Discussion Artillery Service

[MikeyB]

Two questions for the forum about the men in red.

1) If you were in the infantry, you would sign effectively a 2 or 3 year contract with a regiment. How did it work with artillery? Did batteries similarly form together and discharge together?

2) Statistically speaking, did you have a higher percentage of survival if you were an artilleryman versus an infantryman? Let's ignore installations and garrison troops. Maybe more concretely, if you served in the AoP, did the average artilleryman have a greater chance of survival than the average infantryman?

Mike

 

[John Winn]

First off, the tour of duty varied both between the CSA and the US and, in the US, with the year of enlistment (there were six and nine month enlistments toward the end of the war in the US). In the CSA, those still in the ranks eventually had their tours changed such that they were in until the end.

As to the average artilleryman's chances of survival I've not seen any statistics about that but I'd guess they were about the same as the average infantryman's chances. Artillery was somewhat exposed, in a relatively fixed position, and also subject to infantry attack (which is why they were commonly protected on their flanks by infantry). Batteries often engaged in duels with enemy batteries which could be deadly. Everything else was pretty much the same (i.e. regarding provisions and medical care). Also, most field battery personnel walked (i.e. did not ride on the limber or a caisson or a horse) so they marched pretty much like infantry.

That's my take based on a lot of reading (field artillery being a special interest of mine). I'll be interested to see what some of our knowledgeable redlegs members have to say.

 

[Belfoured]

Two questions for the forum about the men in red.

1) If you were in the infantry, you would sign effectively a 2 or 3 year contract with a regiment. How did it work with artillery? Did batteries similarly form together and discharge together?

2) Statistically speaking, did you have a higher percentage of survival if you were an artilleryman versus an infantryman? Let's ignore installations and garrison troops. Maybe more concretely, if you served in the AoP, did the average artilleryman have a greater chance of survival than the average infantryman?

Mike

Regarding item 1, most northern state volunteer artillery batteries/regiments involved similar enlistments as infantry regiments. In fact, there were times when troops enlisted as infantry and were converted to artillery. If I recall correctly, the group that formed the 1st Minnesota Light originally set out to establish an infantry regiment but Gov. Ramsey then decided the state needed a battery so they became an artillery unit instead. It also happened in reverse. A number of these artillery units were enlisted for three-year terms. I'm actually not aware of northern artillery units being enlisted for the short duration (e.g., 9 months) that some northern infantry regiments were, although others may know. There also was a practice of US regular batteries recruiting from State infantry regiments to fill losses. The War Department issued General Order No. 154 after Antietam so that the regular batteries could get back up to strength. In these cases the recruit would serve the remaining term of his enlistment in the battery. I believe this happened with Battery B 4th US (which recruited from the Iron Brigade) and Battery A 4th US (Cushing's battery at Gettysburg), as well as with several others.

 

[Belfoured]

First off, the tour of duty varied both between the CSA and the US and, in the US, with the year of enlistment (there were six and nine month enlistments toward the end of the war in the US). In the CSA, those still in the ranks eventually had their tours changed such that they were in until the end.

As to the average artilleryman's chances of survival I've not seen any statistics about that but I'd guess they were about the same as the average infantryman's chances. Artillery was somewhat exposed, in a relatively fixed position, and also subject to infantry attack (which is why they were commonly protected on their flanks by infantry). Batteries often engaged in duels with enemy batteries which could be deadly. Everything else was pretty much the same (i.e. regarding provisions and medical care). Also, most field battery personnel walked (i.e. did not ride on the limber or a caisson or a horse) so they marched pretty much like infantry.

That's my take based on a lot of reading (field artillery being a special interest of mine). I'll be interested to see what some of our knowledgeable redlegs members have to say.

Like you, I haven't seen any statistical analysis. Battery casualties were always "small" in number because we're referring to what essentially was an infantry company at full strength. I'm not sure how deadly counter battery fire was per se but then the infantry had less to worry about in the way of exploding caissons/limbers and flying "shrapnel" from rocks/fences/trees that were struck. I'm certain about one thing, though - it was deadly work for the poor four-footed "draftees" who did all the pulling.

