Confederate Kentucky - Planning Thread

@Saphroneth, care to weigh in on any of this?

In any case, I have a lot more reading ahead of me. Hess' Civil War Logistics and Hughes' book on Belmont are definitely on the list. Also, a copy of Civil War High Commands is pretty much mandatory. With this and school coming up, this is coming, but not coming quickly.

Minor high command things:
In December 1861, Davis offered Bragg command of the Trans-Mississippi after seeing how he whipped the Gulf department into shape. Bragg turned it down, and the command eventually went to Earl Van Dorn, and Pea Ridge was the result. I think Bragg would have been a better choice than him at least.

In the east, I'm thinking of having Kirby Smith stay as a wing/corps commander.

I'm not against @BlueandGrayl's idea for someone like Seward or Fremont becoming president, but we also have to take into consideration this will start making ripples long before September 1861.
 
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Hmm, well, this is mostly a positive change for the CSA of course overall. I can't speak to ORBATs specifically but in terms of available resources... the stronger Confederate force from Kentucky and a weakened equivalent Union force will result in the need to dispatch or retain more troops west, thus weakening the Army of the Potomac somewhat.
If we assume that basically about 1.5 divisions worth' of men (15,000) join the Confederacy instead of the Union, that means that to retain similar comparative force levels in the West would take three divisions' extra troops moved in from elsewhere (30,000 - 15,000 to replace the missing guys and 15,000 to face them.)

Assuming for the moment that McClellan is in command of the AotP in early 1862 and that his force has two fewer divisions, this might put the kibosh on any offensive plans in the East - not only is the West more of a priority, but the conclusion historically was that a minimum of 40,000 troops were required in and near Washington to defend it. Historically McClellan planned to leave about 55,000 (though he got his numbers wrong and claimed more) but with 40,000 needed to defend Washington then the possible force to take is reduced (and if the historical removal of a corps takes place then McClellan's actual offensive would have to take place with only six to seven divisions' worth of troops - indeed it is quite possible he would be outright outnumbered by Johnston's main body.)

While that would be an interesting way to take it (McClellan plans an offensive in much the same way as historically, is required by vote of corps commanders to go for the Peninsular option, 1st Corps is witheld, McClellan's army fights a basically even battle around Yorktown mid-month and is forced to retreat) it's probably not strictly necessary...
 
So basically, if the Union makes the same resource allocation decisions in this timeline as it did in ours, adjusted for the different levels of resource available, then either:

1) the Warwick line holds if it's ever tested at all, Fort Monroe remains as a coastal enclave and Gosport Navy Yard remains under Confederate control for the forseeable future, meaning that the Union simply can't get over the Rappahanock. This logjam isn't broken until the second round of volunteers starts, but it'll take so long to train them up to standard that you're looking at 1863 for the first offensive and McClellan's probably fired... thus it's very costly and slow pure-overland campaigns all the way.
Or:
2) the Warwick line is evacuated, McClellan stalls at the Chickahominy as per history and reinforcements don't show up (again as per history), McClellan's smaller force collapses under the pressure during the Seven Days as he has to thin his line too much to try and hold north of the Chickahominy, a major chunk of the Union army is captured, and Lee beats whoever's in command of the Army of Virginia but there's nothing to reconstitute an army able to defend Washington...

(Granted that the Butterfly Effect exists, it's possible neither scenario would result - but the best case is probably no better than historical.)
 
I'm planning for eventually about 55,000-60,000 men to join the CSA's ranks, but here we run into one of the most severe limiting factors - finding weapons. I don't think this large number would be in the ranks yet until perhaps late 62, but even the 15,000 figure @Saphroneth uses will have to be armed somehow. While we're on the subject - does anybody know some good sources on the USA/CSA ability to arm themselves?

I'm surprised at how easy it would be to royally screw up McClellan's plan and get him outnumbered. In the interest of keeping things fair, what should I do here?

Also, big thanks to everyone helping so far, you guys are great!

On the naval side of things (shoutout to @rebelatsea here, care to offer any opinions/books?), I think it would be easier for the CSN to finish to the Tennessee/Arkansas/Eastport (which will be a bit different from the actual ships) in the upper Mississippi, and the Louisiana/Mississippi at New Orleans. The Louisiana was a troubled ship before it was even built, what could have been done to make at least a decent ship?

