Davis Bragg and Davis

It is well known that Davis favored certain commanders (A.S. Johnston, Leonidas Polk, Braxton Bragg) and showed displeasure to others (P.G.T.Beauragard, Joe Johnston), regardless of individual competencies or flaws.
Never quite understood how all the animosity between Davis, Johnston and Beauregard started anyway. I know that Johnston and Davis had a problem over seniority and rank but was there more ?
 
William Wing Loring's clash with Jackson early in the war almost led to Jackson's resignation. Loring had contacted political superiors in Richmond complaining about Jackson. Jackson received an order from Richmond to bring Loring's troops back from where Jackson had left them at Romney. Jackson complied, then submitted his resignation. It took a lot of soothing to talk him into rescinding his resignation.

Richard S. Ewell once said he always expected he would receive an order from Jackson to assault the North Pole. Most of Jackson's subordinate commanders considered him to be crazy, but his success in the Valley campaign as well as his success in the Second Manassas campaign and at Chancellorsville overrode such views.

Nothing succeeds like success.
That said (and I wholeheartedly agree), one wonders how history would have treated Jackson had he lived and been subjected to the same scrutiny as Bragg.
I've not been a big fan of Bragg (I am of Jackson), but their differences may only have been as you suggest: even though their contests and opponents were different, one won, the other lost.
 
At eleven o'clock on the morning following Christmas Day, 1862, General Braxton Bragg of the Confederate Army forced his Company E, 6th Kentucky Infantry Regiment (part of the commonly denoted "Orphan Brigade") to stand round their fellow soldier, Asa Lewis, who awaited execution. Exactly one hour later the firing squad of twelve men carried out the young soldier's sentence. As Lewis' body, pierced by eleven bullets, fell to the ground, General John C. Breckenridge was "seized with a deathly sickness," as a comrade of Lewis recalled, as he similarly collapsed, overwhelmed by the grief of the occasion.

Asa Lewis had enlisted in the Confederacy the year prior to his execution, and despite his lack of training, showed promise with his impressive performance at the Battle of Shiloh. Enlisting early in the war, Lewis had served the entirety of his commitment by December, and though he declined to reenlist, he had remained in Murfreesboro for several months. Perhaps feeling pressure from his regiment and commanding officers, Lewis reluctantly agreed to sign up for another commitment. Following the reversal of his decision not to reenlist, however, Lewis got word that his father had died, leaving his mother and sisters without any male support on their farm that had already suffered the effects of several Union raids. Upon hearing this news, Lewis requested permission to visit his family, but was refused. Viewing his enlistment status as less than explicitly outlined, Lewis left his brigade in the manner of "French leave" on December 4, 1862 for his Kentucky home– with the intent to return after assisting the finances of the women toward whom he felt responsibility. He did not journey far before officials detected his absence, however, and was promptly brought back and issued a warning against further such conduct. Nevertheless, Lewis left once again, was caught, and following the court martial to hear the details of his case, was sentenced to death by a firing squad.

In 1862, still early in the struggle, Confederate military authorities tended to carry out sentences with more leniency than in the latter portion of the war, often implementing punishments of a less severe nature for desertion, such as a period of hard labor, forfeiture of a portion of one's pay, or being branded as a deserter. As supplies dwindled and morale dropped, the number of desertions increased, and enforcement of the Confederate Articles of War clause regarding the punishment of death for deserters became more rigorous, with Robert E. Lee realizing that their inferior numbers could not take a further toll from absentee soldiers. Not surprising for this time then, Lewis' corps commander, General Breckinridge, upon hearing the news of Lewis' sentence, pleaded with General Bragg to intervene and save the 19 year old from what Breckinridge viewed as murder. Bragg, known for both his resolve to stand firm against the actions of deserters and his contempt for the Kentucky brigade, was unwavering in his determination to make an example out of Lewis. Breckinridge, unrelenting as well, brought a signed petition to Bragg on the day preceding the scheduled execution, displaying the support of all his officers to refer this case to President Davis rather than hastily carry out such a severe sentence. Bragg refused, stating firmly in response to Breckinridge's appeals, "You Kentuckians are too independent for the good of the army. I'll shoot every one of them if I have to."

Through denying any possibility of action that could have stopped the death of Private Asa Lewis, and making a spectacle of the event to Lewis' comrades and commanding officers, Bragg solidified the abhorrence between himself and the Kentuckians. Moreover, Bragg's relationship with Breckinridge suffered immensely as a result of this decision, erasing any hope that the pair had of repairing the damage of previous conflicts.
 
