Confederacy Victory By Attrition?

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Apr 30, 2012
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Was there any point during the war in which Union casualties came close to tipping overall public sentiment against the war? "War weariness" was certainly a concern for Lincoln and a hope of the Confederates, but did it ever actually come close to reality?

The aftermath of the Overland Campaign and the failed assaults on Petersburg seem the most likely candidate to me.

Obligatory acknowledgement: public opinion polls didn't exist in the 1860s.
 
And I think your last sentence acknowledges this can only be speculation on our part.

Was Shiloh in fact the greater shock, more casualties in two days than the young nation had suffered in wars up to that point? Was it the aftermath of the Seven Days, which thwarted a large and expensive attempt to take Richmond and end things for good? Or maybe Fredericksburg, where the valor of the troops and the bankruptcy of the high command seemed most evident? Certainly the Overland campaign is an understandable contender.

Or did Greeley and the other journalists ever really speak for 'the North'? Was there ever really a time when those who went to war for the Union, as fervent and sincere in their beliefs as those who sought Southern independence, came even close to ready to give up?

Good question.
 
Or did Greeley and the other journalists ever really speak for 'the North'? Was there ever really a time when those who went to war for the Union, as fervent and sincere in their beliefs as those who sought Southern independence, came even close to ready to give up?

Yes, this may be a key distinction. It doesn't mean much for a newspaper to bemoan casualty lists if they were anti-war from the beginning.

A newspaper turning anti-war, or expressing serious concerns about the casualties after being supportive of the administration and war would mean a lot more. Or a legislator or governor who started our pro-war but changed at some point.

Diaries or letters to/from home are also illustrative because they were intended for a private audience rather than public partisan propaganda. While we can't say how much any one of them reflected larger trends they can be illustrative about what had the greatest impact.
 
Was there any point during the war in which Union casualties came close to tipping overall public sentiment against the war? "War weariness" was certainly a concern for Lincoln and a hope of the Confederates, but did it ever actually come close to reality?

The aftermath of the Overland Campaign and the failed assaults on Petersburg seem the most likely candidate to me.

Obligatory acknowledgement: public opinion polls didn't exist in the 1860s.
Percentage-wise, the south was being more "attritted" by war casualties than the north, so if anyone was going to give up because of this, it would have been the south.
 
Wasn't the North war weary too.

The Democratic Party was bitterly split between War Democrats and Peace Democrats, a group further divided among competing factions. Moderate Peace Democrats who supported the war against the Confederacy, such as Horatio Seymour, were preaching the wisdom of a negotiated peace. After the Union victory at the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863, moderate Peace Democrats proposed a negotiated peace that would secure Union victory. They believed this was the best course of action, because an armistice could finish the war without devastating the South.[11] Radical Peace Democrats known as Copperheads, such as Thomas H. Seymour, declared the war to be a failure and favored an immediate end to hostilities without securing Union victory.[12]

250px-Democratic_presidential_ticket_1864b.jpg

McClellan and Pendleton campaign poster
George B. McClellan vied for the presidential nomination. Additionally, friends of Horatio Seymour insisted on placing his name before the convention, which was held in Chicago, Illinois, on August 29–31, 1864. But on the day before the organization of that body, Horatio Seymour announced positively that he would not be a candidate.

Since the Democrats were divided by issues of war and peace, they sought a strong candidate who could unify the party. The compromise was to nominate pro-war General George B. McClellan for president and anti-war Representative George H. Pendleton for vice president. McClellan, a War Democrat, was nominated for president over the Copperhead Thomas H. Seymour. Pendleton, a close associate of the Copperhead Clement Vallandigham, balanced the ticket, since he was known for having strongly opposed the Union war effort.[13] The convention adopted a peace platform[14] – a platform McClellan personally rejected.[15] McClellan supported the continuation of the war and restoration of the Union, but the party platform, written by Vallandigham, opposed this position
 
On the other hand, is there a point where you've had so many casualties that you feel like you can't voluntarily stop? Like all those deaths would mean nothing if you did? I ask because, honestly, that's the only way I can make any sense of World War I on the Western Front.
I have seen this sentiment expressed in Union soldiers' diaries. It was also used by some to argue against the election of the previously beloved McClellan.
 
"Attrition" was a much greater problem for the South, not the Northern States. Although Southern casualties are terribly under-reported, both sides suffered nearly the same numbers.
1688911076455.png


The USA mobilized about 2.8 million men; the Confederacy probably shy of one million. The US total included a large number of foreign recruits, 180,000 negro troops, and over 100,000 Southern troops, so there was still a large manpower pool in the North from which to draw in case of a continuation of the war from mid-1865.

There were no wonder weapons that could guarantee maximize enemy casualties without risking your own neck. The only question was who "won" these battles and could claim some political advantage from them. As to who was going to win the war, from mid-1862 the Confederate situation was already desperate, and resorted to a conscription to fill the ranks...

From Mr. McFeeley's book on Gen. Grant, who learned an important lesson from hard knocks early in the war;

1688910330054.png

1688910405342.png


Both sides suffered just over 600 casualties in this action...

1688910542497.png
 
On the other hand, is there a point where you've had so many casualties that you feel like you can't voluntarily stop? Like all those deaths would mean nothing if you did? I ask because, honestly, that's the only way I can make any sense of World War I on the Western Front.
It is worth pointing out, perhaps, that anti-war sentiments by some authors who served on the Western Front took over the narrative in large part because it accorded with how much of the world viewed WWI in the wake of WWII, i.e. that it had been a waste because WWII happened. At the actual time (and this is an area where their writing often resembled that of Civil War soldiers!) many soldiers on the Western Front believed in what they were fighting for even if they thought their generals were useless.
 