With the two big ironclads finished and Hollins probably still in command (having not freaked out NOLA's defense), I wonder if New Orleans could actually be defended. Will Union intelligence just find out, causing Farragut and Porter to receive reinforcements and run the forts later, or would there be a proper naval battle between Farragut and Hollins? Other than the ironclads, the CSN fleet is pretty weak (kind of a Bismarck/Tirpitz thing here), so the Union fleet might just overwhelm Hollins.
 
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I'm planning for eventually about 55,000-60,000 men to join the CSA's ranks, but here we run into one of the most severe limiting factors - finding weapons. I don't think this large number would be in the ranks yet until perhaps late 62, but even the 15,000 figure @Saphroneth uses will have to be armed somehow. While we're on the subject - does anybody know some good sources on the USA/CSA ability to arm themselves?

I'm surprised at how easy it would be to royally screw up McClellan's plan and get him outnumbered. In the interest of keeping things fair, what should I do here?

Also, big thanks to everyone helping so far, you guys are great!

On the naval side of things (shoutout to @rebelatsea here, care to offer any opinions/books?), I think it would be easier for the CSN to finish to the Tennessee/Arkansas/Eastport (which will be a bit different from the actual ships) in the upper Mississippi, and the Louisiana/Mississippi at New Orleans. The Louisiana was a troubled ship before it was even built, what could have been done to make at least a decent ship?

With the two big ironclads finished and Hollins probably still in command (having not freaked out NOLA's defense), I wonder if New Orleans could actually be defended. Will Union intelligence just find out, causing Farragut and Porter to receive reinforcements and run the forts later, or would there be a proper naval battle between Farragut and Hollins? Other than the ironclads, the CSN fleet is pretty weak (kind of a Bismarck/Tirpitz thing here), so the Union fleet might just overwhelm Hollins.

I don't really know enough to say but if there is a defending army at New Orleans even if the CSA fleet is defeated it could be tough for the north to take the city, as Britain found in 1815! :frown: The attackers are a long way from any bases and presumably have limited supplies so as to having to win quickly while the defenders will know the terrain.

Weapons will be the big issue. However IF the south gets its act together I think the blockade was fairly leaky early on so it should be possible. Also would help that greater threat to the union from the western fighting occurring further north might draw resources away from the navy. Also if New Orleans stayed in southern hands that would also help in this as one more port available to the south and denied the north. Furthermore the union would then only be able to end the use of the Mississippi by the south from a northern advance only.
 
While we're on the subject - does anybody know some good sources on the USA/CSA ability to arm themselves?
I can point you at Robcraufurd's assessment for the Union, but the bottom line is that the North was not independent of imported weapons or weapon materials until at least 1864 (though they had stockpiles by then). The South had a domestic weapons material pipeline, but they also had trouble procuring enough good weapons (a lot of the Southern army had muskets not rifles, though Lee's force historically did manage to completely transition to rifles.)

For the initial rush of extra troops you could pretty much sort it out by having Kentucky State Arsenal (Frankfort) supply the excess, though they'll all be muskets. Later on you can have CSA imports handle it for the later recruits, especially if New Orleans remains in Confederate hands and the blockade thus remains patchy for longer.

And, of course, if things go completely pear shaped and McClellan's army is captured, that's your small arms problem solved right there...


I'm surprised at how easy it would be to royally screw up McClellan's plan and get him outnumbered. In the interest of keeping things fair, what should I do here?
Essentially this is just because historically McClellan was promised troops, made plans based on having those troops, then did not get those troops. He was able to overcome this disadvantage and prevent the loss of his army, but it was close - especially in the Seven Days, when he was legitimately outnumbered even historically.
(When was this? Pick a date, it happened over and over for basically the entire Peninsular campaign.)



