Civil War Naval Papers

[Belfoured]

Collections; Maritime Studies / Master's Theses / North Carolina Collection
Publisher; East Carolina University
The Development of Confederate Ship Construction : An Archaeological and Historical Investigation of Confederate Ironclads Neuse and Jackson
Author; Campbell, Peter B.

Abstract
Southern shipbuilding in 1861 was comparable to construction throughout the United States. Confederate ships early in the war show continuity of these traditions, but beginning in 1862, wartime stimuli created a distinct Confederate shipbuilding style. This thesis examines changes in the Confederacy's conceptual approach to construction by tracing pre-war shipbuilding traditions and popular trends in naval architecture. As a consequence of shipbuilders' conservative nature, ships' structural systems and assembly order change gradually, allowing traditions to be traced. A decentralized shipbuilding program led to high levels of variability between Confederate ships, even among vessels of the same class. Local shipbuilders used vernacular methods to expedite construction. Historical and archaeological examination of the CSS Neuse and Jackson, two diamond hull ironclads today housed in museums, identified the progression of Confederate shipbuilding and the non-traditional features in their construction.

https://thescholarship.ecu.edu/handle/10342/2227 - click on View / Open link under the title

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

And another flash drive is getting filled up.

 

[USS ALASKA]

And another flash drive is getting filled up.

Dude, if you were good this year, ask Santa for some more...


USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Ma'ams / sirs, in a concerted effort to assist @Belfoured in his mission to fill every easily mobile storage device in the known free world with historical data, may I humbly present the following...

"IRRESISTIBLE MACHINES" : INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE UNION NAVY 1861-1865
By William Howard Roberts, M.A.
Ohio State University
1999

ABSTRACT
The American Civil War was shaped as much by the economic and industrial resources of the combatants as by their political and strategic thinking. The Union's use of ironclads in quantity was possible only because the navy mobilized Northern industry to build them. This industrial mobilization, and the navy's evolution of a flexible, effective system to manage a ship acquisition program of unprecedented size, is the theme of this work.

To produce its offensive fleet of ironclads, the Union had to change its peacetime method of managing ship acquisition, but the experimental nature of ironclad technology complicated matters. The navy selected the monitor type of ironclad for (quantity production based more upon political and public relations imperatives than upon suitability for the operational tasks at hand.

To build its fleet of monitors, the navy established a "project office" form of management practically independent of the existing navy administrative system. The office of the General Superintendent of Ironclads, under its de facto head Alban C. Stimers, provided desperately needed drive and direction during the critical months of 1862 and 1863. The project office spearheaded the navy's deliberate attempt to broaden the naval industrial base by granting contracts for monitors to inland firms. Under intense pressure, it
learned to support a fleet of high-technology vessels while incorporating the lessons of combat in existing ships and in vessels under construction.

Meanwhile, the navy granted contracts for seagoing vessels to inland firms in a deliberate attempt to broaden its shipbuilding industrial base. The efforts of shipbuilders in Cincinnati, Ohio, form the basis for an assessment of the expansion program. Neither the broadened industrial base nor the advanced acquisition management system survived the return of peace. The expansion shipyards failed to meet expectations during the war due to capital starvation and a navy philosophy that allowed design changes to flourish unchecked; when navy contracts evaporated after the war, so did the expansion yards. In shipbuilding management, Stimers' professional self-destruction discredited the embryonic project office system and drove the navy backwards in its management of
ship acquisition.

https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=osu1488187049542969&disposition=inline

Show us your thumbs! (drives)
USS ALASKA

 

[Belfoured]

Dude, if you were good this year, ask Santa for some more...


USS ALASKA

He claims that the North Pole is having supply chain issues and Rudolph is insisting on working remote ....

 

[Belfoured]

Ma'ams / sirs, in a concerted effort to assist @Belfoured in his mission to fill every easily mobile storage device in the known free world with historical data, may I humbly present the following...

"IRRESISTIBLE MACHINES" : INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE UNION NAVY 1861-1865
By William Howard Roberts, M.A.
Ohio State University
1999

ABSTRACT
The American Civil War was shaped as much by the economic and industrial resources of the combatants as by their political and strategic thinking. The Union's use of ironclads in quantity was possible only because the navy mobilized Northern industry to build them. This industrial mobilization, and the navy's evolution of a flexible, effective system to manage a ship acquisition program of unprecedented size, is the theme of this work.

