Civil War Naval Papers

[USS ALASKA]

Collection; School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs
Title; Raphael Semmes and Confederate commerce raiding in the Civil War: a case study on operational art.
Author; Prickitt, Jeffrey W.
Branch/Country; United States Navy

Abstract
During the American Civil War, Confederate naval captain Raphael Semmes executed one of the most effective naval campaigns in modern history. As captain of the CSS Sumter and CSS Alabama, Semmes raided Union commerce not only in the Caribbean and North Atlantic, but also in the waters off Europe, Brazil, South Africa, and Southeast Asia. An analysis of Semmes using the framework of US joint military doctrine provides valuable insight into the contemporary understanding of operational art. First, Semmes employed limited resources in effective ways. Second, his operational approach included maneuver, tempo, anticipation, center of gravity, branches, risk, operational reach, and culmination. Nevertheless, Semmes ultimately failed to accomplish his strategic objectives. Faulty assumptions, resource constraints, and limited sea control derailed his effort to bring neutral powers into the conflict or convince the North to abandon the war. The lessons from this study are wide ranging. For the US Navy, military planners should prioritize flexibility and incorporate multiple tools of sea control, including decisive battle, blockade, convoys, raids, and patrols. In addition, expanded sea control is possible using a future hybrid fleet of both manned and unmanned surface, subsurface, and air platforms. Furthermore, Semmes's campaign emphasizes the potential exponential impact of asymmetric warfare. Conventional naval superiority is not enough.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 2020-05-21
Date, Digital; 2020-05-21
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2021-09-09

CONTENTdm

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Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
History Theses & Dissertations History
Winter 1992

U.S.S. New Ironsides: The Seagoing Ironclad in the Union Navy
William Howard Roberts
Old Dominion University

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

ABSTRACT
Of the ironclads completed by the Union during the Civil War, only the U.S.S. New Ironsides was a seagoing, high-freeboard design. Her seagoing qualities and heavy battery made her uniquely valuable to the Union in combat. Although New Ironsides was highly successful and her high freeboard design squarely in the European mainstream, she represented the last of her direct line in the U.S. Navy. The lessons learned from her construction and wartime service, which should have provided invaluable instruction for U.S. designers, were not followed up. By failing to develop the seagoing ironclad the United States forfeited the advantages it might have gained over European navies from its extensive combat experience. The Navy was unable to convince Congress that money for ironclads would be well spent, and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a seagoing ironclad fleet was lost for a generation.

https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=history_etds

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[DaveBrt]

Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
History Theses & Dissertations History
Winter 1992

U.S.S. New Ironsides: The Seagoing Ironclad in the Union Navy
William Howard Roberts
Old Dominion University

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]

ABSTRACT
Of the ironclads completed by the Union during the Civil War, only the U.S.S. New Ironsides was a seagoing, high-freeboard design. Her seagoing qualities and heavy battery made her uniquely valuable to the Union in combat. Although New Ironsides was highly successful and her high freeboard design squarely in the European mainstream, she represented the last of her direct line in the U.S. Navy. The lessons learned from her construction and wartime service, which should have provided invaluable instruction for U.S. designers, were not followed up. By failing to develop the seagoing ironclad the United States forfeited the advantages it might have gained over European navies from its extensive combat experience. The Navy was unable to convince Congress that money for ironclads would be well spent, and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a seagoing ironclad fleet was lost for a generation.

https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=history_etds

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

One of the best researched and written papers you have ever posted -- a jewel.

 

[USS ALASKA]

@DaveBrt

Sir, the reason this paper caught my eye was that the author's supposition is that this was a lost opportunity for the USN. I have always looked upon this era as a time of such great change in naval warfare that it was rather fortuitous the USN didn't continue with their ACW expansion. The US didn't spend a great deal of money progressing down various dead-ends, (And didn't have any conflicts where naval power was of the essence), so could thereby let technological advancements shake out. And when pressure was on to re-build the fleet, prior to the Spanish-American War, Congress couldn't point to all the money spent post-ACW on a fleet of obsolete ships and failed experiments. On the flip side of that, the experience gained in ship design, lessons learned during operation, and a more robust industrial base was negated.

