The Peninsula Another Sears Mistranscription

[67th Tigers]

Another Sears Mistranscription

LittlewarsTV's series on the Peninsula brought attention to the following quote:

McClellan was thus confirmed in another of his intuitive leaps of logic. Just as he had been sure in early April that Magruder would never attempt to hold a line all the way across the Peninsula with a mere 15,000 men, he now concluded that with eight times that number the enemy would certainly stay and make a showdown fight of it. "I can not realize an evacuation possible," he told Baldy Smith.

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign . Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.

This is part of Sears' penchant for amateur psychoanalysis, and uses this sentence fragment to advance a case that McClellan was pathologically incapable of imagining that Johnston could withdraw. It is, however, part of a multi-message conversation which paints a very different picture. Moreover, the last word of the quote, "possible," is mistranscribed and is "probable" in the original.

So, what was really happening. The sequence of events starts with two messages to HQ, one from Smith and one from an engineer:

From engineers, artillery officers, sharpshooters and pickets I have reports that no enemy is visible in the works in front of us – our men have been exposing themselves about the batteries all day without being fired upon.

Smith to McClellan, Sumner and Keyes, no timestamp, two copies in the McClellan Papers

A telegram from Gen. Smith to Gen Sumner just received states that Lieut. Bowen reports the enemy to have deserted the works along that line with the exception of a few sharpshooters

Capt Stewart (Engineer) to Barnand at McClellan's HQ, no timestamp

These messages unfortunately aren't timestamped, but McClellan's reply, which contains the quote, is:

Camp Winfield Scott

April 29, 2 p.m.

Genl W.F. Smith, Commanding Divn, 4th Corps

To what extent was the water lessened in depth below the dam last night? Is it now fordable for skirmishers? There are as yet no indications of change on our right and I can ^not realise an evacuation probable. Are their pickets still in their old position on our side of the Warwick on your left near Lee's Mill?

Reply at once.

GB McClellan, Maj Gen

McClellan to Smith, 1400 h

The "not" was inserted by McClellan, and the word at the end of the quote is indistinct, but the first two letters are "pr" and it ends in "ble" with three round letters (a, b, d, and o's) in between, in the pattern a/o, b/d, a/o. The second letter is absolutely not an o, and there are no s's and the letter before the ble isn't an i. Rather than "possible," the actually written word is "probable."

The mistranscribed word.

By changing this one word, and taking it out of context, even removing the primary clause (the sentence fragment being a dependent clause), Sears completely changed the meaning. McClellan asked whether Smith could attack, notes that the rebels have not retreated from the area Wynn's Mill to Yorktown (i.e. the main point of attack), and asks whether there are indications whether Lee's Mill has been abandoned. He does so with urgency.

Clearly, this isn't a McClellan pathologically incapable of imaging a retreat. Instead, given the news of a possible retreat, McClellan promptly acts on the possibility, much like he would a few days later when they actually did retreat.

Smith replied that he was sending a scout out:

I have sent out two scouting parties and a regt and four companies are now out.

Smith to McClellan, no timestamp

He then reported at 1515:

The water was not lowered more than five (5) inches last night – I sent a scout from the picket guard below the dam, who went down to the creek [and] found no pickets on this side but saw a small body of men on the other side in the rifle pits – In the fort a shot fired over from there (?) gives indication of life – A little dirt was thrown into the right embrasure this morning. I place no reliance on the evacuation but thought it necessary to give the reports – Genl's Hancock, Brooks and myself are in the right battery but have as yet determined nothing.

Smith to McClellan, 3.15 p.m.

To which McClellan (who must have been at the signals station waiting) immediately replied:

Telegram received. Are the rebel pickets who are usually on your left on their side of the Warwick river and in front of Lee's Mill still in position?

McClellan to Smith, 3.15 p.m.

Smith wrote, shortly after:

The water below the dam is at the usual stage – I have established tidegauges above and below the dam – I don't think there is any reason to suppose the enemy has left. They have probably fallen back with the exception of a strong guard. They have not molested our pickets today, have not been seen on this side of the creek. I will keep a close watch and keep you informed of any change – The assertion of the general officer of the day was positive as to the falling of the water, the captain in charge still asserts that he knows it to have been low.

