ANV Command issues at Sharpsburg

[Hoplite]

In reading Hartwig (excellent book by the way) he makes it a point over and over again to address the command issues of the ANV. In particular the disjointed command structure. I understand that Lee had divided the army into five parts, but it was together (mostly) for the battle. I am perplexed as well by the seeming lack of much influence by Jackson, Longstreet and even Lee, not to mention the pretty poor performance by DH Hill. At times when it was called for by lower levels of command, there seemed to be no direction and no real guidance. The ANV officer corps was decimated by the time of and during the battle, with men who should not have been in charge, in command. That would seem to my uneducated self to mean that higher command should have taken a more strong hand.

I had always assumed that Sharpsburg (and the results) was a classic slow, cautious McClellan vs an on his game Lee, but now I am beginning to question that assumption. Sure McClellan can be faulted many times over, but he performed up to par- up to his level of command. To me, not so much for the ANV.

 

[rupert822]

I just finished the last chapter on the battle proper, and I agree with you it is excellent, and that he does point out a fair few ANV command issues. It seems like he goes more into the Union high command decisions during the battle than Confederate. That seemed odd to me at first since To Antietam Creek is pretty heavy on what the Confederate high command was up to. I suppose it makes sense that he would concentrate on the aggressor driving the action in each case. I do think it is worth pointing out that both Jackson and D. H. Hill had less than usual to command (Jackson with Hill on the road from Harper's Ferry and Early's Brigade with Stuart to start, and D.H. Hill with a large portion of his division dead, wounded or straggling after South Mountain.) As for Lee, the buck stopped with him and he made sure McClaws and A.P. Hill hit hard at the two moments of greatest jeopardy for his army (not to mention the continued dividends paid by his decision to restore Hood to command a few days earlier).

Not sure if it is coincidence or not, but I seem to remember the Confederate Congress passed a law allowing the formation of Corps almost concurrently with Antietam.

 

[Bruce Vail]

..."poor performance by DH Hill"...

I'd be interested in what Hartwig's specific criticism is?

 

[TallTallMan]

I've always wondered if some of the errors made in battles were the faults of orderlies screwing up their messages. What if Sandie told Hood or Hill wrong?

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I've always wondered if some of the errors made in battles were the faults of orderlies screwing up their messages.

Thought that's a pertinent point raised, generally speaking.

Can recall reading Civil War instances where a commander's verbally issued field orders were conveyed via orderlies/couriers during the heat and chaos of battle, and somehow the intended message got misinterpreted or misunderstood by receiving subordinates, with detrimental effects. But were any misinterpretations/misunderstandings of such carried directions more often than not, the fault of the person charged with transmitting it?

It's not difficult to comprehend that the content of verbal directions relayed via intermediaries (like orderlies and couriers) on the battlefield could get transmitted incorrectly. While it seems less plausible that the entire gist of the message was communicated wrongly, it's certainly more believable that particular words, or even phrases, within the intended communication got erroneously used/substituted, or were omitted, in the announcement to the targeted receiver. It was not just the content, but the paraverbals (e.g. voice tone) of the spoken message, that could be important too. Perhaps an excited or exhausted messenger's voice tone, which emphasized the wrong parts in reiterated instructions, might have influenced a receiver to misinterpret or misunderstand the order originator's intention in the message – that is, it's just not what you say, but how you say it, that matters.

Undoubtedly, there would have been improperly conveyed verbal orders that occurred in battle which had a material effect on troop unit movements and cost consequential unnecessary casualties.

The risks of distortion occurring in issued verbal orders were increased where third parties (other than senders and receivers) were involved to carry the communications. These risks would have been magnified further when the communication was conveyed in the turmoil and pressures of battlefield conditions.

But in many instances it might be unfair, as well as difficult, to apportion too much of the blame on the orderlies/couriers who relayed these verbal messages, where a commander's intentions were later found to have been improperly followed. Thought that often the issuer and/or receiver of the message must bear some responsibility - either by not making their intentions clear enough in the direction or for their own misinterpretations of what was meant by the direction transmitted. In this regard, am reminded of the frequent use of the words 'if practicable' found in written directions, that was sometimes subject to misinterpretation/misunderstanding during the war. Was the issuer or the receiver to blame in these circumstances?

Maybe someone could dig up some blatant examples of where messengers wrongly relayed commander's verbal orders to subordinates, which had material adverse consequences.

 

[Cavalier]

Not civil war but it seems like it might apply, the famous error,(?), that led to the Charge of the Light Brigade.

John

 

[GilbertFarney]

In reading Hartwig (excellent book by the way) he makes it a point over and over again to address the command issues of the ANV. In particular the disjointed command structure. I understand that Lee had divided the army into five parts, but it was together (mostly) for the battle. I am perplexed as well by the seeming lack of much influence by Jackson, Longstreet and even Lee, not to mention the pretty poor performance by DH Hill. At times when it was called for by lower levels of command, there seemed to be no direction and no real guidance. The ANV officer corps was decimated by the time of and during the battle, with men who should not have been in charge, in command. That would seem to my uneducated self to mean that higher command should have taken a more strong hand.

I had always assumed that Sharpsburg (and the results) was a classic slow, cautious McClellan vs an on his game Lee, but now I am beginning to question that assumption. Sure McClellan can be faulted many times over, but he performed up to par- up to his level of command. To me, not so much for the ANV.

In C7 of Their Maryland, I make the case that Lee was extraordinarily active on the field for this early in the war. It is Lee who sends for the reinforcements when they are needed and who shifts the troops. Once those men make it to their designated position, the local commanders take control of their placement. For example:

• Lee sends for McLaws to reinforce D. H. Hill at the northern end of the field. The Hill-Hood-Jackson line collapses before McLaws can come up, however, so McLaws ends up attacking the Federals in the West Woods. Hood positions McLaws' men when they come up, too, not Jackson.
• Lee sends George T. Anderson to Jackson after a request for reinforcements from Sandie Pendleton. Pendleton requested the troops for Hood before Hood's retreat, so those troops arrive late as well and are used in the West Woods counterstroke.
• Lee later calls John Walker's division from the right flank to support Jackson on the left. Jackson positions Walker when he arrives.
• Lee sends for R. H. Anderson's division to reinforce Hill's position in the Sunken Road. Longstreet sends those men in when Anderson arrives.
• Lee orders A.P. Hill to consult with D.R. Jones on the right concerning where his division should go in. Jones is the one who directs Hill to approach via the Miller's Sawmill Road.

The structure of the ANV is in flux at this point and is likely the cause of the command confusion. The divisions of D.H. Hill, R.H. Anderson, and even the brigade of Shanks Evans are unattached commands. Lee himself generally has more of an influence commanding those units than Jackson or Longstreet, although there are exceptions.