Barlow's movement up the knoll

ReveaZapcre

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Mar 27, 2020
On the first day of battle, Francis Barlow moved his division into an impossible position on Barlow's Knoll, whereupon it was overrun on 3 sides and caused the collapse of the XI corp. But what was his motivation? It was a move probably even more suicidal than Sickles' III corp advance. Different sources give different accounts, that Schurz failed to meet Barlow who acted according to orders from Howard, that Barlow was just sickling around, that Schurz/Howard ordered Barlow up the Knoll, and probably most likely, that Barlow misinterpreted Schurz's order to refuse his flank. I think that it the most likely as neither Schurz nor Barlow seem to be individuals who will do a Sickles (Schurz may not have been competent in charge of a corp, especially considering that it was his first time as a substitute for Howard, but certainly he was not prone to taking great risks; he did order to refuse the flank and I doubt he would change it. Barlow's perfomance as a division commander was in general competent, though his relationship with his division was very dysfunctional).
 
On the first day of battle, Francis Barlow moved his division into an impossible position on Barlow's Knoll, whereupon it was overrun on 3 sides and caused the collapse of the XI corp. But what was his motivation? It was a move probably even more suicidal than Sickles' III corp advance. Different sources give different accounts, that Schurz failed to meet Barlow who acted according to orders from Howard, that Barlow was just sickling around, that Schurz/Howard ordered Barlow up the Knoll, and probably most likely, that Barlow misinterpreted Schurz's order to refuse his flank. I think that it the most likely as neither Schurz nor Barlow seem to be individuals who will do a Sickles (Schurz may not have been competent in charge of a corp, especially considering that it was his first time as a substitute for Howard, but certainly he was not prone to taking great risks; he did order to refuse the flank and I doubt he would change it. Barlow's perfomance as a division commander was in general competent, though his relationship with his division was very dysfunctional).
From my readings, Barlow was following Howard's orders to obstruct the Confederate advance to deny him an artillery platform. He saw that the knoll could be that platform and advanced his division. Schurz on the other hand stated that Barlow misunderstood the order.
 
I kinda feel you have something against Schurz. It's possible but I have yet to see much evidence for it while the general consensus seems to be something else.
 
Alright. Will listen when I have the time. Anyone care to give a summary?

The very short summary was that it was a Pfanz-esque interpretation of what occurred. The Barlow's Knoll episode was really just a blow-by-blow of the whos and whats and I haven't had a chance to listen to the Eleventh Corps episode yet.

Ryan
 
Over many years, I've studied in depth Schurz's performance in the Eleventh Corps. I think most of the historians who have commented on him (there aren't that many) haven't done the same. It's fairly easy to catch him telling some real whoppers.
 
After Chancellorsville, Howard appointed Barlow to command of the First Division, Eleventh Corps, for the express purpose of instilling discipline in the unit. Some of the German field officers, particularly Von Gilsa, resisted the effort. From Barlow's perspective, he had plenty of reason to complain about the performance of the Germans.
 
Not a fan of Barlow here. Taking the "artillery platform" left both flanks in the air. Then to blame the "**** Dutch" for the resultant catastrophe...as I said, not a fan.

The thing to remember about Barlow's move was that it wasn't without some logic. If the Confederate threat was coming from the Carlisle Road (Doles was moving his brigade to the east from the vicinity of Oak Hill which Barlow would have clearly seen), taking a position on Blocher's Knoll makes a lot of sense. It forces Doles to face either Barlow to the east or Krzyzanowski to the south and potentially opens Doles' flank to attack. The problem was that Early was also approaching from the northwest along the Harrisburg Road (something that Barlow seems to have been unaware of).

Ryan
 
The movement to the knoll also was not a large advance, a la Sickles on July 2. It was a gradual move which consisted of several phases. At first, skirmishers from Colonel Leopold von Gilsa's Brigade battled against Doles' skirmishers on Blocher's Knoll with the balance of the brigade following, driving the Georgians back. Then 2 sections of Wilkeson's Battery advanced and starting throwing shells at Doles. After that, Brigadier General Adelbert Ames dispatched 4 companies of the 17th Connecticut across Rock Creek along the Harrisburg Road and follows up with the balance of his brigade while the 17th's skirmishers take up a position around the Benner Farm as Early's Division deploys. Unfortunately for Barlow, when Brigadier General John Gordon's Georgians begin advancing, Doles' Brigade also pushed toward Barlow's left. Within just a few minutes, the two Georgia brigades collapse Barlow's line with Barlow himself being shot on the northern slope of Blocher's Knoll, probably within the first few moments of the attack which certainly didn't help the situation.

Of course, it didn't help that Barlow's deployment around the knoll was not great. He created a salient which got hit at roughly the same time on both sides of the line.

Ryan
 
From the podcast, it seems that Barlow misinterpreted Schurz's order (connect with 3rd division and form up the other brigade echelon). Barlow wrote that Schurz's order included "connect with 3rd division" and I believed that if Schurz ordered Barlow up the knoll Barlow would write as such.
 
Alright. Will listen when I have the time. Anyone care to give a summary?

The first part of the Eleventh Corps episode was a history of the units from the organization of Blenker's Division in the autumn of 1861 through the battle of Chancellorsville. I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Ryan
 
The thing to remember about Barlow's move was that it wasn't without some logic. If the Confederate threat was coming from the Carlisle Road (Doles was moving his brigade to the east from the vicinity of Oak Hill which Barlow would have clearly seen), taking a position on Blocher's Knoll makes a lot of sense. It forces Doles to face either Barlow to the east or Krzyzanowski to the south and potentially opens Doles' flank to attack. The problem was that Early was also approaching from the northwest along the Harrisburg Road (something that Barlow seems to have been unaware of).

Ryan
Early was approaching from the northwest? I'm not sure how that jives with how Harrisburg Road approaches the knoll. Perhaps I'm having a directional problem but I thought Early was general moving southwest as he approached this area, meaning he was coming from the northeast. I apologize if I'm missing something obvious.
 
Early was approaching from the northwest? I'm not sure how that jives with how Harrisburg Road approaches the knoll. Perhaps I'm having a directional problem but I thought Early was general moving southwest as he approached this area, meaning he was coming from the northeast. I apologize if I'm missing something obvious.

You are correct. I meant northeast. A "my brain hurts" moment.

Ryan
 

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