Smith to McClellan, 3.30 p.m.

There aren't any further messages I've located in the sequence.

It behoves us to compare the reality of this exchange, with Sears' construct.

The first part, the argument that McClellan couldn't believe Magruder would stand with only 15,000, is a call-back. However, Sears never gave a shred of applicable evidence for this, merely speculating it and then pretending it was a fact. The quote is:

And [sic] from all reports, his estimate of 15,000 Confederate defenders at Yorktown was as wrong as all the rest of it. Logic had persuaded him that with a total of only 15,000 men Magruder would never try to hold a line from river to river—it was against every military precept to attempt so extended a defense with hardly a thousand troops to the mile—

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign . Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.

The "eight times more" is the most extreme interpretation of an intelligence report Pinkerton gave McClellan four days after the quote. Bear that in mind - Sears is making McClellan prescient to make his argument work.

In fact, McClellan gave eerily accurate estimates of enemy strength in this period, and was at no point fooled into thinking Magruder's numerical strength was greater than it actually was. Instead, McClellan's correspondence reveals it was the obstacles to an assault, the flooded Warwick, or the heavily fortifications with a mile wide killing area in front of them, that dominating his thinking. He sought ways of bringing his force to bear.

Further, Sears is simply wrong on Magruder's strength, accepting the Lost Cause argument.

The meat of the matter is the next sentence;

"I can not realize an evacuation possible, [sic]" he told Baldy Smith.

The mistranscription alters the meaning. In the original, in response is to a false report that Baldy Smith sends (and soon disavows) that the rebels have left the fortifications at Dam No. 1. McClellan expresses doubt that they had evacuated, noting the enemy at Yorktown etc. were still visible, and they had not evacuated. He also asks whether the water level was low enough to send skirmishers across the river.

Here we should note that the rebels could control the depth of the river by opening and closing the sluice gates. Water will, of course, move to the lower level of the dam when the sluices are open. On the 16th April, the rebels had lowered the Warwick at Dam No. 1, which allowed an officer to cross on a recce. However, as soon the rebels perceived a threat, they admitted more water into that stretch of the river, raising it to "armpit deep" or about 4 ft. Here McClellan is asking has the river been lowered again?

Sears' argument is that the sentence fragment shows McClellan was pathologically incapable of imaging that the rebels had retreated. This is, of course, patently nonsense.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Actually, the word looks more like possible than probable.

 

[Belfoured]

Another Sears Mistranscription

LittlewarsTV's series on the Peninsula brought attention to the following quote:



This is part of Sears' penchant for amateur psychoanalysis, and uses this sentence fragment to advance a case that McClellan was pathologically incapable of imagining that Johnston could withdraw. It is, however, part of a multi-message conversation which paints a very different picture. Moreover, the last word of the quote, "possible," is mistranscribed and is "probable" in the original.

So, what was really happening. The sequence of events starts with two messages to HQ, one from Smith and one from an engineer:





These messages unfortunately aren't timestamped, but McClellan's reply, which contains the quote, is:



The "not" was inserted by McClellan, and the word at the end of the quote is indistinct, but the first two letters are "pr" and it ends in "ble" with three round letters (a, b, d, and o's) in between, in the pattern a/o, b/d, a/o. The second letter is absolutely not an o, and there are no s's and the letter before the ble isn't an i. Rather than "possible," the actually written word is "probable."

View attachment 443255
The mistranscribed word.

By changing this one word, and taking it out of context, even removing the primary clause (the sentence fragment being a dependent clause), Sears completely changed the meaning. McClellan asked whether Smith could attack, notes that the rebels have not retreated from the area Wynn's Mill to Yorktown (i.e. the main point of attack), and asks whether there are indications whether Lee's Mill has been abandoned. He does so with urgency.

Clearly, this isn't a McClellan pathologically incapable of imaging a retreat. Instead, given the news of a possible retreat, McClellan promptly acts on the possibility, much like he would a few days later when they actually did retreat.

Smith replied that he was sending a scout out:


He then reported at 1515:



To which McClellan (who must have been at the signals station waiting) immediately replied:


Smith wrote, shortly after:



There aren't any further messages I've located in the sequence.

It behoves us to compare the reality of this exchange, with Sears' construct.

