Artillery at Gettysburg

[Hoplite]

Was just re-reading Gottfried's Artillery of Gettysburg after some years. I really struck me in this re-read of the immense superiority of the Union artillery and how it probably saved the AOP. Of course the disorganization and terrible decisions of the ANV did not help. He made it clear on numerous occasions that the ANV artillery commanders (and corps command) dropped the ball. I was particularly struck by Hunt's comments that had the Confederate artillery been concentrated on the point of attack on July 3rd , it would have been different, but they were disjointed and firing everywhere.

 

[Tom Elmore]

The Confederates did place a considerable amount of fire along their objective, although it was not a point but rather a front of about half a mile. In addition, they attempted to suppress Federal batteries located on either side of that front, from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. Meanwhile, Union infantry benefitted from many stone walls that provided good cover and concealment. Once the duel began, smoke often obscured the view and accuracy was no longer possible except perhaps against enemy cannon discharges that would reveal their position.

I would agree on the overall superiority of the Union artillery arm, but would not say it was immense. Most of the Confederate guns had been previously captured from the Federals, including a substantial number taken at the beginning of the campaign from Milroy at Winchester. Artillery pieces were more effective as range decreased, and because the Confederates did most of the attacking, often over open ground, it played into Union hands in terms of overall artillery effectiveness.

 

[mwalker6043]

The fuses used by the Confederates also played a role in their lack of concentration. In March 1863 the laboratory at Brown's Island Arsenal in Richmond suffered an explosion that destroyed the building, killing more than 40, mostly women and girls.
By Gettysburg they were using fuses that were made elsewhere. The new fuses were inconsistent, and many burned at a slower rate than the Richmond fuses. Which resulted in a lot of over shots landing beyond their intended targets.
General Pendleton was definitely not as effective of an ordinance officer as General Hunt. Pendleton was behind on the times. He graduated West Point in 1830 with Joseph Johnston and Jefferson Davis. He left the Army in 1833, became a minister and teacher. He enlisted in 1861. Joseph Johnston promoted him to Chief of Artillery. Lee tried to remove him, but failed because Pendleton was a close friend of Jefferson Davis. He not as familiar with modern weapons and tactics. Many of his battalion and battery commanders made up some of his short comings but not enough.

 

[rpkennedy]

The Confederates did place a considerable amount of fire along their objective, although it was not a point but rather a front of about half a mile. In addition, they attempted to suppress Federal batteries located on either side of that front, from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. Meanwhile, Union infantry benefitted from many stone walls that provided good cover and concealment. Once the duel began, smoke often obscured the view and accuracy was no longer possible except perhaps against enemy cannon discharges that would reveal their position.

I would agree on the overall superiority of the Union artillery arm, but would not say it was immense. Most of the Confederate guns had been previously captured from the Federals, including a substantial number taken at the beginning of the campaign from Milroy at Winchester. Artillery pieces were more effective as range decreased, and because the Confederates did most of the attacking, often over open ground, it played into Union hands in terms of overall artillery effectiveness.

I think a lot of the superiority of the Federal arm was in its professionalization. The organization had a ton of experience at the top and that filtered down to the individual batteries. Plus, it also helped that the AotP had a number of excellent citizen-soldiers who ended up commanding artillery brigades (Charles Wainwright, Thomas Osborn, Augustus Martin, Freeman McGilvery, and Charles H. Tompkins).

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Personally, I think some of the inaccuracy of the Confederate bombardment is somewhat overstated. While I agree that it didn't accomplish what Lee expected of it, the bombardment did severely batter the batteries along Cemetery Ridge. Lee's goal was probably beyond the capabilities of the Confederate artillery and there were a lot of overshots, I wouldn't have wanted to be a member of Cushings or Brown's batteries.

Ryan

 

[redbob]

This diagram should show you everything you need to know about Union Artillery coverage of the field at Gettysburg. Plus, they had more units in reserve and plenty of ammunition.

 

[eBrowne]

If this map depicts the Union artillery during Pickett's Charge, it contains some inaccuracies. Probably best to view the map as the range that the Union batteries could cover.

 

[Belfoured]

The fuses used by the Confederates also played a role in their lack of concentration. In March 1863 the laboratory at Brown's Island Arsenal in Richmond suffered an explosion that destroyed the building, killing more than 40, mostly women and girls.
By Gettysburg they were using fuses that were made elsewhere. The new fuses were inconsistent, and many burned at a slower rate than the Richmond fuses. Which resulted in a lot of over shots landing beyond their intended targets.
General Pendleton was definitely not as effective of an ordinance officer as General Hunt. Pendleton was behind on the times. He graduated West Point in 1830 with Joseph Johnston and Jefferson Davis. He left the Army in 1833, became a minister and teacher. He enlisted in 1861. Joseph Johnston promoted him to Chief of Artillery. Lee tried to remove him, but failed because Pendleton was a close friend of Jefferson Davis. He not as familiar with modern weapons and tactics. Many of his battalion and battery commanders made up some of his short comings but not enough.

I have never actually seen Lt. Dinwiddie's report to Gorgas regarding his inspection of paper fuzes from the different manufacturing facilities, although much has been made of its apparent findings about the variable burn rates. I suspect that the problems at Gettysburg - and at other battles - were due to multiple factors. One of the reasons for relying on paper fuzes may have been the manufacturing defects in the Confederate Bormanns.

 

[Scott1967]

I really struck me in this re-read of the immense superiority of the Union artillery and how it probably saved the AOP.

Erm no , Nothing saved the AoP they basically outfought their opponent by choosing good ground and having amazing interior lines , Bobby Lee didn't lose the battle because of his decision's he was beaten by a determined Union army under George Meade.

