Confederate plans - but to figure out how to coordinate things.

Two things come to mind:

Should Polk reinforce Johnston to the utmost of his ability (which may include even more men than he historically took)?

Should Forrest (at this time Lee - as in Stephen D. Lee - is in command of Polk's cavalry, it must be noted) be kept where he is, or transfered to the AoT to take Wheeler's place, or is it better to have him where he is?

Also, and less urgently: What is to be done with the mess of troops (broken bits of Morgan's command and so on) in East Tennessee? This is not vital, but it really would be good to make sure it can contribute - the Confederacy cannot afford to squander what manpower it has available.

There are other issues, but while the conference would be unlikely to produce a dramatic change in strategy, it could produce a better understanding of how things are situated and what people are worried about.

If for instance the overwhelming majority of Federal forces in the West are facing Johnston, that means that the other areas can and should be stripped to the bone - assuming, that is, that they would do more good with Johnston than causing havoc seperately.

It would also provide an opportunity that would hopefully encourage Johnston to speak freely about what he was dealing with. Johnston (or anyone else in his position, this is a comment on the situation the AoT is facing) needed to explain his plans (at least in a general sense - planning on holding at Dalton, planning on drawing Sherman into Georgia, planning on...whatever), his worries, what he feels he can accomplish (and if he's convinced he can't do anything, we have a problem), and so on.

It is said that Pendleton's report supported Johnston's assertion that his army was in no shape to attack. This is true. It is also true that Pendleton's report described Johnston's army as no worse off than any similarly situationed Confederate force.

So all of this needs to be understood and whatever decisions are later made once the campaign starts will be done based on a clear and mutual understanding of what problems and resources the Confederacy has.

It would take, as a reasonably safe conclusion, roughly 2 to 1 odds to beat a Confederate army in the field. Maybe more - and this assumes competent Yankee generalship, of course - Banks has far more men than Taylor but lost. If the Confederates were able to ensure that the areas to be concerned about (primarily Virginia and Georgia) are facing more favorable odds, it is possible that they could deflect the Union thrusts that would be made.

However, to do that would require understanding where concentration is needed...which ties back into the fact that Davis and his generals really need to make sure to be clear and informative with each other. There is no possible hope if that is not achieved, there may be a hope if that is achieved - even if nothing fundementally different is done, having that as a basis allows for making the most of the situation.

 

[K Hale]

Lee would advise stripping the west of troops and bringing them to Virginia; Johnston would argue for a western consolidation; Beauregard would support Johnston; Cooper was a cypher.

After hearing all of the opinions Davis would decide that they should just keep on keeping on and nothing would change.

I agree; this is exactly how I would expect this to go down. Didn't the parties named above (except Beauregard) have basically this exact meeting before the Seven Days, except the subject was whether to abandon Norfolk?

 

[OpnOlympic]

Pretty good description of why such a conference was almost sure to fail.
Could Davis convince Johnston, that he would Not expect him, Johnston, to fail. Could Johnston convince Davis, that he would Not fail?
Would Lee be open to opportunities somewhere else in the confederacy, besides N. Va.
From known facts, we know, these issues would seem irreducible, because none of the main actors seem capable of transcending their limitations for the common good.
Most of the responsibility, I place on Davis, because if the others are capable such transcendence, he would have to find it and find a way to convince or make them do it. The historical Davis seems to have been singularly incapable of doing it, or of wanting to, from people he did not like.

 

[Elennsar]

Nothing Lee is suggesting in Virginia is costing the Confederacy anything...now, maybe if troops had been sent from Johnston to Lee, that could be a problem. It must be noted that Lee is assuming that the western armies are reinforcing the eastern Federals - not an unreasonable assumption. Untrue, but not unreasonable.

If Lee was stripped to reinforce Johnston - even assuming that would do any good in Georgia - it weakens the Confederacy badly in Virginia at a time that it can afford that even less than in 1863.

Nor are there opportunities anywhere else.

The West has plenty of manpower for the task facing it if it is properly used. This may or may not have been true earlier, it is certainly true with Johnston having 60-75,000 men (counting Polk, coastal reinforcements, and the Georgia militia) to Sherman's 80-100,000.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Should Polk reinforce Johnston to the utmost of his ability (which may include even more men than he historically took)?