The first part, the argument that McClellan couldn't believe Magruder would stand with only 15,000, is a call-back. However, Sears never gave a shred of applicable evidence for this, merely speculating it and then pretending it was a fact. The quote is:



The "eight times more" is the most extreme interpretation of an intelligence report Pinkerton gave McClellan four days after the quote. Bear that in mind - Sears is making McClellan prescient to make his argument work.

In fact, McClellan gave eerily accurate estimates of enemy strength in this period, and was at no point fooled into thinking Magruder's numerical strength was greater than it actually was. Instead, McClellan's correspondence reveals it was the obstacles to an assault, the flooded Warwick, or the heavily fortifications with a mile wide killing area in front of them, that dominating his thinking. He sought ways of bringing his force to bear.

Further, Sears is simply wrong on Magruder's strength, accepting the Lost Cause argument.

The meat of the matter is the next sentence;



The mistranscription alters the meaning. In the original, in response is to a false report that Baldy Smith sends (and soon disavows) that the rebels have left the fortifications at Dam No. 1. McClellan expresses doubt that they had evacuated, noting the enemy at Yorktown etc. were still visible, and they had not evacuated. He also asks whether the water level was low enough to send skirmishers across the river.

Here we should note that the rebels could control the depth of the river by opening and closing the sluice gates. Water will, of course, move to the lower level of the dam when the sluices are open. On the 16th April, the rebels had lowered the Warwick at Dam No. 1, which allowed an officer to cross on a recce. However, as soon the rebels perceived a threat, they admitted more water into that stretch of the river, raising it to "armpit deep" or about 4 ft. Here McClellan is asking has the river been lowered again?

Sears' argument is that the sentence fragment shows McClellan was pathologically incapable of imaging that the rebels had retreated. This is, of course, patently nonsense.

What is the source confirming the decision to materially "lower" the Warwick on April 16 so that it could be crossed? ("not more than 5 inches" is immaterial). And by "source" I don't mean your filling in a vacuum with your own opinion. What was the tactical purpose behind this alleged decision to actually lower the level of the river barrier? As an aside, given that McClellan, who was present in person, directly approved the order sending the Third Vermont companies across the river, it appears he made a very stupid decision.

 

[trice]

Another Sears Mistranscription

LittlewarsTV's series on the Peninsula brought attention to the following quote:



This is part of Sears' penchant for amateur psychoanalysis, and uses this sentence fragment to advance a case that McClellan was pathologically incapable of imagining that Johnston could withdraw. It is, however, part of a multi-message conversation which paints a very different picture. Moreover, the last word of the quote, "possible," is mistranscribed and is "probable" in the original.

So, what was really happening. The sequence of events starts with two messages to HQ, one from Smith and one from an engineer:





These messages unfortunately aren't timestamped, but McClellan's reply, which contains the quote, is:



The "not" was inserted by McClellan, and the word at the end of the quote is indistinct, but the first two letters are "pr" and it ends in "ble" with three round letters (a, b, d, and o's) in between, in the pattern a/o, b/d, a/o. The second letter is absolutely not an o, and there are no s's and the letter before the ble isn't an i. Rather than "possible," the actually written word is "probable."

View attachment 443255
The mistranscribed word.

By changing this one word, and taking it out of context, even removing the primary clause (the sentence fragment being a dependent clause), Sears completely changed the meaning. McClellan asked whether Smith could attack, notes that the rebels have not retreated from the area Wynn's Mill to Yorktown (i.e. the main point of attack), and asks whether there are indications whether Lee's Mill has been abandoned. He does so with urgency.

Clearly, this isn't a McClellan pathologically incapable of imaging a retreat. Instead, given the news of a possible retreat, McClellan promptly acts on the possibility, much like he would a few days later when they actually did retreat.

Smith replied that he was sending a scout out:


He then reported at 1515:



To which McClellan (who must have been at the signals station waiting) immediately replied:


Smith wrote, shortly after:



There aren't any further messages I've located in the sequence.

It behoves us to compare the reality of this exchange, with Sears' construct.

The first part, the argument that McClellan couldn't believe Magruder would stand with only 15,000, is a call-back. However, Sears never gave a shred of applicable evidence for this, merely speculating it and then pretending it was a fact. The quote is:



The "eight times more" is the most extreme interpretation of an intelligence report Pinkerton gave McClellan four days after the quote. Bear that in mind - Sears is making McClellan prescient to make his argument work.