 

[Belfoured]

Personally, I think some of the inaccuracy of the Confederate bombardment is somewhat overstated. While I agree that it didn't accomplish what Lee expected of it, the bombardment did severely batter the batteries along Cemetery Ridge. Lee's goal was probably beyond the capabilities of the Confederate artillery and there were a lot of overshots, I wouldn't have wanted to be a member of Cushings or Brown's batteries.

Ryan

I agree. And, as I pointed out above, I've never seen the actual Dinwiddie report on the altered paper fuze burn times, but that has become a major "explanation" for the alleged inadequacy/overshots during the bombardment. For example, overshots can also result from inaccurate estimates of distance using the table of fire, etc.

 

[Belfoured]

Erm no , Nothing saved the AoP they basically outfought their opponent by choosing good ground and having amazing interior lines , Bobby Lee didn't lose the battle because of his decision's he was beaten by a determined Union army under George Meade.

I'd echo that. I'm very much an "artillery guy" but - to paraphrase Pickett's alleged quote a little - I always thought the Yankee infantry had something to do with it.

 

[rpkennedy]

I agree. And, as I pointed out above, I've never seen the actual Dinwiddie report on the altered paper fuze burn times, but that has become a major "explanation" for the alleged inadequacy/overshots during the bombardment. For example, overshots can also result from inaccurate estimates of distance using the table of fire, etc.

IIRC, the report indicated that the new fuses were burning just a hair slower than the other batches but it's been a good while since I read it. That may account for some of the overshots but something that I think was far more relevant was the smoke obscuring the fields of vision. After the first few shots, some of the guns began firing over Cemetery Ridge and, IMO, that had more to do with no longer being able to clearly see their targets.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

IIRC, the report indicated that the new fuses were burning just a hair slower than the other batches but it's been a good while since I read it. That may account for some of the overshots but something that I think was far more relevant was the smoke obscuring the fields of vision. After the first few shots, some of the guns began firing over Cemetery Ridge and, IMO, that had more to do with no longer being able to clearly see their targets.

Ryan

Agree. That's why I referred to possible errors in determining distance. In an era of direct fire, a black powder battlefield could become challenging in a hurry.

 

[6thMichCav]

A little sidebar on fuses. If a shell at some point of its flight is traveling, say, 800 feet per second (I'm just guessing at a mid-trajectory velocity), a half-second fuse error will cause an intended impact/burst error of 400 feet. Even a tenth of a second of a fuse error could have saved lives by an over or under shot error of 80 feet.

If my guess is wrong, please correct my math and assumptions accordingly.

 

[Belfoured]

A little sidebar on fuses. If a shell at some point of its flight is traveling, say, 800 feet per second (I'm just guessing at a mid-trajectory velocity), a half-second fuse error will cause an intended impact/burst error of 400 feet. Even a tenth of a second of a fuse error could have saved lives by an over or under shot error of 80 feet.

If my guess is wrong, please correct my math and assumptions accordingly.

The general concept is accurate. Small "timing" errors result in significant distance errors. The specifics would be in the table of fire - always keeping in mind that this is 19th century technology.

 

[LCYingling3rd]

Years ago I had a Park Service guide (I do not recall who) explain the impact that weather had on the cannonade. He said the stillness of the air and humidity caused the smoke from the Confederate cannon to linger along the Union front line, totally obscuring the designated target after about fifteen minutes of firing. He said that the remaining hour and a half or so of firing was essentially firing blind - which is another reason it was not as effective. He even said that a windy day would probably have led to a different outcome!

Has anyone else heard that?

 

[Belfoured]

Years ago I had a Park Service guide (I do not recall who) explain the impact that weather had on the cannonade. He said the stillness of the air and humidity caused the smoke from the Confederate cannon to linger along the Union front line, totally obscuring the designated target after about fifteen minutes of firing. He said that the remaining hour and a half or so of firing was essentially firing blind - which is another reason it was not as effective. He even said that a windy day would probably have led to a different outcome!

Has anyone else heard that?

In a general way, yes. The proposition is certainly accurate - as @rpkennedy and I have posted, that would occur on any black powder battlefield after a relatively brief period with a large number of guns firing. Any meaningful breeze would help with that. I avoid predictions about "a different outcome" and - personal opinion only - I wish folks who are imparting their knowledge to others would avoid those statements. There are far too many factors involved to get from "A" to "Z".

 

[gc45]

Liked Redbob's map of artillery and if accurate looks to me confederate soldiers were taking it from several directions where the union not so much; so what then are the inaccracies ebrowne is referring to? I doubt anyone would want to be along the Emmettsburg road or past that point on this day. No question both sides took a beating, the union just had more of everything on cemetary hill. Bobby lee may have lost this one, but I for one, think him a great general and had he lead the Union from the start the war may have been over much sooner. He had to know he was fighting a loosing battle but staying true to his roots gets my praise!

 

[eBrowne]

If this map is during Pickett's Charge then Hill's Battery was not there. It had withdrawn during the cannonade. Norton's Battery should be depicted probably where McCartney's battery is shown. Norton's battery was firing during the Charge. Rickett's Pa F&G was nowhere near where depicted on the map. Part of his battery was rolled a short distance somewhere over by Stewart's battery. McCartney's battery came onto Cemetery Hill shortly after the conclusion of the Charge. That battery probably should not be depicted.

 

[eBrowne]

Also the sentence "they had more units in reserve and plenty of ammunition" is not totally true. Huntington went to the Artillery reserve to see if there were any reserve batteries to bring up. There were none. The ammunition on Cemetery Hill was low. There would have been plenty at the Reserve but not readily available.