J. Johnston Changing my mind about Joe Johnston

[Andersonh1]

Since I started studying Civil War history, I've become aware of Joe Johnston as one of the top Confederate Generals. Up to this point, I haven't been impressed with the man, and honestly wondered why he was rated highly by his peers and by the opposition. He always seemed to do nothing or retreat and give ground rather than make an attempt to win.

But as I'm getting further into volume 3 of Shelby Foote's Civil War, and as I'm reading the account of Sherman's march into Georgia, Johnston is starting to appear in a different light. In many ways, he's a lot like Lee in that he's able to read the situation and guess what his opponent's next move will be, and he will move to counter it. He had the smaller army, so he would always try to fight from a defensive position rather than risk his army on an assault, which makes sense. He was cautious, but would fight when he found an opening.

I'm starting to think differently of the man. He didn't throw away the lives of his soldiers, so that's obviously a point in his favor. I still think he's far too quick to retreat rather than fight, but if nothing else this section of the book shows that there's generally a sound tactical reason for what he does.

Anyone have more knowledge of the man's career and have some thoughts on Joe Johnston as a general?

 

[Pat Answer]

Since I started studying Civil War history, I've become aware of Joe Johnston as one of the top Confederate Generals. Up to this point, I haven't been impressed with the man, and honestly wondered why he was rated highly by his peers and by the opposition. He always seemed to do nothing or retreat and give ground rather than make an attempt to win.

But as I'm getting further into volume 3 of Shelby Foote's Civil War, and as I'm reading the account of Sherman's march into Georgia, Johnston is starting to appear in a different light. In many ways, he's a lot like Lee in that he's able to read the situation and guess what his opponent's next move will be, and he will move to counter it. He had the smaller army, so he would always try to fight from a defensive position rather than risk his army on an assault, which makes sense. He was cautious, but would fight when he found an opening.

I'm starting to think differently of the man. He didn't throw away the lives of his soldiers, so that's obviously a point in his favor. I still think he's far too quick to retreat rather than fight, but if nothing else this section of the book shows that there's generally a sound tactical reason for what he does.

Anyone have more knowledge of the man's career and have some thoughts on Joe Johnston as a general?

I'm in the opposite lane. I started out with Sam Watkins' praise for "Uncle Joe" as a general who took care of his men and spent their lives as carefully as possible and, from the point of view of an Army of Tennessee soldier, it's easy to see how Johnston shines in comparison with his predecessor Bragg and his successor Hood. I still think his overall generalship was solid for the reasons you note. But these days I'm more accepting of some of the criticisms of his strategic approach. Sure, the Confederate army is still largely intact in the field, but what happens politically if Richmond falls in 1862 - or Atlanta in July 1864?
There are a number of CWT forum experts on the Vicksburg and Atlanta campaigns whose opinions on this carry weight.

 

[johan_steele]

His men adored him. When compared to Bragg or Hood he was a genius. As for the charge of not wanting to fight he was one who chose his battles carefully. Keep in mind Peachtree Creek was his plan. It was as close as the CS ever came to to truly smashing Sherman.

He also did a far better job of supplying his army than any other. He understood logistics and terrain better than most. His mistake was in assuming his opponent was competent. In Sherman & Thomas he was right.

 

[DaveBrt]

Anddrsonh1,

I think your original impression was the correct one. The list of his unforced failures is long -- a few:
1. Though he knew all winter that his position at Centreville, Va was not tenable, he retreated toward Richmond with so little regard to a plan that a huge amount of precious meat was lost at the Thoroughfare Gap meat plant and much Manassas Gap RR rolling stock was isolated on the western end of the road, which Johnston knew could not be held.
2. Battle of Seven Pines was poorly run.
3. Knowing that he had to work with Pemberton to survive against Grant, he none-the-less did little until Pemberton was closed up in Vicksburg. Then it was too late to be effective.
4. Though pressed repeatedly to rescue the precious, and plentiful, rolling stock of the Mississippi railroads after Vicksburg fell, he never managed to get the bridged across the Pearle River completed so the locomotives and cars could be saved.
5. He came within a hair's breadth of loosing his entire army in northern Georgia by letting a Union army get in his rear. He knew of the danger and the passes that had to be protected, but did not take sufficient measures to defend them. Only the timidity of the Union general prevented the loss of his army.

What did he do right? He let Beauregard fight the battle at 1st Manassas, he fought hard to supply his troops in all situations, and........

 

[James N.]

...Anyone have more knowledge of the man's career and have some thoughts on Joe Johnston as a general?

From an earlier period in his career, one that is overlooked by comparison with his command of the Army of Tennessee in 1864, was his direction in the opening moves in response to McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. Last year I read the revised edition of Robert Tanner's Stonewall in the Valley which pointed out the influence Johnston's orders and expressed wishes had on what is usually described as purely Jackson's independent campaign in the Shenandoah. It was obvious Jackson was trying to tailor his moves with those of Johnston with the approval of Davis (or at least his military advisor, Robert E. Lee), so at least some of the credit Jackson receives should also be shared with Johnston.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Whether the men under a commander love him or not is not necessarily a good mark of effectiveness as a commander. Grant, arguably the most-successful commander of the war, had nowhere near the adoration accorded a McClellan or a Lee, for instance. (This doesn't necessarily equate to casualty rates. Lee's ANV had a horrendous casualty rate by any estimation, but his men by and large were devoted to him.)

 

[hanna260]

On a note unrelated to his strategies, Johnston has also always struck me as a bit of a prima donna, too. He just could not get along with Davis, and I think that being able to get along with people higher placed than you was important in the ACW.

 

[cash]

Retreating Joe screwed up the Atlanta campaign from the beginning. As soon as he allowed Sherman to get out of the mountains in Northern Georgia, it was all over but the shouting. Sure, he didn't waste the lives of his men, but he also didn't take steps to ensure he wasted the lives of his enemies. Shelby could talk a good game, and he was a marvelous writer, but he didn't have a deep understanding of the war. Joe would probably have fought the decisive battle of Key West when he couldn't retreat any further.

 

[TinCan]

I have to agree with cash and DaveBrt. Johnston was to quick to surrender territory to the enemy and this was a major reason he and Davis were at odds.

 

[brass napoleon]

He was forever waiting for the perfect opportunity, while doing little to create his own opportunities.

 

[Nytram01]

Johnston was a competant conventional commander. I am a fan and defender of his but I never claim him to be more than that.

 

[Nytram01]

Anddrsonh1,

I think your original impression was the correct one. The list of his unforced failures is long -- a few:
1. Though he knew all winter that his position at Centreville, Va was not tenable, he retreated toward Richmond with so little regard to a plan that a huge amount of precious meat was lost at the Thoroughfare Gap meat plant and much Manassas Gap RR rolling stock was isolated on the western end of the road, which Johnston knew could not be held.

Johnston remained at Centerville because he was waiting for the Confederate Government to decide if it could get him some reinforcement so he could attack into the North. He only ever considered the position temporary and a staging point for an offensive at that, it was entirely unsuitable as a defensive positon.

Furthermore objected officially to the establishment of the meat packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap - correctly arguing that it was a tactically exposed position. His objections were completely disregarded.

The official records stated that of the 2,706,733 pounds of pork and beef at Thoroughfare only 369,819 pounds were left behind after the withdrawal, and of that 200,000 pounds was given away to local farmers.

2. Battle of Seven Pines was poorly run.

No more so than Lee's first major offensive at Mechanicsville. A general can hardly be condemned for his first attempt at a major offensive battle involving tens of thousands of troops going awry.

3. Knowing that he had to work with Pemberton to survive against Grant, he none-the-less did little until Pemberton was closed up in Vicksburg. Then it was too late to be effective.

He arrived at Jackson on May 13th, two thirds of Grant's army fell upon him the next day driving him from the city, then his plans for the campaign were betrayed to his enemy when a courier took written orders from him for Pemberton to McPherson who sent it to Grant. Grant then having full knowledge of the intentions of his enemy acted upon it and struck while they were still seperate. After being driven from Jackson, Johnston was a day or so behind events until Pemberton was besieged.

He had arrived mid-campaign with no up-to-date information on the campaign - and what little he was given was inaccurate - and was almost immediately set upon by the main body his enemies forces then betrayed and his plans handed to his enemy. What General, exactly, could have been successful in those circumstances?

4. Though pressed repeatedly to rescue the precious, and plentiful, rolling stock of the Mississippi railroads after Vicksburg fell, he never managed to get the bridged across the Pearle River completed so the locomotives and cars could be saved.

Johnston ordered the bridge rebuilt. The work lagged but was that his fault or the inadequecies of the Confederate Engineers?

5. He came within a hair's breadth of loosing his entire army in northern Georgia by letting a Union army get in his rear. He knew of the danger and the passes that had to be protected, but did not take sufficient measures to defend them. Only the timidity of the Union general prevented the loss of his army.

He did not have the man power to defend every pass through the mountain, he did not know where all of his enemies forces were, and his cavalry commander was not scouting as he was daily being directed to do. Johnston placed his main forces in the areas he thought most likely to be attacked. He was wrong, but that didn't make his decision unreasonable nor unjustified. When the Federals came through Snake Creek Gap he deployed the entirity of Hood's Corps to meet it and prepared to move his whole army if the threat was serious enough - only halting the move when Hood cautioned him that the advance through Snake Creek Gap might be a diversion following McPherson's aborted advance on Resaca.

What did he do right? He let Beauregard fight the battle at 1st Manassas, he fought hard to supply his troops in all situations, and........

Johnston took control of 1st Manassas.

He allowed Beauregard to prepare and plan it because he felt Beauregard would know the area better as that's where his army had been, but Beauregard's plans only reached one of his subordinates before the federals attacked and made them obsolete. Beauregard ignored the fighting on his left flank and claimed it was only a fient. For most of the morning he stood idle on Lookout Hill waiting for the chance to launch his own offensive, while Johnston stood in the background reluctant to step in because of his delicate sensibilities for proper military ettiquette.

Johnston was the man responsible for sending Jackson, Bee, and Hampton to the left to reinforce the threatened sector, and when finally he could stand the inaction no longer and was fed up with his suggestions that the battle was actually happening on the left getting dismissed, Johsnton announce "The battle is there. I am going" and left Lookout Hill to head to the left flank to take control, leaving Beauregard to follow in his wake.

Johnston and Beauregard rallied the troops - Johnston even being the man to send Bee to the troops he said that famous "there stands Jackson like a stone wall" comment to - then it was Johnston who fell to the rear to establish an Army HQ to control the battle, to find reinforcement and get them to the to front, and then to send Kirby Smith and Early's Brigades on the flank attack that won the day.

Beauregard, meanwhile, was riding up and down the front shouting encouragement to the men and replacing fallen officers with his own staff. He too ordered an offensive, only after the flank attack which won the battle had been launched.

If any one general could have claimed to have been resonsible for winning 1st Manassas then Johnston had a more legitimate claim there than Beaureard - especially when you add in the fact that if Johnston hadn't been so prompt in bringing his army out of the Valley to support Beauregard's then it's likely the Federals would have won that battle.

 

[Drew]

as I'm reading the account of Sherman's march into Georgia, Johnston is starting to appear in a different light. In many ways, he's a lot like Lee in that he's able to read the situation and guess what his opponent's next move will be, and he will move to counter it.

Retreating Joe screwed up the Atlanta campaign from the beginning.

There was no Confederate "Atlanta Campaign." In fact, Sherman's orders were to find Johnston's Army and destroy it.

Sherman failed to execute his orders and took Atlanta instead. Sherman's Booby Prize worked out well for the Union, politically, but it was a Booby Prize for him as an Army commander, because he couldn't get Johnston, whose Army survived.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Lee and Johnston, the South's two most important generals, are a strange study in similarities and contrasts. Both Virginia gentlemen of the old school, classmates at West Point and good friends in the old army, proud, dignified, and gracious. Militarily, though, they were very different. Both inspired devotion among their troops, but Johnston was careful and cautious (the Confederate Fabius, so to speak) whereas Lee was bold and aggressive (the Confederate Scipio, so to speak). Both knew that the South's only chances of victory lay in destroying the North's willingness to continue the war, but went about trying to achieve this in very different ways. Lee sought to demoralize the North by inflicting a series of battlefield defeats, whereas Johnston sought to drag the war out as long as possible and therefore wanted to conserve the South's manpower - its most precious resource - unless and until it would be used to strike the enemy with a good chance of success, which he tried to do at Seven Pines, Cassville, and Peachtree Creek.

People often point out that Johnston has no great battlefield victories to his credit, whereas Lee had triumphs like Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. That's true. But I think it's also worth pointing out that Johnston has no Malvern Hills or Pickett's Charges on his record, either. The South could not continue its war effort when its thin manpower resources were expended and one simply has to give Johnston a higher mark in this regard. The forces under Lee's command suffered massively heavier losses than did those under Johnston's command; as I always like to say, if I was a Confederate soldier who wanted to survive the war and return home to my wife and kids, I would much rather serve under Johnston than Lee.

 

[cash]

There was no Confederate "Atlanta Campaign." In fact, Sherman's orders were to find Johnston's Army and destroy it.

Sherman failed to execute his orders and took Atlanta instead. Sherman's Booby Prize worked out well for the Union, politically, but it was a Booby Prize for him as an Army commander, because he couldn't get Johnston, whose Army survived.

So then all the historians writing about the Atlanta Campaign and including confederate forces are wrong. You should tell them. Grant and Lincoln don't appear to have had any problem with Sherman's modification of his orders. Doesn't seem like a booby prize. It seems like it helped to save Lincoln's reelection.

 

[CSA Today]

Johnston was a competant conventional commander. I am a fan and defender of his but I never claim him to be more than that.

Johnston should have never been in command of anything static -- Richmond or Atlanta. On the other hand, had he been in command once Sherman began his march to the sea, Johnston would have slowly drawn Sherman away from his line of supplies and hopefully prompting him to do something reckless like his attacks at Kennesaw Mountain. I don't see Sherman foraging on a 60 mile swath with Johnston's intact army on his front.

 

[Drew]

So then all the historians writing about the Atlanta Campaign and including confederate forces are wrong. You should tell them. Grant and Lincoln don't appear to have had any problem with Sherman's modification of his orders. Doesn't seem like a booby prize. It seems like it helped to save Lincoln's reelection.

Nice spin, "modification" of his orders. He failed at his ordered objective, flatly. This is poor generalship.

I already noted the Booby Prize worked out well, politically, for the Union. So there's no reason to expect anyone would have a problem with the Booby Prize.

General William T. Sherman failed to execute his orders, find and destroy Johnston's Army. He couldn't do it.

I'm going to bed, you all enjoy dancing around this fact. Have a nice evening.

 

[leftyhunter]

I am in the mushy middle both Davebrt and Nytram01 make some really good points.Maybe the truth is that Johnston did the best he could with the limited manpower available.
Leftyhunter

 

[cash]

Nice spin, "modification" of his orders. He failed at his ordered objective, flatly. This is poor generalship.

His boss didn't think so, and I think he would know what's poor generalship and what isn't a lot better than you. That's exactly what Sherman did. He modified his orders, which a commander on the scene often has leeway to do.

I already noted the Booby Prize worked out well, politically, for the Union. So there's no reason to expect anyone would have a problem with the Booby Prize.

In other words, it's not a booby prize.

General William T. Sherman failed to execute his orders, find and destroy Johnston's Army. He couldn't do it.

As it turns out, he didn't have to. Sounds like he had a much better grasp of the situation than you.

I'm going to bed, you all enjoy dancing around this fact. Have a nice evening.

You're the only one I see dancing.

 

[Nytram01]

Johnston should have never been in command of anything static -- Richmond or Atlanta. On the other hand, had he been in command once Sherman began his march to the sea, Johnston would have slowly drawn Sherman away from his line of supplies and hopefully prompting him to do something reckless like his attacks at Kennesaw Mountain. I don't see Sherman foraging on a 60 mile swath with Johnston's intact army on his front.

Part of the problem with assigning Johnston to defend specific point is the fact that he did not put much importance in locations if defending them would be detrimental to his army. His philosphy was that places lost to the enemy could be retaken later but an army lost is lost forever. Militarilly he was probably more right about this than Davis was when he insisted on defending positions, but politicially it was kind of indefensible.