 

[redbob]

If I remember correctly, if a person enlisted in any branch of the Regular US Army during the Civil War; their term of enlistment was for five years. As the "Regulars" of any branch were often seen as the best troops in the Union Army, they were often placed where the fighting was hottest and their casualty rates reflected this.

 

[Belfoured]

If I remember correctly, if a person enlisted in any branch of the Regular US Army during the Civil War; their term of enlistment was for five years. As the "Regulars" of any branch were often seen as the best troops in the Union Army, they were often placed where the fighting was hottest and their casualty rates reflected this.

Th 5-year year term was certainly the case for the regular artillery regiments and their batteries leading up to the War. As I pointed out, however, the need to fill losses from volunteer infantry regiments during the War led the War Department to allow recruits from those units to serve only the remaining term of their enlistment. The two batteries I mentioned took in quite a few of those guys.

 

[letterreader]

Two questions for the forum about the men in red.

1) If you were in the infantry, you would sign effectively a 2 or 3 year contract with a regiment. How did it work with artillery? Did batteries similarly form together and discharge together?

2) Statistically speaking, did you have a higher percentage of survival if you were an artilleryman versus an infantryman? Let's ignore installations and garrison troops. Maybe more concretely, if you served in the AoP, did the average artilleryman have a greater chance of survival than the average infantryman?

Mike

In addition to some of the other insightful replies here, here are my observations and findings based on limited research but perhaps helpful nevertheless. The survival rate is a good question and i don't think there are any good studies out there now, but the potential to do the statistical analysis should be using some of the new data bases out there on casualties, etc. It gets more difficult to separate casualties through combat as the records of soldiers dying much later because of their wounds is less clear unless you their cross reference all the deaths to lists of casualties from battle. I would agree with one other responder who commented that infantry and artillery units had similar casualty rates, which is different than casualty numbers. You would want to use percentages as most artillery batteries, being four gun units in the Union, were I believe between 120-140 at full strength and obviously much smaller than an infantry regiment. (I'm sure there is an exact no. somewhere.) I think the average artilleryman's chances were, like the average infantryman, more about the luck of the draw and chance than anything. For example, my great-grandfather light artillery battery, the 1st NY Battery B, was organized in September of 1861 and for much of the War, attached to the 2nd Corps who had some of the highest casualty rates for a Corps up through Gettysburg. Had he been in another locale of NY or another state, it might have been different odds. Not unlike the infantry, there seemed to be a reverse reward for those units that were perceived by their commanding officers to be the most effective. They were rewarded with more opportunities! You might also consider boiling your study down to a few units in different Corps and see what you learn. Good questions and good luck.

 

[Belfoured]

In addition to some of the other insightful replies here, here are my observations and findings based on limited research but perhaps helpful nevertheless. The survival rate is a good question and i don't think there are any good studies out there now, but the potential to do the statistical analysis should be using some of the new data bases out there on casualties, etc. It gets more difficult to separate casualties through combat as the records of soldiers dying much later because of their wounds is less clear unless you their cross reference all the deaths to lists of casualties from battle. I would agree with one other responder who commented that infantry and artillery units had similar casualty rates, which is different than casualty numbers. You would want to use percentages as most artillery batteries, being four gun units in the Union, were I believe between 120-140 at full strength and obviously much smaller than an infantry regiment. (I'm sure there is an exact no. somewhere.) I think the average artilleryman's chances were, like the average infantryman, more about the luck of the draw and chance than anything. For example, my great-grandfather light artillery battery, the 1st NY Battery B, was organized in September of 1861 and for much of the War, attached to the 2nd Corps who had some of the highest casualty rates for a Corps up through Gettysburg. Had he been in another locale of NY or another state, it might have been different odds. Not unlike the infantry, there seemed to be a reverse reward for those units that were perceived by their commanding officers to be the most effective. They were rewarded with more opportunities! You might also consider boiling your study down to a few units in different Corps and see what you learn. Good questions and good luck.

