Artillery at Gettysburg

[121st PA Vols]

In a general way, yes. The proposition is certainly accurate - as @rpkennedy and I have posted, that would occur on any black powder battlefield after a relatively brief period with a large number of guns firing. Any meaningful breeze would help with that. I avoid predictions about "a different outcome" and - personal opinion only - I wish folks who are imparting their knowledge to others would avoid those statements. There are far too many factors involved to get from "A" to "Z".

The barrage was of such duration with such an inordinate number of guns firing at the same time that battle smoke never had a chance to clear regardless of any breeze or humidity.

 

[gc45]

ebrowne; thanks for he clairification.

 

[Quaama]

Also the sentence "they had more units in reserve and plenty of ammunition" is not totally true. Huntington went to the Artillery reserve to see if there were any reserve batteries to bring up. There were none. The ammunition on Cemetery Hill was low. There would have been plenty at the Reserve but not readily available.

The Union had plenty of artillery ammunition and so did the Confederates [more on them later]. @redbob said they [the Union?] had "plenty of ammunition" and they did. As this article explains:
"Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long distance firing."

As the 'crossfire diagram' (originally appeared in Issue 18 of the Gettysburg Magazine) also shows, Hunt has positioned his artillery far better. Once the Confederates began to march towards the Union, the Federal guns began to start firing again. It would have been hell on earth with shells coming from multiple directions.

The Confederacy did have some problems with artillery ammunition. They had plenty of it overall, they would have had about 24,000 rounds remaining post Gettysburg, as this official report shows. However, as the linked article says, the issue for the CSA was that not enough rounds had been brought up to the guns, and it would have taken at least an hour to bring more up.
I doubt the CSA artillery was inaccurate as they were mostly experienced crews. There was some problems with fuses but I don't think it was a significant factor.
The main problem with the CSA artillery and the subsequent failure of Pickett's Charge was that Pendleton was out-generaled by Hunt. Hunt deceived the CSA with silenced guns and then made them pay a heavy price with his clever positioning of guns when they started firing again.
The CSA needed a few more men in the assault too. As it was, they got close. Another 5-6,000 men could have made all the difference.

 

[Tom Elmore]

"Post Gettysburg," artillery ammunition was conveyed to Lee's army while it was in position near Hagerstown before it recrossed the Potomac. By the late afternoon of July 3, the supply in the reserve ordnance train was "getting low," according to the officer in charge, who informed Sergeant Major Coupland Page (Pendleton's man) that at the current rate of expenditure they would not be able to meet the demand for another full day's battle. In addition, some ammunition that was still in the train was for siege guns that did not exist in Lee's army, which means someone in the ordnance department hierarchy had made a mistake.

I think the only Confederate guns that still had plenty of ammunition were the shorter range 12-pounder howitzers that had remained largely idle through the battle. There were nine of those in the First Corps, none in the Second Corps, and fifteen in the Third Corps.

 

[Joe Whitworth]

Lee needed more Whitworths