Civil War Blockade Papers

[USS ALASKA]

For those that want a deep dive on this...Federal Court Prize Cases from 1862 and the Court's explanation of the legal interpretations...there isn't an abstract or executive summary...

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep067/usrep067635/usrep067635.pdf

Fun reading and sleep tight!
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

For those that want a deep dive on this...Federal Court Prize Cases from 1862 and the Court's explanation of the legal interpretations...there isn't an abstract or executive summary...

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep067/usrep067635/usrep067635.pdf

Fun reading and sleep tight!
USS ALASKA

I'm retired from all that stuff.

 

[USS ALASKA]

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS AND PROJECTS
Liberty University
College of Arts and Sciences
Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)
8-18-2022

The Effects of the Union Blockade on the Confederacy during the United States' Civil War
Ronald C. Piccirilli,
Liberty University

Abstract
Historians have disagreed on the effects of the Union naval blockade on the states that formed the Confederacy during the United States' Civil War. This research shows that the Union naval blockade caused a spiraling effect on both the Confederate home front and the Confederate war effort. The Confederacy developed new ordnance factories, machine shops, and sources of essential raw materials such as salt and copper. This growth was not adequate to compensate for the loss of imports from the Union naval blockade. The Confederate government could not meet the needs of its population. Because of the blockade by the Union navy, Southerners suffered from shortages of food, medicines, and clothing. These shortages slowly sapped civilian morale and hampered the Confederate war effort. The Confederate government had to rely on its railroad system to move both civilian goods and military materiel. The railroad system proved inadequate. The blockade robbed the Southern railroads of spare parts and replacement rails. It wore out under wartime conditions and created more problems for the civilian population and the war effort. Deprivation of necessities and hunger defeated the Southern population long before the Confederate armies surrendered in the Spring of 1865.

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4849&context=doctoral

Not sure of the copywrite, please use the above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS AND PROJECTS
Liberty University
College of Arts and Sciences
Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)
8-18-2022

The Effects of the Union Blockade on the Confederacy during the United States' Civil War
Ronald C. Piccirilli,
Liberty University

Abstract
Historians have disagreed on the effects of the Union naval blockade on the states that formed the Confederacy during the United States' Civil War. This research shows that the Union naval blockade caused a spiraling effect on both the Confederate home front and the Confederate war effort. The Confederacy developed new ordnance factories, machine shops, and sources of essential raw materials such as salt and copper. This growth was not adequate to compensate for the loss of imports from the Union naval blockade. The Confederate government could not meet the needs of its population. Because of the blockade by the Union navy, Southerners suffered from shortages of food, medicines, and clothing. These shortages slowly sapped civilian morale and hampered the Confederate war effort. The Confederate government had to rely on its railroad system to move both civilian goods and military materiel. The railroad system proved inadequate. The blockade robbed the Southern railroads of spare parts and replacement rails. It wore out under wartime conditions and created more problems for the civilian population and the war effort. Deprivation of necessities and hunger defeated the Southern population long before the Confederate armies surrendered in the Spring of 1865.

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4849&context=doctoral

Not sure of the copywrite, please use the above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

That looks interesting. Let's see if he accessed computer assisted techniques.

 

[Lubliner]

That looks interesting. Let's see if he accessed computer assisted techniques.

I read the first ten or fifteen pages of it and was unimpressed by his presentation. I noticed very many repetitive remarks to the same point, as though a circle was being drawn time and again. Only chapter one, but enough to allay any interest for finding obscure facts.
Lubliner.

 

[USS ALASKA]

NASSAU AND BLOCKADE-RUNNING : 1861- 1865
Keith L. Tinker
Florida Atlantic University
August 1982

PREFACE
The near 700 islands and cays of the Bahamas archipelago stretch for a distance of 760 miles . Grand Bahama and Bimini lie about 60 miles off the coast of Florida. To the south east, Great Inagua is about the same distance from the coast of Cuba and 700 miles from that of Haiti. One of the Bahama Islands, San Salvador, is generally accepted as the first land in the "New World " to be sighted by Columbus in 1492. Each island patch comprises, in most instances, a large island or two, and numerous cays and jutting rocks . The
central island, New Providence, is the location of Nassau, the capital of the Bahamas. Nassau is the Bahamas' hub of commerce and finance, the seat of government, and the best known vacation spot in the Bahamas. The farther one goes from Nassau and New Providence, the more rustic are the settlements, inhabitants, and customs. All islands, except New Providence, are referred to as the Family Islands. It was from Nassau, on New Providence, that the largest blockade-running business was conducted during the American Civil War.