Interesting insights. One very minor nit - most (but hardly all) Union batteries were or became 6 guns. But the strengths you note are correct - as I put it, not much different from a full-strength infantry company. In fact, during the War with Mexico and for a time afterwards the accepted term was 'company" and not "battery". One avenue of research you open is whether a battery's position resulted in greater casualties, as I believe it did. Compare the federal batteries at Glendale with the federal batteries the next day at Malvern Hill. I suspect - but don't know - that infantry was more consistently exposed to the type of close range combat that caused greater casualties.

 

[Western Reserve Volunteer]

I think the numbers of guns varied depending on the year of the war, what army you were attached to and how much action the battery saw. I want to say that 4 gun batteries were more common for Western Federals though I might be wrong. A lot of batteries certainly started as 6 gun batteries and wound up a four gun batteries later so make of that what you will.

My thesis would be that in spite of the numbers of casualties being smaller, the rate of casualties in Artillery were higher, for several reasons. One, artillery can be deadly to its own crew at time so there is a lot more casualties due to misfires, ammunition explosions, & ect than in the infantry. Secondly, artillerymen are usually more concentrated on working the gun than defending themselves, and can't so easily take cover like infantry can. So they'd be very exposed generally speaking, and on top of that they would have to face rifle fire because many generals didn't have a good sense of rifle muskets range, as others have said. Being an artillery man can be rewarding but it's also one of the most complex, difficult jobs in the Army's of the day.

There were some really short enlistment artillery units, drawn from militia units. The Cleveland Light Artillery served only 3 months and won two major victories that led to the loss of half of Virginia in the first year of the war.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The most perilous service was the Signal Corps. 10 killed for every man wounded. There really is a here I am please kill me quality about waving a flag on a battlefield.

 

[drezac]

At the start of the war, there were quite an assortment of artillery units that signed up for the 3 month enlistments.

In Cleveland, the Cleveland Light Artillery ( consisting of 6 1-gun batteries, each under command of a Capt.) under Col. Barnett, enlisted for 3 months and served as the 1st Ohio Volunteer Light Artillery ( 3 month enlistment). after 3 months, they were mustered out of service and disbanded. Col Barnett then formed the 3 year 1st Ohio Volunteer Light Artillery. Many of the members of the Cleveland Light Artillery/3 month 1st Ohio later joined the Ohio National Guard when it was formed in 1864 as the 8th Ohio Independent Battery ONG ( which was not the same as the 8th Ohio Independent Battery that served in federal service)


Col. Cotter formed a 2-gun battery and they enlisted for 3 months. at the end of their enlistment, they recruited to a 6 gun strength, re-enlisted for 3 years, and became Battery A, 1st Ohio Volunteer Light Artillery ( which was a 3 year enlistment). At the end of their enlistment, they were offered a 3 week furlough and bonus to re-enlist. a majority did, replacements were recruited for those that did not, and served until the end of the war.

 

[Belfoured]

I think the numbers of guns varied depending on the year of the war, what army you were attached to and how much action the battery saw. I want to say that 4 gun batteries were more common for Western Federals though I might be wrong. A lot of batteries certainly started as 6 gun batteries and wound up a four gun batteries later so make of that what you will.

My thesis would be that in spite of the numbers of casualties being smaller, the rate of casualties in Artillery were higher, for several reasons. One, artillery can be deadly to its own crew at time so there is a lot more casualties due to misfires, ammunition explosions, & ect than in the infantry. Secondly, artillerymen are usually more concentrated on working the gun than defending themselves, and can't so easily take cover like infantry can. So they'd be very exposed generally speaking, and on top of that they would have to face rifle fire because many generals didn't have a good sense of rifle muskets range, as others have said. Being an artillery man can be rewarding but it's also one of the most complex, difficult jobs in the Army's of the day.

There were some really short enlistment artillery units, drawn from militia units. The Cleveland Light Artillery served only 3 months and won two major victories that led to the loss of half of Virginia in the first year of the war.

I think you're correct about batteries in the western theater. And then there was the change negotiated by Grant and Hunt after the Wilderness. While the prescribed battery size was 6 guns, in exchange for keeping the reserve Hunt agreed to reduce standard battery size to 4 guns. By the time Grant crossed the James, the Army of the Potomac's field artillery war completely changed anyway, to a siege operation. As an aside, the federal gunners in the west generally had to get in line for the standard production types/calibers, so for a good while they had a more varied mix.

