Confederate Kentucky - Planning Thread

[Saphroneth]

Agreed but only so far as it denies the Union these ironclads at first. Production would be moved further up the Ohio and Mississippi rivers (mainly the Ohio). This however does not mean that ironclads not produced for the Union equates to a like number of ironclads for the Confederacy.

If it delays the advances that took place historically, it means an improvement for the CSA as they finish the ironclads they historically started but did not finish; anything else is a bonus.
I should also note that an important western production centre was Cincinnati. That's right on the OH/KY border river and some of the facilities were actually in KY.

According to the 1860 census, NOLA was #6 with 168,675 and St Louis #8 at 160,773 but frankly, that is a minor quibble. The issue of St. Louis being able to produce things while not under Federal control is questionable. St. Louis was a bustling ship building center but where did the materials to fabricate these vessels originate from? Where did she get her iron?

The iron came from three firms. One of them was in Cincinnati, but the other two are unlisted; I'd be surprised if they were from even further given the phrasing of the passage.
It seems self evident to me that St. Louis saw the production of thirty-two ironclad gunboats of one type or another because it was well suited to the production of ironclad gunboats; losing it would mean the loss of skilled manpower, building slips and the like.

'...some...' ?!? Ironclads would have still been produced and possibly in even greater numbers for the need to clear and patrol the Ohio River. Just the timeline would have been pushed to the right. Ironclads were built where they were out of convenience not necessity. Production could be moved to Pittsburgh for example.

That sounds distinctly unlikely - the idea that losing a ship production centre would increase Union ironclad production. All indicators I've seen (the Casco debacle, say) indicate that the Union's shipbuilding capacity was maxed out; losing St Louis would have been a net loss, not a net gain.

Porter had inveighed against "the senseless cry about the want of water, here or there," for at low water, no place had an advantage.10 The Davis Commission looked more closely, however, and found that low water made more difference in some places than in others. Pittsburgh was the worst, as a vessel drawing eight to ten feet could pass down from Pittsburgh to Cairo during only four months of the year, and that time might be further reduced by the river being frozen.

Roberts, William H.. Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology) . Johns Hopkins University Press. Kindle Edition.

 

[USS ALASKA]

If it delays the advances that took place historically, it means an improvement for the CSA as they finish the ironclads they historically started but did not finish; anything else is a bonus.

Sir, which ironclads are you referring to? The CSS Mississippi and Louisiana? How will changes far up north impact what Farragut was doing around NOLA in April of '62? His ships weren't going to be useful on the Ohio River even if they could get there.

The iron came from three firms. One of them was in Cincinnati, but the other two are unlisted; I'd be surprised if they were from even further given the phrasing of the passage.

Missouri and Kentucky did produce some iron but their output was far outweighed by the production of just one Pennsylvania county alone according to the stats provided by @wausaubob from the 1860 census...

https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-12.pdf?#
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-09.pdf?#
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-17.pdf?#

Further analysis shows their production of machinery to be far down the list of importance. A Union loss will not equate to an equal Confederate gain - far from it.

It seems self evident to me that St. Louis saw the production of thirty-two ironclad gunboats of one type or another because it was well suited to the production of ironclad gunboats; losing it would mean the loss of skilled manpower, building slips and the like.

Correct - It would be the loss of one of the most optimum places for production, not the only one.

That sounds distinctly unlikely - the idea that losing a ship production centre would increase Union ironclad production.

I didn't say it would be easy, just that it could be done. Greater operational need would have lead to increased numbers especially with the Old Northwest States demanding the both the Ohio and Mississippi be cleared. Pittsburgh and Wheeling could both produce needed vessels. Pittsburgh did so for the DoD up through WWII. Were there river and weather issues? Yes. Did that stop them? No. And places further up the Mississippi could have been set up for assembly. Actual employment dates would have slid to the right due to these changes.

St Louis and Louisville were regional centers of transportation and manufacturing. Both would have been in range of Union cannon fire from across the rivers, especially their waterfronts. Without supplies from other Northern industrial states, much of their capacity would go for want.

