Antietam

[Saphroneth]

Yes, that would get McClellan a battle at Winchester if Lee wants one, and I'm sure he did. Lee even invited a battle at Winchester with the excuse of returning a bunch of wagons and other stuff at Winchester or another place "if you occupy Winchester" (paraphrasing here). This was in early October, I believe the 2nd.

It could be a bluff, but of course it also could not be. Interesting to think about.

As of that point I think Lee's army is reporting about 58,000 men PFD (albeit by Confederate definitions) if you add in Stuart's cavalry; McClellan is reporting about 99,000 PFD by Union definitions, so about 5:3 odds. It's one of those situations where I could see Lee believing the force ratio would let him "take" McClellan (as Lee had after all beaten Pope quite handily) while McClellan might also believe the force ratio would let him take Lee.
Devil's in the details, though - McClellan's main body is about 53,000 infantry (directed at Jackson with 23,500) and 5th and 6th Corps are about 40,000 (directed at Longstreet with 28,500).
Be interesting to wargame!

Well, I might replace outspoken with prominent. His GO 163 was not a ringing endorsement of Lincoln's EP.

Is it necessary for him to ringingly endorse the Emancipation Proclamation? I don't contest that he disagreed with it, and indeed many did - Lincoln himself admitted that it wasn't as popular as he'd hoped - but he reminded the army that their job was not politics.

What about Pleasanton's cavalry?

3,000-4,000 sabres? (Their horse artillery was heavily engaged, though by my definition I would indeed consider them "fresh").
I wouldn't rate them highly as a blocking force, especially not when Lee has more cavalry on the field.

 

[67th Tigers]

What about Pleasanton's cavalry?

Pleasanton had 6 regiments with him, and probably about 2,500 sabres, organised thus:

• Averell's Brigade, under Col. Childs (then Rush, vice Childs KIA)
  • 5th United States (Capt. Whiting)
  • 4th Pennsylvania (Lt Col Kerr, vice Col Childs, brigadier)
  • 6th Pennsylvania (9 coys) (Col Rush, then Lt Col Smith vice Rush, to brigadier)
• Pleasanton's Own Brigade, under Col. Farnsworth
  • 8th Illinois (Maj Medill, vice Col Farnsworth, brigadier)
  • 3rd Indiana (Maj Chapman)
  • 1st Massachusetts (Col Williams)
• Horse Artilley
  • Battery A, 2nd US Artillery (Capt Tidball, 6 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery B&L, 2nd US Artillery (Capt Robinson, 4 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery M(-), 2nd US Artillery (Lt Hains, 4 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery C&G(-), 3rd US Artillery (Capt Gibson, 4 Ordnance Rifles, section with 6th US Cavalry by elimination)

Lee actually had considerably more cavalry on the field; something like 4,500 sabres under Stuart.

 

[Jantzen64]

It could be a bluff, but of course it also could not be. Interesting to think about.

As of that point I think Lee's army is reporting about 58,000 men PFD (albeit by Confederate definitions) if you add in Stuart's cavalry; McClellan is reporting about 99,000 PFD by Union definitions, so about 5:3 odds. It's one of those situations where I could see Lee believing the force ratio would let him "take" McClellan (as Lee had after all beaten Pope quite handily) while McClellan might also believe the force ratio would let him take Lee.
Devil's in the details, though - McClellan's main body is about 53,000 infantry (directed at Jackson with 23,500) and 5th and 6th Corps are about 40,000 (directed at Longstreet with 28,500).
Be interesting to wargame!


Is it necessary for him to ringingly endorse the Emancipation Proclamation? I don't contest that he disagreed with it, and indeed many did - Lincoln himself admitted that it wasn't as popular as he'd hoped - but he reminded the army that their job was not politics.


3,000-4,000 sabres? (Their horse artillery was heavily engaged, though by my definition I would indeed consider them "fresh").
I wouldn't rate them highly as a blocking force, especially not when Lee has more cavalry on the field.

Loved the idea of wargaming this, Saphroneth!