In fact, McClellan gave eerily accurate estimates of enemy strength in this period, and was at no point fooled into thinking Magruder's numerical strength was greater than it actually was. Instead, McClellan's correspondence reveals it was the obstacles to an assault, the flooded Warwick, or the heavily fortifications with a mile wide killing area in front of them, that dominating his thinking. He sought ways of bringing his force to bear.

Further, Sears is simply wrong on Magruder's strength, accepting the Lost Cause argument.

The meat of the matter is the next sentence;



The mistranscription alters the meaning. In the original, in response is to a false report that Baldy Smith sends (and soon disavows) that the rebels have left the fortifications at Dam No. 1. McClellan expresses doubt that they had evacuated, noting the enemy at Yorktown etc. were still visible, and they had not evacuated. He also asks whether the water level was low enough to send skirmishers across the river.

Here we should note that the rebels could control the depth of the river by opening and closing the sluice gates. Water will, of course, move to the lower level of the dam when the sluices are open. On the 16th April, the rebels had lowered the Warwick at Dam No. 1, which allowed an officer to cross on a recce. However, as soon the rebels perceived a threat, they admitted more water into that stretch of the river, raising it to "armpit deep" or about 4 ft. Here McClellan is asking has the river been lowered again?

Sears' argument is that the sentence fragment shows McClellan was pathologically incapable of imaging that the rebels had retreated. This is, of course, patently nonsense.

First of all, that link in the first line appears to be a link to your own blog and the text you posted appears to be an exact cut-and-paste of your own blog post. Is that what we are looking at here?

Second, everyone who reads your posts probably understands that you spend an inordinate amount of time trying to throw mud at Stephen Sears. You claim about "Sears penchant for amateur psychoanalysis, and uses this sentence fragment to advance a case that McClellan was pathologically incapable of imagining that Johnston could withdraw" is massively overdone. Here is what Sears actually says in that book:

​

Third, you discredit your own claims by your extreme exaggeration of Sears position. Be more rigorous in what you say if you want to pick at tiny points in Sears' books. Pinkerton said 100-120,000 troops and Sears said that was eight times 15,000. Sears might be a bit high if you take the low end of Pinkerton's estimate; Sears is dead-on correct if you take the high end of Pinkerton's estimate. Please stop making mountains out of mole-hills to try to pump up your argument.

The reality is that Johnston was actually pushing to withdraw from this position at Yorktown as soon as he possibly could -- and he had intended to do so since he first toured the position more than two weeks earlier. You have known this as a fact for years. Here on April 29 McClellan is presenting a disbelief that Johnston has pulled back (in part or in all). McClellan was building up for an assault that would not start for almost a week in his estimation -- and very clearly assuming that Johnston's army would still be holding the lines at Yorktown when he started it. Sears might be wrong in his opinion of McClellan's thought-process -- but you are blinding yourself to just how far wrong McClellan was in his opinion about Joe Johnston's thoughts and plans.

 

[Belfoured]

First of all, that link in the first line appears to be a link to your own blog and the text you posted appears to be an exact cut-and-paste of your own blog post. Is that what we are looking at here?

Second, everyone who reads your posts probably understands that you spend an inordinate amount of time trying to throw mud at Stephen Sears. You claim about "Sears penchant for amateur psychoanalysis, and uses this sentence fragment to advance a case that McClellan was pathologically incapable of imagining that Johnston could withdraw" is massively overdone. Here is what Sears actually says in that book:

View attachment 443337​

View attachment 443338​

​

Third, you discredit your own claims by your extreme exaggeration of Sears position. Be more rigorous in what you say if you want to pick at tiny points in Sears' books. Pinkerton said 100-120,000 troops and Sears said that was eight times 15,000. Sears might be a bit high if you take the low end of Pinkerton's estimate; Sears is dead-on correct if you take the high end of Pinkerton's estimate. Please stop making mountains out of mole-hills to try to pump up your argument.

