Beauregard at Atlanta

[Bonnie Prince Charlie]

What if instead of J. E. Johnston commanding the AoT in defense of Atlanta General Beauregard was given command? How might he have differed in his defense of Atlanta from what Johnston did? Could he have been more successful?

Also it's interesting to note that Beauregard wouldn't be available to do his historical Bermuda Hundred Campaign. Perhaps Johnston would be assigned there. Who knows if he could replicate Beauregard's success.

 

[JSylvester]

I am not convinced of Beauregard's abilities to command a large army after his tactical shenanigans at Shiloh. It is probable that he would have sought a decisive battle against Sherman in the beginning of the campaign instead of withdrawing as Johnston did. Due to the numerical disparity I believe it would at best have been a limited sucess with any follow-up being stymied by fresh Union troops. Although not being as reckless as Hood, the AoT would be worn down much earlier than OTL. Any attempt to bottle up Sherman akin to Bermuda Hundred would have been nullified by the latter's tendencies to flank strong positions.

I think Johnston would have been at least as effective against a weak General like Butler as Beauregard at Bermuda Hundred, maybe even decisively defeat a portion of the Federal army.

 

[jackt62]

Beauregard seems to have found a firmer footing as a "defensive" general when faced with fixed positions, notwithstanding his mixed performances in the first year or two of war. From 1863 onwards, his greatest successes were found in the defense of Charleston Harbor, the bottling up of the AotJ at Bermuda Hundred, and the quick witted safeguarding of Petersburg in June 1864. It's hard to speculate the nature of Beauregard as AoT commander instead of Johnston, but from a leadership point of view, Johnston was viewed with great affection by his men. Whether or not Beauregard could have conducted the type of skillful maneuvering that Johnston did in Georgia is also questionable.

 

[Gavrilo Sartorys]

Also it's interesting to note that Beauregard wouldn't be available to do his historical Bermuda Hundred Campaign. Perhaps Johnston would be assigned there. Who knows if he could replicate Beauregard's success.

If Beauregard assumes command of the Army of Tennessee as early as December 1863 (aka when Bragg resigned from command), Johnston might have been let at the head of the Department of the West, controlling technically both Army of Mississippi under Leonidas Polk and Army of Tennessee under Beauregard. The defenses of Petersburg, North Carolina and Southern Virginia can be assumed directly by Braxton Bragg, under the supervision of Davis. Bragg is mostly at his best on training and organizing troops and could therefore manage his command as efficiently as did Beauregard (despite his tactical flaws).

Johnston being so closed of Richmond (and Davis) would be kind of a challenge for Davis. The further he is, the better it is for the harmony of military operations.

So, Johnston can remain in command of his Western Department, leaving Beauregard in charge of tactical operations while Johnston himself is taking charge of both strategic and logistic actions. Johnston is therefore able to move troops from an army to another (Polk's Army of Mississippi, Maury's Army of the Gulf and Beauregard's Army of Tennessee).

But I assume your question was : Could Beauregard perform as well as Johnston at the head of the Army of Tennessee during the Atlanta Campaign ?

And my answer is : Yes, I believe so (at some point).

When Beauregard was resisting against the Union advance towards Corinth during April-May 1862, he handled his army quite well and managed to evacuate his whole command before being assaulted. He shared some of Johnston's defensive traits, especially concerning the mobility of an army in campaign. He may had an offensive spirit at the tactical level but he knew when and where to strike and when and where to flee, considering his chances of success based on information he gathered (for example, sending cavalry units scouting enemy lines and rears). So, this general has potential, and he'll never be worse than Bragg at the head of this army. His popularity, more than his organizational skills, would be his greatest advantage to improve the morale of disheartened soldiers.

One more point : Johnston wanted to change the command structure of the Army of Tennessee as early as January 1864 (O.R. S1-Vol.32, pp. 564-565), before the Atlanta Campaign. He had the First Corps under LTG Hardee and the Second Corps under MG Hindman. Hardee's command had four divisions (Cheatham's, Stevenson's, Cleburne's and Walker's) while Hindman's command was composed of three divisions (Hindman's, Breckinridge's and Stewart's). Johnston asked Cooper several times to create a Third Corps in order to improve the maneuverability of the army, with LTG Hardee commanding three divisions, MG Lovell commanding two divisions and MG Hindman commanding two divisions. I believe Beauregard would organize the army this way, creating three flexible commands rather than keeping two huge formations (Mansfield Lovell being too much criticized for the loss of New Orleans, another general can therefore take his place, either MG Benjamin F. Cheatham, MG Carter L. Stevenson or MG W.H.T. Walker).