 

[John S. Carter]

I think the troops were in better condition than many of the Corp commanders. Burnside was a wreck, although he would dispute that. Sumner, well, he was old and too flustered to have continued in command of anything. Besides that his 2nd Corp had suffered the largest amount of casualties. Hancock would have been counted on to pursue an offensive as well as Franklyn's 6th Corp. There was Porter's 5th Corp, Humphrey's 8 regiments (7 of which were new and inexperienced) could have been used as a reserve if needed. Plus there was Pleasanton's cavalry. Lee was in worse condition and I believe McClellan had enough forces available to bottle up Lee between Antietam Creek and the Potomac if Mac had handled his troops properly.

I disagree that any CSA force could have just "walked into Washington" after the battle. There was a small pursuit of cavalry but it fizzled out and Beauregard's and Johnston's forces were spent.

McClellan's biggest problem was that he was an outspoken antagonist of the administration's policy and thought he should be directing policy. This didn't go well with the Lincoln administration and many of the very influential Radical Republicans that ran the Congressional Committee for the Conduct of the War.

Could it be stated that while Grant lost more men than any other Union commander that the fact that he did two things that the other commanders did not do ,He brought victories and he never was critical of the administration and he never was belligerent towards Lincoln as Mc dId.As for the losses Grant commanded the Union forces longer and into more battles than the others.

 

[Saphroneth]

Could it be stated that while Grant lost more men than any other Union commander that the fact that he did two things that the other commanders did not do ,He brought victories and he never was critical of the administration and he never was belligerent towards Lincoln as Mc dId.As for the losses Grant commanded the Union forces longer and into more battles than the others.

I'd take exception with the idea that Grant brought victories and other commanders did not. How do you define "victories" in this sense?

If you define victories as tactical, then Grant doesn't actually bring any (except arguably Wilderness, where he gets hit hard but Lee's out of position to block him) during the 1864 part of his tenure as top Union commander, while if you define victories in a more operational sense (so Spotsylvania counts, and so does North Anna) he's not the only one who brought them.


As for criticism of the administration, do you mean public or private? McClellan was never to my knowledge publicly critical of the administration, after all, though there was certainly private conversation.

 

[John S. Carter]

I think the troops were in better condition than many of the Corp commanders. Burnside was a wreck, although he would dispute that. Sumner, well, he was old and too flustered to have continued in command of anything. Besides that his 2nd Corp had suffered the largest amount of casualties. Hancock would have been counted on to pursue an offensive as well as Franklyn's 6th Corp. There was Porter's 5th Corp, Humphrey's 8 regiments (7 of which were new and inexperienced) could have been used as a reserve if needed. Plus there was Pleasanton's cavalry. Lee was in worse condition and I believe McClellan had enough forces available to bottle up Lee between Antietam Creek and the Potomac if Mac had handled his troops properly.

I disagree that any CSA force could have just "walked into Washington" after the battle. There was a small pursuit of cavalry but it fizzled out and Beauregard's and Johnston's forces were spent.

McClellan's biggest problem was that he was an outspoken antagonist of the administration's policy and thought he should be directing policy. This didn't go well with the Lincoln administration and many of the very influential Radical Republicans that ran the Congressional Committee for the Conduct of the War.

If Mc would not had been an antagonist toward Lincoln and the administration ,would he have maintained command of the army?Then as far as Congress ,Mc was a Democrat and not against slavery so the pressure came from Mc military performance and from the political front .Mc was as the ancient saying he was his own worse foe,,,,his error was not being able to see it just as with Custer

 

[Mango Hill]

As of that point I think Lee's army is reporting about 58,000 men PFD (albeit by Confederate definitions) if you add in Stuart's cavalry; McClellan is reporting about 99,000 PFD by Union definitions, so about 5:3 odds. It's one of those situations where I could see Lee believing the force ratio would let him "take" McClellan (as Lee had after all beaten Pope quite handily) while McClellan might also believe the force ratio would let him take Lee.
Devil's in the details, though - McClellan's main body is about 53,000 infantry (directed at Jackson with 23,500) and 5th and 6th Corps are about 40,000 (directed at Longstreet with 28,500).
Be interesting to wargame!

