Big Round top

[mdk220]

hello all,

Would it have been possible for Colonel William Oates to hold Big round Top, Bring up Cannons and
fire down the Union line to Little Round Top?
Oates could see the entire Federal line. He could also see about a half mile away, the summit of Little Round Top, which was about 100 feet lower than where he stood. Unlike the heavily wooded Big Round Top, much of the trees on Little Round Top had been cut down months earlier.
He could plainly see that only a handful of men from the Union Signal Corps were on the hill.

It was the highest point at Gettysburg and close to Taneytown Road -
Did Lee know the significance of Taneytown road as being the supply line for Meade?
If I made any mistakes - please correct them.
thx
mike

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

Immediacy is the best friend of an attacking commander. The sooner one strikes, the less chance reinforcements have to arrive. That means going in with what you have on hand.

Additionally, the hour of Oates' advance means it would have been dark well before artillery could have been located, climbed a steep and unimproved hill, bring up or find enough axes, and clear enough trees to create any kind of field of fire.

 

[rpkennedy]

hello all,

Would it have been possible for Colonel William Oates to hold Big round Top, Bring up Cannons and
fire down the Union line to Little Round Top?
Oates could see the entire Federal line. He could also see about a half mile away, the summit of Little Round Top, which was about 100 feet lower than where he stood. Unlike the heavily wooded Big Round Top, much of the trees on Little Round Top had been cut down months earlier.
He could plainly see that only a handful of men from the Union Signal Corps were on the hill.

It was the highest point at Gettysburg and close to Taneytown Road -
Did Lee know the significance of Taneytown road as being the supply line for Meade?
If I made any mistakes - please correct them.
thx
mike

Oates might have held it for a short time but reinforcements were streaming to the south end of the battlefield so the odds were definitely stacked against the Alabamans. As for artillery, there was no place for cannon to be deployed on BRT until large fields of fire were cleared.

The Taneytown Road was definitely important but was not necessarily critical to the AotP (that would have been the Baltimore Pike, according to Meade). But, again, there were a lot of Yankees on the way so the 15th Alabama all by themselves were not nearly enough to keep the road closed.

Ryan

 

[Silverfox]

From what I have read there was a woods road of sorts to bring up cannon----Oates men fought hard to get there and Oates did not want to give BRT back---He was ordered to leave---which he considered ignoring----remember too that his troops had not had water. The 22 men sent off for water had not returned with canteens----after 25 mile hike and battle up BRT his men were hurting.

 

[infomanpa]

hello all,

Would it have been possible for Colonel William Oates to hold Big round Top, Bring up Cannons and
fire down the Union line to Little Round Top?
Oates could see the entire Federal line. He could also see about a half mile away, the summit of Little Round Top, which was about 100 feet lower than where he stood. Unlike the heavily wooded Big Round Top, much of the trees on Little Round Top had been cut down months earlier.
He could plainly see that only a handful of men from the Union Signal Corps were on the hill.

It was the highest point at Gettysburg and close to Taneytown Road -
Did Lee know the significance of Taneytown road as being the supply line for Meade?
If I made any mistakes - please correct them.
thx
mike

I'm confused. You said that on Big Round Top, "Oates could see the entire Federal line," but then you correctly said that BRT was "heavily wooded." How could Oates have seen the entire Federal line through the trees?

 

[Silverfox]

Just as a side note ---six of the men in Co- G of the 15th Ala. were my wife's relatives.

 

[121st PA Vols]

By all the information we have at hand and it's a tonnage, it would not have been possible to hold BRT. As rpkennedy said, "reinforcements were streaming to the south end of the battlefield." To understand that better, almost the entire right flank of the army was coming to assist Sickles plus most of the 12th corps, evacuating Culp's Hill. Very early on, Syke's 5th Corps (13262 present for duty, 10907 battle strength) was put in motion with Sedgwick's 6th (15697, 13596) behind them just past 2. Then Slocum's 12th corps, 10701 minus Green's brigade of 1541 and Geary's division losing their way. Knowing Vincent's brigade of the 5th corps got to LRT just before being attacked by Law tips you off to the proximity of these units and the speed by which large numbers were in position to defend the area or eject lodgments.

Pioneers could have cleared a field of fire in good time as they did on Culps Hill that was also heavily wooded, doing severe damage to Maj. Lattimer's guns on Benners Hill. That they dragged a battery to the crest of LRT (and Culp's Hill) mostly with ropes and men, says it could be done on BRT without problem.
The problem in most of the CSA assaults was they did not have enough depth. Where they had it with Hood's Division was spent fighting in the Wheatfield, Devils Den and LRT with nothing behind it. Interestingly, Lee had inquired of Ewell the possibility of moving his entire corps to the center and right at the close of Day-1.