Just my babblings,
USS ALASKA

 

[Belfoured]

@DaveBrt

Sir, the reason this paper caught my eye was that the author's supposition is that this was a lost opportunity for the USN. I have always looked upon this era as a time of such great change in naval warfare that it was rather fortuitous the USN didn't continue with their ACW expansion. The US didn't spend a great deal of money progressing down various dead-ends, (And didn't have any conflicts where naval power was of the essence), so could thereby let technological advancements shake out. And when pressure was on to re-build the fleet, prior to the Spanish-American War, Congress couldn't point to all the money spent post-ACW on a fleet of obsolete ships and failed experiments. On the flip side of that, the experience gained in ship design, lessons learned during operation, and a more robust industrial base was negated.

Just my babblings,
USS ALASKA

I'd only observe that the 1865-1890 period was pretty much a cipher for both the Army and the Navy. In addition to the obvious areas of inaction and failure to spend , there were smaller items - such as the failure to make progress on indirect fire doctrine for artillery. That was an area in which the Army lagged behind a number of other nations, and only began to catch up in the early 1900's.

 

[USS ALASKA]

A paper to go with @trice 's thread https://civilwartalk.com/threads/a-state-of-war-is-a-most-unfavorable-period-for-experiments.191202/

W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects
1994

Quest for glory: The naval career of John A Dahlgren, 1826-1870
Thomas James Legg
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
This dissertation is, first and foremost, an account of John Dahlgren's long and often controversial naval career. Beginning with his appointment to the navy in 1826, it details his climb from obscurity to the relative fame and recognition that he enjoyed by the end of his life: first as the noted designer of the distinctive, bottle-shaped Dahlgren gun, which was the navy's primary cannon during the
Civil War, and, second, as one of only a few officers to attain the rank of admiral during the Civil War.

Dahlgren's career, both as an ordnance specialist and as a line officer, demonstrates how many officers scrambled up the military ladder. Using whatever means they could, including developing and utilizing political connections as well as conducting personal public relations campaigns, success often had little to do with true professional merit.

Dahlgren's Civil War career is also extremely important. His involvement with the Union's military campaign against Charleston reveals the absolute obsession that the North, especially the Union navy, had with trying to destroy this city. Additionally, Dahlgren's war career shows the Navy Department in an entirely different light than the one in which it is usually seen. Compared to the War Department, the Navy Department has generally been viewed as being relatively flawless during the war, and its few failings have been portrayed as innocent and well meaning mistakes. The circumstances surrounding Dahlgren's appointment to, and subsequent command of, the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron shows that this was not the case, as Dahlgren was primarily a pawn in both the Navy Department's and the Lincoln administration's battles against their Congressional enemies.

This dissertation is also the story of Dahlgren the man. It details the private side of his obsessive quest for personal glory and analyzes the ways in which he struggled to reconcile his insatiable ambition with the realities of his career. While he enjoyed the outward trappings of success, a reputation as a brilliant ordnance expert and the highest rank in the navy, Dahlgren died a bitter and
disappointed man. Because he never experienced victory in battle, which was the ultimate measure of greatness for a naval hero, Dahlgren's lifelong quest for glory was never completely fulfilled.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3758&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Belfoured]

A paper to go with @trice 's thread https://civilwartalk.com/threads/a-state-of-war-is-a-most-unfavorable-period-for-experiments.191202/

W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects
1994

Quest for glory: The naval career of John A Dahlgren, 1826-1870
Thomas James Legg
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
This dissertation is, first and foremost, an account of John Dahlgren's long and often controversial naval career. Beginning with his appointment to the navy in 1826, it details his climb from obscurity to the relative fame and recognition that he enjoyed by the end of his life: first as the noted designer of the distinctive, bottle-shaped Dahlgren gun, which was the navy's primary cannon during the
Civil War, and, second, as one of only a few officers to attain the rank of admiral during the Civil War.

Dahlgren's career, both as an ordnance specialist and as a line officer, demonstrates how many officers scrambled up the military ladder. Using whatever means they could, including developing and utilizing political connections as well as conducting personal public relations campaigns, success often had little to do with true professional merit.

Dahlgren's Civil War career is also extremely important. His involvement with the Union's military campaign against Charleston reveals the absolute obsession that the North, especially the Union navy, had with trying to destroy this city. Additionally, Dahlgren's war career shows the Navy Department in an entirely different light than the one in which it is usually seen. Compared to the War Department, the Navy Department has generally been viewed as being relatively flawless during the war, and its few failings have been portrayed as innocent and well meaning mistakes. The circumstances surrounding Dahlgren's appointment to, and subsequent command of, the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron shows that this was not the case, as Dahlgren was primarily a pawn in both the Navy Department's and the Lincoln administration's battles against their Congressional enemies.