I think it'd be pretty much ahistorical for McClellan to be given more troops than he was historically allowed access to in a situation where the manpower crunch is worse, so IMO you have these choices:

1) The Peninsular campaign unfolds as per historical but the Confederates have a much better numerical situation in the West.
2) McClellan declines to take any offensive action because he cannot be assured of troops sufficient to make the offensive work, and is replaced by someone else who takes the (bloody and costly) Overland option that can't get anywhere important.
3) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign but gets fewer troops and is not tied to the White Oak, moves to the James, can't advance successfully against Richmond with such a numerical disadvantage, and is withdrawn after Lincoln's patience expires. (Sort of the Peninsular Campaign without the actual Seven Days battle taking place.)
4) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign but gets fewer troops and is tied to the White Oak, and the Seven Days shatters his army and captures part or all of it as a formed unit.
5) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign, fails to get though Yorktown quickly, and is recalled before pushing through it.
6) McClellan is defeated in a field battle around Yorktown after Johnston's main army gets down there, and withdraws to Fort Monroe before evacuating.
 
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I can point you at Robcraufurd's assessment for the Union, but the bottom line is that the North was not independent of imported weapons or weapon materials until at least 1864 (though they had stockpiles by then). The South had a domestic weapons material pipeline, but they also had trouble procuring enough good weapons (a lot of the Southern army had muskets not rifles, though Lee's force historically did manage to completely transition to rifles.)

For the initial rush of extra troops you could pretty much sort it out by having Kentucky State Arsenal (Frankfort) supply the excess, though they'll all be muskets. Later on you can have CSA imports handle it for the later recruits, especially if New Orleans remains in Confederate hands and the blockade thus remains patchy for longer.

And, of course, if things go completely pear shaped and McClellan's army is captured, that's your small arms problem solved right there...



Essentially this is just because historically McClellan was promised troops, made plans based on having those troops, then did not get those troops. He was able to overcome this disadvantage and prevent the loss of his army, but it was close - especially in the Seven Days, when he was legitimately outnumbered even historically.
(When was this? Pick a date, it happened over and over for basically the entire Peninsular campaign.)



I think it'd be pretty much ahistorical for McClellan to be given more troops than he was historically allowed access to in a situation where the manpower crunch is worse, so IMO you have these choices:

1) The Peninsular campaign unfolds as per historical but the Confederates have a much better numerical situation in the West.
2) McClellan declines to take any offensive action because he cannot be assured of troops sufficient to make the offensive work, and is replaced by someone else who takes the (bloody and costly) Overland option that can't get anywhere important.
3) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign but gets fewer troops and is not tied to the White Oak, moves to the James, can't advance successfully against Richmond with such a numerical disadvantage, and is withdrawn after Lincoln's patience expires. (Sort of the Peninsular Campaign without the actual Seven Days battle taking place.)
4) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign but gets fewer troops and is tied to the White Oak, and the Seven Days shatters his army and captures part or all of it as a formed unit.
5) McClellan launches the Peninsular campaign, fails to get though Yorktown quickly, and is recalled before pushing through it.
6) McClellan is defeated in a field battle around Yorktown after Johnston's main army gets down there, and withdraws to Fort Monroe before evacuating.
Another difference in having a Confederate Kentucky/Missouri is Tennessee would be in good hands as neither the important industrial center of Nashville (home to Cumberland Iron Works) nor other industrial centers in the Deep South like cities in Alabama or Atlanta/Augusta, Georgia would be invaded as Kentucky would be the main focus and Louisville could go either way, on the Missouri side of things if the Confederates do secure the entire state then they have the Trans-Mississippi as their main focus and possibly St. Louis if they are lucky.
 
Missouri is a big one, yes.

The ironclads built on the Mississippi river system by the Union were at:
(n.b. the Casco design utterly sucked but this would not necessarily be true of a Confederate ironclad)

Cincinnati x2 Casco
St Louis x2 Casco
Brownsville x1 Casco
St Louis x2 Neosho
Mound City x1 Ozark
St Louis x4 Milwaukee
Pittsburgh x2 Marietta
Cincinnati x3 Canonicus
Pittsburgh x1 Canonicus
St Louis x7 City
Cincinnati x1 Indianola
St Louis x1 Benton
Cincinnati x1 Chillicothe
(Can't identify where Essex was upgraded)
St Louis x1 Choctaw
St Louis x1 Lafayette
Cincinnati x1 Tuscumbia

Overall total is that St Louis produced 18 out of the 31 Union ironclads I could localize in the Mississippi river system, and they're preferentially the earlier ones like the Cities. This means that essentially possession of St Louis, especially early in the war, would give the Confederacy a major advantage in the ironclad war... much like no Peninsular campaign would give the Confederacy a major advantage simply by meaning that the Virginia didn't need abandonment and scuttling.
 
