Can Benjamin Butler be redeemed?

As far as Butler's military failings go, my general impression from the Bermuda Hundred (given how early it was and his level of personal involvement I don't think Big Bethel tells us much of anything) is that he delegated too much (a management style that might have worked better with different subordinates) and vacillated on what his objective should be.
 
I support the notion that Butler delegated too much to his Corp Commanders (Gillmore, Smith). Unfortunate for Butler, these Corp Commanders were picked by Grant who fully knowing Gillmore was ineffective, and Smith was damaged goods. I will politely state it seems to me they were more attached to Grant than Butler. Butler quickly noted Gillmore was incompetent, but it took longer to find Smith somewhat emotionally impaired due to combat stress. It is unacceptable for me to support notion that Butler vacillated on his military objective given him by Grant. Butler failed to appear at Richmond because Grant/Meade were checked by Lee at Wilderness/Spotsylvania. Therefore, it is Grant who failed to appear at Richmond, which lead to Butler not appearing. Why blame Butler for Grant's failure? Matter made worse when neither Grant or Meade tells Butler the essential correct progress report or lack of progress being more correct. Fortunately, Butler in a back handed manner learns of the military checks cited above, by way of General Sheridan, who unexpectedly appear in Butler's zone of action, from his famous Raid, that killed Stuart. As Butler is planning to retreat back to Bermuda Hundred stronghold, to prevent the destruction of the Army of James, Beauregard struck at Proctor's Creek, but is checked. Butler successfully escapes. Another matter made worse, is that either Stanton or Halleck is telling Butler that Grant is victorious, and that Butler should press on to Richmond, which would have exposed Butler to possible destruction. Fortunately, Butler ignores the false information and believes Sheridan.
 
I support the notion that Butler delegated too much to his Corp Commanders (Gillmore, Smith). Unfortunate for Butler, these Corp Commanders were picked by Grant who fully knowing Gillmore was ineffective, and Smith was damaged goods. I will politely state it seems to me they were more attached to Grant than Butler. Butler quickly noted Gillmore was incompetent, but it took longer to find Smith somewhat emotionally impaired due to combat stress. It is unacceptable for me to support notion that Butler vacillated on his military objective given him by Grant. Butler failed to appear at Richmond because Grant/Meade were checked by Lee at Wilderness/Spotsylvania. Therefore, it is Grant who failed to appear at Richmond, which lead to Butler not appearing. Why blame Butler for Grant's failure? Matter made worse when neither Grant or Meade tells Butler the essential correct progress report or lack of progress being more correct. Fortunately, Butler in a back handed manner learns of the military checks cited above, by way of General Sheridan, who unexpectedly appear in Butler's zone of action, from his famous Raid, that killed Stuart. As Butler is planning to retreat back to Bermuda Hundred stronghold, to prevent the destruction of the Army of James, Beauregard struck at Proctor's Creek, but is checked. Butler successfully escapes. Another matter made worse, is that either Stanton or Halleck is telling Butler that Grant is victorious, and that Butler should press on to Richmond, which would have exposed Butler to possible destruction. Fortunately, Butler ignores the false information and believes Sheridan.
I am aware from reading older posts that you have some decidedly unique views on Butler's generalship here, but this just doesn't seem factually defensible from where I'm standing. For instance, Grant and the rest of the western officers thought quite highly of Smith at this time, due to his work at Chattanooga, so that was not at all a case of saddling Butler with dead weight by intention. In fact, Grant thought he was correcting for Butler's shortcomings! And I can't imagine you can substantiate that Grant knew Gillmore to be incompetent.

Another matter made worse, is that either Stanton or Halleck is telling Butler that Grant is victorious, and that Butler should press on to Richmond, which would have exposed Butler to possible destruction. Fortunately, Butler ignores the false information and believes Sheridan.
Your presentation of the timeline and reaction from Butler seems to be wrong here though. Butler got that message from Stanton on the 9th and promptly canceled his planned movement against Petersburg. He did quite the opposite of ignoring Stanton. His impression of what was going on to the north was not corrected until later. Per Robertson, Back Door To Richmond, 120-121.
 
On paper, Grant would see a West Pointer with experience on the South Atlantic Coast, thus an asset to a political general like Butler. Grant may have made the mistake of not digging any deeper than that.
I'm all for faulting Grant on being slapdash when he was, such as the mess of the Valley planning that Grant's buddy Ord seems to have caused by just walking off the job. But it's not obvious to me how Grant would have been aware of any problems with Gillmore prior to his showing at the Bermuda Hundred.
 
breckod

Excellent questionings about the Corps Commanders. In the matter of why Gillmore and how would Grant/Lincoln/Stanton have known about his expected poor performance? Note the related date in before May 1864 and Gillmore has plenty of military and personal behavior performance to show his abilities or lack thereof. He was first in the Class at West Point, but only in engineering. He was disliked by his men. He had no significant field experience as a major infantry combat field commander, outside engineering sieges and one very small calvary battle at Somerset KY. that tell us nothing. He had already be place in South Carolina safely a backwater area. He seemingly and openingly stated he did not desire or sought a transfer, as he was happy with what he was trained to do and had been doing as cited above. He had in his Corps mostly garrison type green New England troops, of which little was expected as a general rule in this War. I clearly see how they would choose Gillmore, due to above, and he was what they were seeking: one who was unable and not likely to make Butler a champion with a great victory. He would be a drag on Butler, and he would be most unhappy transfer to Butler. Surely Gillmore reads the newspapers and heard all the Confederate propaganda and anti-Butler Yankees degrading Butler wrongly in my opinion.
 
He had in his Corps mostly garrison type green New England troops, of which little was expected as a general rule in this War.

Disagree, a lot of the 10th Corps had by this time seen hard combat and become veterans. They had generally fought well and would continue to do so, despite their commanding generals' lack of skill.
 
General JJ

The 10th Corps had seen combat but not the type they would face in Virginia. Besides, the general focus of my presentation was Gillmore which you just agreed had "lack of skill". Your last sentence above, I fully support, and I am proud of you to uphold them. Now the 10th did do well initially at Oscelot, Florida in their first real field combat in a large operation of infantry. But it was a rout in the end after they were outflanked. They had little faith in themselves as result, but it was regained in Virginia at time of Petersburg siege, and the offensives launched from Bermuda Hundred several times as ordered by Grant. It was nothing less than a miracle as those offensives were launched from (the great myth claimed to be) the "Bottle" which was supposed by many through the age to be sealed forever by the Confederates. This makes them miracle workers for which they have not got their recognition granted to this day. The 10 Corps made this ridiculous Confederate cheap propaganda fiction and anti-Butler Yankee haters nothing but liars. Hurrah!

Note Gillmore was not on the ground at Oscelot Battle and his orders were for the force to stay near the naval transports. Note this denote Gillmore lack of confident for an open large field battle in the interior and away from his precious naval vessels.
 

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