To produce its offensive fleet of ironclads, the Union had to change its peacetime method of managing ship acquisition, but the experimental nature of ironclad technology complicated matters. The navy selected the monitor type of ironclad for (quantity production based more upon political and public relations imperatives than upon suitability for the operational tasks at hand.

To build its fleet of monitors, the navy established a "project office" form of management practically independent of the existing navy administrative system. The office of the General Superintendent of Ironclads, under its de facto head Alban C. Stimers, provided desperately needed drive and direction during the critical months of 1862 and 1863. The project office spearheaded the navy's deliberate attempt to broaden the naval industrial base by granting contracts for monitors to inland firms. Under intense pressure, it
learned to support a fleet of high-technology vessels while incorporating the lessons of combat in existing ships and in vessels under construction.

Meanwhile, the navy granted contracts for seagoing vessels to inland firms in a deliberate attempt to broaden its shipbuilding industrial base. The efforts of shipbuilders in Cincinnati, Ohio, form the basis for an assessment of the expansion program. Neither the broadened industrial base nor the advanced acquisition management system survived the return of peace. The expansion shipyards failed to meet expectations during the war due to capital starvation and a navy philosophy that allowed design changes to flourish unchecked; when navy contracts evaporated after the war, so did the expansion yards. In shipbuilding management, Stimers' professional self-destruction discredited the embryonic project office system and drove the navy backwards in its management of
ship acquisition.

https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=osu1488187049542969&disposition=inline

Show us your thumbs! (drives)
USS ALASKA

In hockey this is known as an aggressive fore check. I dare you!

 

[USS ALASKA]

Sirs, to tie in with the thread https://civilwartalk.com/threads/admiral-milne-in-nyc-and-washington-d-c-sept-and-oct-1863.199627/ here is the theses that led to the book No need of glory: The British Navy in American waters, 1860-1864 by Regis A Courtemanche

Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, K.C.B., and the North American and West Indian station, 1860-1864
Regis Armand Courtemanche
31 December 1966

Abstract
During most of the nineteenth century, Great Britain maintained eight foreign naval stations, for the protection of her subjects and commerce. This thesis concerns the North American and West Indian Station and its commander, Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, K.C.B., in the years 1860-1864. The first year of Milne's a command was relatively quiet and enabled him to learn the essentials, and to visit the important places of this, his first station command. The Prince of Wales had visited North America in I860, but this had gone very smoothly, 1861 saw the beginning of the American Civil War and the "testing" time for the admiral and his officers. Duo to the poor communications with England, Milne made many of his own decisions; for example, he sent his warships to inspect the federal blockade when it was just being put into effect, and there are many other instances of this initiative. The offensive and defensive capacity of the station is examined at the time of the Trent affair, as well as the allied expedition to Mexico at the same time, December 1861, The second and third years of the war are concerned largely with the legal and diplomatic problems that arose: Milne's opposition to the sustenance and repair of blockade runners, conflicts with colonial governors over the role of naval officers vis-a-vis the belligerents, and other matters. The administration and problems of the station are not neglected. The chain of command is explained and the two most endemic problems of the area: desertion and yellow fever, are examined. With the engagement between, the Monitor and Merrimack, the conflict between ordnance and armour was accelerated. The introduction of the Armstrong gun and the reasons for its failure are detailed. This was a critical situation as it meant that a large part of the armament of nearly every British warship was, from 1861 to 1864, defective. The British view of American forts, weapons and warships is also recounted. No serious writer has accused Milne of being partial to either side in the American struggle. But he was criticized for being more of a 'diplomat' than a 'fighter'. There can be no doubt, however, that his was a position of great delicacy and he handled the problems with consummate skill

Not sure of the copyright so will just post the link http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/4015/1/Courtemanche__Vice-admiral-Milne.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

Sirs, to tie in with the thread https://civilwartalk.com/threads/admiral-milne-in-nyc-and-washington-d-c-sept-and-oct-1863.199627/ here is the theses that led to the book No need of glory: The British Navy in American waters, 1860-1864 by Regis A Courtemanche

Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, K.C.B., and the North American and West Indian station, 1860-1864
Regis Armand Courtemanche
31 December 1966

Abstract
During most of the nineteenth century, Great Britain maintained eight foreign naval stations, for the protection of her subjects and commerce. This thesis concerns the North American and West Indian Station and its commander, Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, K.C.B., in the years 1860-1864. The first year of Milne's a command was relatively quiet and enabled him to learn the essentials, and to visit the important places of this, his first station command. The Prince of Wales had visited North America in I860, but this had gone very smoothly, 1861 saw the beginning of the American Civil War and the "testing" time for the admiral and his officers. Duo to the poor communications with England, Milne made many of his own decisions; for example, he sent his warships to inspect the federal blockade when it was just being put into effect, and there are many other instances of this initiative. The offensive and defensive capacity of the station is examined at the time of the Trent affair, as well as the allied expedition to Mexico at the same time, December 1861, The second and third years of the war are concerned largely with the legal and diplomatic problems that arose: Milne's opposition to the sustenance and repair of blockade runners, conflicts with colonial governors over the role of naval officers vis-a-vis the belligerents, and other matters. The administration and problems of the station are not neglected. The chain of command is explained and the two most endemic problems of the area: desertion and yellow fever, are examined. With the engagement between, the Monitor and Merrimack, the conflict between ordnance and armour was accelerated. The introduction of the Armstrong gun and the reasons for its failure are detailed. This was a critical situation as it meant that a large part of the armament of nearly every British warship was, from 1861 to 1864, defective. The British view of American forts, weapons and warships is also recounted. No serious writer has accused Milne of being partial to either side in the American struggle. But he was criticized for being more of a 'diplomat' than a 'fighter'. There can be no doubt, however, that his was a position of great delicacy and he handled the problems with consummate skill

Not sure of the copyright so will just post the link http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/4015/1/Courtemanche__Vice-admiral-Milne.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Impressive find!

 

[USS ALASKA]

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Effect of new technology on the operational and strategic levels of war: the development of steam propulsion in the United States Navy prior to 1860.
Author; Gray, Robert P.

Abstract
This study uses the development of steam propulsion in the United States Navy as a case study for how new technology affects the strategy of the United States at the operational and strategic levels. Using the modern paradigms of operational and strategic levels of war as delineated in current joint publications, this study shows that the link between technology and strategic and operations design is critical to the application of new technology. Though the period of the study is before the Civil War, significant use of steam propulsion in the United States allows detailed analysis of the application of technology without the influence of other nations. This study shows that, during this period, there is a significant strategic effect of steam technology, whereas steam technology's effect on the operational level of war is difficult to conceptualize. The study shows that certain patterns that relate to steam's application can be applied to modern technological advancement.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1993-06-03
Date, Digital; 2007
Call number; ADA 273954
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2007-11-07

Master of Military Art and Science Theses

cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Seemed fitting to post since the man just recently passed...

JOURNAL ARTICLE
Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy
William N. Still, Jr.
The Journal of Southern History
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1965), pp. 285-304 (20 pages)
Published By: Southern Historical Association

Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy on JSTOR

William N. Still, Jr., Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy, The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1965), pp. 285-304

www.jstor.org

Full article on JSTOR with Google sign-in (if you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Patterns of Procurement and Politics: Building Ships in the Civil War
Jeff Remling

During the U.S. Civil War, the American navy expanded and improved significantly. Pre-war shortages of ships, advances in naval technology, and losses of existing vessels forced the federal government to purchase and build hundreds of ships between 1861 and 1864. This paper examines construction in 1861-62 of three vessels, including two of the earliest "ironclads," which foreshadowed patterns of military procurement that crystallized during the war and still exist today.
The incorporation of new naval technology, which culminated in March 1862 in the "Battle of the Ironclads," was especially trying. The navy had few engineers who could design experimental craft. Even if they could overcome technical difficulties and the risk of failure and potential loss of a career, government-owned navy yards could not build such vessels. With the need for rapid construction of ironclad vessels, the navy had to contract the work out to private industrial yards, itself a relatively new and problematic process. An insightful example into this political-industrial side of naval construction during the Civil War can be found in a study of the construction of the ironclads U.S.S. Galena and U.S.S. Monitor and the more conventional gunboat, the U.S.S. Owasco. Although very different in design, these three vessels were related by having overlapping designers, builders, and/or financial backers, and all of these construction projects were also aided in major ways by the drive and cunning of New Haven businessman Cornelius Scranton Bushnell. Yet it was the Navy's necessity to build up the fleet quickly that gave Bushnell and others like him the opportunity they needed.