ABSTRACT
This thesis examines blockade- running through Nassau during the American Civil War . The initial chapters examine the blockade of Confederate ports, and wartime blockade- running, 1861- 1865. The concluding chapter summarizes the decline of blockade-running through Nassau. The argument of this thesis is that blockade- running through Nassau produced a tremendous increase in trade, with consequent increases in the price of consumer goods, in wages, and in the crime rate. With the decline of blockade- running, prices of commodities, wages, and the crime rate reverted to pre-Civil War conditions.

NASSAU AND BLOCKADE-RUNNING: 1861-1865 | fau.digital.flvc.org

fau.digital.flvc.org

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

University of Tennessee, Knoxville
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange
Masters Theses
Graduate School
5-1998

A long way from home : the West Gulf Blockading Squadron and Union naval logistics in the Civil War
Colin E. Babb

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
The Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, the most distant of all the blockading squadrons from the industrial centers of the North during the Civil War, did not suffer significantly more supply shortages than the other three squadrons. This study presents a general picture of the operations of the Union Navy in the western Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War, as well as a specific discussion of the logistical system created to supply the navy in that region and the ways in which this system was effective at accomplishing its tasks. The United States Navy's supply needs from 1861 to 1865 were unprecedented, and the efforts mounted to meet those needs were initially haphazard and unsatisfactory. By the end of the war, however, a sophisticated supply organization had been created that satisfied much of the navy's demands, despite problems arising from emergent new technologies—such as steam propulsion, larger weaponry, and iron armor that strained logistical planning and implementation. On the whole, naval supplies sent to the Gulf were adequate for the tasks expected of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron. The coast of Texas was an exception; Confederate forces exploited the weaknesses of Union forces there, and achieved a number of spectacular victories at sea as a result. The deficiencies in Union supply efforts, however, were offset by the Union's ability to maintain the strategic initiative in the region.

https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11709&context=utk_gradthes

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

A paper from 1974, and no, I don't agree with it. However, I think it is important to hear contrarian arguments to my passionately held beliefs to have a better understanding of the overall situation. YMMV...

THE WEST GULF BLOCKADE, 1861-1865: AN EVALUATION
DISSERTATION
North Texas State University
Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Robert W. Glover, M. A.
Denton, Texas
May, 1974

This investigation resulted from a pilot research paper prepared in conjunction with a graduate course on the Civil War. This study suggested that the Federal blockade of the Confederacy may not have contributed significantly to its defeat. Traditionally, historians had assumed that the Union's Anaconda Plan had effectively strangled the Confederacy. Recent studies which compared the statistics
of ships captured to successful infractions of the blockade had somewhat revised these views. While accepting these revisionist findings as broadly valid, this investigation strove to determine specifically the effectiveness of Admiral Farragut's West Gulf Blockading Squadron.

Since the British Foreign Office maintained consulates in three blockaded southern ports and in many Caribbean ports through which blockade running was conducted, these consular records were vital for this study. Personal research in Great Britain's Public Record Office disclosed valuable consular reports pertaining to the effectiveness of the Federal blockade. American consular records, found in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. provided excellent comparative reports from those same Gulf ports. Official Confederate reports, contained in the National Archives, various state archives and in the published Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies revealed valuable statistical data on foreign imports. Limited use was made of Spanish and French consular records written from ports involved in blockade running. Extensive use was made of Senate and House documents in determining Federal blockade policy during the war. The record of the Navy's enforcement of the blockade was found in The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies. The contemporary reports of Union and Confederate governmental officials was found in James D. Richardson's respective works on The Messages and Papers, and in the published diaries of Gideon Welles and Gustavas Fox. Contemporary newspapers and first hand accounts by participants on both sides provided color and perspective.

In evaluating the performance of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, a review of the international laws governing blockading was undertaken, emphasizing America's traditional posture regarding the blockades of other nations. Under Gideon Welles, the Federal navy became a powerful and efficient force, although the navy's enforcement of the blockade often resulted in serious diplomatic embarrassment, especially from maritime incidents occurring near the mouth of the Rio Grande River. Nearby Matamoros, Mexico virtually became an international trade mart for Confederate cotton and imports. However, much contraband trade was conducted
through blockaded Gulf ports such as Galveston, Texas.

