Battlefield wounds question....

[George1863]

I am interested in the community's opinions on the proportionate cause of battlefield wounds during the Civil War. I watched an online lecture by Gary Gallagher recently in which he mentioned that, on the basis of records kept by Union surgeons at Spottsylvannia Court House (May, 1864), edged weapons caused a little less than 1% of wounds, artillery rounds caused 10-12% and (obviously) musketry caused the rest. Gallagher suggested that this ratio (or close to it) reflected the wider situation throughout the war. I confess that I was surprised that the proportion caused by artillery was this low, having expected it to be somewhere around 25-30%, as you might find in Napoleonic warfare.

Not having the opportunity to discuss the matter with Professor Gallagher, I would be very grateful for any comment or opinion. As an after-thought, I wondered if surgical records might find it difficult to distinguish between case shot wounds and those inflicted by sidearms - but that's just the idle thought of a novice.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Referring merely to the officially reported treated wound statistics cited above, one can dissect the artillery wounds further (see below), to get some sense of the relative effectiveness of each type of artillery fire during the civil war.

Type of artillery wound total no. % of total (rounded)

Solid shot wound 359 3 %

Shell fragment wound 12,520 89%

Grape, canister wound 1,153 8%

TOTALS 14,032 100%

Think from these counts, one could get a crude indication of the lethal effects of various types of artillery fire on the battlefield, without taking into account non-treated battlefield deaths.

From the above numbers, shell fragments were responsible for inflicting the vast majority of artillery-related battle casualties.

 

[CavRTO]

Referring merely to the officially reported treated wound statistics cited above, one can dissect the artillery wounds further (see below), to get some sense of the relative effectiveness of each type of artillery fire during the civil war.

Type of artillery wound total no. % of total (rounded)

Solid shot wound 359 3 %

Shell fragment wound 12,520 89%

Grape, canister wound 1,153 8%

TOTALS 14,032 100%

Think from these counts, one could get a crude indication of the lethal effects of various types of artillery fire on the battlefield, without taking into account non-treated battlefield deaths.

From the above numbers, shell fragments were responsible for inflicting the vast majority of artillery-related battle casualties.

I'm very surprised at the low casualties caused by grape and canister.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I'm very surprised at the low casualties caused by grape and canister.

So was I, at first look.

Suppose that if the majority of the fighting was conducted at medium to long range, then it's not so surprising.

Also suspect that grape and canister effects would have been found to be proportionally higher, if one could include all of the non-treated battlefield casualties, like killed in action and mortal woundings.

On the other hand, given the magnitude of treated unascertained wounds (42% of total cases), suspect that most of these would be attributable to small arms fire or artillery shrapnel wounds, where it might have been more likely that an assortment of unusual or eccentric projectiles were fired. (Think that standardized balls used in grape and canister, as for solid shot, would have been more readily identifiable in any medical treatment). If this were the case for unascertained wounds, then one might reasonably expect the relative proportions of casualties from small arms fire and artillery shrapnel to be an even higher proportion of the total cases.

 

[George1863]

I think there's a slight anomaly in what the evidence presented in this thread says about the face of Civil War battle, as experienced by a typical infantryman. If we accept that artillery caused around 10% of casualties overall on the basis that many battles were conducted at ranges in excess of 4-500 yards - we may have to revise our opinion of the range at which musketry was exchanged. How could shoulder-arms inflict around 90% of casualties at this range, given that this is at least double of what is typically cited as the effective range of the weapons in use (i.e. 150-200 yards)? One answer could be volume of fire; maybe it took thousands of musket balls even to wound a man. But at 500 yards, say, would they not just be wasting shot?

I have considered for a while that the effective range of typical Civil War shoulder-arms is often understated and ought more to be in the 600-800 yard range, in trained hands and terrain (and smoke) permitting. It is clear from the stats that this was a rifleman's war; but if 200 yards was the typical distance between lines, surely artillery would also wreak havoc?

 

[jepridgen]

I think there's a slight anomaly in what the evidence presented in this thread says about the face of Civil War battle, as experienced by a typical infantryman. If we accept that artillery caused around 10% of casualties overall on the basis that many battles were conducted at ranges in excess of 4-500 yards - we may have to revise our opinion of the range at which musketry was exchanged. How could shoulder-arms inflict around 90% of casualties at this range, given that this is at least double of what is typically cited as the effective range of the weapons in use (i.e. 150-200 yards)? One answer could be volume of fire; maybe it took thousands of musket balls even to wound a man. But at 500 yards, say, would they not just be wasting shot?