The reality is that Johnston was actually pushing to withdraw from this position at Yorktown as soon as he possibly could -- and he had intended to do so since he first toured the position more than two weeks earlier. You have known this as a fact for years. Here on April 29 McClellan is presenting a disbelief that Johnston has pulled back (in part or in all). McClellan was building up for an assault that would not start for almost a week in his estimation -- and very clearly assuming that Johnston's army would still be holding the lines at Yorktown when he started it. Sears might be wrong in his opinion of McClellan's thought-process -- but you are blinding yourself to just how far wrong McClellan was in his opinion about Joe Johnston's thoughts and plans.

 

[Belfoured]

I would only note that the "eight times that number" calculation matches exactly the number of daily rations reported by Pinkerton as obtained from Johnston's Commissary Dep't (119,000). Regarding "prescience", the McClellan advocacy relies on always cherry-picking records in isolation, completely divorced from previous occurrences. As early as April 7 McClellan had told the administration regarding Johnston's pending arrival "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands-probably not less than 100,000 men, and probably more." Moreover, Pinkerton's May 3 report did not arrive as a shocking revelation in a vacuum. The report is a summary of information acquired over time, and in sequence it is the first such since March 29. So McClellan got nothing along these lines from Pinkerton for 5 weeks? That's absurd and in fact Pinkerton's May 3 report shows that it is absurd. Pinkerton states that at the "time of reception" of the incorporated information it was "the subject of special reports to you". He also states that he is using in part information regarding Johnston's army that is "derived in part from previous reports made to you". The idea that McClellan was required to play Carnac the Magnificent before May 3 is simply wrong.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Are any of you saying there is an issue of concern with this particular work by Sears or an inclination by the author? I've enjoyed very much his Landscape Turned Red, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. I'll will admit a bias to Coddington and especially Pfanz on Gettysburg. Guelzo's Gettysburg; The Last Invasion was interesting and more recently Brown's Meade at Gettysburg; A Study in Command. But I've always enjoyed Sear's easy and readable style with good notes and bibliographies.

 

[67th Tigers]

Are any of you saying there is an issue of concern with this particular work by Sears or an inclination by the author?

I have concerns with Sears, because in my own research I find problems with his. This is not the first mistranscription, or out-of-context quotation I've found in Sears. Compare the originals of Porter's communication with Sears' selective quotation:

Porter to McClellan, 2130 1st July 1862

Sears has a bad habit of selective quotation. Consider this:

By 9: 30 he declared victory: "After a hard fight for nearly four hours against immense odds, we have driven the enemy beyond the battle field. . . ." If reinforced, if the men were provisioned and their ammunition replenished, "we will hold our own and advance if you wish." His victorious men "can only regret the necessity which will compel a withdrawal."

Sears, Stephen W.. Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac (p. 271). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.

and

At 9: 30 that night Fitz John Porter signaled McClellan that "against immense odds, we have driven the enemy beyond the battle field and the firing ended at 8: 30." He went on to say that if he could be resupplied with food and ammunition, "we will hold our own and advance if you wish." Here was General Porter, the soul of military caution, proposing to follow up the Malvern Hill victory with a counteroffensive.

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (Kindle Locations 5925-5928). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.

Now that the McClellan papers are online, I can transcribe the whole document. Thirty minutes earlier Porter had begged for a whiskey ration to stiffen the men, and at 2130 he wrote:

Brick House – Near Turkey Creek
July 1st​ – 9.30 P.M.
General McClellan –
After a hard days fight for nearly four hours against immense odds, we have whipped driven the enemy, beyond the battle field and firing ended at 8.30. Our loss is heavy. If new troops can reinforce or replace us [before] daybreak, and our men provisioned, (without food for 24 hours) and ammunition (exhausted) replenished, we will hold our own and advance if you wish. Without these we must retire. Whatever the results of the days victory (and you alone are the judge) they are due to the excellent positions selected by you today, the firm resistance of Morell (2) and Couch (1), the prompt and spirited support of Sykes' regulars,
[page 2, note that the three pages are out of order in the archive]
and Couch's reserves, to Naglee's and Sickles' brigades and the skillful use of the artillery pertaining to Morell[,] Couch and Sykes and admirable disposition and thorough support by Hunt of the reserves. Of I cannot do justice to each command and commander. I cannot Only the country can do it. Every man was engaged and when up is if animated by the one thought of on his individual effort depended the safety of our comd army and heroically did they act. I wish to express my warmest thanks to Gen Sumner for Meagher's brigade, promptly provided when asked for, and for the voluntary assistance of Sickles brigade, which in the noble spirit of a gallant soldier
[page 3]
was hastened forward by Genl Heintzelman when he knew I wanted aid. The country and the Comd General has no more true [illegible] brave soldiers than those engaged today and if they cannot reap the full [illegible deletion] fruits of their labors, today they can only regret the [illegible deletion] necessity of which will compell a withdrawal.
I am General [&c.]
FJ Porter