Missouri is a big one, yes.

The ironclads built on the Mississippi river system by the Union were at:
(n.b. the Casco design utterly sucked but this would not necessarily be true of a Confederate ironclad)

Cincinnati x2 Casco
St Louis x2 Casco
Brownsville x1 Casco
St Louis x2 Neosho
Mound City x1 Ozark
St Louis x4 Milwaukee
Pittsburgh x2 Marietta
Cincinnati x3 Canonicus
Pittsburgh x1 Canonicus
St Louis x7 City
Cincinnati x1 Indianola
St Louis x1 Benton
Cincinnati x1 Chillicothe
(Can't identify where Essex was upgraded)
St Louis x1 Choctaw
St Louis x1 Lafayette
Cincinnati x1 Tuscumbia

Overall total is that St Louis produced 18 out of the 31 Union ironclads I could localize in the Mississippi river system, and they're preferentially the earlier ones like the Cities. This means that essentially possession of St Louis, especially early in the war, would give the Confederacy a major advantage in the ironclad war... much like no Peninsular campaign would give the Confederacy a major advantage simply by meaning that the Virginia didn't need abandonment and scuttling.
Any Confederate possession of St. Louis means another major city in their hands and the nearby Union states of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio could be threatened. Even without St. Louis, having Missouri in Confederate possession will give them another important border state like Kentucky.
 
Missouri is a big one, yes.

.....

Overall total is that St Louis produced 18 out of the 31 Union ironclads I could localize in the Mississippi river system, and they're preferentially the earlier ones like the Cities. This means that essentially possession of St Louis, especially early in the war, would give the Confederacy a major advantage in the ironclad war... much like no Peninsular campaign would give the Confederacy a major advantage simply by meaning that the Virginia didn't need abandonment and scuttling.

Well if they got St Louis, even if in such a way it was seriously damaged and they couldn't produce any ironclads there that sounds like it would be bad for the union simply because of the loss of production on the Mississippi, although possibly more union ironclads could have been produced elsewhere? Coupled with holding New Orleans it sounds like the south could hold pretty much the entire Mississippi up to the Ohio junction at least for quite a while. Which would make attacks further south a lot more difficult and a longer business at the very least.

If their able to use even a fraction of St Louis's production it would considerable boost their capacity, especially since according to Wiki it had a larger population than New Orleans by this point.
 
Well if they got St Louis, even if in such a way it was seriously damaged and they couldn't produce any ironclads there that sounds like it would be bad for the union simply because of the loss of production on the Mississippi, although possibly more union ironclads could have been produced elsewhere? Coupled with holding New Orleans it sounds like the south could hold pretty much the entire Mississippi up to the Ohio junction at least for quite a while. Which would make attacks further south a lot more difficult and a longer business at the very least.

If their able to use even a fraction of St Louis's production it would considerable boost their capacity, especially since according to Wiki it had a larger population than New Orleans by this point.
If the Confederacy got Missouri it would require the Missouri State Guard to keep up their post-Wilson's Creek success or a more decisive defeat of Nathaniel Lyon and his army at Rolla (a key railroad town where Lyon and his men were going to retreat) if there had been no drizzle to create the illusion of a storm to Confederate troops, McCulloch actually got along with Strrling Price (see the Wikipedia page for him on his Civil War days) St. Louis might end up in Confederate hands as you said the South could hold onto the Mississippi up to the Ohio for a while.
 
Well if they got St Louis, even if in such a way it was seriously damaged and they couldn't produce any ironclads there that sounds like it would be bad for the union simply because of the loss of production on the Mississippi, although possibly more union ironclads could have been produced elsewhere?
It's possible some ironclads could have been produced elsewhere, but it would definitely cause a major cut in production because you'll notice that all those ironclads were built in just four places. St. Louis was highly productive because it had the shipyards able to go straight into ironclad production, though it looks like Cincinnati ultimately ended up producing more of the larger, more sophisticated ironclads (though they took so long they mostly didn't see much action.)
 