It is concluded that the West Gulf Blockading Squadron performed only satisfactorily at best. This did not result so much from innate limitations as from outside factors. Among the latter were the open door at Matamoros, the Lincoln administration's diplomatic timerity and national policies that authorized a type of cotton trade with the south. Further, the better vessels were assigned land campaign priorities. The statistics of the cotton trade in this portion of the Confederacy show that cotton exports were significantly high. Most of these exports egressed via Matamoros, but a high percentage existed through blockaded Gulf ports. The fact that 10,000 bales of cotton left the heavily guarded port of Galveston in the last six months of the war indicates the inefficiency of the West Gulf Blockade.

It appears that the West Gulf Blockade was effective enough to create scarcity but never effective enough to seriously interdict the flow of trade. That the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy was largely sustained by imports underscores the blockade's limited effectiveness.

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc500924/m2/1/high_res_d/1002777530-Glover.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

A paper from 1974, and no, I don't agree with it. However, I think it is important to hear contrarian arguments to my passionately held beliefs to have a better understanding of the overall situation. YMMV...

THE WEST GULF BLOCKADE, 1861-1865: AN EVALUATION
DISSERTATION
North Texas State University
Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Robert W. Glover, M. A.
Denton, Texas
May, 1974

This investigation resulted from a pilot research paper prepared in conjunction with a graduate course on the Civil War. This study suggested that the Federal blockade of the Confederacy may not have contributed significantly to its defeat. Traditionally, historians had assumed that the Union's Anaconda Plan had effectively strangled the Confederacy. Recent studies which compared the statistics
of ships captured to successful infractions of the blockade had somewhat revised these views. While accepting these revisionist findings as broadly valid, this investigation strove to determine specifically the effectiveness of Admiral Farragut's West Gulf Blockading Squadron.

Since the British Foreign Office maintained consulates in three blockaded southern ports and in many Caribbean ports through which blockade running was conducted, these consular records were vital for this study. Personal research in Great Britain's Public Record Office disclosed valuable consular reports pertaining to the effectiveness of the Federal blockade. American consular records, found in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. provided excellent comparative reports from those same Gulf ports. Official Confederate reports, contained in the National Archives, various state archives and in the published Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies revealed valuable statistical data on foreign imports. Limited use was made of Spanish and French consular records written from ports involved in blockade running. Extensive use was made of Senate and House documents in determining Federal blockade policy during the war. The record of the Navy's enforcement of the blockade was found in The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies. The contemporary reports of Union and Confederate governmental officials was found in James D. Richardson's respective works on The Messages and Papers, and in the published diaries of Gideon Welles and Gustavas Fox. Contemporary newspapers and first hand accounts by participants on both sides provided color and perspective.

In evaluating the performance of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, a review of the international laws governing blockading was undertaken, emphasizing America's traditional posture regarding the blockades of other nations. Under Gideon Welles, the Federal navy became a powerful and efficient force, although the navy's enforcement of the blockade often resulted in serious diplomatic embarrassment, especially from maritime incidents occurring near the mouth of the Rio Grande River. Nearby Matamoros, Mexico virtually became an international trade mart for Confederate cotton and imports. However, much contraband trade was conducted
through blockaded Gulf ports such as Galveston, Texas.

It is concluded that the West Gulf Blockading Squadron performed only satisfactorily at best. This did not result so much from innate limitations as from outside factors. Among the latter were the open door at Matamoros, the Lincoln administration's diplomatic timerity and national policies that authorized a type of cotton trade with the south. Further, the better vessels were assigned land campaign priorities. The statistics of the cotton trade in this portion of the Confederacy show that cotton exports were significantly high. Most of these exports egressed via Matamoros, but a high percentage existed through blockaded Gulf ports. The fact that 10,000 bales of cotton left the heavily guarded port of Galveston in the last six months of the war indicates the inefficiency of the West Gulf Blockade.

It appears that the West Gulf Blockade was effective enough to create scarcity but never effective enough to seriously interdict the flow of trade. That the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy was largely sustained by imports underscores the blockade's limited effectiveness.

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc500924/m2/1/high_res_d/1002777530-Glover.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Except that even if the entire cotton production of Texas had made it through the blockade. it would only have kept the price down a little bit.. The synopsis mentions 10,000 bales. But the natural prewar exports of US cotton were in the range of 3.2M to 4M bales.
And by the last 6 months of the Civil War, there were crooked deals all over the place to get the cotton flowing again. @Philip Leigh did a nice job illustrating how the "no policy" policy of the US administration operated.
The US strategy with respect to Texas was to hold New Orleans and patrol the lower Mississippi.