At eleven o'clock on the morning following Christmas Day, 1862, General Braxton Bragg of the Confederate Army forced his Company E, 6th Kentucky Infantry Regiment (part of the commonly denoted "Orphan Brigade") to stand round their fellow soldier, Asa Lewis, who awaited execution. Exactly one hour later the firing squad of twelve men carried out the young soldier's sentence. As Lewis' body, pierced by eleven bullets, fell to the ground, General John C. Breckenridge was "seized with a deathly sickness," as a comrade of Lewis recalled, as he similarly collapsed, overwhelmed by the grief of the occasion.

Asa Lewis had enlisted in the Confederacy the year prior to his execution, and despite his lack of training, showed promise with his impressive performance at the Battle of Shiloh. Enlisting early in the war, Lewis had served the entirety of his commitment by December, and though he declined to reenlist, he had remained in Murfreesboro for several months. Perhaps feeling pressure from his regiment and commanding officers, Lewis reluctantly agreed to sign up for another commitment. Following the reversal of his decision not to reenlist, however, Lewis got word that his father had died, leaving his mother and sisters without any male support on their farm that had already suffered the effects of several Union raids. Upon hearing this news, Lewis requested permission to visit his family, but was refused. Viewing his enlistment status as less than explicitly outlined, Lewis left his brigade in the manner of "French leave" on December 4, 1862 for his Kentucky home– with the intent to return after assisting the finances of the women toward whom he felt responsibility. He did not journey far before officials detected his absence, however, and was promptly brought back and issued a warning against further such conduct. Nevertheless, Lewis left once again, was caught, and following the court martial to hear the details of his case, was sentenced to death by a firing squad.

In 1862, still early in the struggle, Confederate military authorities tended to carry out sentences with more leniency than in the latter portion of the war, often implementing punishments of a less severe nature for desertion, such as a period of hard labor, forfeiture of a portion of one's pay, or being branded as a deserter. As supplies dwindled and morale dropped, the number of desertions increased, and enforcement of the Confederate Articles of War clause regarding the punishment of death for deserters became more rigorous, with Robert E. Lee realizing that their inferior numbers could not take a further toll from absentee soldiers. Not surprising for this time then, Lewis' corps commander, General Breckinridge, upon hearing the news of Lewis' sentence, pleaded with General Bragg to intervene and save the 19 year old from what Breckinridge viewed as murder. Bragg, known for both his resolve to stand firm against the actions of deserters and his contempt for the Kentucky brigade, was unwavering in his determination to make an example out of Lewis. Breckinridge, unrelenting as well, brought a signed petition to Bragg on the day preceding the scheduled execution, displaying the support of all his officers to refer this case to President Davis rather than hastily carry out such a severe sentence. Bragg refused, stating firmly in response to Breckinridge's appeals, "You Kentuckians are too independent for the good of the army. I'll shoot every one of them if I have to."

Through denying any possibility of action that could have stopped the death of Private Asa Lewis, and making a spectacle of the event to Lewis' comrades and commanding officers, Bragg solidified the abhorrence between himself and the Kentuckians. Moreover, Bragg's relationship with Breckinridge suffered immensely as a result of this decision, erasing any hope that the pair had of repairing the damage of previous conflicts.
One question and one comment. Why did he have such contempt towards the Kentuckians ? I always thought they were excellent soldiers. The Orphan brigade was supposed to be one of the best in the AoT.
 
Why did Jefferson Davis hold on to Braxton Bragg as long as he did ? I know they were friends but couldn't he see what an incompetent boob he was in the field ? The man didn't get along with anybody. He might have been a good administrator but as far as running an army he was terrible. Surely there were better field commanders than him in the western armies. I could name a few. Somebody please enlighten me.

Davis and Bragg were not friends, at least not at the time of Bragg's appointment to command the Army of Tennessee (called the Army of the Mississippi at the time). Before the war, Davis had been Secretary of War and he undertook a number of initiatives to reform the army, including the army's artillery arm. Bragg, as the most prominent artillery commander to emerge from the Mexican War, disagreed with Davis's reforms. This turned into a squabble. After Bragg was given an unfavorable posting (assigned to the frontier to "chase Indians with six-pounders"), he decided that Davis had it in for him and resigned.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Bragg continued to believe that Davis held a grudge (his wife would tell Sherman so at a dinner before the latter departed northward). Though Bragg was the senior antebellum officer from Louisiana, a young upstart G.T. Beauregard was appointed to the command of Confederate troops before Bragg was commissioned. Furthermore, Beauregard was assigned at the flashpoint of Charleston, while Bragg was posted to the relative backwater of Pensacola.