Full 14-page article can be read here - https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol17/tnm_17_1_16-30.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

Patterns of Procurement and Politics: Building Ships in the Civil War
Jeff Remling

During the U.S. Civil War, the American navy expanded and improved significantly. Pre-war shortages of ships, advances in naval technology, and losses of existing vessels forced the federal government to purchase and build hundreds of ships between 1861 and 1864. This paper examines construction in 1861-62 of three vessels, including two of the earliest "ironclads," which foreshadowed patterns of military procurement that crystallized during the war and still exist today.
The incorporation of new naval technology, which culminated in March 1862 in the "Battle of the Ironclads," was especially trying. The navy had few engineers who could design experimental craft. Even if they could overcome technical difficulties and the risk of failure and potential loss of a career, government-owned navy yards could not build such vessels. With the need for rapid construction of ironclad vessels, the navy had to contract the work out to private industrial yards, itself a relatively new and problematic process. An insightful example into this political-industrial side of naval construction during the Civil War can be found in a study of the construction of the ironclads U.S.S. Galena and U.S.S. Monitor and the more conventional gunboat, the U.S.S. Owasco. Although very different in design, these three vessels were related by having overlapping designers, builders, and/or financial backers, and all of these construction projects were also aided in major ways by the drive and cunning of New Haven businessman Cornelius Scranton Bushnell. Yet it was the Navy's necessity to build up the fleet quickly that gave Bushnell and others like him the opportunity they needed.

Full 14-page article can be read here - https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol17/tnm_17_1_16-30.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

It was difficult and there were scandalous failures. Engines could be too weak, too big, too fragile or too inefficient. One class of steam iron clads would not stay afloat when armed and supplied with coal.

 

[USS ALASKA]

The Vulnerability of the Union War Effort to Naval Attacks at the Beginning of the US Civil War
David G. Surdam

The Confederate warship Virginia's short-lived triumph in March 1862 triggered a latent fear among some northerners, perhaps exemplified by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton's fit of panic. Upon hearing of the ironclad warship Virginia's successful sortie and apparent invulnerability against a northern fleet anchored in Hampton Roads off the southern Virginia coast, Stanton feared that the ironclad would destroy the remainder of the Union fleet there and scuttle General George McClellan's campaign against Richmond. He further feared that the ironclad would then steam up the Atlantic coast and wreak havoc upon northern ports, and he warned New York officials to block the entrances to the port. Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory hoped for this very result. Virginia's dubious seaworthiness and the Federal warship Monitor squelched Mallory's hopes and allayed Stanton's fears. Prior to Virginia's attack, northern nerves were upset by the Trent incident and the attendant possibility of British naval attacks.

Virginia's failure to fulfill the Confederacy's hopes should not disguise the unease northerners felt about potential naval attacks. Northerners certainly were familiar with the effects of naval attacks: the War of 1812 was reminder enough. Was the northern war effort vulnerable to naval attacks? Was it important that the Federal navy prevented the nascent Confederate navy or the powerful British navy from attacking northern ports? The vulnerability or invulnerability of the northern war effort to naval attacks has received little attention from historians, possibly because Confederate naval attacks seemed unlikely and because the Trent incident ended quietly. But if the Europeans had intervened or if the Confederates had better success in building or buying a navy, the spectre of such attacks against northern cities might have become reality.

https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol10/tnm_10_2_41-58.pdf

Excellent 18 page article by Surdam

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects
Winter 2017

Making History Stick: Representations of Naval Stores in North Carolina Museums
Catherine Widin Bailey
College of William and Mary

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the extent to which three North Carolina museums, the North Carolina Museum of History, the Cape Fear Museum, and the Maritime Museum at Southport, represent the state's history of naval stores. Being a crucial part of North Carolina's past that is frequently ignored in the formal education system, naval stores should be highlighted in museum exhibits about the state's history and heritage. A critical analysis of these exhibits shows how these representations form a significant part of civic engagement and suggests improvements that would enhance the education of audiences about the importance of naval stores to the historical development of the state.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=etd

Cheers.
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

Seemed fitting to post since the man just recently passed...