 

[Belfoured]

The most perilous service was the Signal Corps. 10 killed for every man wounded. There really is a here I am please kill me quality about waving a flag on a battlefield.

Interesting. I doubt many people know this.

 

[Rhea Cole]

In 1841, the U.S. Army fielded the first homegrown artillery. The 1841 model 6 pound cannon & 12 pound howitzer were significantly lighter than the cast iron guns that were the previous standard.

The standard battery consisted of a section (4 guns) of flat trajectory cannon & a section of howitzers that would lob exploding shells. By the start of the Civil War, rifled cannon were introduced. At Stones River, Parson's Battery of four rifles & four howitzers anchored the Union line. Parson's fired almost 2,000 rounds that day.

In this image, the battery commander in the upper left, ordered,"fire by piece from the left, fire!" From that position, he could observe the fall of shot & make adjustments accordingly. You can see the cannoneers reloading their pieces. Firing in sequence like this meant that a continuous fire could be maintained. The battery never fired in a volley (all at once) because that would left the battery vulnerable & made it all but impossible to observe the fall of shot.

(In this photo, the left gun of the section nearest the camera had experienced a misfire. The number one of that gun (me) has not moved to sponge the piece. A misfire was a common occurrence during the war & still happens these days. The gunner calls, "Do not advance, the primer has failed!.... Re-prime the piece!" During the war, they re-primed almost immediately. We are a little more circumspect & wait a bit.)

At Stones River, Rosecrans' 14th Army Corps, soon to be the Army of the Cumberland, had an artillery menagerie. Six pound smoothbores, 12 pound howitzers, Wiard rifles, 3" rifles, 2.9" Parrott rifles, James rifles & Rifled James & 12 pound cannon/howitzers all used unique ammunition. Needless to say, attempting to resupply the right battery with the right ammunition during combat was a recipe for chaos.

Gibbon's Battery C & G Fair Oaks VA June 1862. Library of Congress

This image of Gibbon's Battery illustrates just how complex an artillery battery was. Each gun is accompanied by a caisson/ammunition carrier. Not shown in this image, the traveling forge, battery wagon & supply wagons that served the battery. Reducing this mob down to four guns made it far more maneuverable.

Lessons were being learned. Eight guns when deployed in battery was about the size of a football playing field. Rosecrans reduced the battery to two sections of three & homogenized them. It would take a while, but the goal was to have batteries consist of 12 pound Napoleon cannon/howitzers or 3" rifles. In time, the rough mountainous country in which the AoC operated & experience resulted in a half battery of 4 guns to become the best solution. An 8 gun battery in column was a mile long, halving that was obviously going to be more nimble.

In the latter stages of the war, a section of two guns became common. Here is where terminology gets a bit difficult. A battery still consisted of eight guns. The 4 gun & 2 gun units were still part of the battery. As a generic term, battery also refers to any line of guns of 2 or more, which can be a bit confusing. When it became necessary, the various elements of the battery could coalesce & line up with other batteries to form a large battery of as many guns as were needed.

Needless to say, there were any number of variables. The Chicago Board of Trade Battery salvaged an abandoned cannon & overnight refurbished it during the Battle of Stones River. So, it became a nine gun battery. Eli Lilly's Battery that was assigned to Wilder's Lightening Brigade had four 3" rifles & 4 12" mountain howitzers known as the Jackass Battery.

As with all things Army of the Potomac, things were a bit more ponderous back east. Their small area of operation & other operational factors resulted in a different deployment of artillery than the Army of the Cumberland & Sherman's army group. I will leave that topic to someone who studies that part of the war.

 

[Belfoured]

In 1841, the U.S. Army fielded the first homegrown artillery. The 1841 model 6 pound cannon & 12 pound howitzer were significantly lighter than the cast iron guns that were the previous standard.

View attachment 345368

The standard battery consisted of a section (4 guns) of flat trajectory cannon & a section of howitzers that would lob exploding shells. By the start of the Civil War, rifled cannon were introduced. At Stones River, Parson's Battery of four rifles & four howitzers anchored the Union line. Parson's fired almost 2,000 rounds that day.