I have considered for a while that the effective range of typical Civil War shoulder-arms is often understated and ought more to be in the 600-800 yard range, in trained hands and terrain (and smoke) permitting. It is clear from the stats that this was a rifleman's war; but if 200 yards was the typical distance between lines, surely artillery would also wreak havoc?

It would, but I'd counter the artillery would be behind the infantry lines in most cases. If your guns are 200 yards from an infantry line headed your way, the battery commander would be looking for some support or limbering up to relocate. Exceptions being places that had to be held like Cemetery Ridge, LRT, Shiloh, etc. A line of infantry against cannons only could pick off crew and horses with volley fire just like the 33rd Va. at First Manassas.

 

[George1863]

@jepridgen

I like your line of reasoning and am still absorbing it. Presumably you would accept that sharpshooters were capable of operating at ranges in excess of 200 yards, particularly against artillery teams? There is evidence from the Crimean War that Enfield P1853 volleys could be effective at ranges in excess of 400 yards (even at 800 yards). I can't see why effective range would be halved in the hands of American soldiers more familiar with hunting rifles than a typical recruit to the British army. Length of service and training may be a factor, of course, but you would expect that the American had advantages.

My understanding of artillery deployment within a brigade position is that at various times during the day, it might be behind, adjacent to or in front of its supporting infantry, depending on the state of battle. If you are correct in that it was usually positioned behind supporting infantry, I wonder if this doesn't explain the low proportion of wounds inflicted by grape/canister? Often the guns would be masked by friendly troops which limited fire to high-trajectory missiles such as shell.

 

[jepridgen]

@jepridgen

I like your line of reasoning and am still absorbing it. Presumably you would accept that sharpshooters were capable of operating at ranges in excess of 200 yards, particularly against artillery teams? There is evidence from the Crimean War that Enfield P1853 volleys could be effective at ranges in excess of 400 yards (even at 800 yards). I can't see why effective range would be halved in the hands of American soldiers more familiar with hunting rifles than a typical recruit to the British army. Length of service and training may be a factor, of course, but you would expect that the American had advantages.

My understanding of artillery deployment within a brigade position is that at various times during the day, it might be behind, adjacent to or in front of its supporting infantry, depending on the state of battle. If you are correct in that it was usually positioned behind supporting infantry, I wonder if this doesn't explain the low proportion of wounds inflicted by grape/canister? Often the guns would be masked by friendly troops which limited fire to high-trajectory missiles such as shell.

Depending on the type of support required, it could be in any of those locations. Speaking in generalities, a battery commander would have to start limbering up if his position were in danger of being overrun. There are always exceptions to that like I said above, or the battery could withdraw via prolong and fire as it withdrew to another position. Yes, any cannons not in direct support on a line would have clear fields of fire, but they would have to hold off on canister behind a line of infantry for obvious reasons. That could be a reason for reduced artillery casualties. They'd have to fire shell or case shot over anyone to their front.

Regarding sharpshooters or volley fire, sharpshooters could decimate a battery and did on occasion. The timing just had to be right for the sharpshooters. Effective infantry support discouraged that. Volleys would do the trick as well, but keep in mind most British were regulars. Firing at a deer or squirrel is different when they're firing back. There weren't a lot of regular soldiers during the Civil War. There were also varied levels of weapon quality that might limit effectiveness. It really is just timing. An infantry unit had to catch a battery with just the right lack of support at the right time to get close enough to shoot them down. Conversely, a battery had to be there at the right (or maybe wrong) time to get close in direct fire on an advancing line.

Any other time and you're just shooting a three inch projectile from a few hundred yards hoping your angles are right, or you are walking as fast as you can to close the distance and finish off your attack and scare off the artillery before you are shot to pieces. I suspect the infantry was much more concerned about their foot soldier counterparts than the cannons.

 

[George1863]

@jepridgen

You are doing a very good job of persuading me. Many thanks. I think that I haven't adequately factored in the proportion of guns in a typical brigade (five or six, among 1,200 shoulder-arms). If even 10% of casualties are inflicted by this battery, that's still a hard day's work for the gunners.