An aggressive George H. Thomas at Chattanooga

[Joseph A. Rose]

Several authors like to claim that General George H. Thomas wasn't aggressive before and at the Battle of Chattanooga. Bruce Catton, in Grant Takes Command, indicated that a skeptical Thomas was deliberate and slow to get going and liked to have everything ready down to the last belt buckle before action started. Dr. Brooks Simpson, in Triumph Over Adversity, implied that Thomas was not exactly "an aggressive fighter." Larry J. Daniel, in Days of Glory, charged that Thomas "showed little stomach for the offensive." Christopher Einolf, in George Thomas: Virginian for the Union, went so far as to allege that Thomas, not sharing Grant's urgency, even wanted to remain on the defensive for another month. These complaints, however, are completely contradicted by Thomas' actions, such as when he:

• Ordered General Joseph Hooker to concentrate in preparation for the Cracker Line operations on the very same evening, October 19,1863, that Thomas took command of the Army of the Cumberland;
• Proposed his own plans for attacking on November 8th​ when Grant wanted an imprudent assault around Tunnel Hill to relieve pressure on General Ambrose Burnside in East Tennessee (Although during the later battle, it turned out that Thomas' general plans worked and Grant's didn't);
• "Went to General Grant and advised against any further postponement of our movement," on November 22nd​, when Sherman was found to be behind schedule (although Grant did not approve the proposal);
• Attacked, captured, and fortified Orchard Knob on November 23rd​, after Grant directed him to ascertain by a demonstration the truth or falsity of a report on enemy movements;
• Instructed Hooker to endeavor to take the point of Lookout Mountain on November 24th​, after Hooker had been given no plans by Grant;
• Ordered Hooker and General John Palmer to move on the enemy's works in front of Missionary Ridge, by pivoting on Philip Sheridan's division (Until Grant took General Baird's division and sent it to General William T. Sherman, who didn't need it);
• Ordered Hooker to march for and carry Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge on 11/25;
• Placed four divisions in line for the assault against the rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge on the afternoon of 11/25; sent a staffer to General Baird indicating that it was Thomas' wishes that he ascend the ridge; and then sent messages to General Wood to continue the ascent; and
• Ordered all of the cavalry in the department, except sufficient to guard the line of Tennessee, into East Tennessee to annoy the enemy and press him as much as possible, after the victory on the previous day.

What is more, each of Thomas' plans that Grant permitted him to put into action was greatly successful. Grant's plan was for General Sherman to roll down the ridge from the north, a movement that failed miserably.

As evidence of a non-aggressive Thomas, those four authors all pointed to a letter in UCLA's William S. Rosecrans Papers from General Thomas to General Rosecrans, which they date 11/19/63. That date seems corroborated by a marginal notation on it "Rec'd 11/28." This was just before the battle's scheduled start, and a passage in the letter which the authors quoted sounds rather timid: "If however we can hold out for a month longer our position will be entirely secure."

In the letter, Thomas appeared to be quite concerned about his supply situation. "Our horses however are entirely exhausted, and the R R has nearly given out. If however we can hold out for a month longer our position will be entirely secure. … I shall have the N.W R.R done by the end of the year, when we shall all be able to feel secure and certain about our grub and other supplies." The comment on whether "we can hold out for a month longer" appears to refer more to commissary shortages rather than any military vulnerability.

And the letter contains some other matter that more than suggests an earlier date. The dateline certainly looks like "November 19th​" on first glance. But the "1" could well be a slash, which would make the letter's date November 9th​. A ten-day difference doesn't mean much in the grand scheme of history, although this makes it harder for people to use this letter to unduly tarnish Thomas' reputation.

What makes a November 9th​ date extremely likely is the letter's mention that, "Sherman has dropped the R. R on the south side of the Tennessee River entirely. has posted a strong force at Eastport. to guard that Depot. and will station the bulk of his old corps the 15. on the Nashville and Decatur R.R and from Huntsville to Stevenson." This description did not pertain to a November 19th​ date. Sherman had visited Chattanooga on November 15th​ and the advance of his army was just downriver past the points mentioned in Thomas' letter. In fact, Grant's battle plan—in which Sherman's four divisions held a starring role—was promulgated on the 18th​—so on the 19th​ Thomas could have held no expectation that Sherman's divisions would be stationed in the rear. But on November 8th​, Grant had referred to work on the Nashville and Decatur R.R and that a portion of Sherman's force would be guarding it.

