Charleston, April 7 1863

[andy19k10]

The ironclad attack on Charleston in April 1863 seems to have failed completely, yet it was a very good learning experience for the Union Navy as regards the capabilities of their monitors. DuPont seems to have had no enthusiasm for it and was (apparently) sacked because of it's failure. What could he have done that could have made the attack a success? (bering in mind that he would get no support from the Army)

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

If the condition is that it be a purely Navy attack (which is precisely what Assistant Secretary Fox was pushing for, in part because of his exaggerated ideas about the monitors' capabilities), I don't see any reasonable chance of success. Du Pont was exactly right, the Navy couldn't go it alone, and the monitors had limitations that needed to be taken into account; his sacking was really more about the way he handled the aftermath. Gideon Welles did him a disservice when he said something along the lines of 'Farragut would take the place three times while Du Pont was still coming up with excuses not to;' instead, Farragut would have had the chutzpah to say, 'It can't be done that way. If you want Charleston taken, let me do it my way, and give me the support I need.'

(Allow me to highlight a great recent biography of Du Pont, by the way: Kevin J. Weddle's Lincoln's Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont, University of Virginia Press, 2005.)

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Now... with a cooperating landing force... The options basically are:

I. James Island (the Secessionville route), culminating in the capture of Fort Johnson, which would have given the Union effective command of the inner harbor.

II. Sullivans Island, culminating in the capture of Fort Moultrie.

III. Morris Island, culminating in the capture of Battery Wagner; this is of course the option that was chosen by Dahlgren and Gillmore.


Option I has the biggest potential payoff but also requires the most in the way of force projection inland, particularly after the Confederate defenses were built up after the botched early attempt at Secessionville. Options II and III only aim at closing off the mouth of the harbor; of those two, II is riskier because the ultimate objective is not all that defensible (hence Anderson's abandoning it in favor of Sumter to begin with). III is really the only sensible option; although it does mean slogging up a narrow front, the resulting capture commands both the main channel and threatens Sumter. So, while not the glorious victory that the Union high command would have preferred, it was the pragmatic choice.

 

[andy19k10]

i'm assuming most of the Confederate ord was 32-pdrs, 8 and 10-inch Columbiads. Woulkd there have been many rifled pieces at that time?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

A few; majority would have been smoothbores, though.

 

[andy19k10]

That is what I had thought, with prodeuction at Tredegar and Selma just getting under way as it were. I'm really starting to see that Dupont got the shaft at Charleston. Very heavy pressure to make this attack that he didnt appear to think would work, yet he did not fully express his reservations to Wells or Fox. Still.........it was a VERY good learning experiece for the Navy at a very small cost in lives.

 

[Carronade]

I'd agree a purely naval attack had no prospect of success. The map recently posted by CSA Today shows how many batteries there were inside the harbor; it would be interesting to know exact numbers and types of guns, but the Union ironclads would be in a hornets' nest. It would be particularly difficult for damaged or disabled ships to retire or for others to assist them. As it was a couple of the monitors had had their turrets jammed, and of course Keokuk had been completely crippled, soon to sink. There were also the ironclads Chicora and Palmetto State if an opportunity arose for them to intervene.

On the land side, taking Batteries Wagner and Gregg allowed the federals to bombard Sumter and tighten up the closure of the harbor entrance a bit, but not much else. They could fire a few random shots into Charleston from the Swamp Angel, but they apparently did not consider that sufficiently worthwhile to deploy another gun after the first one self-destructed. I think any serious effort by land needed to be by James Island, which would require a larger commitment, including shallow draft gunboats.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Du Pont compared Charleston Harbor to a porcupine turned inside-out, with the quills all pointing inwards.

Although Du Pont was eventually blamed for the result, it appears that he was ready to recommence the attack on April 8, but his captains' damage reports caused him to reconsider. Some writers have considered that mere face-saving on Du Pont's part, but I tend to think it's accurate; his actions earlier in the war indicate that he was perfectly capable of aggressive action. Weddle, Craig Symonds, and others have come to the conclusion that Du Pont's ouster was in part because Lincoln had come to the conclusion that he was some sort of naval McClellan, and he'd had quite enough of that sort of thing. Possibly an instance where Lincoln's intuition may have led him to the wrong conclusion.

 

[andy19k10]

i quite agree. And it seems that when Licoln's fair-haired boy Dahlgren took over, he went for the exact sort of "siege" (for want of a better term) that Dupont had thought of in the first place. It all does seem like wasted effort tho, as Charleston wasnt that important a port other than symbolism. I tent to think the effort would have been better spent on Wilmington.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I tend to think that Du Pont, who was considerably more experienced in command at sea and in combat conditions than Dahlgren, may very well have gotten along better with the local Army commanders, particularly Gillmore. While it may not have resulted in anything more than happened historically, it might have come quicker and at a lesser cost.

The effort was not wholly wasted at Charleston; it was a much larger prewar port than Wilmington, and the increase of Wilmington as a port of entry was principally because Charleston had become so difficult (albeit not impossible) to enter. There was also a command separation (the dividing line between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons was at the North Carolina/South Carolina border), which did not assist coordination and planning.