Another factor with the inclusion of these two states into the Confederacy would have been the loyalties of their populations. As @leftyhunter has highlighted in his threads on guerilla warfare, simply controlling these added territories might be more trouble than they are worth to the South.

Missouri will be hanging out there. She has no direct connection to the rest of the Confederacy via Railroad. 4/5ths of her Mississippi river access will be under potential Federal guns. To deny Union usage of those portions of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers that border these states is going to take a lot of cannon, gun powder, and manpower - which as @DaveBrt has repeatedly pointed out as the main weakness of the South. Kentucky will have an easier time but might be most useful as a buffer zone for Tennessee. And looking at the attached topographical map - that doesn't look like a whole lot of fun to campaign through...but that works both ways - kinda like West Virginia

http://www.outlookmaps.com/shop/kentucky-topographic-map

I should also note that an important western production centre was Cincinnati. That's right on the OH/KY border river and some of the facilities were actually in KY.

Indeed - of the metropolitan centers the Confederacy would gain in the top 100 of the 1860 census are...

08 / St. Louis / Missouri / 160,773
12 / Louisville / Kentucky / 68,033
56 / Covington / Kentucky / 16,471
92 / Newport / Kentucky / 10,046

...all across a river from the Union and the three in KY are tied very closely to the Northern economies on and across the river from them. Where do you think their support will fall? St Louis is going through a transition at this time from a North / South to an East / West movement of goods and services though in all four, the flow of goods up and down the Mississippi, (and Ohio to / from the Mississippi) will remain important.

I'm going to have to tag along with DaveBrt in that this has the potential to prolong the war.
1883

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

The total value of all farms in Kentucky in 1860 was $291M and the livestock was worth $61M. The recapitulation suggests a big undercount of Kentucky livestock in the census. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/agriculture/1860b-09.pdf?#
Kentucky had a lot to be conservative about, including if the north starting liberating slaves, the slaves in Kentucky would be one of the first targets.
The US could probably go on without Kentucky, but the situation may not have been symmetrical. The livestock resources of Kentucky would have prolonged the war. But without the Kentucky resources the Confederacy was exposed. It was a critical that Kentucky not secede.

 

[wausaubob]

A writer like Gavin Wright poses the question why wasn't weren't the southerners more conservative. Kentuckians provide the one answer, they were conservative.

 

[leftyhunter]

Sir, which ironclads are you referring to? The CSS Mississippi and Louisiana? How will changes far up north impact what Farragut was doing around NOLA in April of '62? His ships weren't going to be useful on the Ohio River even if they could get there.



Missouri and Kentucky did produce some iron but their output was far outweighed by the production of just one Pennsylvania county alone according to the stats provided by @wausaubob from the 1860 census...

https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-12.pdf?#
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-09.pdf?#
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/manufactures/1860c-17.pdf?#

Further analysis shows their production of machinery to be far down the list of importance. A Union loss will not equate to an equal Confederate gain - far from it.



Correct - It would be the loss of one of the most optimum places for production, not the only one.



I didn't say it would be easy, just that it could be done. Greater operational need would have lead to increased numbers especially with the Old Northwest States demanding the both the Ohio and Mississippi be cleared. Pittsburgh and Wheeling could both produce needed vessels. Pittsburgh did so for the DoD up through WWII. Were there river and weather issues? Yes. Did that stop them? No. And places further up the Mississippi could have been set up for assembly. Actual employment dates would have slid to the right due to these changes.

St Louis and Louisville were regional centers of transportation and manufacturing. Both would have been in range of Union cannon fire from across the rivers, especially their waterfronts. Without supplies from other Northern industrial states, much of their capacity would go for want.

Another factor with the inclusion of these two states into the Confederacy would have been the loyalties of their populations. As @leftyhunter has highlighted in his threads on guerilla warfare, simply controlling these added territories might be more trouble than they are worth to the South.