Not as definitive, Thomas also stated that, "Our news from Burnside is that Longstreet is approaching him slowly but he feels secure + perfectly able to defend himself against Longstreet unless he can send sufficient cavalry to cut of[sic] his trains of supplies." But Longstreet's (partial) siege of Knoxville began on November 17th​. The comment about "Longstreet is approaching him slowly" makes little sense given the chronology.

There are other passages in Thomas' letter to Rosecrans that might help prove when it was written. Maybe someone can produce relevant evidence to that effect, although my review of the various items so far hasn't found anything significant one way or the other:

• "Your letter enclosing Genl Mortons Report on the Rebel defensive works at Chattanooga was received some days since."
• "Our work progresses slowly. You remember what a Herculean task it was to undertake to complete the defenses of this place"
• "I was in hopes after opening the road to Bridgeport on this side of the River that we would have some little relief. but I do not see that our labors have been diminished, for we have been compelled to build and corduroy the entire road from here to Kelly's Ferry."
• "However we have quite a good road now and have accumulated something like fifteen days rations ahead."
• "We also have in position twelve heavy guns with sufficient ammunition to fight two battles here."

 

[DBF]

to a letter in UCLA's William S. Rosecrans Papers from General Thomas to General Rosecrans, which they date 11/19/63.

Thank you for posting this information - I'm an admirer of General Thomas and reading as much as possible about him.

 

[rbasin]

IMO, Grant's role as the savior of Chattanooga relies on Thomas being regarded as timid and slow. Same thing a year later at Nashville.

 

[jackt62]

Thomas seems to be at a disadvantage in terms of providing an objective analysis of his leadership. And much of that is due to the fact that Grant became general-in-chief and President, and wrote a best selling war memoir, whereas Thomas did not live long enough to remain in the public eye. Yes, there may have been valid differences in personality (Thomas being more deliberative in his actions), but Thomas' ability as one of the great CW commanders has been clouded by the judgement of Grant's history.

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

Looking at the date of the letter in close-up, I should have suggested that the character in front of the "9" might represent a slash or it might be the letter "b" as part of the abbreviation for "November."

 

[JeffBrooks]

For more than a century, historians misjudged James Longstreet because of the aspersions by Jubal Early and the other members of the Lost Cause Crew. The same fate has largely befallen George Thomas thanks to the aspersions cast by Grant, Schofield, and even Sherman. Unfortunately, Thomas didn't have a Pulitzer-winning novel and a successful Hollywood production to restore his reputation. If you ask me, Thomas was the outstanding military leader of the Civil War on either side. He never lost a battle. Under his leadership, the Army of the Cumberland was the most professional and effective army on the continent. He is so often derided as a purely "defensive" general, yet two of the war's most successful tactical offensives - Chattanooga and Nashville - were carried out by Thomas. He is called slow, yet almost always his judgment on timing proved absolutely correct, especially at Nashville.

 

[NedBaldwin]

"Went to General Grant and advised against any further postponement of our movement," on November 22nd​, when Sherman was found to be behind schedule (although Grant did not approve the proposal);

Did not Grant approve the proposal?The delay for Sherman was because the bridge broke at Browns Ferry. This was why Osteraus ended up operating with Hooker instead of staying with Sherman. After Thomas wrote what you quote, he wrote "This met the approbation of the Commanding General, and on it was based my order of the 23d to General Hooker..."

 

[NedBaldwin]

"sent a staffer to General Baird indicating that it was Thomas' wishes that he ascend the ridge..."