JOURNAL ARTICLE
Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy
William N. Still, Jr.
The Journal of Southern History
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1965), pp. 285-304 (20 pages)
Published By: Southern Historical Association

Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy on JSTOR

William N. Still, Jr., Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy, The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1965), pp. 285-304

www.jstor.org

View attachment 463019

Full article on JSTOR with Google sign-in (if you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

And I think both were abandoned within a few days of each other in May 1862. Bragg pulled the garrison out of Pensacola to support A.S. Johnston's counterattack at Shiloh, and I believe the naval yard at Pensacola was burned. The Confederates were compelled to abandon Norfolk and Gosport because the supply lines to location were vulnerable to McClellan's army. The standard history protects what the Confederates did and what they were faced with when New Orleans, Pensacola, and Norfolk were occupied by US forces in May 1862.

 

[atlantis]

And I think both were abandoned within a few days of each other in May 1862. Bragg pulled the garrison out of Pensacola to support A.S. Johnston's counterattack at Shiloh, and I believe the naval yard at Pensacola was burned. The Confederates were compelled to abandon Norfolk and Gosport because the supply lines to location were vulnerable to McClellan's army. The standard history protects what the Confederates did and what they were faced with when New Orleans, Pensacola, and Norfolk were occupied by US forces in May 1862.

Why couldn't shipyards be established at Mobile and Wilmington both had rail and telegraph connections with harbors capable of handling ocean going ships.

 

[wausaubob]

Why couldn't shipyards be established at Mobile and Wilmington both had rail and telegraph connections with harbors capable of handling ocean going ships.

Ask @DaveBrt why industrial projects like that were out of reach for the Confederacy. He has the ready answer.

 

[DaveBrt]

Ask @DaveBrt why industrial projects like that were out of reach for the Confederacy. He has the ready answer.

Lack of manpower!!! All of the problems the Confederacy had were rooted in the lack of manpower -- lack of iron, lack of shipyards, lack of infantry, etc.

 

[atlantis]

Lack of manpower!!! All of the problems the Confederacy had were rooted in the lack of manpower -- lack of iron, lack of shipyards, lack of infantry, etc.

Dave, so what do you think of Mallory was he realistic or a dreamer.

 

[wausaubob]

Lack of manpower!!! All of the problems the Confederacy had were rooted in the lack of manpower -- lack of iron, lack of shipyards, lack of infantry, etc.

Virginia disbursed its population growth westward. Before 1860, population growth slowed in Tennessee. The US retained Baltimore, Louisville and St. Louis. And then the US navy put New Orleans under the guns and Butler was able to move up and occupy the city.
I believe both enslaved labor and paid labor were earning a premium in New Orleans before the war. The steep rise in the price of enslaved labor prior to the escalation of the fighting and the outbreak of war is also a foreshadowing of labor shortages.
The US had labor shortages too. But it also had a large labor force of women familiar with the demands of light manufacturing.
And the stream of immigrants to the US slowed but never completely stopped.
The point of interest is how many men left the Confederate economy to get away from the trouble. escape conscription, or based on the likelihood that the US railroads would pay better?
I suspect that the shift in the Confederacy from steamboats and steamships to railroads was a significant cause of labor shortages.
In that era, railroads were very labor intensive. Track maintenance was labor intensive. A locomotive experiences much more vibration than a steamboat and locomotives had to be constantly rebuilt.
The US manpower capacity showed when it built dormitories, sawmills and steamboat wharves at Bridgeport. TN, and then the enormous river port at City Point, VA. How was the Confederacy supposed to match stuff like that?

 

[Lubliner]

I suspect that the shift in the Confederacy from steamboats and steamships to railroads was a significant cause of labor shortages.

A lot of the manpower shortages existed due to the armament industry, Trafalgar being one that drew on the available resource pool.
Lubliner.