Big Mistake

[John Davison]

Were they hoping that someone would come forward and yell, "Wait?"

 

[JeffBrooks]

In 1861, before the blockade was really in place, Judah Benjamin suggested that the Confederate government buy up all the cotton it possibly could and ship it to Europe, where it could be used as collateral to float government loans in European bond markets. This would have had a significant impact on the subsequent course of the war, since it would have kept inflation at lower rates than actually happened historically. Inflation was as much a cause of the Confederacy's collapse as anything else. The Civil War, like most wars, was won and lost on the bond market just as much as on the battlefield.

 

[1950lemans]

I agree with Billy Yank. Had they stayed in Montgomery they would have been in a more centralized location to deal with both the eastern and western areas and perhaps one area would not have suffered at the expense of the other.

Good, good point. Why did they move their capital anyway?

 

[TinCan]

Montgomery was quickly seen by the Confederate leadership as being unsuitable for it's needs. The Confederates needed Virginia and Davis sent Stevens to secure it. Richmond had the second largest foundry in the United States as well as the largest flour mill in the world inside it's city limits, two very important points to consider when picking a capital of a new nation.

 

[Kenneth Almquist]

Good, good point. Why did they move their capital anyway?

An answer appears in the Washington Post. Briefly, Richmond was a fairly major city; Montgomery was not.

 

[1950lemans]

An answer appears in the Washington Post. Briefly, Richmond was a fairly major city; Montgomery was not.

Thanks. I didn't know Montgomery was only a "village"!

 

[Elennsar]

And drawing Federal attention to Virginia, which was favorable ground for the Confederacy to defend, was a good idea.

Meanwhile, the issues with the West would remain - the idea that the West was ignored needs to take into account things like how little (relative to Lee) the Western generals communicated with Davis. Just being in Montgomery wouldn't help with that.

Biggest nonmilitary mistake to me? Terrible railroad policy.

 

[kevikens]

I have always thought that the Southern states were in a better position to win their independence in 1861 than the Thirteen Colonies were in 1775. The most glaring difference, and the one that most mattered, was European recognition and the diplomatic failure to obtain that recognition, and the aid that came with it, was the salient difference. Had the Confederacy gotten that assistance I think they would have secured their independence.

Did the defense of their peculiar institution prevent that recognition? In the case of British aid ( though not necessarily French help), yes. Could the Confederacy have retained the essence of chattel slavery and gotten British assistance? I think so. How? By agreeing to modify the institution into some form of serfdom or peonage at once with limited rights to the enslaved population and a long term agreement to abolish forced labor in the not too distant future.

For the Confederacy to prevail it was essential to have that European recognition and aid. Its unwillingness to think about and discuss or consider any modification of the institution as the necessary price to be paid for the foreign assistance was the greatest blunder the Southern people made once they committed themselves to war.

 

[ole]

From what I've read, Montgomery sucked. The weather and bugs sucked. The availability of housing and hospitality sucked. I was hard to get to and get out of. And then (Jersey, take note), there was the stroking Virginia thing.

 

[ErnieMac]

For the Confederacy to prevail it was essential to have that European recognition and aid. Its unwillingness to think about and discuss or consider any modification of the institution as the necessary price to be paid for the foreign assistance was the greatest blunder the Southern people made once they committed themselves to war.

Had Confederacy been willing to modify slavery and agree to abolish forced labor secession probably would not have occurred.

 

[kevikens]

Yes, indeed, which is why it was a blunder on more than one level.

 

[unionblue]

The inability to compromise.

 

[1SGDan]

The inability to compromise.

I would say the unwillingness to compromise. They had they ability to do so but would not.

 

[unionblue]

I would say the unwillingness to compromise. They had they ability to do so but would not.

1SGDan,

I bow to your logic and clear meaning.

"Unwillingness to compromise" is much more to the point I was trying to make.

Thanks for the assist.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[JeffBrooks]

Appointing James Mason as the representative to the United Kingdom was a pretty stupid mistake. He had about as much business being a diplomat as I would have to be playing in the World Cup.

 

[Carronade]

Did the defense of their peculiar institution prevent that recognition? In the case of British aid ( though not necessarily French help), yes. Could the Confederacy have retained the essence of chattel slavery and gotten British assistance? I think so. How? By agreeing to modify the institution into some form of serfdom or peonage at once with limited rights to the enslaved population and a long term agreement to abolish forced labor in the not too distant future.

If the southern states were willing to make concessions on slavery, they would not have any urgent need to secede at all. The United States was willing to let them keep slavery unchanged where it existed; the immediate issue was expansion into the territories. Would Britain in this scenario support the Confederacy seizing US territory in order to expand slavery/serfdom/peonage?

The other big issue was enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, but again, could an independent Confederacy demand, or Britain support, recovery of fugitive slaves from what would now be a separate sovereign nation?

 

[OpnCoronet]

The biggest non-military mistake of the confederacy i.e., the csa, was to fall for their own propaganda, about the inate superiority of the southern people and culture.

 

[diane]

Listening to the fire-eating secessionists like Yancey. What do you know, the Yankees did want to fight about it. A couple of these rabble-rousers did show up for the war, but the rest tucked tail and hid! Yancey at least was a diplomat for a little, then settled down to being an ankle-biter against Davis.

 

[Carronade]

Perhaps instead of Montgomery, we should say a more centrally located Confederate capital, which I agree might have supported a more balanced allocation of forces and high-level attention to all theaters. Richmond and Virginia would still have been important for the reasons mentioned. Geography and logistics make a substantial Union effort in the eastern theater almost inevitable, but they would probably not have considered it top priority without the additional lure of the rebel capital.

Of course the location of the Union capital in the front lines near one end of the thousand-mile border had an impact on their deployments.

The use of interior lines and especially railroads was critical, and I agree with Elennsar about railroad policy as a crucial non-military mistake. Related but slipping into the military side is the devotion of industrial resources to the production of ironclads, which despite a few spectacular battles made little substantial contribution (although they did contribute three ironclads to the US Navy). The Confederates achieved some of their best successes on the water (Galveston, Plum Point Bend, Indianola) with improvised warships which cost little to equip or operate.

 

[diane]

Perhaps instead of Montgomery, we should say a more centrally located Confederate capital, which I agree might have supported a more balanced allocation of forces and high-level attention to all theaters. Richmond and Virginia would still have been important for the reasons mentioned. Geography and logistics make a substantial Union effort in the eastern theater almost inevitable, but they would probably not have considered it top priority without the additional lure of the rebel capital.

Of course the location of the Union capital in the front lines near one end of the thousand-mile border had an impact on their deployments.

The use of interior lines and especially railroads was critical, and I agree with Elennsar about railroad policy as a crucial non-military mistake. Related but slipping into the military side is the devotion of industrial resources to the production of ironclads, which despite a few spectacular battles made little substantial contribution (although they did contribute three ironclads to the US Navy). The Confederates achieved some of their best successes on the water (Galveston, Plum Point Bend, Indianola) with improvised warships which cost little to equip or operate.

With the railroads, it was a little ironic that as secretary of war Davis wanted the rest of the country to invest in Southern railroads, and to run a railroad through the South and Southwest to southern California. It was mostly the planters who didn't want it!