This dissertation is also the story of Dahlgren the man. It details the private side of his obsessive quest for personal glory and analyzes the ways in which he struggled to reconcile his insatiable ambition with the realities of his career. While he enjoyed the outward trappings of success, a reputation as a brilliant ordnance expert and the highest rank in the navy, Dahlgren died a bitter and
disappointed man. Because he never experienced victory in battle, which was the ultimate measure of greatness for a naval hero, Dahlgren's lifelong quest for glory was never completely fulfilled.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3758&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Thanks. Interesting title - Schneller published his biography of Dahlgren Quest for Glory two years later. I'll now have to check whether his bibliography lists Legg.

The paper has a good discussion of the production issues involving the XV-inch and Ericsson's unfortunate solution of the "smoke box" to avoid the obvious alternative of enlarging the gun ports.

 

[USS ALASKA]

University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
6-1-1968

A study of the activities of James Dunwoody Bulloch: Confederate naval agent in Great Britain
Michael T. Young
University of Nebraska at Omaha

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
When I first thought of writing this paper it seemed like an insurmountable task. I certainly would never have completed the task if it had not been for the capable advice and assistance of several people. I was bewildered in the entanglement of British-American relations seeking a possible thesis topic when I disintered the name of James Dunwoody Bulloch. James Bulloch was a Southern gentleman who had vision and ability. He was as valuable to the Confederate navy as Lee was to the Confederate Army. Bulloch's exploits were not recorded in the history books as arduously as were those of Northern Naval officers such as David G. Farragut and David D. Porer. Fate seems to reserve a grave of obscurity for men who fight on the losing side.

https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1483&context=studentwork

Cheers.
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Given the number of references to 'The Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 16 April 1856', I thought this might be of value...

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century

by Nicholas Parrillo
(Ph.D. Candidate, American Studies, Yale University. J.D., Yale Law School, 2004. For valuable comments on and conversations about this Article, I am grateful to David Fontana, Robert W. Gordon, Michael J. Graetz, Jan Lemnitzer, Jerry L. Mashaw, Jon D. Michaels, Richard J. Ross, Stephen F. Williams, the participants in the Designing Public Institutions seminar at Yale Law School, and Julia Simon-Kerr and her fellow editors at the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities. I am solely responsible for any errors.)

ABSTRACT
The U.S. government has recently moved toward privatizing military services, most noticeably in Iraq, where profit-seeking contractors frequently engage in combat against insurgents. Many observers are shocked and disturbed by these developments, since they violate the governmental monopoly on military combat, which is probably the most accepted and intuitive aspect of the public-private distinction in America today. In fact, however, exclusive governmental control of combat is not an inherent nor even a particularly old part of the American experience. For much of U.S. history, one of the most important options in the nation's military repertoire was the use of privateers, that is, privately owned and operated ships, licensed to forcibly capture enemy merchant vessels and pocket the proceeds. Privateering constituted the principal U.S. offensive strategy in the maritime theater of the War of 1812 and was a major part of U.S. contingency planning through the Civil War. But sometime thereafter, the U.S. government ceased to consider the option. Thus far, no scholar has seriously investigated how and why the United States abandoned privateering. This Article fills the gap. It recreates the choice that the government faced, delineating how privateers differed from a public navy in terms of strategic capabilities, financing, technology, and the incentives and rules that operated on the persons who did the fighting, plus the institutions that enforced those rules. The Article concludes that privateering survived for so long-in spite of persistent humanitarian objections that accountability structures were not sturdy enough to control the violence that privateers inflicted because the American people wished to avoid a large permanent military establishment, fearing that such an institution would be a menace to democracy. It was only in the 1890s, when the nation gave up its anti-militarist tradition and embarked on a program of imperial expansion overseas, that privateering proved functionally inadequate to the nation's new ambitions and therefore vanished from the realm of possibility.

https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/7398/04_19YaleJL_Human1_2007_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

I could not find a copyright status so just posted the above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects
Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects
2012