In Vietnam, the United States inflicted far more casualties upon the North Vietnamese and its supporters with a much smaller population base than it suffered and yet, North Vietnam ended up achieving their political and military objectives in the long run because of war weariness and anti war sentiment among the American public and media. Attrition was the primary goal of the US military for the first years of the war instead of political or physical objectives and eventually the American will to fight a drawn out campaign in a foreign land was exhausted before the numbers game was won.

Could the South have done the same to the North during the Civil War? During the bloody summer of 1864, Lincoln at one time was doubting his reelection to a second term and the press was very critical of the high casualties the Union forces were suffering despite the fact that Union armies were inflicting heavy casualties upon the South that it could not afford to suffer with a significantly smaller population base. The difference between Vietnam and the Civil War was that the Union was fighting a war of physical conquest instead of one of attrition and in the end Sherman's campaign through the heart of the South and Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah Valley gave the Lincoln administration and the voting population of the North the assurance that it needed to continue the fight until the Confederacy was defeated. The only way the South could have broken the Union's will to fight was to hang on to the dwindling territory it controlled and continue to wear the Union will to fight down until the 1864 elections and it did not have the resources to accomplish that.
 
Insofar as attrition would be a deciding factor in the public mind of the Northern peoples and perhaps leading to the ending of the war on terms more favorable to the South than it did in reality, I would choose July of 1863; specifically the battle of Gettysburg.

If the battle had gone to Lee, the main army of the Union would have suffered 3 major defeats within in a row 2 with catastrophic losses.

But, IMO, Outside the AoP being destroyed or forced to surrender, I think Lincoln was determined enough and canny enough to pull the Union through in any event. But, a third straight Confederate Victory and this one on Union soil, would be hard to swallow by the general public at the time.
 
Was there any point during the war in which Union casualties came close to tipping overall public sentiment against the war? "War weariness" was certainly a concern for Lincoln and a hope of the Confederates, but did it ever actually come close to reality?

The aftermath of the Overland Campaign and the failed assaults on Petersburg seem the most likely candidate to me.

Obligatory acknowledgement: public opinion polls didn't exist in the 1860s.
Porter Alexander would have agreed with you.
On the other hand, is there a point where you've had so many casualties that you feel like you can't voluntarily stop? Like all those deaths would mean nothing if you did? I ask because, honestly, that's the only way I can make any sense of World War I on the Western Front.
And he said as much in his memoir, they had to fight to the last ditch.
 
At one point Lincoln said My God, what will the country say Things were going badly
That was after Chancellorsville, itself coming after Fredericksburg and the Mud March.
"The guy I put in charge after firing the guy I put in charge to replace the first guy I put in charge just failed… what will the country say about my judgment?" :D
 
That was after Chancellorsville, itself coming after Fredericksburg and the Mud March.
"The guy I put in charge after firing the guy I put in charge to replace the first guy I put in charge just failed… what will the country say about my judgment?" :D
I think that's an important distinction. There may be no problem with the stated goal of the administration to preserve the union but a definite problem with how the administration is (or isn't) carrying it out as opposed to having a problem with the stated goal of the administration from the get-go.
 
At one point Lincoln said My God, what will the country say Things were going badly
Yet despite Lincoln's lament, there's surprisingly little indication the country had much of a reaction at all to Chancellorsville. This leads me towards skepticism that even a Confederate tactical win at Gettysburg would have a dramatic impact.
 
Yet despite Lincoln's lament, there's surprisingly little indication the country had much of a reaction at all to Chancellorsville. This leads me towards skepticism that even a Confederate tactical win at Gettysburg would have a dramatic impact.
"My God! It is horrible—horrible; and to think of it, 130,000 magnificent soldiers so cut to pieces by less than 60,000 half-starved ragamuffins!"

Horace Greely, NY Tribune


"At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we gained not an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued."

Lee on Chancellorsville.
 
In Vietnam, the United States inflicted far more casualties upon the North Vietnamese and its supporters with a much smaller population base than it suffered and yet, North Vietnam ended up achieving their political and military objectives in the long run because of war weariness and anti war sentiment among the American public and media. Attrition was the primary goal of the US military for the first years of the war instead of political or physical objectives and eventually the American will to fight a drawn out campaign in a foreign land was exhausted before the numbers game was won.

Could the South have done the same to the North during the Civil War? During the bloody summer of 1864, Lincoln at one time was doubting his reelection to a second term and the press was very critical of the high casualties the Union forces were suffering despite the fact that Union armies were inflicting heavy casualties upon the South that it could not afford to suffer with a significantly smaller population base. The difference between Vietnam and the Civil War was that the Union was fighting a war of physical conquest instead of one of attrition and in the end Sherman's campaign through the heart of the South and Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah Valley gave the Lincoln administration and the voting population of the North the assurance that it needed to continue the fight until the Confederacy was defeated. The only way the South could have broken the Union's will to fight was to hang on to the dwindling territory it controlled and continue to wear the Union will to fight down until the 1864 elections and it did not have the resources to accomplish that.
Yes but there are vast differences between Vietnam and the ACW . The Confederacy didn't have 100k foreign troops based in its territory unlike North Vietnam.
Leftyhunter
 
Yet despite Lincoln's lament, there's surprisingly little indication the country had much of a reaction at all to Chancellorsville. This leads me towards skepticism that even a Confederate tactical win at Gettysburg would have a dramatic impact.
I'm not a mystic but I think that if Lee would have won at Gettysburg the South might have won the war. Just saying. For sure the following scenarios would have been a lot different, the war a lot longer.
 

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