View attachment 345370

In this image, the battery commander in the upper left, ordered,"fire by piece from the left, fire!" From that position, he could observe the fall of shot & make adjustments accordingly. You can see the cannoneers reloading their pieces. Firing in sequence like this meant that a continuous fire could be maintained. The battery never fired in a volley (all at once) because that would left the battery vulnerable & made it all but impossible to observe the fall of shot.

(In this photo, the left gun of the section nearest the camera had experienced a misfire. The number one of that gun (me) has not moved to sponge the piece. A misfire was a common occurrence during the war & still happens these days. The gunner calls, "Do not advance, the primer has failed!.... Re-prime the piece!" During the war, they re-primed almost immediately. We are a little more circumspect & wait a bit.)

At Stones River, Rosecrans' 14th Army Corps, soon to be the Army of the Cumberland, had an artillery menagerie. Six pound smoothbores, 12 pound howitzers, Wiard rifles, 3" rifles, 2.9" Parrott rifles, James rifles & Rifled James & 12 pound cannon/howitzers all used unique ammunition. Needless to say, attempting to resupply the right battery with the right ammunition during combat was a recipe for chaos.

Lessons were being learned. Eight guns when deployed in battery was about the size of a football playing field. Rosecrans reduced the battery to two sections of three & homogenized them. It would take a while, but the goal was to have batteries consist of 12 pound Napoleon cannon/howitzers or 3" rifles. In time, the rough mountainous country in which the AoC operated & experience resulted in a half battery of 4 guns to become the best solution. An 8 gun battery in column was a mile long, halving that was obviously going to be more nimble.

View attachment 345372

In the latter stages of the war, a section of two guns became common. Here is where terminology gets a bit difficult. A battery still consisted of eight guns. The 4 gun & 2 gun units were still part of the battery. As a generic term, battery also refers to any line of guns of 2 or more, which can be a bit confusing. When it became necessary, the various elements of the battery could coalesce & line up with other batteries to form a large battery of as many guns as were needed.

Needless to say, there were any number of variables. The Chicago Board of Trade Battery salvaged an abandoned cannon & overnight refurbished it during the Battle of Stones River. So, it became a nine gun battery. Eli Lilly's Battery that was assigned to Wilder's Lightening Brigade had four 3" rifles & 4 12" mountain howitzers known as the Jackass Battery.

As with all things Army of the Potomac, things were a bit more ponderous back east. Their small area of operation & other operational factors resulted in a different deployment of artillery than the Army of the Cumberland & Sherman's army group. I will leave that topic to someone who studies that part of the war.

A good point for surveying the A of the P is Gettysburg. The overwhelming majority of batteries were 6 rather than 4 guns. An even larger majority were uniform caliber/type. As noted, the inability to effectively use the Reserve at the Wilderness caused Grant to decide to eliminate it. Hunt resisted and negotiated the standard battery size down to 4 guns instead. The 1861 Instructions presumed a battery of 6 pieces, although recognixzing it could be 6 or 8. The manual designated the section as containing 2 pieces. As a practical matter the establishment leading up to the War was the 6-gun battery fiielding 4 M1841 6 lbers and 2 M1841 12 lb howitzers. That quickly changed with ramped up prodiction of the M1857 gun-howitzer, the 10 lb Parrott, and the 3-inch Ordnance Rifle. But, again, much of the initial production benefited the A of the Potomac, so the westeners had a longer quest for unifornoty.

 

[Western Reserve Volunteer]

It should be pointed out that the M1841 weapons family was not the first "homegrown artillery" of the US Army. They were the culmination of decades of experimentation with casting techniques, materials, and design of cannons.

The first family of standard artillery weapons that compares well to the 1841 family would be the pattern of 1819 which spawned many new designs, 6 pdr guns, 24 pdr siege guns, and 24 pdr howitzers being among them.


I'm working on a artillery profile that covers several varieties of Iron 6pdrs starting with the Model 1819 that you can see in my avatar. Keep your eye out for it!