Missouri will be hanging out there. She has no direct connection to the rest of the Confederacy via Railroad. 4/5ths of her Mississippi river access will be under potential Federal guns. To deny Union usage of those portions of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers that border these states is going to take a lot of cannon, gun powder, and manpower - which as @DaveBrt has repeatedly pointed out as the main weakness of the South. Kentucky will have an easier time but might be most useful as a buffer zone for Tennessee. And looking at the attached topographical map - that doesn't look like a whole lot of fun to campaign through...but that works both ways - kinda like West Virginia

View attachment 215183
http://www.outlookmaps.com/shop/kentucky-topographic-map



Indeed - of the metropolitan centers the Confederacy would gain in the top 100 of the 1860 census are...

08 / St. Louis / Missouri / 160,773
12 / Louisville / Kentucky / 68,033
56 / Covington / Kentucky / 16,471
92 / Newport / Kentucky / 10,046

...all across a river from the Union and the three in KY are tied very closely to the Northern economies on and across the river from them. Where do you think their support will fall? St Louis is going through a transition at this time from a North / South to an East / West movement of goods and services though in all four, the flow of goods up and down the Mississippi, (and Ohio to / from the Mississippi) will remain important.

I'm going to have to tag along with DaveBrt in that this has the potential to prolong the war.
1883

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Quite right in that history always shows that even if one side sizes and holds enemy territory ; if even a portion on the population is hostile to the other side guerrilla warfare will occur. Counterinsurgency always ties down a lot of manpower. Counterinsurgency was a real problem for both sides. Kentucky along with a few other states had both Unionist and Confederate guerrillas.
Leftyhunter

 

[OldReliable1862]

4) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign but gets fewer troops and is tied to the White Oak, and the Seven Days shatters his army and captures part or all of it as a formed unit.

Just throwing this this out here, but what are the possible effects of McClellan himself being captured when part of his army is captured? My first thought is that if the Joint Committee decides to blame McClellan for the disaster, he conveniently won't be present to defend himself. There will probably be stories of him secretly being a rebel sympathiser and committing treason, but this could backfire on the administration if they come down on him too hard.

 

[Saphroneth]

Just throwing this this out here, but what are the possible effects of McClellan himself being captured when part of his army is captured? My first thought is that if the Joint Committee decides to blame McClellan for the disaster, he conveniently won't be present to defend himself.

Well, it means McClellan won't be available for command. Consider that during the 1862 invasion it was McClellan who rallied the splintered components of the Federal Army into a field force - without him it's Pope or Burnside, assuming the rest of the command arrangements are otherwise close to historical.

It's quite possible you'd see:

June 30 - Army of the Potomac shattered, substantially captured - maybe one division makes it all the way down to Fort Monroe to take ship
July - Lee reorgs and reinforces somewhat, then marches north
Late July - battle south of Washington, analogue to Second Bull Run. Pope's force is outnumbered and he's beaten badly, and there's no second line of reinforcements as the second volunteer call was too recent.
August - Without McClellan's ability to rally together a coherent force from a shattered army on very short notice, the capital isn't defended.

Note that this isn't as bad as the ATL Second Bull Run could go. What ultimately saved the day there was that there was a formed unit to retreat behind (2nd Corps, IIRC?) but that wouldn't exist here.

 

[Saphroneth]

There will probably be stories of him secretly being a rebel sympathiser and committing treason, but this could backfire on the administration if they come down on him too hard.

If they tried it might backfire very hard. Knowing McClellan he'd have been calling for reinforcements continuously; also knowing McClellan he'd have been calling for a plausible amount of reinforcements, meaning an amount within the means of the Federal Government. Given that his original plans were and are a matter of record, it would be obvious if anyone bothered to check that the Government had sent McClellan off with less troops than he said he needed to implement his plan, ordered him to implement it anyway, then blamed him when it didn't work.
That line of logic held OTL, it might hold TTL with a worse outcome, but if it doesn't then that's the kiss of death for any coherent Union strategy - it tells the generals that they will be blamed for any mistakes made at the high command level.