Ironclad Revolution: The History, Discovery and Recovery of the USS Monitor
Anna Gibson Holloway
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
On the afternoon of March 8, 1862, the Confederate ironclad ram Virginia, built upon the burned-out hulk of the steam screw frigate Merrimack, crawled slowly into Hampton Roads to challenge the Union blockade of the Confederate coastline. Before nightfall, the Virginia had wreaked havoc upon the Union blockading fleet: the USS Cumberland lay at the bottom of the Roads, her flags still defiantly flying while the surrendered USS Congress blazed ominously in the harbor until exploding spectacularly in the early morning hours of March 9. The USS Monitor-a vessel of a radical new design and completely untried in battle-arrived too late to make a difference on the 8th, but met the Virginia on the morning of the 9th in a contest that signaled the first time ironclad had met ironclad in combat. While their four-and-a-half-hour battle ended in a draw, it changed much of the future course of naval warfare. Within days of the engagement, navies around the world were declaring an end to wooden construction and moving forward with their own ironclad building programs-many of which predated both the Monitor and the Virginia. Furthermore, the Monitor's rotating gun turret design freed vessels from the strictures of broadside tactics by allowing the guns, rather than the entire vessel, to be turned, and ushered in a new element of battleship design. Neither the Virginia nor the Monitor lived out that year, however. The Virginia was destroyed in May of 1862 by her own crew to keep her from enemy hands, while the Monitor succumbed to a nor'easter on New Year's Eve off the coast of Cape Hatteras. Discovered in 1973, the Monitor was designated a National Marine Sanctuary in 1975 under the auspices of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Since 1987, The Mariners' Museum in Newport News, VA has served as the principal repository for artifacts recovered from the wrecksite and is currently conserving over 210 tons of the Union ironclad in the Batten Conservation Complex. This dissertation serves as the text for the catalogue of the award-winning exhibition, Ironclad Revolution, which opened at The Mariners' Museum in 2007. The author serves as curator of the USS Monitor Center. Drawing from artwork, archival material and the recovered artifacts themselves, this work seeks to tell the full story of the Monitor: her history, discovery, recovery, and conservation.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3382&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

...not the best scan on the internet...

Butler University
Digital Commons @ Butler University
Graduate Thesis Collection Graduate Scholarship
1-1-1953

The Construction and Administration of the Union Navy
Robert K. Eisenbarth

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
The main theme of this thesis is the precise role of the navy department in the struggle to maintain the Union. However, naval operations themselves are not within the scope of this thesis. To what degree did the navy department assist in the successful prosecution of the war? What problems were faced by Welles in the purchase, charter, and construction of naval vessels? What was the relationship between the department and Congress? What evidence of fraud and corruption existed?

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1448&context=grtheses

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Naval War College Review
Volume 26
Number 2 March-April
Article 8
1973

The Role of Riverine Warfare in the Civil War
John F. Dillon
U.S. Navy

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8082&context=nwc-review

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Analysis of the relationship between technology and strategy and how they shaped the Confederate States Navy.
Author; Brown, Wesley A.

Abstract
This study investigates the use of technology by the Confederate States of America to develop naval strategy and ultimately the Navy during the American Civil War. The study concentrates on the building and use of: ironclads to break the blockade and coastal defense, torpedoes (mines) for coastal defense, and Submarines to help break the blockade at Charleston. The use of technology had a significant influence on the Confederate Navy not only on the strategic, but also on the operational and the tactical levels of war. Operational campaigns were planned and executed around the presence or absence of confederate ironclads by both the North and the South. Battles were won, lost, or never fought due to the presence of confederate torpedoes laid in Southern harbors. The threat of Confederate submarines caused Union blockading squadrons to reduce the capabilities of catching runners by moving the fleet out of the submarines tactical range. Today's Navy, in its quest for new technology, faces a similar situation as the Confederate Navy did in 1861. The Navy must seek new technology to enhance warfighting skills and not simply look for the "ultimate weapon," as the Confederate Navy first thought of the ironclad.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Date, Original; 1999-06-04
Date, Digital; 1999-06-04
Call number; ADA 367701
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2006-08-24

CONTENTdm

cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Sirs, a paper to go with these threads...