If the Confederacy got Missouri it would require the Missouri State Guard to keep up their post-Wilson's Creek success or a more decisive defeat of Nathaniel Lyon and his army at Rolla (a key railroad town where Lyon and his men were going to retreat) if there had been no drizzle to create the illusion of a storm to Confederate troops, McCulloch actually got along with Strrling Price (see the Wikipedia page for him on his Civil War days) St. Louis might end up in Confederate hands as you said the South could hold onto the Mississippi up to the Ohio for a while.

BlueandGrayl

A little puzzled here because looking at the Wiki page for McCulloch it mentioned he have a very poor opinion of the Missouri rebels and a 'feud' with Price. See para 2-4 on his civil war service of the Wiki link for McCulloch - not quote sure how to insert a link here? Or did you mean IF he had got along with Price? Does look as a potential big missed opportunity.

Steve
 
BlueandGrayl

A little puzzled here because looking at the Wiki page for McCulloch it mentioned he have a very poor opinion of the Missouri rebels and a 'feud' with Price. See para 2-4 on his civil war service of the Wiki link for McCulloch - not quote sure how to insert a link here? Or did you mean IF he had got along with Price? Does look as a potential big missed opportunity.

Steve
By McCulloch actually trying to get along with Price I mean he has a better opinion of him and doesn't get into feuds with him unlike OTL.
 
BlueandGrayl

A little puzzled here because looking at the Wiki page for McCulloch it mentioned he have a very poor opinion of the Missouri rebels and a 'feud' with Price. See para 2-4 on his civil war service of the Wiki link for McCulloch - not quote sure how to insert a link here? Or did you mean IF he had got along with Price? Does look as a potential big missed opportunity.

Steve

By McCulloch actually trying to get along with Price I mean he has a better opinion of him and doesn't get into feuds with him unlike OTL.
I'm considering having Bragg accept Davis' December 1861 offer to command the Trans-Mississippi. I think Bragg deserves a bit more credit than he usually gets - the 1862 move from Tupelo to Chattanooga was a feat that only really happened again when Longstreet moved his corps west in 1863. I'm wondering how this would turn out, while Van Dorn stays in the cavalry and Kirby Smith becomes a corps commander in the ANV.

Rough idea for early 1862:
Army of Northern Virginia
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston
First Corps - MG G. W. Smith
Second Corps - MG James Longstreet
Third Corps - MG E. K. Smith
Valley - MG Thomas J. Jackson
Cavalry - BG J. E. B. Stuart

"Army of the Peninsula"
MG John B. Magruder

Dept. of Norfolk
MG Benjamin Huger

Army of Kentucky
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston
Left Wing - MG William J. Hardee
Right Wing - MG George B. Crittenden (replaced with MG Simon B. Buckner)
Cavalry: MG Earl Van Dorn

Gulf Department

New Orleans
MG Mansfield Lovell

Army of the West
MG Braxton Bragg
Left - MG(MSG) Leonidas Polk
Right - BG Benjamin McCulloch
 
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I'm considering having Bragg accept Davis' December 1861 offer to command the Trans-Mississippi. I think Bragg deserves a bit more credit than he usually gets - the 1862 move from Tupelo to Chattanooga was a feat that only really happened again when Longstreet moved his corps west in 1863. I'm wondering how this would turn out, while Van Dorn stays in the cavalry and Kirby Smith becomes a corps commander in the ANV.

Rough idea for early 1862:
Army of Northern Virginia
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston
First Corps - MG G. W. Smith
Second Corps - MG James Longstreet
Third Corps - MG E. K. Smith
Valley - MG Thomas J. Jackson
Cavalry - BG J. E. B. Stuart

"Army of the Peninsula"
MG John B. Magruder

Dept. of Norfolk
MG Benjamin Huger

Army of Kentucky
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston
Left Wing - MG William J. Hardee
Right Wing - MG George B. Crittenden (replaced with MG Simon B. Buckner)
Cavalry: MG Earl Van Dorn

Gulf Department

New Orleans
MG Mansfield Lovell

Army of the West
MG Braxton Bragg
Left - MG(MSG) Leonidas Polk
Right - BG Benjamin McCulloch

Well I don't know much about him but the Wiki article doesn't bode well. [I know its Wiki but its all I have to go on at the moment.:redface:] Not only doesn't it rate him much as a commander but he also seems to have had difficulties with subordinates and especially Polk so that sounds like a recipe for serious problems in the west. Possibly Bragg goes west but Polk ends up elsewhere, which might remove that clash?
 