Yes, but not exactly as was done in fact. I have always thought the best use of Polk's troops would have been to concentrate them in northern Alabama to present a genuine threat to the Federal railroads. 15,000 Rebels troops would have been far too large a force for Sherman to ignore, and he would have had to detach two corps or so to keep Polk off his railroad (especially the choke-point of Bridgetown). That would perhaps be a more material benefit to Johnston than actually joining him with his troops.

Should Forrest (at this time Lee - as in Stephen D. Lee - is in command of Polk's cavalry, it must be noted) be kept where he is, or transfered to the AoT to take Wheeler's place, or is it better to have him where he is?

He should have been sent to attack Sherman's supply lines. Davis insisted that he stay where he was to repulse Union raids into northern Mississippi, overlooking the fact that those raids were only happening BECAUSE the Yankees wanted Forrest to stay where he was. Had Forrest struck northeast, the Yankees in Memphis would had had to follow him, thus abandoning any attacks into northern Mississippi.

Also, and less urgently: What is to be done with the mess of troops (broken bits of Morgan's command and so on) in East Tennessee? This is not vital, but it really would be good to make sure it can contribute - the Confederacy cannot afford to squander what manpower it has available.

I don't think these troops would have made a useful contribution by either joining Lee or Johnston. In history, they raided into Kentucky, but accomplished little. Simply by remaining a threat, they were drawing off forces that could otherwise have been added to Grant or Sherman. I think raiding into Kentucky and generally spreading havoc there was the best use the Confederacy could have made of these troops, for both military and political reasons, but obviously the raid would have to be handled much better.

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

Pretty close to my estimate Scribe, except Beauregard would probably have favored a two prongeed offensive one in the East and one in the West, with both armies meeting somewhere in Ohio or Pa, then the combined armies to turn back to besiege and take Washingt D.C.
and after it being rejected, then supporting Johnston.

Yowza. The ridges of southwestern Pennsylvania. That's awful country to traverse from W-E. Would be like going up and down Lookout Mountain for a hundred and fifty miles on no food. It's the same set of ridges.

I've bicycled all of it and hiked just a little bit of it. Thoroughly nasty.

I realize you're only saying you think it would be PGTB's plan, but ... I feel sorry for them just thinking about it.

 

[ole]

We have a virtual twin of this thread under the name of "Jackson's Proposed Raid" (or something like that). Both belong in the "what if" forum.

It is apparent that the CSA's last best hope was to strike early, in one place, and hard. It couldn't and didn't, which generously slathers its leadership for being short-sighted and totally unready for what it was starting.

It was already way too late when Lincoln got his sea legs and seriously got to thinking about serious war-making. Hitting the Union when Lincoln was still feeling his way around the government hair-ball marked the last moment a Confederate victory was possible.

 

[Elennsar]

Had Forrest struck northeast, the Yankees in Memphis would had had to follow him, thus abandoning any attacks into northern Mississippi.

There are a variety of obstacles getting in the way here. And it is unlikely that if Forrest had just packed up that the Federal raids would stop - there are plenty of things in Alabama and Mississippi the Confederates need to keep a hold of (which is how tying Forrest down works).

I'd elaborate, but I'm not sure this is the place for discussing exactly how improbable a good railroad break was.

I think raiding into Kentucky and generally spreading havoc there was the best use the Confederacy could have made of these troops, for both military and political reasons, but obviously the raid would have to be handled much better.

Agreed. Its figuring out how to make that happen that's important - a raid that winds up with them useless for a month, even if somewhat successful - is not worth the horseflesh.

 

[OpnOlympic]

Probably true Baggage Handler #2, but Beauregard was already convinced that Davis would reject any plan of his out of hand, thus having no real expectation of it being taken seriously, by the Commander In Chief and his advisors.
He would do it, simply to keep his hand in the top affairs And, of course, to irritate Davis.

 

[Severon]

Beauregard's main job was to irritate Davis. After he left command, he clashed with Davis all the time.

 

[Scribe]

Beauregard's main job was to irritate Davis. After he left command, he clashed with Davis all the time.

But that wasn't all one-sided. Davis irritated Beauregard every bit as much as Beauregard irritated Davis.

 

[K Hale]

A mutual irritation society.

 

[ole]

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