CSS Georgia (ironclad floating battery) armament | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Been trying to decipher the armament of the CSS Georgia. I have reference books but, new material has come to light. What are the known guns?

civilwartalk.com

CSS Georgia | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Morning Folks Has anyone come across any news of the CSS Georgia lately. Read a small bit about it not long ago but cant remember if it said searchers had found it or where in the process of looking for it. It would be very interesting if it were found and artifacts could be brought to the...

civilwartalk.com

CSS Georgia: More conserved artifacts go into storage -- at least for now | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Treasures from the CSS Georgia: Conserved artifacts from vessel are carefully stored, awaiting their moment in a museum's spotlight. https://civil-war-picket.blogspot.com/2019/06/treasures-from-css-georgia-conserved.html -- US Navy photo Shanna Daniel in CSS Georgia storage area in Washington, DC

civilwartalk.com

CSS Georgia Casement Cross Section | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Ubn8APELYCY/Uo4scJGTWVI/AAAAAAAADW4/0_H1-SY2ifc/s1600/Casemate+Cross+Section.jpg Stumbled across this on @Phil Gast site http://civil-war-picket.blogspot.com/2013/11/mysteries-of-deep-upcoming-raising-of.html Is this an accurate depiction? Also, does anyone know the...

civilwartalk.com

Neat acquisition at the Museum RE: CSS Georgia | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

By now, I am sure that everyone knows this image of the CSS Georgia is a hoax. Well, out of the blue, the Ships of The Sea Museum in Savannah GA received the photos of the model used to create the hoax, photos of one of the culprits on the right of the image getting dressed for the photo...

civilwartalk.com

Ironclad CSS Georgia: Recovery of casemate to begin | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

CSS Georgia recovery: Crews back on Savannah River will try to lift 2 casemate sections intact. http://civil-war-picket.blogspot.com/2017/06/css-georgia-recovery-crews-back-on.html

civilwartalk.com

...and others...

CSS Georgia: Archival Study
CONTRACT NO. DACW21-99-D-0004
DELIVERY ORDER 0029

Report submitted to: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District
100 West Oglethorpe Avenue
Savannah, Georgia 31402-0889

Report submitted by: New South Associates
6150 East Ponce de Leon Avenue
Stone Mountain, Georgia 30083

Mary Beth Reed - Principal Investigator
Authors: Mark Swanson, New South Associates – Historian and Robert Holcombe, National Civil War Naval Museum – Historian
New South Associates Technical Report 1092
January 31, 2007

CSS Georgia, a Confederate ironclad constructed in Savannah in 1862 and scuttled in the Savannah River two years later, was virtually forgotten for over a hundred years. It was "rediscovered" in 1968, when a pipeline dredge working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers struck the remains of the vessel in 20 feet of water north of Fort Jackson (Lawson 1978a, Pt. 2:13; Garrison et al. 1980:4). The wreck site, located three miles below Savannah and 11 miles above the mouth of the river, is adjacent to the main navigation channel of the Savannah River (Design Memorandum 1983:I-1). Now listed on the National Register of Historic Places, CSS Georgia is identifi ed as possibly one of the 10 most signifi cant wreck sites in U.S. waters. The signifi cance of the site has led to discussions about stabilizing the wreck, and possibly raising it, as well as planning for mitigation of adverse impacts to the wreck that may result from future dredge activities.

Archaeological mitigation at Georgia site would have the potential to answer some basic questions about life on a Confederate ironclad. Unlike other ironclads of the Savannah Squadron, Georgia was not blown up or burned prior to sinking. As a result, the potential for the recovery of material possessions on board the vessel is great. Such a project would offer unique challenges as well. Compared to many other ironclads from the Civil War, relatively little is known about Georgia (Figure 1; Garrison et al. 1980: front; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, c. 1985; Design Memorandum 1983). It is one of the few ironclads for which plans have not been found, and are not likely to be found (Babits 1993:30). Although it was constructed in Savannah virtually by committee, the size of the vessel is in dispute, with lengths ranging from 260 to 150 feet, and beam widths ranging from 50 to 60 feet (Garrison et al. 1980:24). Modern sounding equipment tends to support a length closer to the 150-foot range, but the measurements of the wreck are simply not known (Judy Wood, personal communication, 2002). There are three Civil War era engravings of Georgia, and no two agree as to its size and appearance. The only surviving photograph is of poor quality and questionable attribution. All of which suggests that relatively little is known about a wreck site identified as one of the most significant in the nation.