Following the Shiloh and Corinth Campaigns, Davis was facing a crisis in the west. His main commander in the west, Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead. His western and Tran-Mississippi armies had seen major defeats and he was losing ground rapidly. And now Johnston's successor was Beauregard. Beauregard was already a political opponent of Davis, and he performed a number of actions without having the liberty to do so or to have the courtesy inform Davis of his decisions.

This is where Bragg emerges. He was already chief of staff of the army and had exercised command of the Army of the Mississippi when Beauregard was sick or was acting as an army group commander (after Van Dorn's army had come to Corinth). He had received praise for his actions at Shiloh. He had commanded the largest corps of the army there and as a result of his actions, Bragg was made a full general (and thus placed over the other senior commanders, Polk and Hardee). And contrary to Bragg's belief, Davis did not hold a grudge. Up to this point, Bragg had a good military record.
He was a hero from the war in Mexico, his actions in training troops in the Gulf had been highly praised (and these troops were the most disciplined of the Confederate troops to fight at the Battle of Shiloh), and he publicly emerged from Shiloh with a decent combat record (criticisms of his behavior at the Hornet's Nest would not emerge until much later). He had the pedigree and experience for the command.

Cash has already noted that Bragg wasn't as incompetent as it may seem. Bragg actually did pretty well went he started command. He seized the strategic initiative in the theater, saved Chattanooga in 1862, and recovered Middle Tennessee. It his invasion of Kentucky where things start to come apart. Kirby Smith did not cooperate with Bragg and Bragg could not give orders to him unless their armies were together. Polk, who approached orders lackadaisically, refused several orders on the day of Perryville itself. And there was a change in command structure that offended Hardee (who had been acting army commander for a brief period).

Of course, the failure of the Kentucky Campaign came down to several things, including Bragg failing to accurately to guess Buell's intentions (Bragg was consistently poorly served by his cavalry), his split focus between military objectives and political ones. However, Bragg blamed the Kentuckians for the campaign's failure (as they failed to enlist in droves) and this caused a rift between him and that faction's officers.

Various incidents drove the army's command structure apart. A feud with Polk, Hardee openly denigrating Bragg to his staff and junior officers, an incident following the Battle of Stones River where Cheatham fell from his horse and was accused of being drunk led to Cheatham and Bragg falling out, resulting in a rift between Bragg and several of his key subordinates.

Now there were Bragg supporters. Wheeler, Stewart, J.P. Anderson, Bate, and W.H.T. Walker were pro-Bragg. And after Stones River, when Davis first considered replacing him, it came down to one available commander - Joseph Johnston. The discord between Davis and Johnston is well known and Johnston, not wishing to be seen as a usurper, declined to assume command of Bragg's army.

In the second crisis of command after Chickamauga, Davis again had few options. Complicating matters were that Bragg had just won a victory. The only serious options were Johnston and Beauregard. Lee would not leave Virginia, and even if Lee left Virginia, then who would replace Lee in Virginia?

The simple truth of the matter is that the Confederates had only one great army commander, Lee. And Lee could not be everywhere. Which brings us to the crux of your question. What about other field commanders?

Joseph Johnston was the next choice. But Davis and Johnston were barely on speaking terms following Vicksburg. Davis blamed Johnston for losing Vicksburg, and his retreats at Richmond and at Jackson, Mississippi, were troubling considerations for an army that would be defending Atlanta after Chattanooga. And Johnston was a figurehead among the growing anti-Davis political movement in Richmond.

Beauregard was a nonstarter. Returning him to command would be an admission that Davis had made a mistake in replacing him. Like Johnston, Beauregard was an anti-administration figure.

That left local commanders. The senior of which was Longstreet. Longstreet had performed well at Chickamauga but had then made a mess of things elsewhere. He had intrigued against Bragg in favor of Johnston, and his recent performance at Knoxville had been mediocre in the most favorable light. Additionally, Lee was starting to pressure for the return of his best corps commander.