 

[wausaubob]

Texas was a very low priority compared to Mobile, Charleston and Wilmington.

 

[USS ALASKA]

A paper to go with post #161...not that the Confederate States had much call to use it. And yes, written by John Paul Jones...

University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications
School of Law
2023

The Confederate Law of Prize
John Paul Jones
University of Richmond

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Copywrite 2023 John Paul Jones

ABSTRACT
This essay describes the prize law of the Confederate States of America. Due to the Union's blockade of the South's coastline, Confederate judges heard very few prize cases. But when they did, they closely hewed to the prize law of the United States

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2696&context=law-faculty-publications

Because of copywrite, please use above link

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[east_beast]

I have a cool piece of blockade history. The Bermuda was a Confederate blockade runner that was captured going into Savannah. The most important part of the cargo was sheets of seaweed paper embossed with "CSA" that was unprinted Confederate currency. I have a sheet of that unprinted currency.

 

[Bur Oak]

I have a cool piece of blockade history. The Bermuda was a Confederate blockade runner that was captured going into Savannah. The most important part of the cargo was sheets of seaweed paper embossed with "CSA" that was unprinted Confederate currency. I have a sheet of that unprinted currency.

This has come up before on another thread.

The ONLY reference to seaweed paper is on the list of the cargo of the Bermuda made immediately after it's capture, and I believe it to have been a mistake made by those compiling that list. The reason I believe that comes from later documents concerning the subsequent sale of that cargo.

A paper entitled Counterfeit Currency as an Instrument of War by Sergio Torres includes the following passage:
"According to Benny Bolin in his article How the Confederacy Provided for Union Banknotes, some of the paper captured from The Bermuda was sold to the US Treasury Department. Court records referred to the paper as banknote paper detailing "many reams of fine white Bank Note paper, watermarked 'CSA' intended obviously for Confederate States banknotes and bonds." Based on Bolin's research, the US Treasury Department acquired 10 reams of CSA watermarked paper at $2.00 per ream. The rest of the paper was described as 490 reams of Bank Note paper sold at $2.50 per ream, 35 reams of foolscap sold at $6.00 per ream and 10 reams of damaged paper sold at $1.50 per ream at auction in Philadelphia where The Bermuda was taken after being taken into custody. The paper was watermarked with CSA eight times in block letters. Each sheet was 13.25 inches wide by 16 inches long and the paper was antique woven with full rag content."

Since all of the paper seized in that cargo was NOT banknote paper, I suspect that perhaps the "foolscap" or something else might have had seaweed pulp, and may have been labelled as such. That information may have been falsely assumed to apply to all of the paper in that shipment. There were lots of other things on board that ship, and one can imagine the list of cargo was made in a hurry by a person or persons neither expert in nor interested in evaluating paper quality or composition. The later document, stating "antique woven with full rag content" likely comes from a more authoritative source who took the time to examine it in detail.

The only sources claiming that the banknote paper contained seaweed pulp are this one document and others quoting it. There are no other documents supporting that claim that I have been able to find. There is no mention that I have ever read of seaweed pulp paper in any of the books written by experts on Confederate currency.

I searched on the Internet for anything about seaweed pulp paper dating back to the early 1860's. The only thing I was able to find was an application for a patent on the process of making it in England. The application was filed in 1866. This would seem to imply that use of seaweed pulp in the production of paper was not widespread during our Civil War. It is doubtful that the Confederate Treasury would have accepted anything as unproven as that when mills in England were still able to supply quality rag paper suitable for banknotes.

 

[east_beast]

Okay, unprinted Confederate currency of seaweed origin or not.

 

[Bur Oak]

Okay, unprinted Confederate currency of seaweed origin or not.

The Confederacy used plenty of paper with the same watermark. There is no reason to assume that the seized shipment was of a different origin or composition. Without other contemporaneous documentation corroborating seaweed (correspondence, invoice, bill of lading, etc.), I remain skeptical at the very least.

 

[Bur Oak]

[accidental duplicate post removed.]

 

[east_beast]

The Confederacy used plenty of paper with the same watermark. There is no reason to assume that the seized shipment was of a different origin or composition. Without other contemporaneous documentation corroborating seaweed (correspondence, invoice, bill of lading, etc.), I remain skeptical at the very least.

Understood. It's definitely unprinted currency though. The outline of the CSA embossment matches up perfectly with a Confederate $10 bill.