Hmm, well, this is mostly a positive change for the CSA of course overall. I can't speak to ORBATs specifically but in terms of available resources... the stronger Confederate force from Kentucky and a weakened equivalent Union force will result in the need to dispatch or retain more troops west, thus weakening the Army of the Potomac somewhat.
If we assume that basically about 1.5 divisions worth' of men (15,000) join the Confederacy instead of the Union, that means that to retain similar comparative force levels in the West would take three divisions' extra troops moved in from elsewhere (30,000 - 15,000 to replace the missing guys and 15,000 to face them.)

Assuming for the moment that McClellan is in command of the AotP in early 1862 and that his force has two fewer divisions, this might put the kibosh on any offensive plans in the East - not only is the West more of a priority, but the conclusion historically was that a minimum of 40,000 troops were required in and near Washington to defend it. Historically McClellan planned to leave about 55,000 (though he got his numbers wrong and claimed more) but with 40,000 needed to defend Washington then the possible force to take is reduced (and if the historical removal of a corps takes place then McClellan's actual offensive would have to take place with only six to seven divisions' worth of troops - indeed it is quite possible he would be outright outnumbered by Johnston's main body.)

While that would be an interesting way to take it (McClellan plans an offensive in much the same way as historically, is required by vote of corps commanders to go for the Peninsular option, 1st Corps is witheld, McClellan's army fights a basically even battle around Yorktown mid-month and is forced to retreat) it's probably not strictly necessary...
Looking at the OR, it looks the Dept. of the Potomac had well over 100,000 PFD. Strangely, civilwarintheeast.com shows only about 5 organized divisions, and I don't think there are enough troops in the forts and such to make up the difference (assuming each division is about 10-11,000-ish men). I'm wondering where McClellan would draw the units to send East at all.
 
Looking at the OR, it looks the Dept. of the Potomac had well over 100,000 PFD. Strangely, civilwarintheeast.com shows only about 5 organized divisions, and I don't think there are enough troops in the forts and such to make up the difference (assuming each division is about 10-11,000-ish men). I'm wondering where McClellan would draw the units to send East at all.
Meant 'West' in the post.

Here's the organization for the Army of the Potomac in September 1861:
http://civilwarintheeast.com/us-army-sep-61/army-of-the-potomac-september-1861/
Banks' division
Casey's provisional division (receiving new units)
Dix's division (Baltimore garrison)
McCall's division
McDowell's division
Porter's division

Unattached brigades:
Blenker's bde.
Couch's bde.
Franklin's bde.
Graham's bde.
Heintzelman's bde.
Hooker's bde.
Howard's bde.
Hunter's bde.
Kearny's bde.
Keyes' bde.
Lander's bde.
Richardson's bde.
Sherman's bde.
Sickles' bde.
W. F. Smith's bde.
Stone's bde.
Troops at Fort Corcoran
Troops at Fort Runyan
Troops at Fort Ellsworth

That's five divisions and seventeen (sixteen and the fortress troops) brigades. If we say the divisions are about 10,000 strong, and the brigades 3,500, we end up with 109,500.

Any of the scenarios presented by @Saphroneth will very likely end with McClellan being sacked. Whoever the administration goes with next (Sumner? Rosecrans?) will probably go for the Overland route, and how that will go is hard to say.

In the west, I don't think there's anything the Rebs can do to hurt the Old Northwest really. It wasn't exactly a small job for Morgan to move 1,800 men across the Ohio in 1863, so moving an army won't be easy to say the very least.

While the Confederacy will definitely not be curbstomping the Union, I think the 1862 midterms will not look good at all for the Republicans. I might have Britain step in to mediate once the new congress takes its seats in March of 63 along with the other Great Powers.
 
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