Hardee was the senior subordinate from the Army of Tennessee. Yet he had turned down command of the army before, despite his criticisms of those would assume the responsibility of commanding it.

In the end, it came down to Johnston by default.
 
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One question and one comment. Why did he have such contempt towards the Kentuckians ? I always thought they were excellent soldiers. The Orphan brigade was supposed to be one of the best in the AoT.

One gets the feeling that Bragg felt contempt for all the soldiers in his command...
 
One question and one comment. Why did he have such contempt towards the Kentuckians ? I always thought they were excellent soldiers. The Orphan brigade was supposed to be one of the best in the AoT.

The failure of the Kentucky Campaign. Bragg had been promised by Kentuckians such as Morgan that all Bragg had to do was set up camp in Kentucky and the Bluegrass Staters would trip over themselves to enlist. When this did not happen, it soured Bragg on Kentuckians considerably. And he may have resented the late arrival of Breckinridge's division to his army (too late for the campaign), but that wasn't Breckinridge's fault.
 
I'm adding Hess' book to my list to read. I'm interested especially on how he deals with Bragg's reputation for brutal and unnecessary executions of his own men.

Actually, that's more of media perception and personality. When Bragg assumed command, there was an incident where a soldier was alledgedly executed for shooting a pig on the march. Yet Hess actually finds that Johnston executed more men in the spring of 1864 than Bragg did during his entire tenure.
 
He could have appointed D.H. Hill as a replacement. But, then again, if a sour disposition and matrinet behaviour was the problem, then Hill wouldn't be much of an improvement over Bragg...

D.H. Hill would have been problematic for several reasons. He was only a temporary lieutenant general (Congress had not gotten around to confirming his appointment) and was junior to Polk and Hardee. This is without even going into Hill's poor performance in the Chickamauga Campaign.
 
Davis and Bragg were not friends, at least not at the time of Bragg's appointment to command the Army of Tennessee (called the Army of the Mississippi at the time). Before the war, Davis had been Secretary of War and he undertook a number of initiatives to reform the army, including the army's artillery arm. Bragg, as the most prominent artillery commander to emerge from the Mexican War, disagreed with Davis's reforms. This turned into a squabble. After Bragg was given an unfavorable posting (assigned to the frontier to "chase Indians with six-pounders"), he decided that Davis had it in for him and resigned.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Bragg continued to believe that Davis held a grudge (his wife would tell Sherman so at a dinner before the latter departed northward). Though Bragg was the senior antebellum officer from Louisiana, a young upstart G.T. Beauregard was appointed to the command of Confederate troops before Bragg was commissioned. Furthermore, Beauregard was assigned at the flashpoint of Charleston, while Bragg was posted to the relative backwater of Pensacola.

Following the Shiloh and Corinth Campaigns, Davis was facing a crisis in the west. His main commander in the west, Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead. His western and Tran-Mississippi armies had seen major defeats and he was losing ground rapidly. And now Johnston's successor was Beauregard. Beauregard was already a political opponent of Davis, and he performed a number of actions without having the liberty to do so or to have the courtesy inform Davis of his decisions.

This is where Bragg emerges. He was already chief of staff of the army and had exercised command of the Army of the Mississippi when Beauregard was sick or was acting as an army group commander (after Van Dorn's army had come to Corinth). He had received praise for his actions at Shiloh. He had commanded the largest corps of the army there and as a result of his actions, Bragg was made a full general (and thus placed over the other senior commanders, Polk and Hardee). And contrary to Bragg's belief, Davis did not hold a grudge. Up to this point, Bragg had a good military record.
He was a hero from the war in Mexico, his actions in training troops in the Gulf had been highly praised (and these troops were the most disciplined of the Confederate troops to fight at the Battle of Shiloh), and he publicly emerged from Shiloh with a decent combat record (criticisms of his behavior at the Hornet's Nest would not emerge until much later). He had the pedigree and experience for the command.

Cash has already noted that Bragg wasn't as incompetent as it may seem. Bragg actually did pretty well went he started command. He seized the strategic initiative in the theater, saved Chattanooga in 1862, and recovered Middle Tennessee. It his invasion of Kentucky where things start to come apart. Kirby Smith did not cooperate with Bragg and Bragg could not give orders to him unless their armies were together. Polk, who approached orders lackadaisically, refused several orders on the day of Perryville itself. And there was a change in command structure that offended Hardee (who had been acting army commander for a brief period).

