Big Mistake

[rhp6033]

In 1861, before the blockade was really in place, Judah Benjamin suggested that the Confederate government buy up all the cotton it possibly could and ship it to Europe, where it could be used as collateral to float government loans in European bond markets. This would have had a significant impact on the subsequent course of the war, since it would have kept inflation at lower rates than actually happened historically. Inflation was as much a cause of the Confederacy's collapse as anything else. The Civil War, like most wars, was won and lost on the bond market just as much as on the battlefield.

I agree, Benjamin's plan made sense. Instead, they were burning cotton at the dockside with the idea that somehow this would create enough of a shortage to compel Britain to intervene. Under Benjamin's plan, the South could have created a cartel in cotton, similar to OPEC, which sold just enough to keep Britain from growing their Indian and Egyption cotton, and made a huge profit to boot.

I was thinking of the Confederacy's economic policies as being a major contributor to their demise. You would have thought that with less than a hundred years between the American Revolution and the Civil War, they might have appreciated the difficulty in financing a war, much less a government, all from scratch. Take a look at the financing the Continental Congress had to use during the American Revolution:

(a) Buying up goods (mostly wheat) and selling it abroad, shipped in the hulls of merchant ships and using the profits to fund the war. This was okay as far as it went, but it was a pittance of the amounts needed to pay and supply an army.

(b) Issuing promissory notes to farmers and others in exchange for supplies, to be paid after the war was over. Of course, once the initial fever of patriotism passed it became harder and harder to find suppliers willing to part with goods in exchange for notes, especially in an inflationary economy.

(c) Issuing bonds to be repaid after the war. The rather meagre interest rates by today's standards didn't compensate for the risk involved, so this limited it's ability to raise money.

(d) Issuing paper currency which quickly devalued as inflation took hold due to shortages.

(e) Allowing the states to compete with the national government in all of these money-raising schemes.

The Confederacy went through exactly the same path, and at just about the same rate, as the Continental Congress did. But the success of the revolution was a very near thing, by the time of the movement from near New York City south to entrap Cornwallis, large portions of the army were threatening to go directly to Congress in a coup to obtain the money owed to the soldiers for years. Only the arrival of French forces, and more importantly large loans in the nature of hard currency in strongboxes, prevented that from occuring as an initial payment on a portion of the debt owed the solders was distributed to them. The Confederacy never had a foreign government willing to shell out large amounts of hard currency to support them.

 

[kevikens]

If the southern states were willing to make concessions on slavery, they would not have any urgent need to secede at all. The United States was willing to let them keep slavery unchanged where it existed; the immediate issue was expansion into the territories. Would Britain in this scenario support the Confederacy seizing US territory in order to expand slavery/serfdom/peonage?

The other big issue was enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, but again, could an independent Confederacy demand, or Britain support, recovery of fugitive slaves from what would now be a separate sovereign nation?

The mistake made was that both Southerners and Northerners had abandoned rationality and were operating on the basis of emotion. Outrage, fueled by indignation and stoked by fire breathing provocateurs, each side thoroughly convinced of its virtuous righteousness. I don't know how those mistakes could have been realistically resolved given the tenor of the times. Sometimes, just sometimes, matters get so out of control it becomes impossible to rein in the zealots.

 

[James N.]

A friend gave me a first edition of Catton's book. It's in beautiful shape and I love books, nevertheless I'm now going to read it. My library consists of only of reading copies -- no matter what the condition!

Like all Catton it's a good read and with hindsight leaves you shaking your head and wondering "What were they thinking!?"

 

[James N.]

I have always thought that the Southern states were in a better position to win their independence in 1861 than the Thirteen Colonies were in 1775. The most glaring difference, and the one that most mattered, was European recognition and the diplomatic failure to obtain that recognition, and the aid that came with it, was the salient difference. Had the Confederacy gotten that assistance I think they would have secured their independence...