This is quite different to how Sears used it. Sears stripped out the reports of the state of the force that Porter made, and that Porter considered the troops used up and in need of replacement. Porter reports that losses were heavy, and that the troops have no ammunition, and haven't eaten in 24 hours. He states that without replacing the troops (or reinforcing them, and provisioning them), then he must withdraw.

Sears deletes the dire reports of the state of Porter's command to state that Porter was suggesting a counteroffensive. He wasn't. In fact he was stating that the position couldn't be held with the troops in the state they were in.

 

[trice]

Are any of you saying there is an issue of concern with this particular work by Sears or an inclination by the author? I've enjoyed very much his Landscape Turned Red, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. I'll will admit a bias to Coddington and especially Pfanz on Gettysburg. Guelzo's Gettysburg; The Last Invasion was interesting and more recently Brown's Meade at Gettysburg; A Study in Command. But I've always enjoyed Sear's easy and readable style with good notes and bibliographies.

I am not.

Biographers are rarely neutral about their subject. They end up with strong feelings about him or her -- usually positive, sometimes negative. Sears clearly ended up negative about George B. McClellan. I find his books enjoyable, well-researched and interesting even when I find the occasional mistake or point I don't agree with in them.

The Fletcher Pratt Award was established in 1956. Sears books have won the award three times (Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam in 1983,Chancellorsville in 1996, Gettysburg in 2003). They do not give that out for sloppy research or defamatory bias. If some one tells you something different, reach for the salt shaker.

Guelzo's Gettysburg; The Last Invasion was another winner of the Fletcher Pratt award.

 

[Belfoured]

I am not.

Biographers are rarely neutral about their subject. They end up with strong feelings about their subject -- usually positive, sometimes negative. Sears clearly ended up negative about George B. McClellan. I find his books enjoyable, well-researched and interesting even when I find the occasional mistake or point I don't agree with in them.

The Fletcher Pratt Award was established in 1956. Sears books have won the award three times (Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam in 1983,Chancellorsville in 1996, Gettysburg in 2003). They do not give that out for sloppy research or defamatory bias. If some one tells you something different, reach for the salt shaker.

Guelzo's Gettysburg; The Last Invasion was another winner of the Fletcher Pratt award.

I concur. In addition, the statement extracted from Lincoln's Lieutenants is not inconsistent with Porter's message - unless Porter's reference to reinforcement with fresh troops within 24 hours is simply disingenuous because there was no such possibility and he knew it.

There is little question that Sears came to a negative view of McClellan. It should be kept in mind that Sears is the guy who went through McClellan's voluminous wartime papers and put them in publication. It is virtually impossible for anyone who is being honest to read all of that material and come to any conclusion other than that McClellan - to at least some significant degree - was self-righteous, a narcissist, and a guy who believed that he was consistently the victim of intellectually inferior, unfair and jealous conspirators. How much that influences the historian's assessment of what happened and why is the question. I have little doubt that at any "fork in the road" on McClellan where a completely objective historian might go either way, Sears is likely to take the adverse fork. Grady McWhiney actually turned over vol. 2 of his projected 2 volume Bragg project to his grad student because his work on vol. 1 caused him to loathe Bragg. But that's different from questioning everything Sears has ever written about McClellan that is in any way negative.

 

[rpkennedy]

Are any of you saying there is an issue of concern with this particular work by Sears or an inclination by the author? I've enjoyed very much his Landscape Turned Red, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. I'll will admit a bias to Coddington and especially Pfanz on Gettysburg. Guelzo's Gettysburg; The Last Invasion was interesting and more recently Brown's Meade at Gettysburg; A Study in Command. But I've always enjoyed Sear's easy and readable style with good notes and bibliographies.