Taking into account that McClellan still stuck to the belief that Lee had a larger force than his at Antietam months after the battle (97,000) that force ratio might need a little tweaking for a wargame.

 

[Saphroneth]

If Mc would not had been an antagonist toward Lincoln and the administration ,would he have maintained command of the army?Then as far as Congress ,Mc was a Democrat and not against slavery so the pressure came from Mc military performance and from the political front .Mc was as the ancient saying he was his own worse foe,,,,his error was not being able to see it just as with Custer

Based on how elements of Lincoln's administration had been attempting to cause McClellan to fail (preferring a failed campaign to McClellan succeeding) as early as March 1862, and how in September/October 1862 Lincoln described McClellan as "too useful to sacrifice", I think it's McClellan's military performance that meant he stayed in command of the army as long as he did.

That McClellan was a Democrat is of course true, but so was about half the United States adult population; that he was not against slavery is not true, because if someone actually reads the Harrisons Landing letter it is plain as day that McClellan is giving a blueprint for a way to end slavery in the Union.
I rather think that McClellan did know he was at political risk, he could hardly have failed to realize it when Lincoln wrote him a letter in March basically saying "I had to detach a division from your army because the political arguments for it were too strong, but that's the last division you'll lose" and then in April he lost three more of them. McClellan does appear to be less than fully cognizant of how strong the political pressures are on Lincoln which make it hard to retain McClellan in command, and I believe he was politically naive in another way - on at least one occasion he seems to prefer trying to do things "through proper channels" when the problems he is currently experiencing result from someone deliberately trying to make everything go wrong for him such that proper channels will not work.

 

[Saphroneth]

Taking into account that McClellan still stuck to the belief that Lee had a larger force than his at Antietam months after the battle (97,000) that force ratio might need a little tweaking for a wargame.

So?* He still attacked - what McClellan knows as of September 30 is:

"I was willing to attack at Antietam, and I did a lot of damage to Lee." (His estimate of the damage he did is actually somewhat higher than the truth.)
"My enemy has not been significantly reinforced." (McClellan's estimate of the troops which were with Lee were basically that Lee had brought everything he could bring, so there were no reinforcements to bring in.)
"I have been significantly reinforced." (McClellan's army with which he initiated battle on the 17th was, as far as he was concerned, 87,000 strong - he now has an army about 100,000 strong. Functionally this means he's had all the Antietam casualties made good plus he has his whole force with him, so he's become stronger since the 17th.)

This means therefore that McClellan must believe the force ratio is better than it was at Antietam. It's simply logically impossible for it not to be. And he gave it a good go at Antietam, so he'd be willing to do the same now.


* What McClellan actually thought Lee had at Antietam is hard to disentangle; I tend to the view that that 97,000 estimate is actually the "reasonable worst case" estimate, the "what if Lee brought everything he had available", and that McClellan's view of how big Lee's army was was a range of probabilities for which that was the upper limit.

 

[Mango Hill]

Is it necessary for him to ringingly endorse the Emancipation Proclamation? I don't contest that he disagreed with it, and indeed many did - Lincoln himself admitted that it wasn't as popular as he'd hoped - but he reminded the army that their job was not politics.

Yes! Why would McClellan even address the issue unless it was for a political purpose? Neither Grant or Buell found a need to make some sort of announcement to their respective armies. I'll quote from Sears Young Napoleon:

"In the face of this unanimous counsel, (McClellan had asked for advice on how to react to the EP from several of his Generals; and had received advice from the Blair's and other prominent people; italics mine.) he finally abandoned the idea of abandoning the proclamation publicly and instead issued a general order to the army explaining that it was every soldier's duty to obey the acts of the government. 'Discussions by officers & soldiers concerning public measures....when carried at all beyond temperate and respectful expressions of opinion,' he wrote, substituted 'the spirit of political faction' for the higher duty of respect and support for the civil authority. The only legitimate remedy for political error was at the ballot box."

It should be no secret that the political error McClellan was referring to was the EP.

