Cold Harbor Options After June 3

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I'm reading Gordon Rhea's final volume on the Overland Campaign.

I was surprised to learn the Union army began digging approaches on June 4 and a Pennsylvania regiment even started a mine. We could have had The Crater at Cold Harbor instead of Petersburg! Some of the Confederate line would have been difficult or impossible to effectively use siegecraft against due to creeks or soil conditions. Was there any real prospect for success at Cold Harbor? (Grant and Meade didn't seem inclined toward using such tactics at Petersburg, other than The Crater, so perhaps "could" is largely irrelevant if the generals weren't interested in trying.)

Grant decided to make another southward flanking move to cross the James and for Petersburg. He doesn't seem to have considered trying to flank Lee back the other way despite the Confederate left arguably being a little exposed (Lee's right was securely on the Chickahominy). During the whole Overland Campaign the AOTP only made one attempt at a backtracking flanking maneuver, an abortive attack late in the Spotsylvania operations. The James River was of course where Grant had wanted to go in the first place. Setting that preference aside: was there any merit in trying to turn the Confederate left at Cold Harbor after the failed June 3 assault but before Warren and Burnside were shifted away from that flank?

 

[Belfoured]

I'm reading Gordon Rhea's final volume on the Overland Campaign.

I was surprised to learn the Union army began digging approaches on June 4 and a Pennsylvania regiment even started a mine. We could have had The Crater at Cold Harbor instead of Petersburg! Some of the Confederate line would have been difficult or impossible to effectively use siegecraft against due to creeks or soil conditions. Was there any real prospect for success at Cold Harbor? (Grant and Meade didn't seem inclined toward using such tactics at Petersburg, other than The Crater, so perhaps "could" is largely irrelevant if the generals weren't interested in trying.)

Grant decided to make another southward flanking move to cross the James and for Petersburg. He doesn't seem to have considered trying to flank Lee back the other way despite the Confederate left arguably being a little exposed (Lee's right was securely on the Chickahominy). During the whole Overland Campaign the AOTP only made one attempt at a backtracking flanking maneuver, an abortive attack late in the Spotsylvania operations. The James River was of course where Grant had wanted to go in the first place. Setting that preference aside: was there any merit in trying to turn the Confederate left at Cold Harbor after the failed June 3 assault but before Warren and Burnside were shifted away from that flank?

It's a legitimate question. Grant appears to have decided on the James River maneuver by June 5, so we're looking at a very short window. In addition, Butler was already down there, so that move would be adding his force to the mix. The fact is that Grant's move definitely caught Lee off balance for a few crucial days. A shift to Lee's left (if feasible) might have prevented Lee's dispatch of Early on June 12 - good for Union forces to the North but also leaving Lee with Early's strength to oppose Grant.