 

[Rhea Cole]

A good point for surveying the A of the P is Gettysburg. The overwhelming majority of batteries were 6 rather than 4 guns. An even larger majority were uniform caliber/type. As noted, the inability to effectively use the Reserve at the Wilderness caused Grant to decide to eliminate it. Hunt resisted and negotiated the standard battery size down to 4 guns instead. The 1861 Instructions presumed a battery of 6 pieces, although recognixzing it could be 6 or 8. The manual designated the section as containing 2 pieces. As a practical matter the establishment leading up to the War was the 6-gun battery fiielding 4 M1841 6 lbers and 2 M1841 12 lb howitzers. That quickly changed with ramped up prodiction of the M1857 gun-howitzer, the 10 lb Parrott, and the 3-inch Ordnance Rifle. But, again, much of the initial production benefited the A of the Potomac, so the westeners had a longer quest for unifornoty.

I am surprised that so many 6 pound cannon survived the war. Melting down three of them salvaged enough very valuable metal to cast 2 Napoleons. Mr. Newton's laws being what they are, a 12 pounder is exponentially more powerful than a 6. That is quite a trade, same number of horses, same number of men, huge increase in hitting power. If that isn't a win/win scenario, I don't know what is.

One of the four original 1841 model six pound smoothbore cannon on the square in Franklin TN. There were six pounders at Ft. Negley, Fortress Rosecrans, Ft Defiance & other backwater installations. I assume that explains their survival.

In this image taken of Battery Mitchell in Fortress Rosecrans Murfreesboro TN, a Model 1841 show glancing blow to the wheel & a corresponding dink in the gun barrel. In the background is one of the homegrown experiments that has been pointed out. It appears to be a 70 pound field howitzer. Either that or it is a prop from Buster Keaton's The General.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Two questions for the forum about the men in red.

1) If you were in the infantry, you would sign effectively a 2 or 3 year contract with a regiment. How did it work with artillery? Did batteries similarly form together and discharge together?

2) Statistically speaking, did you have a higher percentage of survival if you were an artilleryman versus an infantryman? Let's ignore installations and garrison troops. Maybe more concretely, if you served in the AoP, did the average artilleryman have a greater chance of survival than the average infantryman?

Mike

Like anything else, it depended on where you were assigned & what you were doing. The heavy seacoast artillery in the forts along the eastern seaboard never fired a shot in anger, as far as I know. The artillerymen assigned to Fort Negley in Nashville, with the exception for a sojourn to Moccasin Point in Chattanooga, served out the war w/o any war wounds or KIA. Parson's battery, on the other hand, lost all its guns & most of its men when unseen Confederate infantry came boiling out of a ravine & over ran them. In this case, I don't think there is an average artillerist that makes statistical sense.

 

[byron ed]

1) As an artilleryman you enlisted with the army for whatever term of service you enlisted for. That you mustered in as, or were assigned to, Artillery is just an aside.

2) As field artillery your battery was assigned to campaign with Infantry (or in the case of flying artillery with Cavalry) on the same battlefields at the same time unless held in reserve (with Infantry or cavalry) in a less exposed position. If emplaced on the front line you could be shot first, along with the ranks on the front line. So nothing in particular would ensure a higher or lower percentage of survival for field artillery over Infantry or cavalry. But as mentioned earlier, if you were emplaced behind works, especially heavy artillery in permanent works, that increased your chances of survival. Imagine what those heavy artillerists converted to Infantry thought about that ("Mother, today we were issued muskets and left to march to battle"). The Army was the army, not much you could do about it.

Beyond that, there's a mountain of work needed to compare casualty figures between all CW units with artillery North and South to come up with a general percentage of survival. Perhaps someone has spent a couple years compiling that; I'd like to see it, so good question.

 

[Cavalier]

I just happen to have the 1986 edition of Busey & Martin at my bedside, (flu), and of course we are referring to Gettysburg here. It gives the highest percentage of loss to a Union battery as 31%. Whereas there are 54 Union infantry regiments with losses of over 50%. These are losses from all causes, killed, wounded, missing/captured. The highest total loss in a Union battery was 38.

My impression has always been that infantry fighting in the line of battle, two ranks, shoulder to shoulder files, were more prone to individual casualties then artillery with gun crews manning guns spaced 14 or so yards apart.

Given what I have read I would say your survival chances were better in the artillery.I

John