To help pull together information on Georgia, New South Associates of Stone Mountain, Georgia, has conducted an archival study of the vessel for the Savannah District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Together with materials gathered over the past 35 years, New South has gathered additional data from the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the University of Texas at Austin. Other locations visited as part of this archival investigation included the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; the Virginia Historical Society in Richmond; the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Tulane University in New Orleans; the Dun & Bradstreet Collection at the Baker Library, Harvard University; and the University of Texas at Austin. Also included were historical resources in the city of Savannah itself: the Georgia Historical Society and the Coastal Heritage Society, including Old Fort Jackson. From these sources, the project historians gathered a wide range of materials on many aspects of the vessel. Research was conducted by Mark Swanson of New South Associates and Robert Holcombe of the National Civil War Naval Museum under the direction of Mary Beth Reed of New South Associates.

Wayback Machine

I'm not sure of the copywrite so will just post the above link. 22 pages of sources listed at the end. On the Wayback Machine so download while you can!!!

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects
Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects
1977

Suppress and protect: the United States Navy, the African slave trade, and maritime commerce, 1794-1862
Judd Scott Harmon
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
Until after the Civil War the primary peacetime mission of the American Navy was the protection of the nation's maritime commerce. Piracy in the Mediterranean led Congress, in 1794, to authorize the construction of the first six frigates of the United States Navy. After the suppression of piracy in the West Indies, an expanding maritime commerce led merchants to demand naval protection of the sea lanes against possible attacks. This mission was implemented by deploying ships and squadrons to foreign stations' where they would be more readily available to aid American shipping. By 1843 six squadrons had been created.

Also in 1794 the United States passed the first in a series of laws designed to inhibit the African slave trade. The first merely prohibited the building or fitting out of slavers in the United States for the foreign slave trade. In 1800 the Navy was given a new mission: the actual sup- pression of the slave trade. At first this was limited to American waters, but the role expanded and in 1819 the Navy began patrolling African waters. In 1820 the slave trade was equated with piracy and conviction of engaging in it carried the death penalty.

Historians have seen a conflict in this duality of mission. Their argument has been that the United States Navy was small--about forty vessels were in active service. Dividing the available ships among six squadrons subtracted from the effectiveness of the squadrons involved in the suppression of the slave trade.

It is the contention of this study that deploying ships to foreign squadrons for the protection of commerce actually aided the Navy's war against slavers. Over a period of twenty-four years vessels were occasionally detached from the West India station to visit Africa. These hit-or-miss efforts, between 1819 and 1843, to suppress the slave trade, without deploying a permanent squadron, resulted in the capture of few slavers and the trade continued.

Although intended to protect America's maritime commerce, the more permanent arrangement of deployed squadrons in the West Indies, off Brazil, and off Africa after 184), was better able to cope with the slave trade. Vessels more constantly in the vicinity of the slave trade routes provided the basis for more effectual suppression of the African slave trade.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3532&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

The Battle for Mobile Bay and the Hunt for CSS Alabama
Union Naval Intelligence in the American Civil War: Moving Toward a Global Intelligence System
Matthew E. Skros

However, also important in the history of the Civil War are the naval engagements that took place both in American territorial waters and around the world. These engagements, while small in scale relative to the fights on historic battlefields, were precursors to the global engagements that future generations would experience and introduced American naval strategists to the role worldwide intelligence would play in order require to ensure success. In those future engagements. In that sense, these naval battles underscored what might not be so obvious to casual observers today: global commerce and its defense were crucial to the new nation, and challenges to that commerce were a paramount security concern.

https://www.cia.gov/static/22a036f03ac169f51526290b19d1fb47/Union-Naval-Intel-War.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

The Battle for Mobile Bay and the Hunt for CSS Alabama
Union Naval Intelligence in the American Civil War: Moving Toward a Global Intelligence System
Matthew E. Skros

However, also important in the history of the Civil War are the naval engagements that took place both in American territorial waters and around the world. These engagements, while small in scale relative to the fights on historic battlefields, were precursors to the global engagements that future generations would experience and introduced American naval strategists to the role worldwide intelligence would play in order require to ensure success. In those future engagements. In that sense, these naval battles underscored what might not be so obvious to casual observers today: global commerce and its defense were crucial to the new nation, and challenges to that commerce were a paramount security concern.

https://www.cia.gov/static/22a036f03ac169f51526290b19d1fb47/Union-Naval-Intel-War.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Semmes and the Alabama were in trouble after Semmes decided to burn the Rockingham. After that British sources were going to narrow down the Alabama's location. According to this paper the key tip came from open source shipping news from Bristol, England.
After that Winslow and the Kearsage were in the right place to take advantage of further information.
The US ambassador to France at that time was incompetent. But his assistant, and the consular officers knew their business.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Sirs, a paper to go with these threads...