Of course, the failure of the Kentucky Campaign came down to several things, including Bragg failing to accurately to guess Buell's intentions (Bragg was consistently poorly served by his cavalry), his split focus between military objectives and political ones. However, Bragg blamed the Kentuckians for the campaign's failure (as they failed to enlist in droves) and this caused a rift between him and that faction's officers.

Various incidents drove the army's command structure apart. A fued with Polk, Hardee openly denigrating Bragg to his staff and junior officers, an incident following the Battle of Stones River where Cheatham fell from his horse and was accused of being drunk led to Cheatham and Bragg falling out, resulted in a rift between Bragg and several of his key subordinates.

Now there were Bragg supporters. Wheeler, Stewart, J.P. Anderson, Bate, and W.H.T. Walker were pro-Bragg. And after Stones River, when Davis first considered replacing him, it came down to one available commander - Joseph Johnston. The discord between Davis and Johnston is well known and Johnston, not wishing to be seen as a usurper, declined to assume command of Bragg's army.

In the second crisis of command after Chickamauga, Davis again had few options. Complicating matters were that Bragg had just won a victory. The only serious options were Johnston and Beauregard. Lee would not leave Virginia, and even if Lee left Virginia, then who would replace Lee in Virginia?

The simple truth of the matter is that the Confederates had only one great army commander, Lee. And Lee could not be everywhere. Which brings us to the cruxt of your question. What about other field commanders?

Joseph Johnston was the next choice. But Davis and Johnston were barely on speaking terms following Vicksburg. Davis blamed Johnston for losing Vicksburg, and his retreats at Richmond and at Jackson, Mississippi, were troubling considerations for an army that would be defending Atlanta after Chattanooga. And Johnston was a figurehead among the growing ant-Davis political movement in Richmond.

Beauregard was a nonstarter. Returning him to command would be an admission that Davis had made a mistake in replacing him. Like Johnston, Beauregard was an anti-adminstration figure.

That left local commanders. The senior of which was Longstreet. Longstreet had performed well at Chickamauga, but had then made a mess of things elsewhere. He had intrigued against Bragg in favor of Johnston, and his recent performance at Knoxville had been mediorce in the most favorable light. Additionally, Lee was starting to pressure for the return of his best corps commander.

Hardee was the senior subordinate from the Army of Tennessee. Yet he had turned down command of the army before, despite his criticisms of those would assume the responsibility of commanding it.

In the end, it came down to Johnston by default.
Thank you sir, clears up some things for me.
 
After reading more about him I do agree that he was not as bad as some believe but, I also think he could not, or would not get along with his fellow officers. If you don't have the support or the willingness of the people under you then it becomes very hard to accomplish anything. And I also realize that some under him weren't the best material also.
I think this comes from Lee White, Park Ranger at the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park...

James Cooper of the 1st Louisiana Regulars. Cooper wrote from Dalton on December 5th, 1863: "Genl Bragg took leave of us on the 2nd of this month a sad parting to us who have served with him during the whole war. We were attached to him personally, and regret his leaving because notwithstanding the abuse heaped upon him by the press of the country, we are satisfied that his course, though dictated by the patriotism that has characterized his whole career, will prove a serious blow to the country and our cause. We know the difficulties and embarrassments with which the bold hero has had to contend and the self sacrficing devotion with which he has struggled to overcome them; and yet, never turning aside to vindicate his course before a prejudiced people or to repel and expose the slanders of his enemies. Throughout the army I believe his loss severely felt and sincerely regretted."


William J. Bass of the 7th Mississippi
This is from the diary entry for June 15th, 1864.
"The Army visited by General Bragg [as] he passed through our camp to General Walthall's Brigade, a great many followed after him [and] seemed to be anxious to see the face of their old commander. After reaching General Walthall's Brigade, loud cheers were heard for a speech from General Bragg who told them that he was no hand to speak, that the best speech he had ever heard was made by them in front of the enemy with their muskets and it would afford him much pleasure to be with us again on such an occasion. He said that he had been far from us, but he could assure us that we had not been forgotten by him."


Luthor Wyman, Semple's ALA Battery: "Gen. Hardee is at present in command of the army, he is not liked at all by the men. Reports are that Gen. Johnston will take command in a few days with Gen. Bragg as his adjutant general. He will do. A large portion of the army was very sorry to part with Bragg..."


