Chickamauga

[Irishtom29]

The problem with the Army of Tennessee wasn't a lack of fervor in the ranks. Lee would have had to deal with the same nincompoops Bragg had to deal with. Anyway, talk of Lee going west is just science fiction.

Perhaps I'm not in the spirit of these what if fantasies. I avoid this forum but posts here show up on the home page.

 

[Carronade]

Does anyone think having Lee come West, even if briefly, would alleviate the ill feeling in the AoT and help their performace in battle? Then again, Lee had never worked with Polk, Buckner, Wheeler, or Forrest before, and disliked D. H. Hill, so maybe it won't change much.

I think it could engender ill feeling at the idea of the "new broom" coming in to clean up the mess. There would likely be little time for Lee and his new subordinates to get to know each other and develop mutual confidence before they had to go into action.

Let's not forget that this would be shortly after Gettysburg. While Lee was still well respected, he had just suffered his greatest defeat, and his attempt to carry the war to the north had failed. Not the best moment for the Confederate leadership to present him as the savior of the west.

Lee himself suffered a crisis of confidence, even offering his resignation. When it was turned down, he went on doing his duty. In his heart he probably accepted - correctly I would say - that he was still the best man to lead the ANV. He would have had very mixed feelings about taking up a new command.

Sending Lee to the west would tip off the Union that the Confederates planned major action there, even more so than moving troops. It couldn't possibly be kept secret. It might also have given Meade and the Union more confidence to press the offensive in the east. It's a bit puzzling that they weren't more aggressive after Gettysburg, but the fact that they were still facing Lee was likely part of it.

 

[jackt62]

The reality is that Lee did not favor his transfer to the western seat of war, although he would have gone if so ordered. If there is a scenario where Lee does go west, it would have made more sense to do so around May-June 1863, when Lee, and part of the ANV might have worked in conjunction with the AOT against Rosecrans (who was in the process of flanking Bragg and the AOT out of middle Tennessee), thereby relieving pressure on the Vicksburg front. That possibility was certainly discussed by Davis and the cabinet but Lee was steadfast in his desire to invade Pennsylvania, which he argued, would indirectly reduce pressure on Vicksburg.

 

[rbasin]

Bragg should have hit Rosecrans before the battle when the AotC was spread out. Rosecrans was extremely lucky Bragg didn't.

 

[rbasin]

Does anyone think having Lee come West, even if briefly, would alleviate the ill feeling in the AoT and help their performace in battle? Then again, Lee had never worked with Polk, Buckner, Wheeler, or Forrest before, and disliked D. H. Hill, so maybe it won't change much.

Wouldn't have made a difference.

 

[Generic Username]

The 40,000 Union troops in Chattanooga were on the verse of starvation when the Cracker Line was finally established, with a day's worth (or even less) of rations according to one source I've read. Had William Oates been able to organize a more effective counter-attack after the Federal landing at Brown's Ferry, they could've closed the immediate threat of the Cracker Line and probably enforced the entrapped Federals to surrender within a few days.

 

[scone]

The loss of at Chattanooga Orchard Knob and Missionary ridge.... … lot a blame around before to … just my two cents

 

[Luke Freet]

Bragg should have hit Rosecrans before the battle when the AotC was spread out. Rosecrans was extremely lucky Bragg didn't.

Oh no, Bragg tried. He planned to pin a wing of Rosecran's army (I believe it was Thomas' Corps) and scatter it at McLemore's Cove.
He would have succeded, if his subordinates had faith in his plans, which, after Murfreesboro, was an impossibility. Thomas Hindman was in position and was supposed to signal the start of the assault, but he held off, because of his disdain for Bragg.
In all honesty, the only Confederate leaders who came out of Chickamauga and Chattanooga relatively untarnished were Bushrod Johnson and Patrick Cleburne.

 

[scone]

many hated bragg others not so much … The brake through on the 20th split them in half … the passage to Chattanooga should have been cut off …. sit in a chair and think of things.

 

[Irishtom29]

The 40,000 Union troops in Chattanooga were on the verse of starvation when the Cracker Line was finally established, with a day's worth (or even less) of rations according to one source I've read. Had William Oates been able to organize a more effective counter-attack after the Federal landing at Brown's Ferry, they could've closed the immediate threat of the Cracker Line and probably enforced the entrapped Federals to surrender within a few days.

Oates was Oates. If Oates does something different then the Federals do something different and on and on, you can spin this kind of business forever.

The Army of the Cumberland was not trapped in Chattanooga, it had a line of retreat to Bridgeport. An inability to stay in Chattanooga would've resulted in a retreat, not a surrender.