Setting Torpedoes in Charleston Harbor | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Happened on this while looking for something else. New image to me. Harper's Weekly, June 13, 1863: SINKING TORPEDOES AT CHARLESTON. WE are indebted to the artist correspondent of a London illustrated paper [Russell?] for the picture on page 380, representing THE SINKING OF TORPEDOES BY...

civilwartalk.com

Cross-section of CSA torpedo found in Tennessee River | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1, 1888, Page 368 https://archive.org/stream/battlesleadersof01cent#page/364/mode/2up

civilwartalk.com

Union use of mines? | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Did the Union Navy use,any kind of mines or torpedoes to block Confederate ports? If so any succss or failures? Did the Union Navy have any succss on mine clearing to protect their ships,stationed off of Confederate ports? Thanks, Leftyhunter

civilwartalk.com

Torpedoes used by the South - drawings | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Who knew they were so many types? Our Navy in Time of War (1861-1915) Page 198 https://archive.org/stream/ournavyinwar00mattrich#page/196/mode/2up

civilwartalk.com

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THE GHOSTS OF REBEL TORPEDOES: INTEGRATED NAVAL MINING AS A DECISIVE FACTOR IN LITTORAL WARFARE
by John F. Whalen Lieutenant Commander, USNR

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

ABSTRACT
The employment of naval mines can be subdivided into two categories - where mines are used as stand-alone weapons, and where they are fully integrated with other maritime components. History has shown that integrated naval mining can be a decisive factor in littoral warfare. Successful integration requires the production of four operational conditions in a littoral theater. In two case studies, the Confederate defense of Charleston and the Turkish stand in the Dardanelles, integrated defensive mining incorporating these four conditions facilitated the defeat of superior adversaries. In more recent times, Iran has focused its maritime strategy on employing an integrated capability in the Persian Gulf, targeted directly at the U.S. Navy's endemic weaknesses in mine countermeasures.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA307466.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

Reading through the papers located by @USS ALASKA prompts me to again suggest the US Navy won the US Civil War.
1. Grant's operation at City Point was completely based on water transportation. It mirrored the French and English operation in Crimea, but expanded on that campaign with available 1864 technology.
1.a. The transfer of the VI Corp from Virginia to Washington was accomplished by water transport.
1.b. The XIX Corp was transferred from LA to Washington by water transport. All these movements had to be protected by absolute naval dominance by the US Navy.
2. When General Hood's Confederate Army invaded Tennessee, the US army assembling at Nashville was supplied in part by water transports which were protected by Captain/Rear Admiral Lee's river gunboats.
3. When Sherman left Atlanta on his famous late Fall march through Georgia, he has marching towards one of several locations patrolled by the US navy. Once he made contact with the navy he could be resupplied by water transport. He didn't have to march back.
4. The last critical combined arms operation of the US Civil War was the bitter and lethal fight over Fort Fisher which controlled the approaches to the blockade runners' port of Wilmington, NC. The US prevailed in this action, which set the stage for the insertion of John Schofield's corp into North Carolina by water transport. This operation shortened the war and prevented a good deal of useless bloodshed in North Carolina in April 1865, and that Spring and Summer.
These are ways in which the US Navy protected the logistics and safe movement of US land forces.
Not included in the list are the sinking of the Alabama, the closing of Mobile Bay, the torpedoing of the Albermerle, and the illegal but successful capture of the Confederate raider Florida.

 

[wausaubob]

Google only provides excerpts from this book:

Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer

A classic account of the 40-year Naval career of Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, whose contributions to Naval engineering helped usher in the development of the modern American Navy. Focusing on the years during and immediately after the Civil War, this study chronicles the extensive contributions...

books.google.com

But it should be a reminder that as the larger economy and the established government, the US had the upper hand in getting and retaining talent like Isherwood, Eads, and Ericsson. The Confederates had their own innovators. But they could not keep up with the US in steam engineering.