I disagree, not with your idea about the Civil War but about the Revolution. What mattered most in a comparison between the two was geography - Simply put the difficulties of conducting an unpopular long-distance war led to disasters like Saratoga and Yorktown; it took at least a month for communication to cross the Atlantic ( west-to-east; even longer in reverse ) making coordination impossible. Compare this with the instant avenues by river and rail into the Confederacy and instant connections by telegraph between Washington and all the major Northern field armies.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I disagree, not with your idea about the Civil War but about the Revolution. What mattered most in a comparison between the two was geography - Simply put the difficulties of conducting an unpopular long-distance war led to disasters like Saratoga and Yorktown; it took at least a month for communication to cross the Atlantic ( west-to-east; even longer in reverse ) making coordination impossible. Compare this with the instant avenues by river and rail into the Confederacy and instant connections by telegraph between Washington and all the major Northern field armies.

Good point. The south(or its leadership, anyway) tended to see their situation, as though it was the same as the American Revolution. Which in philosophical terms may have been, theoretically, relevant, but, in fact, the differences of the geo-polictical and technological realities between the two events,were not adequately understood, thus the lesson's to be learned from the previous revolution were not logically applied.

 

[kevikens]

I disagree, not with your idea about the Civil War but about the Revolution. What mattered most in a comparison between the two was geography - Simply put the difficulties of conducting an unpopular long-distance war led to disasters like Saratoga and Yorktown; it took at least a month for communication to cross the Atlantic ( west-to-east; even longer in reverse ) making coordination impossible. Compare this with the instant avenues by river and rail into the Confederacy and instant connections by telegraph between Washington and all the major Northern field armies.

I wrote what I did about the American Revolution because the Colonial Rebels came very close to losing that war toward the end. looking at the status of the rebellion in 1780, matters were not looking favorable for the Rebels, not at all with mutinies in the ranks, French second thoughts, the collapse of Continental currency and a general feeling among the populace that the best thing that could be done was to come up with some kind of accommodation with the best terms possible. Even Franklin in France was considering this. We tend to think that things got better and better for the American cause as the war went on and that was not true. We came uncomfortably close to losing that war.

So, yes, the problem of distance and its effects on logistics and communications hurt the British but even with those problems they almost pulled it off. Had the North those communications and logistical problems its victory over the South would have been quite difficult, but not impossible. So while distance made it harder for Britain to win it did not preclude the possibility of Britain putting down the rebellion as she almost did. While communications and logistical problems led to Saratoga and Yorktown they did not prevent Long Island and the loss of NYC, Brandywine, Germantown, the capture of Philadelphia, the capture of Savanna, Charlestown, and the catastrophic defeat of the Continentals at Camden. Put another way, despite the distance and logistical problems besetting the British effort, what wrecked British efforts was French money, French arms, French ships and French soldiers. Take those assets away and the other Crown difficulties were potentially quite surmountable as they almost were even with all that French aid. Merci beaucoup, mes bon amis.

 

[1950lemans]

The mistake made was that both Southerners and Northerners had abandoned rationality and were operating on the basis of emotion. Outrage, fueled by indignation and stoked by fire breathing provocateurs, each side thoroughly convinced of its virtuous righteousness. I don't know how those mistakes could have been realistically resolved given the tenor of the times. Sometimes, just sometimes, matters get so out of control it becomes impossible to rein in the zealots.

For more insight along these lines I would recommend:
A Disease of the Public Mind: A New Understanding of Why We Fought the Civil War, Thomas Fleming, 2013.

 

[Elennsar]

Perhaps instead of Montgomery, we should say a more centrally located Confederate capital, which I agree might have supported a more balanced allocation of forces and high-level attention to all theaters. Richmond and Virginia would still have been important for the reasons mentioned. Geography and logistics make a substantial Union effort in the eastern theater almost inevitable, but they would probably not have considered it top priority without the additional lure of the rebel capital.

Of course the location of the Union capital in the front lines near one end of the thousand-mile border had an impact on their deployments.

