Burnside's Bridge

[rhettbutler1865]

Having Fran Barnum's piece, which is SO beautiful...and my birthday on Antietam,: why did Burnside pour troops onto that bridge? I still don't know...

 

[Dred]

Natural progression of the battle as it raged across the fronts. Starting on the northern flank, then around to the center of the sunken road, then to the south when for some reason , McClellan, in all his wisdom decided not to press the attack when the Confederates finally broke at the Bloody Lane, and instead insisted that the right flank of the Confederates must be week. Burnside's Bridge being the only crossing available, it fell to him to turn the flank since any units on any other section of the battlefield were pretty much decimated at that point. It would have worked too, if Hill hadn't basically ran all the way from Harper's Ferry.

 

[rhettbutler1865]

Thanks, Dred...OK--I buy that.

 

[chucksr]

One has to wonder why McClellan waited so long--Burnside was at the bridge long before his 12pm. initial attempt, troops were across the creek at Snavely Ford south of the bridge and an attack early in the morning would have rolled up the thin Confederate forces between the bridge and Sharpsburg and effectively cut the Confederate forces coming from Harper's Ferry off from the main scene of the battle. Reading about all the piecemeal attacks and missed opportunities is simply frustrating--especially knowing that McClellan had the enemy's battle plan in his hands three days before the actual battle.

 

[Specster]

Having Fran Barnum's piece, which is SO beautiful...and my birthday on Antietam,: why did Burnside pour troops onto that bridge? I still don't know...

 

[Specster]

It seems any conversation involving Burnside and bridges end in disaster (Fredericksburg was even worse)

 

[NedBaldwin]

...why did Burnside pour troops onto that bridge? I still don't know...

Becuase McCellan ordered him to, allegedly saying "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now"

 

[67th Tigers]

One has to wonder why McClellan waited so long

Long and the short, he didn't.

McClellan had issued an order before 0700 to Burnside, the contents of which are unknown. Cox supposed from what Burnside told him it was to be ready to attack. This may make sense as since he'd been ordered to have his corps deployed to attack 20 hours earlier, they still were not in position.

At 0800 Lt Wilson delivered an order for Burnside to attack, and Cox's first attack went in at 0900.

At "around 0900" McClellan noted Burnside still wasn't attacking. He sent Col. Sackett, the inspector general of the army down to him, possibly carrying a repeat of the 0800 order timestamped 0910 (the 0910 order has a description of the positions of other units at 0800), down to Burnside. Burnside stated that Sackett was the "third or fourth" man to bring him this order. Sackett was ordered to stay with Burnside until he was over the bridge.

The "third or fourth" implies that the pre-0700 order was the same as the later orders, to attack rather than a warning order.

Colonel Key was then sent around midday to reiterate Burnside's orders. This time Key had been told by McClellan that Burnside must gain the heights "if it cost 10,000 men". He carried in his pocket a signed order relieving Burnside from duty and placing Morell in command of 9th Corps, which he did not use, as Burnside then gained the bridge. Key then returned to HQ.

Key returned sometime around 1430 or 1500 because 9th Corps still had not moved onto the heights. He managed to get Burnside moving again.

 

[Saphroneth]

Starting on the northern flank, then around to the center of the sunken road, then to the south when for some reason , McClellan, in all his wisdom decided not to press the attack when the Confederates finally broke at the Bloody Lane, and instead insisted that the right flank of the Confederates must be we(a)k.

I'm sorry to jump in on what may be a throwaway line, but my understanding is that at the time the Confederates gave back from Bloody Lane McClellan's own force had essentially expended three corps in frontal attacks. There wasn't much left to send in attacks, and indeed when Early counterattacked most of the remaining Union force on the right (6th Corps) had to be spread out as a line to shield the shattered units.
As for the break, RH Anderson formed a second line when he came up from reserve, so there was no breach and Hill's troops retreated through RH Anderson's line before reforming.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm sorry to jump in on what may be a throwaway line, but my understanding is that at the time the Confederates gave back from Bloody Lane McClellan's own force had essentially expended three corps in frontal attacks. There wasn't much left to send in attacks, and indeed when Early counterattacked most of the remaining Union force on the right (6th Corps) had to be spread out as a line to shield the shattered units.
As for the break, RH Anderson formed a second line when he came up from reserve, so there was no breach and Hill's troops retreated through RH Anderson's line before reforming.

That's basically right.

When the 2 brigades in the sunken road broke there were 4 brigades of Anderson behind them for them to rally on.

The idea that "the centre was broken" doesn't really start appearing until 23 years after the battle. It started with Charles Coffin's Century article, and continued through a few other Century articles. The main aim of these articles seems to be attacks on Fitz John Porter,.

In 1878 Porter finally got his case reviewed, and in 1879 the Schofield Commission resolved to quash the previous courts martial. There was massive political opposition to this, not least Garfield (the next President) who served on the panel that convicted Porter. When Garfield was assassinated Chester A. Arthur became President and tried to veto a bill restoring Porter's citizenship and Commission. This bill was forced through by Congress and Porter was restored to the army (as the senior Colonel in the army), but not pardoned. He resigned his Commission as soon as the official notification of his reinstatement was made.

This provoked a huge backlash amongst the radicals. They wrote some quite slanderous accounts of Porter in the Century, and some modern criticism of McClellan was conceived as an attempt to prevent Porter's pardon in the 1880's.

 

[Saphroneth]

So essentially McClellan has three avenues of attack - north, centre and south.