Is it ever said that it was "Thomas' wishes"?
If so, how do you explain that this was his wish?
IIRC, Baird's report refers to the wishes of the "Commanding General"

 

[Philip Leigh]

For more than a century, historians misjudged James Longstreet because of the aspersions by Jubal Early and the other members of the Lost Cause Crew. The same fate has largely befallen George Thomas thanks to the aspersions cast by Grant, Schofield, and even Sherman. Unfortunately, Thomas didn't have a Pulitzer-winning novel and a successful Hollywood production to restore his reputation. If you ask me, Thomas was the outstanding military leader of the Civil War on either side. He never lost a battle. Under his leadership, the Army of the Cumberland was the most professional and effective army on the continent. He is so often derided as a purely "defensive" general, yet two of the war's most successful tactical offensives - Chattanooga and Nashville - were carried out by Thomas. He is called slow, yet almost always his judgment on timing proved absolutely correct, especially at Nashville.

That's a good summation.

Nonetheless, I am genuinely curious to understand his inaction at Perryville. Can you throw some light on that?

Thanks.

 

[rbasin]

That's a good summation.

Nonetheless, I am genuinely curious to understand his inaction at Perryville. Can you throw some light on that?

Thanks.

Wasn't that Buell not believing he was in an actual battle?

 

[JeffBrooks]

Nonetheless, I am genuinely curious to understand his inaction at Perryville. Can you throw some light on that?

Not sure what you mean. Thomas was not in command at Perryville. As I recall, he was second-in-command to Buell and had sort of a supervisory role over the right wing, which was not engaged.

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

Is it ever said that it was "Thomas' wishes"?
If so, how do you explain that this was his wish?
IIRC, Baird's report refers to the wishes of the "Commanding General"

If you review the references that Baird elsewhere makes to the commanding general, this refers to Thomas. Grant had already sent his orders to Baird through Baldy Smith (IIRC) and they did not mention an ascent of the ridge. And when Grant first expressed his desire for an advance on the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge by Wood's and Sheridan's divisions, Baird's division wasn't even ready for an advance.

Other authors state that this was Grant's wish. Do you have any evidence that they are correct? Have you ever expressed your skepticism with them? One of these authors apparently posts regularly here.

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

If you review the references that Baird elsewhere ....

I should have added that Grant expressed anger at seeing the ascent (according to Fullerton and Wood); wanted to know who sent the troops up the ridge (according to Wood, Bridges, and Fullerton); was surprised, along with Thomas and Wood, at the ascent (according to Brigham, Wilson, and Doyle); and disclaimed that it was part of the plan (according to Meigs). Several individuals noted that Grant even threatened whoever ordered the men up the ridge!

Those would be very, very strange reactions if Grant had actually told them that he wished an ascent.

 

[uaskme]

Did not Grant approve the proposal?The delay for Sherman was because the bridge broke at Browns Ferry. This was why Osteraus ended up operating with Hooker instead of staying with Sherman. After Thomas wrote what you quote, he wrote "This met the approbation of the Commanding General, and on it was based my order of the 23d to General Hooker..."

Browns Ferry was open when Sherman came up. When Sherman left Bridgeport he traveled by Division. The Division Trains were behind each Division. It had rained for several days. So this configuration destroyed the roads and cost him a couple of days. Sherman should of put all his Trains in the rear. So. To deflect criticism away from Sherman, Grant blames the ever slow Thomas. He blames Thomas for destroying his animals during this period and says the AOC is demoralized and won't come out of their trenches. So, he needs Sherman.

Battle of Missionary Ridge. Sherman assaults the wrong Ridge, which cost him a day. Then when he assaults Tunnel Hill, he does so by Brigade. Which was not effective. He is stopped. Grant tells Thomas to do Something! Grant suggest a demonstration on Missionary Ridge to assist Sherman. AOC proves they have fight in them. They carry the Ridge. Lookout Mountain was suppose to be a Demonstration. In the end, Grant calls Lookout Mountain a skirmish, Hooker is no friend of his Boy Sherman. And says Missionary Ridge assault went as planned and gave Sherman the Credit. Grant never trusts Thomas. Something about him being a Virginian. He plays great favor to Sherman, who performed miserably. Sherman blames his performance on the loss of Willy.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Map showing visual signal stations Chattanooga​

There is a chain of command issue that colors the premise of this thread. At Chattanooga, Grant was what we would now call an army group commander. Sherman command the Army of the Tennessee, Thomas commanded the Army of the Cumberland & Hooker commanded two corps of the Army of the Potomac; all of them reported directly to Grant. Orders flowed up & down the chain of command through Grant & HQs of those commands. The compressed nature of the position meant that the army commanders & Grant had personal contact when orders were being prepared.