It being top priority is in the Confederacy's favor. Virginia is a lot more defensible than Tennessee and Mississippi.

And "the West" in 1863 and 1864 (1862 is a bit imbalanced) has comparable troop strength to Virginia. It's how they're used within that, and the woeful lack of support (areas for it to draw supplies from, that is) for the AoT in particular, that shows any unfairness to that hard luck force.

More to the point, a more central location isn't going to make Davis more informed on the situation without the Western commanders keeping him informed. I don't have my copy of Two Great Rebel Armies at my fingertips at the moment, but I really don't get a sense of Bragg and Johnston (either Johnston) keeping Davis as well informed as Lee did. And given the telegraph (or rail), it would not have been particularly hard.

 

[cash]

For more insight along these lines I would recommend:
A Disease of the Public Mind: A New Understanding of Why We Fought the Civil War, Thomas Fleming, 2013.

I haven't read the book, but I heard Fleming speak about it. From what he said, I wouldn't recommend that book to anyone.

 

[Elennsar]

I haven't read the book, but I heard Fleming speak about it. From what he said, I wouldn't recommend that book to anyone.

How so?

 

[cash]

How so?

He has a viewpoint that has been discredited for decades.

 

[Elennsar]

He has a viewpoint that has been discredited for decades.

Oh. One of those writers.

Joy.

 

[1950lemans]

Oh. One of those writers.

Joy.

I believe the "discredited part" is that he believed if it weren't for Northern & Southern agitators (of which he gives examples) maybe the war could have been avoided. Most historians dismiss that idea today. The war was coming anyway you looked - it was coming like the sunrise every morning.

 

[Drew]

In November, 1895, While speaking in Atlanta, Georgia on the subject "The Negro as a Soldier," Medal of Honor winner, Christian A. Fleetwood spoke of what he perceived to be the Confederacy's failure at arming black freemen, and emancipating slaves who would in turn volunteer. Stating it "was not his purpose" to speculate on what might have been, "the immense addition to the Confederate fighting force, the quick recognition of them by Great Britain, to which slavery was the greatest hindrance, and the fact that the heart of the Negro was with south, but for slavery, and one could make the case for a different outcome of the war."

This is one of the best posts I've seen in my time at CivilWarTalk. Thank you, ETR. Wow, just wow.

 

[cash]

I believe the "discredited part" is that he believed if it weren't for Northern & Southern agitators (of which he gives examples) maybe the war could have been avoided. Most historians dismiss that idea today. The war was coming anyway you looked - it was coming like the sunrise every morning.

His "new understanding of the war" would be new if this was 1920.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?313181-1/new-understanding-civil-war

 

[damYankee]

At 4:30 am on April 12, 1861, Capt. James fired a 10" mortar. That was the biggest mistake of the war.

 

[Drew]

At 4:30 am on April 12, 1861, Capt. James fired a 10" mortar. That was the biggest mistake of the war.

DamYankee, you didn't read the directions, in the OP.

Edit: Sheesh, damYankee, not Ned. Whoops.

 

[leftyhunter]

As a beginner, I go (once more) with Gen. Longstreet ... or better with the character of Gen. Longstreet from the film "Gettysburg" who said:
"We should have freed the slaves, then fired on Ft. Sumter".

Then what was the point of starting a CW in the first place?
Leftyhunter

 

[unionblue]

Then what was the point of starting a CW in the first place?
Leftyhunter

"What did we go to war for, if not to protect our property?"

--Robert M. T. Hunter, Senator from Virginia.

 

[FarawayFriend]

Then what was the point of starting a CW in the first place?
Leftyhunter

I'm a bit scared to ignite another fiery discussion, we have had many on that subject already, but I think that state's rights in general or better the neglect of state's rights by a Federal government is a major issue. We should avoid discussing modern politics - but think about the former Soviet Union and the many states which seceded from it and most recently the Ukraine/Krim question. No slaves anywhere - but nevertheless the wish to secede.