 

[Mango Hill]

3,000-4,000 sabres? (Their horse artillery was heavily engaged, though by my definition I would indeed consider them "fresh").
I wouldn't rate them highly as a blocking force, especially not when Lee has more cavalry on the field.

4,300 according to Sears Young Napoleon p. 333 Now I'm in a wargaming mode. What if Couch had been sent to Boteler's Ford instead of in support of Franklyn? Add that to the mix and A. P. Hill would have had a hard time saving Lee's bacon.

 

[Saphroneth]

4,300 according to Sears Young Napoleon p. 333 Now I'm in a wargaming mode. What if Couch had been sent to Boteler's Ford instead of in support of Franklyn? Add that to the mix and A. P. Hill would have had a hard time saving Lee's bacon.

If you mean Couch should have been sent to go there by crossing the Burnside Bridge on the 18th, AP Hill is in the way; if you mean he should have been sent to go there by going along the south side of the Potomac on the 17th, AP Hill left Thomas' brigade to prevent any Union troops from crossing at Harpers Ferry.

If you mean something else please clarify.

And frankly at this point I'd barely trust Sears to tell me when the sun rose during the campaign - he's been caught outright fabricating information on more than one occasion. The 4,300 number is what McClellan gave his cavalry strength as, but it's PFD strength and includes some units which weren't at the battle itself; 67th has given effective strength.

 

[Mango Hill]

Pleasanton had 6 regiments with him, and probably about 2,500 sabres, organised thus:

• Averell's Brigade, under Col. Childs (then Rush, vice Childs KIA)
  • 5th United States (Capt. Whiting)
  • 4th Pennsylvania (Lt Col Kerr, vice Col Childs, brigadier)
  • 6th Pennsylvania (9 coys) (Col Rush, then Lt Col Smith vice Rush, to brigadier)
• Pleasanton's Own Brigade, under Col. Farnsworth
  • 8th Illinois (Maj Medill, vice Col Farnsworth, brigadier)
  • 3rd Indiana (Maj Chapman)
  • 1st Massachusetts (Col Williams)
• Horse Artilley
  • Battery A, 2nd US Artillery (Capt Tidball, 6 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery B&L, 2nd US Artillery (Capt Robinson, 4 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery M(-), 2nd US Artillery (Lt Hains, 4 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery C&G(-), 3rd US Artillery (Capt Gibson, 4 Ordnance Rifles, section with 6th US Cavalry by elimination)

Lee actually had considerably more cavalry on the field; something like 4,500 sabres under Stuart.

According to the Official Records as stated in Battles & Leaders Vol. II p. 600;

Cavalry Division, BG Alfred Pleasonton,

First Brigade, Maj. Charles Whitting
Cpt. Joseph H. McArthur 5th U. S.
Cpt. William P. Sanders 6th U. S.

Second Brigade, Col. John F. Farnsworth
Maj. William H. Medill 8th Ill
Maj. George H. Chapman 3rd Ind.
Cpt. C. Crowninshield 1st Mass.
Cpt. Peter Keenan 8th PA

Third Brigade, Col. Richard H. Rush
Col James H. Childs (KIA) 4th PA
Lt. Col. James K. Kerr
Lt. Col. C. Ross-Smith 6th PA

Fourth Brigade, Col. Andrew T. McReynolds
Maj. Alonzo W. Adams 1st NY
Maj. James A. Congdon 12th PA

Fifth Brigade Col. Benjamin F. Davis (escaped from HF along with 12th Ill)
"" "" 8th NY
Lt. Col. Samuel W. Owen 3rd PA

Unattached Col. William J. Palmer 15th PA (detachment)

no cavalry artillery given.

Although counting by regiments does not give a number for troops it should be of some guide as to strength both "Grimes" Davis 8th NY and Voss 12th Ill had between 1,200 and 1,300 at HF according to two sources, Sears being one.

 

[Saphroneth]

It should be no secret that the political error McClellan was referring to was the EP.

Since it had happened so recently, yes, any mention of political error would be referring to that. What McClellan is actually doing however is not saying that it was a political error - he's saying, effectively, "if you think there's been some kind of political error, the remedy is the ballot box".