Liet. James Fraser, Co. H, 50th Alabama Infantry would write to Bragg on Dec 2nd, 1863: "Our whole camp is full of sorrow and sadness, for we had learned to love you as a child loves his father, and the thought of being separated from you, and losing perhaps forever your paternal-like care sends pangs most bitter through our insides. Many of us have followed you with gladness from Mobile up to the present, and the longer we remained with you the more we loved you, and the more confidence we had in your skill and ability as a military chieftain, and we always felt sure that while General Bragg commanded no evil could ever befall us. Your old army was never dissatisfied with you…and we love you today better, and can yield a more willing service to your command than we can to any untried leader. But for fear I weary you with the length of my letter, I bid you goodbye for the regiment. We all love you alike. Should you retire from the army entirely, which God forbid, we hope you many find a peace and joy and rest which you so much need, and praying that you may live to see us a free, happy, and independent nation, and that when at last your career on earth shall have ended, you may be received into that heavenly abode, where no vile slanderers are allowed to enter."

Captain John Ellis, 19th LA would write in October of 1863: "Bragg is truly a great man. He metes out justice to the high as well as to the low." Then a few weeks later, "It was an unbending justice Bragg meted out to his generals, his colonels, his captains, and privates alike that brings the ire of officers high in the rank down upon General Bragg. His men love Bragg…His army has been held together, and has been so disciplined and organized by him as to nearly compensate in efficiency what it sadly lacked in numbers. All this is attributable to General Bragg. The papers say he is incompetent. His career and history gives this the lie. They say the army has no confidence in him, but, as I know the men in this army and my acquaintance extends to many brigades including men from every state, I am prepared to pronounce this, like the former, a lie. No army ever had more confidence in its leaders, and Napoleon's guard never followed his eagles more enthusiastically than this ragged army has and will follow the lead of its gaunt, grim chieftain."

QM Sgt. Edward Brown, 45th Ala. Would write on Dec 2nd, 1863:
"I am and always have been a Bragg man and I am sorry to have him leave the army…I guess Longstreet will take command of this army and he may please the people and the army for a while, but I doubt his ability to wield an army like Bragg."

Also look at this:http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ccwrt_history/talks_text/mcwhiney_bragg.html


Kevin Dally
 
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The failure of the Kentucky Campaign. Bragg had been promised by Kentuckians such as Morgan that all Bragg had to do was set up camp in Kentucky and the Bluegrass Staters would trip over themselves to enlist. When this did not happen, it soured Bragg on Kentuckians considerably. And he may have resented the late arrival of Breckinridge's division to his army (too late for the campaign), but that wasn't Breckinridge's fault.
You can't depise men from a whole state for the lack of what some didn't do. He should have been thankful that the ones that did show up were such ferocious fighters and gave their all.
 
That said (and I wholeheartedly agree), one wonders how history would have treated Jackson had he lived and been subjected to the same scrutiny as Bragg.
I've not been a big fan of Bragg (I am of Jackson), but their differences may only have been as you suggest: even though their contests and opponents were different, one won, the other lost.

Winning covers up a whole lot of problems.
 
How about Patrick Cleburne ? The man was a very talented officer, I think he had what it takes. Also very inspiring to his troops.
Cleburne was Commander of a Corps in the Confederate Forces at Jonesboro, GA in Aug/Sept of 64, he didn't fare too well in that capacity.

Kevin Dally
 
That said (and I wholeheartedly agree), one wonders how history would have treated Jackson had he lived and been subjected to the same scrutiny as Bragg.
I've not been a big fan of Bragg (I am of Jackson), but their differences may only have been as you suggest: even though their contests and opponents were different, one won, the other lost.
One died, one lived. I believe that if Jackson hadn't died when he did, his "mettle" would have been severely deflated thru attrition of war. Lee couldn't beat the Federal Army, how can we think a subordinate of his would have done better?

Kevin Dally
 
Bragg did as good as anyone could have given the manpower disparity of the confederacy combined with the large geographic area of responsibility. We see something similar on the eastern front from mid 1943 onward.
 
Bragg did as good as anyone could have given the manpower disparity of the confederacy combined with the large geographic area of responsibility. We see something similar on the eastern front from mid 1943 onward.
Interesting analogy. Bragg had a temporary manpower advantage at Chickumungua. Of course General Hooker changed that.
Leftyhunter
 

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