Confederate Strategy Conference

[trice]

The way to really resolve the issues of 1864 Confederate strategy was to get Davis, Bragg, Cooper, Lee, Johnston, Beauregard together and hash things out.

That would be hard to do, but they are all probably within two days travel of some point in the Carolinas by RR. You might not be able to get them all at the same time, but assume you called such a meeting in late February, when the weather and the condition of the armies pretty much prohibited major operations.

Any ideas on where that should be and what might happen?

Tim

 

[Scribe]

The way to really resolve the issues of 1864 Confederate strategy was to get Davis, Bragg, Cooper, Lee, Johnston, Beauregard together and hash things out.

That would be hard to do, but they are all probably within two days travel of some point in the Carolinas by RR. You might not be able to get them all at the same time, but assume you called such a meeting in late February, when the weather and the condition of the armies pretty much prohibited major operations.

Any ideas on where that should be and what might happen?

Tim

The idea breaks on the shoals of Davis. He considered himself the Confederacy's best and only impowered strategist.

 

[ole]

Interesting concept. It is clear that such a conference was desperately needed. A concerted, cooperative effort was to scream for. Was it too late? Was it Davis who didn't think of it or didn't want it?

We continually note that Davis did this and Lee did that and Johnston and Bragg did their thing. Was there ever a time when they all thought in concert?

Seems that Lincoln managed to keep all his armies on, more or less, the same track. (With some considerable limping early on.)

Thanks for the thought.

Ole

 

[trice]

The idea breaks on the shoals of Davis. He considered himself the Confederacy's best and only impowered strategist.

Hmm, he considered himself not the only one, but certainly the one in charge, IMHO. I admit he was a bit too control-oriented, but maybe someone (i.e., someone like Lee) could lead him to water.

I don't think it too likely, either, but it seems obvious that central planning was pretty weak and the parts were pulling in different directions when they needed to be yoked as a team.

The ideal, I suppose, would be a joint conference that got everyone to the clear understanding that the top priorities were Lee and Johnston, holding Richmond and Atlanta (the minimum). That everyone else had to consider everything they did in relation to that.

While they are there, maybe some of these people can wake up to the harsh realities of what they needed to do, and spark some serious planning and attention.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

While they are there, maybe some of these people can wake up to the harsh realities of what they needed to do, and spark some serious planning and attention.

That seems doable - assuming that the individuals in question aren't stupid or crazy.

The main problem I see is that...well, and exagerating to make a point - I'm not convinced the individuals who weren't aware of the harsh realities by this point weren't at least a little stupid or crazy.

 

[trice]

That seems doable - assuming that the individuals in question aren't stupid or crazy.

The main problem I see is that...well, and exagerating to make a point - I'm not convinced the individuals who weren't aware of the harsh realities by this point weren't at least a little stupid or crazy.

Local commanders of any type are always very concerned with the immediate threats they face. It is practically guaranteed that they will be by their job description. Only the rare bird will sacrifice his own area to help someone else without a strong hand guiding him from above.

As a case in point, when Polk moves to join Johnston, he takes more troops than planned (about 14,000). This stripped AL-MS down to the bone, which is why Forrest has to be retained in northern MS when Johnston wants him in Middle TN. Maybe that was a good idea, maybe not. But would Johnston have been that badly hurt if Polk brings 4-5,000 less? Can Forrest then go into Middle TN with 3,000+ in May-June-July instead of late September?

The parameters of things like that needed to be argued out and discussed among the leaders, face-to-face. It would have gotten these guys more on the same page, and filled some of them in on where there place was and what was/was not possible.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

The parameters of things like that needed to be argued out and discussed among the leaders, face-to-face. It would have gotten these guys more on the same page, and filled some of them in on where there place was and what was/was not possible.

Yeah. There are times and places when the best option is something like what Polk did - but if that was how the Confederacy was going to handle things, that it ruled out other options (sending Forrest a-raiding for whatever level of good that may have accomplished) needed to be known.

For the most part, things managed to work out despite this in Virginia - though only just. In Georgia/Alabama/Mississippi, the need to figure out how to balance the needs of the two departments and to figure out what was the best effective use of the limited number of regulars (as distinct from militia, the useless sort of partisan rangers, state troops, and the odds and ends left over) was vital - both areas can be threatened at once and unlike the smaller area that is Virginia, sending troops hastily from Johnston to Alabama (and even more so to Mississippi) or vice-versa cannot work in a timely fashion - so if transfers are going to be made, the sooner the better.

Its a messy situation - but the Confederacy direly needs to find a solution to be able to salvage what little hope it has for victory.

If things were going to work out despite not having such plans, the Confederacy wouldn't have lost Tennessee.

 

[Scribe]

Hmm, he considered himself not the only one, but certainly the one in charge, IMHO. I admit he was a bit too control-oriented, but maybe someone (i.e., someone like Lee) could lead him to water.


Tim

"During the months he had Bragg, and even after the turn of the year [1865] when he confronted the disintegration of his armies and his country, Davis contined to immerse himself in a sea of minutiae. His administrative practice did not change at all. He wanted to know why a lieutenant from Louisiana was promoted in a South Carolina artillery unit; he even entered a dispute over seniority between two captains in a Virginia regiment. A plan to promote several captains in General William Hardee's command generated a directive to the adjutant and inspector general. In early spring 1865 Davis gave directions in a controversy over a local commander's right to revoke a general order for a special assignment. Late in April he instructed [Secretary of War] Breckenridge in the promotions of lieutenants in general staffs."

William J. Cooper, Jefferson Davis, American

If Davis could not bring himself to stop rearranging the deck chairs on the Confederate Titanic in April 1865 it seems highly unlikely that he would have loosened his grip on overall strategy at any earlier date.

 

[OpnOlympic]

The conclusion of such a meeting would be a forgone conclusion. Who, of those named, would or could stand against Davis and Lee?

 

[whitworth]

The Confedreracy absolutely, lost the war

The Confederacy lost the war. They lost the war because the Confederacy was unable to win the war in 1864, 1863 and 1862.

In retrospect the South lost the war with the generals and army it had, the logistics it was greatly short of in the war, territory it was unable to defend. The Confederacy lost the short war; the Confederacy lost the longer war. The Confederacy lost the idea in 1860, that it could ever be independent or win a war.

And no modern reader can save what the Confederacy lost from 1861 to 1865.
And no living reader, can take the blame the Confederacy errors made during that war.

 

[Nytram01]

The conclusion of such a meeting would be a forgone conclusion. Who, of those named, would or could stand against Davis and Lee?

Joseph E. Johnston - nationwide feud with Davis and hasn't seen eye to eye with the President since 1st Manassas and in 1864 he believes that Lee doesn't care for any thing but his Army of Northern Virginia and is persuading Davis and the Confederate High Command that only Virginia matters. He says something along the line of "the government sees with Lee's eyes".

P.G.T. Beauregard - dusgruntled with being set aside in a quite corner of the war and desparately wants to get back into the thick of the action. He has been sending plans for the main theaters to the Confederate high command, and getting them promoted by his advocates in Confedeate politics, for most of his time in South Carolina (1863 onwards) plans which Davis dismiss with little consideration (probably rightfully so in truth). He too does not see eye to eye with Davis on anything and has not since the early period of the war.

Samuel Cooper - I dont know enough about him to judge.

But regardless of Cooper there will be at least two people in Joe Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard could and would oppose Lee and Davis if they believe the course of action proposed to be poorly judged or think they have a better idea.

 

[ole]

Who, of those named, would or could stand against Davis and Lee?

Hmmmm. I'm probably wrong here, but I have the idea that Lee was rather uni-dimensional. He had his army and his state and his job to do. I don't see him mixing in with the affairs of state ... at least, not instigating or influencing such a move.

The "conference" would have been a great idea and might have consolidated the goals of the Confederacy. If each of the major players had a firm idea of his place on the chess-board, and his role in the overall effort, the Confederacy would likely have had a better chance of pulling together.

Meanwhile, I'm grateful to Trice for asking the question. It opens many doors.

Ole

The entire conflagration reminds me of that cartoon of two tethered mules each trying to reach their own separate heap of hay.

Which brings us full circle to the weakness of Jefferson Davis when compared to Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln didn't need a conference to get all the ducks in a row; he said this is where we are and this is where we're going. Get into the harness or get out of my sight.

But the ramble has little to do with the efficacy of a conference. It would have been a good idea. I think. But I also think that Davis copped a 'tude and wouldn't or couldn't admit that he was clueless. So we had several Reb armies that weren't working toward the same end.

 

[Nytram01]

The Confederacy lost the war. They lost the war because the Confederacy was unable to win the war in 1864, 1863 and 1862.