While I don't agree with all of his conclusions (just as I disagree with some of Guelzo's criticisms of Meade, which I find to be overly harsh), I would still heartily recommend all of Sears' books so long as people understand his point-of-view (he's not a big fan of McClellan, he feels the opposite towards Hooker, etc.). Landscape Turned Red is probably the best single volume work on Antietam, Gettysburg is well written, and Chancellorsville is probably the best book on that campaign. I also like To the Gates of Richmond quite a bit as well as well as Lincoln's Lieutenants.

Ryan

 

[121st PA Vols]

Thank you for your views trice, 67th Tigers etc on Sears vis-a-vis McClellan.

I'm skeptical of historians who takes sides, feeling they should give the facts, the why's and how's as they know them rather than simple condemnation. Will admit I may be confusing authors with historians, blurring the lines. They should seek 'neutral ground' so to speak.
I've found more than a few take license or just plain get it wrong. One I admire tremendously says Sykes' 5th corps was 20 plus miles from Gettysburg in Hanover, which is 13 miles, attempting to make a point of distance and the precarious nature of 1st and 11th corps Day-1. Or that Slocum's 12th corps was 12 miles away in Two Taverns, it's 5 miles not 12. I'm born and raised there and know these distances, or can look them up! Another continued calling Reynolds the 'Right Wing Commander', not the Left. These are legit historians.
And rpkennedy, I agree on Guelzo who I personally like despite getting things absolutely wrong; egs, maintaining the following.
* Meade saw his role as defensive, was averse to risk
* it was largely about falling back to Pipe Creek
* not inclined to search out Lee
* Reynolds precipitated the battle

The facts:
**** Meade ordered Reynolds to Gettysburg. Not to simply advance to the area from Emmitsburg, see what you can find but to go to Gettysburg specifically. Meade knew with reasonable accuracy where large elements of Lee's army were, the roads they were on, etc via excellent cavalry work by Buford and Signal Corps work including Carrick's Knob, behind Mt. St. Marys in Emmitsburg. This is all in ORs.
**** Meade wanted to go on the offensive asking Warren to join Slocum to know if an attack on the CSA left (Johnson div) via Culps Hill sector was advisable; again in ORs

POSITIVES:
He mentions the soldier's role often and their importance which is refreshing rather than another lecture how brilliant this or that officer was. He attempts to be vivid in battle description to show the horrors of war.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Actually, the word looks more like possible than probable.

Concur. My fairly clear impression is that the word appears to be 'possible'.

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

Thank you for your views trice, 67th Tigers etc on Sears vis-a-vis McClellan.

I'm skeptical of historians who takes sides, feeling they should give the facts, the why's and how's as they know them rather than simple condemnation. Will admit I may be confusing authors with historians, blurring the lines. They should seek 'neutral ground' so to speak.
I've found more than a few take license or just plain get it wrong. One I admire tremendously says Sykes' 5th corps was 20 plus miles from Gettysburg in Hanover, which is 13 miles, attempting to make a point of distance and the precarious nature of 1st and 11th corps Day-1. Or that Slocum's 12th corps was 12 miles away in Two Taverns, it's 5 miles not 12. I'm born and raised there and know these distances, or can look them up! Another continued calling Reynolds the 'Right Wing Commander', not the Left. These are legit historians.
And rpkennedy, I agree on Guelzo who I personally like despite getting things absolutely wrong; egs, maintaining the following.
* Meade saw his role as defensive, was averse to risk
* it was largely about falling back to Pipe Creek
* not inclined to search out Lee
* Reynolds precipitated the battle

The facts:
**** Meade ordered Reynolds to Gettysburg. Not to simply advance to the area from Emmitsburg, see what you can find but to go to Gettysburg specifically. Meade knew with reasonable accuracy where large elements of Lee's army were, the roads they were on, etc via excellent cavalry work by Buford and Signal Corps work including Carrick's Knob, behind Mt. St. Marys in Emmitsburg. This is all in ORs.
**** Meade wanted to go on the offensive asking Warren to join Slocum to know if an attack on the CSA left (Johnson div) via Culps Hill sector was advisable; again in ORs

POSITIVES:
He mentions the soldier's role often and their importance which is refreshing rather than another lecture how brilliant this or that officer was. He attempts to be vivid in battle description to show the horrors of war.

