An anti-blockade view to go with post #15...
A Naval Sieve: The Union Blockade in the Civil War
William N. Still Jr
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4844&context=nwc-review
1158
Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Still repeats the old line that no battle was lost because the Confederacy was short of arms or equipment.
As always, this ignores the thousands of men sent home from the call up of Tennessee men in 1861. The Governor, Harris, sent them home because he had no weapons for them and the Confederacy could not provide weapons. What would the impact have been if another 35,000 men had been armed and in the western army in Jan. '62?
The lack of appropriate heavy guns was clearly felt in New Orleans, the NO forts, the Mississippi fleet, Vicksburg in '62, etc. Imports would have improved this situation and might have changed the outcome of some battles.
But the main problem was the lack of a purchasing and paying system for the Confederate government in '61 and much of '62. There was no reason for companies to build weapons on speculation and ship them to the CSA -- again, on speculation. Manufacturers wanted concrete orders and payment methods, regardless of any blockade.
In my opinion, the reason the railroads and iron workers did not get their act together and deal as major powers in the market to order supplies from Europe was the immaturity of the railroad and iron industry companies in regard to international trade. The RRs had bought iron rails from England, but nothing else. The idea of ordering a common rail, arranging financing, arranging shipping, buying and setting up rolling plants, etc. was just beyond what 120 small railroads could put together at this stage in their growth. The blockade made it more difficult, but was not the sole logistical problem that the South faced in getting the support it needed from Europe.