In retrospect the South lost the war with the generals and army it had, the logistics it was greatly short of in the war, territory it was unable to defend. The Confederacy lost the short war; the Confederacy lost the longer war. The Confederacy lost the idea in 1860, that it could ever be independent or win a war.

And no modern reader can save what the Confederacy lost from 1861 to 1865.
And no living reader, can take the blame the Confederacy errors made during that war.

...which is more or less self evident and not really adding much to this thread specifically. While it is relevent to the reasons why the Confederacy lost the war overall it does not seem that relevant to the question of where this meeting of Confederate High Command and Generals in 1864 to discuss strategy for that specific time would take place nor what would be discussed at said meeting or what would be decided.

I think you have made your point pretty clear already. In the dozens of threads you have posted almost identicle articles in you made it perfectly clear that you believe the Confederacy was doomed to failure right from the start and that nothing done in the modern age can change that so there is no point debating anything.

Is there any real point to just reiterating your points over and over again in any thread that is made to discuss anything the Confederacy could have done differently?

 

[OpnOlympic]

A strategy conference is not a debate, they all will voice their opinions and Davis will consult his advisers i.e. Lee and come to a conclusion as to the proper action he approves of. Anyone care to guess what Lee would advise and once spoke, what Davis would decide?
The assumption of this thread is that the crisis of the war has actually been reocognized and that something drastic needs to be done, with little liklihood of a second chance; of those name who will Davis trust and listen too, most seriously?

 

[ole]

Too good to let go just yet, as three very interesting posts popped up while I was composing mine.

I was thinking that much of the infighting and scrabbling for prominence might well have been avoided by the hypothetical "Conference."

But then we'd have not used up acres of bandwidth discussing "Lee should've, Bragg should've, Davis should've" and the like. Cuts to the chase.

Ole

 

[OpnOlympic]

The potential for some good, would have been present at such a meeting. But, Davis would almost certainly have mismanaged it as he did the AoT command situation when he visited Bragg in 1863.
Almost certainly, he would have given short shrift to Beauregard and Johnston and they would have been quick(if not faster) to respond in kind.
I do not mean any would openly oppose or strongly argue with the decisions of Davis, but that some would expect Davis to ignore (if not denigrate) any of their suggestions or ideas and thus would not be open minded or really accepting of his decision; because they would suspect his decision making would be based on personal feelings rather than military exigency.
Davis would have to work hard to reestablish a necessary rapport with important subordinate, which is unlikely, even had he the necessary skill and willingness to do so.

 

[ole]

Dammit, Opn! Sure. Bring reality in while we're building castles in Spain.

Meanwhile, agreed. Davis wasn't the kind of man who'd open up and consider anyone else's observations. But the conference just might have gotten a few more of his subordinates on the same page? Guess I'm hopelessly optimistic.

Ole

 

[OpnOlympic]

Well, as already noted, the potential was there and theoretically(at least) anything is possible.
A good idea that died aborning.

 

[Scribe]

A strategy conference is not a debate, they all will voice their opinions and Davis will consult his advisers i.e. Lee and come to a conclusion as to the proper action he approves of. Anyone care to guess what Lee would advise and once spoke, what Davis would decide?
The assumption of this thread is that the crisis of the war has actually been reocognized and that something drastic needs to be done, with little liklihood of a second chance; of those name who will Davis trust and listen too, most seriously?

Lee would advise stripping the west of troops and bringing them to Virginia; Johnston would argue for a western consolidation; Beauregard would support Johnston; Cooper was a cypher.

After hearing all of the opinions Davis would decide that they should just keep on keeping on and nothing would change.

 

[captainrlm]

Fascinating question and discussion - sort of a national "Council of War" for the Confederacy.

I just do not believe they had good enough relationships amongst each other to make this a productive meeting, and, even if they had, would Davis had been decisive enough?

Ole mentioned Lincoln, but even he had his troubles with McClellan. What he did, however, was get rid of Little Mac after early November 1862, keeping him out of service for the rest of the war. He didn't keep bringing him back in different commands like Davis did with Johnson or keep him around forever like Davis did with Bragg. He gave Mac a chance - perhaps too many - but got rid of him when he determined the Little Napoleon was not effective. Davis never did that with a guy like Johnson.

I just don't see a strong enough leader among that group to get anythign accomplished (Lee would have demurred to Davis, his political superior, I believe; he may have tried to work behind closed doors, but I do not think he would have publicly contradicted anything Davis did. He was a "good soldier" in that regard.)