 

[OldReliable1862]

Well, it means McClellan won't be available for command. Consider that during the 1862 invasion it was McClellan who rallied the splintered components of the Federal Army into a field force - without him it's Pope or Burnside, assuming the rest of the command arrangements are otherwise close to historical.

It's quite possible you'd see:

June 30 - Army of the Potomac shattered, substantially captured - maybe one division makes it all the way down to Fort Monroe to take ship
July - Lee reorgs and reinforces somewhat, then marches north
Late July - battle south of Washington, analogue to Second Bull Run. Pope's force is outnumbered and he's beaten badly, and there's no second line of reinforcements as the second volunteer call was too recent.
August - Without McClellan's ability to rally together a coherent force from a shattered army on very short notice, the capital isn't defended.

Note that this isn't as bad as the ATL Second Bull Run could go. What ultimately saved the day there was that there was a formed unit to retreat behind (2nd Corps, IIRC?) but that wouldn't exist here.

I readily acknowledge you're the more well-versed on this by far, but you do expect that few to escape? The AotP now has only about 8 divisions, so Davis may not release the coastal troops.

 

[Saphroneth]

I readily acknowledge you're the more well-versed on this by far, but you do expect that few to escape? The AotP now has only about 8 divisions, so Davis may not release the coastal troops.

There's two parts to this question.

As of the end of May OTL, the Army of the Potomac was on the Chickahominy and the White Oak. This is actually a very good position to threaten Richmond, but it's also a dangerous position to be in for the AotP because there is a certain minimum requirement to actually defend in this position - historically McClellan had the minimum required to defend, but he shifted troops to attack Richmond and this opened a hole.

Basically this map explains the problem:

The numbers aren't quite right for the ATL, but the geography is the same. Removing McClellan's troops and removing the coastal troops is pretty much a wash anyway.

So McClellan has to have a certain amount of his force south of the river to attack Richmond, and he has to have a certain amount of force north of the river near Mechanicsville to defend against an attack over the Chickahominy there (because there's a bridge he can't cover with his guns) and he has to have a certain amount of force along the line of the Tolopatamoy to protect against Jackson attacking. Historically he didn't have enough troops to fill all those goals; if he's going to be proof against Jackson attacking and against a potential attack in the Mechanicsville area, he's committing something like 4-5 divisions north of the river (2 along the Tolopatamoy, 2-3 at Mechanicsville) and that leaves him only 3-4 divisions south of the river; that's not enough to defend against the potential for Lee's entire main body (here something like 70,000 PFD or more, which is still 10,000 or more down on the historical strength) hitting him in the face; that's an attack at 2:1 odds.

McClellan is vulnerable somewhere; he doesn't have the troops to hold a line effectively otherwise.

The solution to this is to shift south to the James, but he wasn't allowed to do that historically; if he's allowed to do that TTL then it changes things, but it's something the Administration never allowed historically.


The second half of the question is why so few troops would escape. For that, I'm going to rely on a different picture:

Essentially, the straight line distance from the battlefield area to the Yorktown line (the closest point at which a Federal formation could reasonably be said to be "safe") is about fifty miles; that's much further on the march, and to get all the way to Fort Monroe is an even bigger ask. For about half McClellan's army (the half around Savage's Station rather than north of the Chickahominy) the line of retreat also involves crossing an unfordable and unbridged river, and it may as well involve flying; if the historical opener to the Seven Days takes place with McClellan's right flank driven in and forced to retreat south of the Chickahominy, nobody's getting out at all.

 

[OldReliable1862]

Does Kentucky going rebel change the Union strategy of using the rivers to penetrate the Confederate heartland? I'd expect the Confederates to put a fort at the junction of the Ohio, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland, but I'm not sure how much would be needed to actually stop them. Most of the Confederate ironclads being built at various locations on the Mississippi or the Cumberland won't be finished until spring-summer 1862.