As of 1PM, north and centre have both failed. The commanders have expended essentially their entire strength, and have been so badly shattered that 6th Corps needs to be committed so as to hold the line - so that's no good.

In the south, Burnside still has troops who are neither expended nor needed to hold the line. While McClellan appears to have believed that Lee's force was larger than his own (instead of roughly comparable) this seems to be largely balanced out by his somewhat inflated view of Union troops vis-a-vis Confederate.
So an attack in the south is the only real option left. It would have ideally gone in simultaneously (hence McClellan ordering Burnside forwards to capture the LD on the 16th!) but if Burnside can attack it may still succeed - certainly the option of instead pulling Burnside back and making another attempt on the right fails both because of the time it would take the troops to move and because something would need to be kept on the left anyway.
Without any particularly significant reserves available to McClellan in a central location he can't simply shift reserves right, and indeed as it was most troops were on the right anyway (something like 2/3 of divisions were north of or covering the Middle Bridge, counting Sykes as covering the Middle Bridge).

 

[Dred]

I'm sorry to jump in on what may be a throwaway line, but my understanding is that at the time the Confederates gave back from Bloody Lane McClellan's own force had essentially expended three corps in frontal attacks. There wasn't much left to send in attacks, and indeed when Early counterattacked most of the remaining Union force on the right (6th Corps) had to be spread out as a line to shield the shattered units.
As for the break, RH Anderson formed a second line when he came up from reserve, so there was no breach and Hill's troops retreated through RH Anderson's line before reforming.

Its true that the center wasn't broken simply because Bloody Lane collapsed. I have always been highly critical of McLellan. Regardless, he was never one to really press the attack upon success... But If I remember right, Burnside's assault was supposed to take place much sooner to try and pressure the flanks of the Sunken Road. But by the time Burnside got across, instead of a concentrated effort you got yet another piecemeal attack.

 

[Saphroneth]

Its true that the center wasn't broken simply because Bloody Lane collapsed. I have always been highly critical of McLellan. Regardless, he was never one to really press the attack upon success...

He was, to some extent, but not at the cost of recklessness. There was almost nothing whatsoever to attack with by the time Bloody Lane collapsed (there were about two brigades left in fighting condition) and by the time 6th Corps arrived they had to just stabilize the line.

McClellan's real problem in the histories is simply that people inflate the troop counts he had and under-report his foes. That's what makes him look "scared" - but if you examine e.g. Oak Grove, he was actually attacking Richmond despite his enemy (with equal numbers in reality and superior according to spy work) being entrenched.

But If I remember right, Burnside's assault was supposed to take place much sooner to try and pressure the flanks of the Sunken Road. But by the time Burnside got across, instead of a concentrated effort you got yet another piecemeal attack.

True, though that's not really McClellan's fault per se. (Burnside definitely bears a lot of the responsibility, as he took something like a full day to take the bridge, but it might simply be there were too many Confederates on the field that day as Lee was able to keep putting in reserves.)

 

[connecticut yankee]

One has to wonder why McClellan waited so long--Burnside was at the bridge long before his 12pm. initial attempt, troops were across the creek at Snavely Ford south of the bridge and an attack early in the morning would have rolled up the thin Confederate forces between the bridge and Sharpsburg and effectively cut the Confederate forces coming from Harper's Ferry off from the main scene of the battle. Reading about all the piecemeal attacks and missed opportunities is simply frustrating--especially knowing that McClellan had the enemy's battle plan in his hands three days before the actual battle.

There is much "evidence"out there that Burnside did not receive an order to advance and take the bridge until the afternoon. Such evidence suggests that McClellan again had his customary slows and after the battle used Burnside as his scapegoat. If true, this would not be surprising if you consider McClellan's personality and what he was capable of doing to preserve and enhance his reputation. Like so many Civil War events, to pursue the truth as to what happened and who was to blame, you could spend the greater part of your lifetime trying to figure out McClellan and Burnside's culpability in what went wrong on the Union left at Antietam that day.

 

[Saphroneth]

There is much "evidence"out there that Burnside did not receive an order to advance and take the bridge until the afternoon. Such evidence suggests that McClellan again had his customary slows and after the battle used Burnside as his scapegoat.

McClellan didn't really have "customary slows" as such, usually when he was stalled it was for a very good reason.

If true, this would not be surprising if you consider McClellan's personality and what he was capable of doing to preserve and enhance his reputation.

It also wouldn't surprise me if it were an 1864 election myth, a lot of what's in the common understanding is.

Out of interest, what is the evidence? Is there anything solid, or is it all circumstantial?

 

[67th Tigers]

There is much "evidence"out there that Burnside did not receive an order to advance and take the bridge until the afternoon

Nonsense. Cox in his AAR says he received an order to attack from Burnside "around 9 o'clock", after receiving an order to move to the bridge at "around 7 o'clock".

McClellan is known to have given Burnside a warning order for the assault around 1100 hrs on the 16th.

McClellan's 0800 attack order was carried by a future superintendent of the USMA, and he was adamant about it despite Burnside's later denials.

. Such evidence suggests that McClellan again had his customary slows and after the battle used Burnside as his scapegoat. If true, this would not be surprising if you consider McClellan's personality and what he was capable of doing to preserve and enhance his reputation. Like so many Civil War events, to pursue the truth as to what happened and who was to blame, you could spend the greater part of your lifetime trying to figure out McClellan and Burnside's culpability in what went wrong on the Union left at Antietam that day.

It's been done by Moe Daoust.