 

[Bur Oak]

Understood. It's definitely unprinted currency though. The outline of the CSA embossment matches up perfectly with a Confederate $10 bill.

The watermarked paper you posted with the letters CSA surrounded by a wavy line was indeed definitely intended for currency. Much similar paper made it through the blockade. It was used for many 1862 $100 and $50 notes (Types 49 & 50), many 1863 $50, $20, $10, and $5 notes (Types 57 through 60), and all 1863 $100 notes (Type 56).

It's difficult to see the "CSA" in the scans of the note below because of the design, but the wavy border shows clearly. The letters are more visible when holding the note(s) up to a light.

 

[USS ALASKA]

A short paper to go with post #150...

THE APALACHICOLA TIMES
Chasing Shadows: Blockade running and 'the abominable Old Hag'
November 21, 2020
Mark Curenton

https://cdn.wildapricot.com/197281/resources/Documents/Newspaper%20Articles/Chasing%20Shadows_%20Blockade%20running%20and%20'the%20abominable%20Old%20Hag'%20-%20Apalachicola%20The%20Times.pdf?version=1670979354000&Policy=eyJTdGF0ZW1lbnQiOiBbeyJSZXNvdXJjZSI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY2RuLndpbGRhcHJpY290LmNvbS8xOTcyODEvcmVzb3VyY2VzL0RvY3VtZW50cy9OZXdzcGFwZXIlMjBBcnRpY2xlcy9DaGFzaW5nJTIwU2hhZG93c18lMjBCbG9ja2FkZSUyMHJ1bm5pbmclMjBhbmQlMjAndGhlJTIwYWJvbWluYWJsZSUyME9sZCUyMEhhZyclMjAtJTIwQXBhbGFjaGljb2xhJTIwVGhlJTIwVGltZXMucGRmP3ZlcnNpb249MTY3MDk3OTM1NDAwMCIsIkNvbmRpdGlvbiI6eyJEYXRlTGVzc1RoYW4iOnsiQVdTOkVwb2NoVGltZSI6MTcxMzM3MTYxOH0sIklwQWRkcmVzcyI6eyJBV1M6U291cmNlSXAiOiIwLjAuMC4wLzAifX19XX0_&Signature=bEGqMKWKm0Jc6E9lZBA7wSyMr0BdwpOzjUfTqsYKP3K2JnqU3TsweZavf0dDD6mIvBW595Y9xmZX~iEPQXEex6WP6hd59qJwXtfrcmaRTry9ci~cyRPabcLLy8L7lU7cphlcf0Q2CmQuuspkVo4~3C8yCO55IbzRnp8slNfTefN5RVLhs3xf-gjyGAyBJNpRvADQ5seJYtg4TDC4HI82BlsV1lbT-h~XqwtYYZmXTP7q6a~5b4GQT3Q796gX9dE2xt0izkyIoXsvYFj0uGd7KuYZBWG0AfG0WYXuy~xNp5yD1LVTgVYHTWB1apF7h35sQqKKlOwTiMNUbTDzpqE2HA__&Key-Pair-Id=K27MGQSHTHAGGF

Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

OK ladies and gents - this one is the whole way from Christchurch, New Zealand...

The blockade of the Confederacy during the American Civil War
Green, Michael Frederick
University of Canterbury
Master of Arts
1969

Abstract:
The blockade of the Confederacy has been studied and described often before and may not seem to have been a very rewarding topic for a thesis. Nevertheless I have found it immensely interesting, perhaps because this longest sustained continuous operation of the Civil War seemed on closer study to have all sorts of unexpected connections with other events and issues. Because the general outlines and many of the details are quite well known, I decided to build my study around the theme of effectiveness, to which there are two related yet distinct approaches. There is the relatively straight-forward story of the build-up from practically nothing of a naval force adequate to enforce a blockade of so long a coastline, in the course of which a host of problems of unprecedented magnitude and character had to be surmounted. And there is the legal question of effectiveness, the subject of great debate at the time. To study this satisfactorily it was necessary to look at the American blockade in a longer historical perspective, to consider its place in the development of blockade law and practice, and to examine the adequacy of the methods and standards of judgement applied to determine effectiveness. By combining these two approaches, one mainly narrative and one mainly analytical, I hope I have produced a fresh look at an old question.

All Rights Reserved

https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstreams/691bff3d-d652-4a52-bd37-c6fcbdf0a849/download

Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA