Captain Semmes / CSS ALABAMA operational orders

[USS ALASKA]

When U.S.S. Kearsarge arrived off Cherbourg on June 14, 1864 – Captain Semmes supposed stated that : ". . . My intention is to fight the Kearsarge as soon as I can make the necessary arrangements. I hope they will not detain me more than until tomorrow evening, or after the morrow morning at furthest. I beg she will not depart before I am ready to go out."

Does anyone know what kind of operational orders Semmes had - what his ROE was understood to be? Reason I ask is that if he was tasked to disrupt Union shipping to the greatest extent that he could, it would seem to be counter-productive to desire a battle with Union warship. Any damage that leads to a mission kill, or worse, for CSS Alabama negates her ability to service her primary targets.

Thanks for the help,
USS ALASKA

 

[Cavalry Charger]

When U.S.S. Kearsarge arrived off Cherbourg on June 14, 1864 – Captain Semmes supposed stated that : ". . . My intention is to fight the Kearsarge as soon as I can make the necessary arrangements. I hope they will not detain me more than until tomorrow evening, or after the morrow morning at furthest. I beg she will not depart before I am ready to go out."

Does anyone know what kind of operational orders Semmes had - what his ROE was understood to be? Reason I ask is that if he was tasked to disrupt Union shipping to the greatest extent that he could, it would seem to be counter-productive to desire a battle with Union warship. Any damage that leads to a mission kill, or worse, for CSS Alabama negates her ability to service her primary targets.

Thanks for the help,
USS ALASKA

Was there a personal insult attached to this naval battle? One that Semmes felt he couldn't overlook involving the Captain of the Kearsage? My understanding is that there was an agreement made to allow the two ships to leave port and battle outside of French waters which attracted a large viewing crowd back on shore. Were there also modifications made to the Kearsage that Semmes wasn't aware of which ultimately led to his defeat? Some kind of false deck with chain reinforcements? I believe the CSS Alabama tried to create a smokescreen in order to gain an advantage in battle. I could be 'talking through my hat', and am speaking off the top of my head, but I'd be interested if anyone could confirm these details.

 

[Carronade]

Semmes conveyed through the French authorities a letter to Captain Winslow of the Kearsarge that he intended to come out and fight as soon as he was ready, but I would not call that an insult; Winslow was equally eager for an engagement. Kearsarge was never in port; she remained offshore in respect of French neutrality. She did have iron chain hung over the sides in way of the boilers and engines.

AFAIK Semmes' orders were strictly to raid Union commerce. Even moderate damage, in addition to her needing repairs and drydocking already, might indeed have been a "mission kill".

The longer Alabama remained in one place, the more likely additional Union ships are to arrive. The USN would be happy to station 2-3 warships off Cherbourg indefinitely if it kept Alabama confined. The odds of getting away would only get worse with time.

One other option would be to try to slip out at night or in bad weather. Even if there was an exchange of fire with Kearsarge, the overall chances of escape are better than a straightforward daylight battle.

A year earlier, Semmes had approached the Union fleet off Galveston, risking his commerce raiding mission. As it happens, he got away with it and sank USS Hatteras, but there seems to have been some compulsion to fight real battles rather than just burn helpless merchant ships. Round shot weren't the only balls that played a role in naval combat

 

[USS ALASKA]

She did have iron chain hung over the sides in way of the boilers and engines.

I think I read somewhere - most likely here on this board - that it was the Kearsarge's exec, Lt. Cdr. James S. Thornton, that had come up with that idea - having done so before on USS Hartford? That sound right?

AFAIK Semmes' orders were strictly to raid Union commerce. Even moderate damage, in addition to her needing repairs and drydocking already, might indeed have been a "mission kill".

The longer Alabama remained in one place, the more likely additional Union ships are to arrive. The USN would be happy to station 2-3 warships off Cherbourg indefinitely if it kept Alabama confined. The odds of getting away would only get worse with time.

Exchange Semmes for Langsdorff, Union for RN, and Alabama for Admiral Graf Spee...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Carronade]

I think I read somewhere - most likely here on this board - that it was the Kearsarge's exec, Lt. Cdr. James S. Thornton, that had come up with that idea - having done so before on USS Hartford? That sound right?

Exchange Semmes for Langsdorff, Union for RN, and Alabama for Admiral Graf Spee...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Dunno about the chains, but Mark, Andy, or rebel probably will.

We might recall that Semmes had had to abandon the Sumter at Gibraltar when she was blockaded by Union ships including Kearsarge. Sumter had also been in need of repair, and more to the point she was not powerful enough to engage a sloop of war. Wonder if that might have influenced Semmes' thinking?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

RE the chains--- it had been a normal part of stripping for action for centuries to do things like send down unnecessary masts that could fall, temporarily improve defense arrangements, preposition rescue and repair equipment, and so forth; it was what competent captains did before battle. I don't know who first came up with the chains idea, but the Kearsarge certainly wasn't the first; what was a little unusual is that she had them rigged in a semi-permanent way, with some sort of wooden structure around them.

The chains business only became an "issue" after the battle when Semmes was attempting to justify himself. In the actual event, poor gunnery by the Alabama and the deteriorated condition of her ammunition supply were much more decisive.

 

[AndyHall]

A year earlier, Semmes had approached the Union fleet off Galveston, risking his commerce raiding mission. As it happens, he got away with it and sank USS Hatteras, but there seems to have been some compulsion to fight real battles rather than just burn helpless merchant ships.

Semmes knew Galveston had been taken by the Federals in October and believed, based on gossip in northern newspapers taken from captured merchantmen, that in January he would find a large (and unarmed) fleet of invasion transports anchored off the bar here. His idea was to run in among them in the dark, guns blazing, and slip away again before dawn. It was an audacious plan, but still not spoiling for a straight-up fight against Federal warships.

What he didn't know was that Galveston had been recaptured on January 1, and when he arrived late on the afternoon of January 11 he discovered that the blockading squadron was still offshore, and (in fact) lobbing shells into the town. That's when he led away Hatteras, that had been sent to investigate the strange sail, away from the rest of the squadron where he could take her on in a single-ship action.

 

[AndyHall]

The chains business only became an "issue" after the battle when Semmes was attempting to justify himself. In the actual event, poor gunnery by the Alabama and the deteriorated condition of her ammunition supply were much more decisive.

Yep. Semmes faced some legit disadvantages going against Kearsarge, but he did himself no favors by whinging after the fact about how terribly unfair it was. The chains thing is a good example -- it was standard practice.

Semmes' complaints about the unfairness of it all are pretty rich coming from a guy who'd spent the last two years intercepting and destroying dozens of unarmed civilian merchant ships.

 

[AndyHall]

 

[AndyHall]

When U.S.S. Kearsarge arrived off Cherbourg on June 14, 1864 – Captain Semmes supposed stated that : ". . . My intention is to fight the Kearsarge as soon as I can make the necessary arrangements. I hope they will not detain me more than until tomorrow evening, or after the morrow morning at furthest. I beg she will not depart before I am ready to go out."

Does anyone know what kind of operational orders Semmes had - what his ROE was understood to be? Reason I ask is that if he was tasked to disrupt Union shipping to the greatest extent that he could, it would seem to be counter-productive to desire a battle with Union warship. Any damage that leads to a mission kill, or worse, for CSS Alabama negates her ability to service her primary targets.

Semmes arrived at Cherbourg hoping he could have Alabama refitted and overhauled, but found that the only drydock there that was large enough, the government dock at the navy yard, would not take him due to neutrality issues. Before Semmes could sail again, Kearsarge arrived offshore and the game was up.

Semmes then faced three options -- (1) dismiss his crew and turn the ship over to local port authorities, (2) sit and do nothing while Alabama slowly rotted beneath his feet, or (3) try to make a break for it and face Keararge directly. He chose the latter as the least-worst option.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Yep. Semmes faced some legit disadvantages going against Kearsarge, but he did himself no favors by whinging after the fact about how terribly unfair it was. The chains thing is a good example -- it was standard practice.

Semmes' complaints about the unfairness of it all are pretty rich coming from a guy who'd spent the last two years intercepting and destroying dozens of unarmed civilian merchant ships.

Well, the man was a lawyer - and spent 800 some pages trying to explain away his positions in 'Memoirs of Service Afloat During the War Between the States'. That is a heck of a book. Put me asleep a couple of times while trying to get through it. If a rabid badger attacked you while you were reading it you could kill it with this massive tome...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

(2) sit and do nothing while Alabama slowly rotted beneath his feet.

In hindsight, 2 would have been his best option if it kept a couple of federal cruisers off shore to keep an eye on him.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[AndyHall]

Well, the man was a lawyer - and spent 800 some pages trying to explain away his positions in 'Memoirs of Service Afloat During the War Between the States'. That is a heck of a book. Put me asleep a couple of times while trying to get through it. If a rabid badger attacked you while you were reading it you could kill it with this massive tome...

Not many people find that book a compelling read.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

The personality differences are why I much prefer reading about John Newland Maffitt. Give me a cheerful, humorous bon vivant over a sour-grapes stickler any day!

 

[USS ALASKA]

I think I read somewhere - most likely here on this board - that it was the Kearsarge's exec, Lt. Cdr. James S. Thornton, that had come up with that idea - having done so before on USS Hartford? That sound right?

Thought I read it somewhere - @Story posted it on another Alabama thread...

http://donhollway.com/alabama-kearsarge/

"Kearsarge executive officer Lt. Cdr. James S. Thornton had served as exec on Capt. David G. Farragut's flagship, USS Hartford, at the Battle of New Orleans in April 1862, when she grounded under the guns of Fort St. Philip and only an improvised iron mail of heavy chains saved her. He proposed the same armor for the Kearsarge."

Also has a nice pic illustrating how they strung the chains together.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Not many people find that book a compelling read.

It is interesting to get into the man's mind to get a handle on his thought process but I often wondered if the juice was worth the squeeze after finishing it.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Dilandu]

Semmes then faced three options -- (1) dismiss his crew and turn the ship over to local port authorities, (2) sit and do nothing while Alabama slowly rotted beneath his feet, or (3) try to make a break for it and face Keararge directly. He chose the latter as the least-worst option.

He probably could try to just slip away under the nighttime (or just run & hope to avoid "Kearsarge" after sunset), but Semmes seems to be quite a bit of glory hound & really wanted to do some swashbuckling. After all, he already risked everything before by attacking "Hatteras". Such sucsess clearly led him to overestimate his crew & ship.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Such sucsess clearly led him to overestimate his crew & ship.

Possibly. Another facet is that he could be certain that, if he waited any longer, more Union cruisers would show up off Cherbourg, undoubtedly including USS Niagara which Semmes could never hope to tackle. A one-on-one with an approximately equal opponent was the best odds he could hope for under the circumstances.

 

[BillO]

According to Kerr, Semmes XO on both the Sumpter and the Alabama, wrote in his memoirs that the French offered to replace his old powder with new but Semmes refused.

 

[JPChurch]

That one Blakely shell that was fired from the Alabama's forward pivot gun could/ would have put the Kearsarge out of action had the fuse ignited the charge inside.