History isn't a binary. You and I could look at the same source material and reach differing conclusions. And everyone has biases. It's human nature.

 

[Belfoured]

History isn't a binary. You and I could look at the same source material and reach differing conclusions. And everyone has biases. It's human nature.

To be fair to Sears, we've been steered to an alleged "error" in Lincoln's Lieutenants in an attempt to undermine Sears' reliability:

"By 9: 30 he declared victory: "After a hard fight for nearly four hours against immense odds, we have driven the enemy beyond the battle field. . . ." If reinforced, if the men were provisioned and their ammunition replenished, "we will hold our own and advance if you wish." His victorious men "can only regret the necessity which will compel a withdrawal."

We're told that this is a bias-motivated misinterpretation of Porter message to McClellan at 9:30 PM on July 1, 1862, following repulse of the Confederate attacks at Malvern Hill. In fact, anyone who reads the message objectively will conclude that Sears correctly summarized what Porter told McClellan. But there's more to support Sears.

In his recent biography of Porter, Radical Sacrifice, William Marvel reached a virtually identical interpretation - and, as his source note shows, it is based solely on his reading of the message and not on Sears. Marvel cannot be objectively accused of a negative viewpoint regarding McClellan. In fact, if he has a negative bias towards anyone, it's against McClellan's arch-enemy Stanton (about whom Marvel has published an excellent biography, in addition to his frequently critical four volumes about the war years and the administration).

But the best source for the meaning of Porter's message should be the guy who wrote it. Fortunately, we have his own interpretation in Battles & Leaders, vol. 2 at p. 423:

"By these officers I sent messages to the commanding general, expressing the hope that our withdrawal had ended and that we
should hold the ground we now occupied , even if we did not assume the offensive. From my standpoint I thought we could maintain our position, and perhaps in a few days could improve it by advancing."

As Porter points out, he then received McClellan's orders to withdraw - which had been issued before McClellan had even received Porter's views.

Sears may well have formed a generally adverse view about McClellan but - as I pointed out previously - that does not render his assessments of McClellan generally unreliable.

 

[JimN]

The word is definitely "possible" and not "probable." The second letter is obviously not an r. Think you need to learn a little about deciphering period handwriting.

 

[67th Tigers]

The word is definitely "possible" and not "probable." The second letter is obviously not an r. Think you need to learn a little about deciphering period handwriting.

It's an r. That's how McClellan wrote his r's. He starts with a downstroke and then comes up and curves the upstroke around. The word "possible" is on the same page and has a round o as the second letter instead of the down and upstroked r which looks almost like a v that McClellan used. Coming off the r, he goes down and does a loop like the o in the earlier possible, instead of an s. On the next letter he starts with an upstroke and then comes straight back down, missing the barrel of the b, but he does that a lot (see the b in the ble) and so it looks like an l.

 

[JimN]

It's an r. That's how McClellan wrote his r's. He starts with a downstroke and then comes up and curves the upstroke around. The word "possible" is on the same page and has a round o as the second letter instead of the down and upstroked r which looks almost like a v that McClellan used. Coming off the r, he goes down and does a loop like the o in the earlier possible, instead of an s. On the next letter he starts with an upstroke and then comes straight back down, missing the barrel of the b, but he does that a lot (see the b in the ble) and so it looks like an l.

Your example and another example of his (yours says "possible" and this one says "possibly."

 

[JimN]

Your example and another example of his (yours says "possible" and this one says "possibly."

View attachment 448089

View attachment 448090

Both say "possible". My mistake.

 

[JimN]

It's an r. That's how McClellan wrote his r's. He starts with a downstroke and then comes up and curves the upstroke around. The word "possible" is on the same page and has a round o as the second letter instead of the down and upstroked r which looks almost like a v that McClellan used. Coming off the r, he goes down and does a loop like the o in the earlier possible, instead of an s. On the next letter he starts with an upstroke and then comes straight back down, missing the barrel of the b, but he does that a lot (see the b in the ble) and so it looks like an l.

That letter that you say is an "o" is definitely not an o. That's not how he wrote his o's. It is an "s" as he normally writes an s.