*Army of Tennessee : Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard

- First Corps : Lt-Gen. William J. Hardee
- - - Stevenson's Div. : Maj-Gen. Carter L. Stevenson
- - - Cleburne's Div. : Maj-Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne
- - - Walker's Div. : Maj-Gen. W.H.T. Walker

- Second Corps : Maj-Gen. Mansfield Lovell / Maj-Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham
- - - Cheatham's Div. : Maj-Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham / Brig-Gen. George E. Maney
- - - Breckinridge's Div. : Brig-Gen. William B. Bate

- Third Corps : Maj-Gen. Thomas C. Hindman
- - - Hindman's Div. : Brig-Gen. John C. Brown
- - - Stewart's Div. : Maj-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart

A nice "What If", leading to much more questions and consequences than I first thought !

 

[major bill]

I think one of the limitations of any commander of the Army of Tennessee is that a major defeat would be a disaster for the Confederate war effort in the Western Theater. Risking a major defeat was chancy, so only a large battle with a very good chance of victory could be considered. Waiting for just the right conditions saps the offensive spirit of an army. The Confederate army waiting for just the right conditions, played in to the Union strengths.

The commander of the Army of Tennessee also must have realized that the Confederate stratagem was to hold in the west while winning in the east. So any operation had to be aimed at slowing down the Union from winning in the west. Did President Davis expect and commander of the Western Theater to win the war by achieving victories in the Western Theater?

 

[Pat Answer]

The commander of the Army of Tennessee also must have realized that the Confederate stratagem was to hold in the west while winning in the east. ... Did President Davis expect and commander of the Western Theater to win the war by achieving victories in the Western Theater?

Interestingly enough, in early 1864 this was basically the disagreement between Davis (take the war to Sherman immediately) and J Johnston (not without more supplies and troops than I have or am likely to get) on western strategy…

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Always thought Hardee would have made the best choice for command of the Army in the circumstances at the time. Although not ideal, he was generally steady and reliable (his nickname was 'old reliable'), and he exercised a mix of effective offensive and defensive abilities. Hood was too offensive and reckless; Johnston (and also Beauregard, more an engineering officer), was too defensive and cautious.

 

[Luke Freet]

Always thought Hardee would have made the best choice for command of the Army in the circumstances at the time. Although not ideal, he was generally steady and reliable (his nickname was 'old reliable'), and he exercised a mix of effective offensive and defensive abilities. Hood was too offensive and reckless; Johnston (and also Beauregard, more an engineering officer), was too defensive and cautious.

I don't think too highly of Hardee. He is quite unimaginative, and it doesn't seem the man has any sense of initiative. I will admit he had a better organized staff (Hood's staff was second only to Earl Van Dorn's in how terrible it was for a major field army). So I imagine supply and logistics issues experienced later in the campaign wouldn't have been as bad.
The bigger problem is that Sherman had to be repulsed. If his supply line was unmolested, Sherman could cut the railroads and force Hardee to abandon the city (this was his historical strategy). I doubt Hardee would do anything like Bald Hill on his own initiative.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I don't think too highly of Hardee. He is quite unimaginative, and it doesn't seem the man has any sense of initiative. I will admit he had a better organized staff (Hood's staff was second only to Earl Van Dorn's in how terrible it was for a major field army). So I imagine supply and logistics issues experienced later in the campaign wouldn't have been as bad.
The bigger problem is that Sherman had to be repulsed. If his supply line was unmolested, Sherman could cut the railroads and force Hardee to abandon the city (this was his historical strategy). I doubt Hardee would do anything like Bald Hill on his own initiative.

No argument here. In my view, there is no point considering in depth the suitability of Hardee for the highest command, if (with multiple opportunities) he refused or declined to accept the position. I believe that was his consistent stance on the matter.

For me, his unwillingness (for whatever the reason) to accept the responsibilities of Army leadership, makes him clearly unsuitable for the highest command position. Because of this fact alone, there is no need to consider him any further for this role.

At least Hood willingly took on the position with great zeal, even though he was unfit for this command at the time.

I don't know which would have been worse, in terms of consequences for the Confederacy, at this time. Having an Army commander (Hood) who was out of his depth, or a commander (Hardee) whose heart wasn't in it.

 

[jackt62]

don't think too highly of Hardee. He is quite unimaginative, and it doesn't seem the man has any sense of initiative.

That is a good way of putting it. Hardee conjures to mind a safe and reliable (as his nickname goes) product of the old army, whose biggest attribute seems to be as a cheerleader for drill and routine as exemplified by producing a drill manual (mostly translated from the French I believe). Whether effective or not, at least Hood and Johnston had strongly defined sets of military dogma when they led their respective armies. Although as corps and department commanders go, Hardee had many capable moments, as at Stones River and Savannah.

 

[Mark Harden]

I think Beauregard would have had a much better chance of dealing effectively with Sherman than Retreatin' Joe Johnston. During the Corinth advance, Beauregard made very effective moves against Halleck's huge forces, it wasn't just Halleck's slowness. And Beauregard lashed out at Halleck more than Johnston ever did at Sherman.

It's a shame that after Beauregard left his command for health reasons after the evacuation of Corinth without providing notice to Richmond, Davis never again trusted him with an army command. Davis respected his ability enough to give him important positions at Charleston and Petersburg - where Beauregard did well - but he would never trust him with an army again.