Command Fatigue

[jackt62]

For Hancock his Gettysburg wound never seem to heal and continued to bother throughout the rest of the war.

In his "History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac," Francis Amasa Walker says this about Hancock and the II Corps' failed Petersburg assault of June 15, 1864:

"It is difficult to say how much of the failure to seize the opportunity offered was due to the fact that the fatigues and excitement of the past forty days had brought about a renewal of General Hancock's disability from his severe Gettysburg wounds. That gallant and devoted officer, who, day and night, never spared himself, whether in camp, on the march, or in battle, was now suffering intense pain, as fragments of the badly splintered bone, dislodged by six weeks of almost continuous labor in the saddle, began to work their way out of the inflamed flesh, requiring him frequently to seek rest in an ambulance or on the ground, when otherwise he would have been galloping over the field or leading the march of his foremost division."

 

[Saphroneth]

I think it's possible to say that there are some commanders who are simply unaffected by the carnage of war affecting their commands, but there's something of a dichotomy going on - some of the qualities in a commander which make their unit better (i.e. the commander is empathetic) also result in the commander being more likely to care for the formation which they have spent a considerable time working with, fostering the improvement of, administrating and identifying with.

The exception would be people who either have very good self control (that is, they do suffer emotionally from the damage to their command, but are able to operate unaffected by it) or who are essentially sociopathic (that is, they don't actually feel for the unit but are good at "faking it", which means they can effectively portray a commander with a care for the unit.)

Of course, a commander who's emotionally invested in their unit isn't the only way to produce a good unit - another way is simply good and long drilling on the regimental, brigade and to some extent division level. This allows the corps commanders or wing commanders or army commanders to make their decisions with emotional distance while still producing a good unit, since they weren't involved with the process of training up the men - they were involved with the process of getting the field and general officers in order, but those men are more rarely casualties anyway because their place (especially for the general officers) is simply not on the front line.

 

[John S. Carter]

It is totally unrelated to the US Civil War, but I would recommend the 1949 movie Twelve O'clock High as a brilliant study on the effects of the stress of command. For what it's worth.

The mental fatigue is a large part in decision making in all aspects of one's life.Many a tragic decisions have been committed in such st states.In history of wars historians should view the mental state not of just the soldiers but also the mental state of the command.Was he suffering from being disciplined by command? Had he lead divisions into a sacrificial battle? Had he been denied a promotion or some other officer who was of less ability received it? Did he in a mental state of seeking fame and glory result in his moving his division of position in total disregard to orders?Did he delay in carrying out orders because mentally he feared defeat or that he cold not deal with the death after seeing so many after years of compat?I agree that this is unrelated to the war,:however ,the issue does matter when it effects the outcome of a battle or the condition of the soldiers and command involved in that war.I read that McClellan as a visitor to Crimean war was so affected by the horo that he saw that it may have affected his command of the army in battle .

 

[Saphroneth]

I read that McClellan as a visitor to Crimean war was so affected by the horo that he saw that it may have affected his command of the army in battle .

That specific case is a tricky one. Certainly I think one would argue that McClellan placed a premium on the value of fortification as a result of his experience; conversely for example Grant placed a low value on fortification (a theme throughout most of his career), probably because of the events at Fort Donelson.

It would be possible to advance the hypothesis that "McClellan's command was impaired by his observations of the horrors of war" but we would then need to find a place to test it - that is, find where this actually did alter his decisions. Certainly Antietam doesn't work because if that is what it looks like when you're reluctant to attack then I have a hard time thinking of a Union commander who ever attacked properly - what army commander committed more troops to assaults on the same day than McClellan at Antietam?

 

[Lubliner]

Of particular note many historians and followers have questioned Colonel Custer at Little Big Horn.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

Of particular note many historians and followers have questioned Colonel Custer at Little Big Horn.
Lubliner.

Custer's fate is kind of the sort of thing any expanding empire runs into now and then when it annoys the locals. The odd battalion massacre happens, and it should be noted that the details aren't exactly clear because everyone on Custer's side died.

Certainly Custer screwed up, but how is a little less clear. Overconfidence probably played a role though.