It's the equivalent of saying "if you think he's made a mistake, vote him out". That phrasing does not automatically mean you think that a mistake has been made, it just means that you're achnowledging that some people you're speaking to think a mistake has been made (which is only reality).

Remember that there was serious paranoia (and discussion) at different times among various people during the war that a general would set himself up as a dictator - hardly an irrational fear with Napoleon within living memory. This is a period of serious dissention in the country when the President has done something which people disapprove of - in the forthcoming midterms he'll lose his majority and only hang on to a working congressional caucus due to the "War Democrats" - and McClellan, the person who would be the active part of any such "set up a dictator" movements, has basically said "no, if you disagree then vote".

 

[Saphroneth]

According to the Official Records as stated in Battles & Leaders Vol. II p. 600;

As 67th has researched recently, the ORs don't reflect the situation actually at Antietam. For example McReynolds' brigade (at the time the 1st NY, 8th PA and 2 battalions of the 12th PA) was off doing a recce towards Gettysburg and was not available on the 17th.

 

[Mango Hill]

Could it be stated that while Grant lost more men than any other Union commander that the fact that he did two things that the other commanders did not do ,He brought victories and he never was critical of the administration and he never was belligerent towards Lincoln as Mc dId.As for the losses Grant commanded the Union forces longer and into more battles than the others.

Yeah! That little weasel actually entertained the idea of toppling Old Abe with HIS army. BTW, add Thomas and Sherman to the list of commanders who were probably opposed to the EP but knew that their job was to bring victories and leave policy to the elected CIC.

 

[Mango Hill]

Based on how elements of Lincoln's administration had been attempting to cause McClellan to fail (preferring a failed campaign to McClellan succeeding) as early as March 1862, and how in September/October 1862 Lincoln described McClellan as "too useful to sacrifice", I think it's McClellan's military performance that meant he stayed in command of the army as long as he did.

That McClellan was a Democrat is of course true, but so was about half the United States adult population; that he was not against slavery is not true, because if someone actually reads the Harrisons Landing letter it is plain as day that McClellan is giving a blueprint for a way to end slavery in the Union.
I rather think that McClellan did know he was at political risk, he could hardly have failed to realize it when Lincoln wrote him a letter in March basically saying "I had to detach a division from your army because the political arguments for it were too strong, but that's the last division you'll lose" and then in April he lost three more of them. McClellan does appear to be less than fully cognizant of how strong the political pressures are on Lincoln which make it hard to retain McClellan in command, and I believe he was politically naive in another way - on at least one occasion he seems to prefer trying to do things "through proper channels" when the problems he is currently experiencing result from someone deliberately trying to make everything go wrong for him such that proper channels will not work.

McClellan's blueprint was for the gradual extinction of slavery and for protecting said property. It's in the Harrison Landing letter.

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan's blueprint was for the gradual extinction of slavery and for protecting said property. It's in the Harrison Landing letter.

Well, "gradual" is relative; he explicitly suggested the mass emancipation of every slave in a state at once, after all.
He's suggesting doing it pretty quick, too, since he's talking about doing it during the war or at least on grounds of military necessity:

The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

I think what's interesting about it is that McClellan, the army man, suggested a legalistic way of eliminating slavery, while Lincoln the lawyer opted for using the army to do it.

 

[Mango Hill]

So?* He still attacked - what McClellan knows as of September 30 is:

"I was willing to attack at Antietam, and I did a lot of damage to Lee." (His estimate of the damage he did is actually somewhat higher than the truth.)
"My enemy has not been significantly reinforced." (McClellan's estimate of the troops which were with Lee were basically that Lee had brought everything he could bring, so there were no reinforcements to bring in.)
"I have been significantly reinforced." (McClellan's army with which he initiated battle on the 17th was, as far as he was concerned, 87,000 strong - he now has an army about 100,000 strong. Functionally this means he's had all the Antietam casualties made good plus he has his whole force with him, so he's become stronger since the 17th.)

This means therefore that McClellan must believe the force ratio is better than it was at Antietam. It's simply logically impossible for it not to be. And he gave it a good go at Antietam, so he'd be willing to do the same now.