 

[Saphroneth]

Does Kentucky going rebel change the Union strategy of using the rivers to penetrate the Confederate heartland?

It might if it means the forts on the Cumberland and the Tennessee are better sited. It also might if it means the Union has to make an amphibious crossing of the Ohio just to get a solid base.

Practically speaking, though, I think if the Union tries to attack at all it'll do so up the rivers - those are the best logistics routes going.

 

[OldReliable1862]

There's two parts to this question.

As of the end of May OTL, the Army of the Potomac was on the Chickahominy and the White Oak. This is actually a very good position to threaten Richmond, but it's also a dangerous position to be in for the AotP because there is a certain minimum requirement to actually defend in this position - historically McClellan had the minimum required to defend, but he shifted troops to attack Richmond and this opened a hole.

Basically this map explains the problem:
View attachment 215605

The numbers aren't quite right for the ATL, but the geography is the same. Removing McClellan's troops and removing the coastal troops is pretty much a wash anyway.

So McClellan has to have a certain amount of his force south of the river to attack Richmond, and he has to have a certain amount of force north of the river near Mechanicsville to defend against an attack over the Chickahominy there (because there's a bridge he can't cover with his guns) and he has to have a certain amount of force along the line of the Tolopatamoy to protect against Jackson attacking. Historically he didn't have enough troops to fill all those goals; if he's going to be proof against Jackson attacking and against a potential attack in the Mechanicsville area, he's committing something like 4-5 divisions north of the river (2 along the Tolopatamoy, 2-3 at Mechanicsville) and that leaves him only 3-4 divisions south of the river; that's not enough to defend against the potential for Lee's entire main body (here something like 70,000 PFD or more, which is still 10,000 or more down on the historical strength) hitting him in the face; that's an attack at 2:1 odds.

McClellan is vulnerable somewhere; he doesn't have the troops to hold a line effectively otherwise.

The solution to this is to shift south to the James, but he wasn't allowed to do that historically; if he's allowed to do that TTL then it changes things, but it's something the Administration never allowed historically.


The second half of the question is why so few troops would escape. For that, I'm going to rely on a different picture:

View attachment 215606

Essentially, the straight line distance from the battlefield area to the Yorktown line (the closest point at which a Federal formation could reasonably be said to be "safe") is about fifty miles; that's much further on the march, and to get all the way to Fort Monroe is an even bigger ask. For about half McClellan's army (the half around Savage's Station rather than north of the Chickahominy) the line of retreat also involves crossing an unfordable and unbridged river, and it may as well involve flying; if the historical opener to the Seven Days takes place with McClellan's right flank driven in and forced to retreat south of the Chickahominy, nobody's getting out at all.

This really leaves me wondering where Lincoln goes from here, as the AotP will need months to recover from something like this.

If McC's army is that far along the Peninsula, that would mean Norfolk has likely fallen, but the Confederates could probably recapture it before too long.

 

[Saphroneth]

If McC's army is that far along the Peninsula, that would mean Norfolk has likely fallen, but the Confederates could probably recapture it before too long.

Oh, certainly Norfolk has fallen. If McClellan's got past Yorktown then Norfolk has fallen.
In fact, once Norfolk has been lost to the CSA it's quite hard to get it back, because Union control of Yorktown renders Norfolk untenable in the long term and Yorktown is easy to supply by sea; besides, everything of value's been wrecked.

This really leaves me wondering where Lincoln goes from here, as the AotP will need months to recover from something like this.

If the worst case scenario I outline takes place the AotP is gone. Functionally the only Union field army is then Pope's Army of Virginia, and we all know how well that gets on with fighting Lee.


Otherwise - well, a badly mauled AotP in safety somewhere at Harrisons Landing can't take the offensive credibly until it's been heavily reinforced. How much reinforcement it would take depends on the amount of troops that got out of whatever battles mauled it badly and led to the capture of some of the force, and historically Lincoln basically said "wait until the new levies are available for reinforcement".