* What McClellan actually thought Lee had at Antietam is hard to disentangle; I tend to the view that that 97,000 estimate is actually the "reasonable worst case" estimate, the "what if Lee brought everything he had available", and that McClellan's view of how big Lee's army was was a range of probabilities for which that was the upper limit.

Spaghetti post are discouraged so I'll address your points as individually the best I can.

When Mac was shown SO 191 he saw that Lee's army was separated and rightly so decided to try to attack it's smallest force which was Longstreet with his biggest force. The right thing to do. After the victories at South Mt. he headed towards Boonsboro believing that Longstreet was still there. I forgot how he ended up meeting Lee at Sharpsburg but he ended up there as Longstreet was not at Boonesboro. Mac didn't know that Miles would surrender on the morning of the 15th for he hoped to rescue the HF garrison with Franklyn and Couch's division. Once Mac reaches Sharpsburg and sees that Lee is not retreating, what other option does he have but to attack?

As to giving it another go? He wasted a month and 10 days before he set out on his brilliant campaign to cut off Jackson. It's too bad he didn't get an opportunity to continue the campaign. All the time before setting out on the 3BR Campaign he spent complaining about everything from lack of shoes to lack of horses. He also didn't think much of the 15 or so regiments he had been reinforced with. Felt they need training, which was probably true.

As to McClellan's numbers and Lee's forces he was getting really bad intelligence from Pleasonton and from Penn. governor Curtin. The sad thing is he was an engineer and an experienced army commander so he should have known how many troops a really long supply route can actually supply a given number of troops.

 

[Saphroneth]

Spaghetti post are discouraged so I'll address your points as individually the best I can.

When Mac was shown SO 191 he saw that Lee's army was separated and rightly so decided to try to attack it's smallest force which was Longstreet with his biggest force. The right thing to do. After the victories at South Mt. he headed towards Boonsboro believing that Longstreet was still there. I forgot how he ended up meeting Lee at Sharpsburg but he ended up there as Longstreet was not at Boonesboro. Mac didn't know that Miles would surrender on the morning of the 15th for he hoped to rescue the HF garrison with Franklyn and Couch's division. Once Mac reaches Sharpsburg and sees that Lee is not retreating, what other option does he have but to attack?

As to giving it another go? He wasted a month and 10 days before he set out on his brilliant campaign to cut off Jackson. It's too bad he didn't get an opportunity to continue the campaign. All the time before setting out on the 3BR Campaign he spent complaining about everything from lack of shoes to lack of horses. He also didn't think much of the 15 or so regiments he had been reinforced with. Felt they need training, which was probably true.

As to McClellan's numbers and Lee's forces he was getting really bad intelligence from Pleasonton and from Penn. governor Curtin. The sad thing is he was an engineer and an experienced army commander so he should have known how many troops a really long supply route can actually supply a given number of troops.

Okay, so going down the list.


SO 191 - McClellan didn't attack the smallest force with his biggest force. He did the most aggressive move that was feasible given the geography - he attacked everywhere he could reach Lee's force.

Then he pursued Longstreet through Boonsboro (which is where the road is) to Antietam Creek which is where Longstreet + DH Hill had gone and gone firm; McClellan brings up his army over the course of the 15th and 16th, cuts Lee off from going north into Pennsylvania, and then launches one of the largest one-day attack sequences of the war which sees about 55,000-60,000 troops PFD sent in on the attack on the same day. Notably as of the time he's committed the troops to the attack his reinforcements (Franklin,Morell) are still marching to the field,even Morell has not yet arrived when he commits Richardson to rejoin Sumner.

This is not the actions of a man too timid to commit.


And McClellan would have options other than attacking at Sharpsburg - he could have simply cut Lee off and then not attacked (it's not like Lee is achieving anything if he's stuck in a small triangle of Maryland), indeed he could have waited until Franklin/Humphreys/Morell/Couch had arrived and attacked with an even bigger hammer on the 18th. McClellan's attack on the 17th is a choice between speed and mass; it's also an attempt to maul Lee's army.