At Chattanooga, the excellent visual, Beardslee repeating telegraph & telegraphic com net of the AoC provided Grant with direct contact with his subordinate commanders. For example, both Thomas & Hooker were controlling the fire of the battery at Moccasin Bend via visual signals during the attack on Lookout Mountain. Flag signals were exchanged between Thomas at Orchard Knob & the attackers reaching the top of Missionary Ridge. Both he & Grant had realtime intel on the situation & could respond accordingly.

On Orchard Knob, Grant & Thomas were standing side by side, so there was no intervening com network necessary. Ultimately, every order issued by any of the army group commanders were under Grant's supervision & his responsibility; so there is no Grant's commands & Thomas' commands as the premise of this post implies.

Grant was reading General Bragg's visual communications in what amounted to real time. The AoC signalists were gathering "contrabands," as intercepted signals were called & decrypting them immediately. For example, General Hardee's reports from atop Lookout Mountain made it clear that he had fallen for the demonstration on Raccoon Mountain intended to draw attention away from Sherman's river crossing. All the Union Commanders at Chattanooga had unprecedented situational awareness due to the extraordinary topography.

Photo copied sun map of Chattanooga & vicinity​

It is useful to point out that Grant, Thomas & Sherman made a personal reconnaissance of the Tunnel Hill position. There were no accurate maps of the area that showed the actual lay of the land. The sun map compiled by AoC topographers was known to be compiled with incomplete data. How the personal recon & Merrill's topographer's missed the fact that the ridge was broken, leaving Tunnel Hill detached is one of those fog of war things that we will never understand.

Sherman & Thomas got along very well. Just why Grant & Thomas rubbed each other the wrong way has never been clear to me. The only thing I can come up with was that Thomas was cerebral in a way Grant never was... which isn't much to go by.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Not sure what you mean. Thomas was not in command at Perryville. As I recall, he was second-in-command to Buell and had sort of a supervisory role over the right wing, which was not engaged.

Yes, but his entire corps did almost nothing. Unless he was a victim of an acoustic shadow, I cannot understand why he did so little. Even with such a shadow, IIRC, there was enough action on his front to make him suspicious of a bigger battle on his left.

 

[jackt62]

And yet Grant never publicly chastised Sherman for mistaking the location of Tunnel Hill, whereas Grant was very quick to infer of Thomas that he might have ordered the men to ascend Missionary Ridge beyond the rifle pits, even though the former action was a mishap, and the later a success.

 

[Rhea Cole]

And yet Grant never publicly chastised Sherman for mistaking the location of Tunnel Hill, whereas Grant was very quick to infer of Thomas that he might have ordered the men to ascend Missionary Ridge beyond the rifle pits, even though the former action was a mishap, and the later a success.

The reason his didn't criticize Sherman for the faulty recon of Tunnel Hill was that Grant, Sherman & Thomas made a personal recon & didn't recognize the actual lay of the land. The sun map compiled by the AoC topographers didn't show the break in the ridge, either. I have posted a copy in this thread.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Yes, but his entire corps did almost nothing. Unless he was a victim of an acoustic shadow, I cannot understand why he did so little. Even with such a shadow, IIRC, there was enough action on his front to make him suspicious of a bigger battle on his left.

In his testimony to the court of inquiry, Thomas himself said, "I did not know that a battle had been fought on the left until after night-fall, when, as I was riding to my tent, Lieutenant Fitzhugh, of General Buell's staff, overtook me and told me. This must have been about 7 o'clock."

When asked if he had heard firing, Thomas answered, "I heard cannonading about the time that the bead of Crittenden's corps reached the position it was to take up, and I directed Captain Mack, my chief of artillery, to report to General Buell that I had arrived in position and with the head of the column, and would superintend the placing of troops in position, and requested the general to send me any orders by Captain Mack. Captain Mack returned about 12, with a plan of the ground and directions from the general to dispose the troops in a certain manner preparatory to an attack the next morning at Perryville but the arrangement was not positive; it left the arrangement of the troops somewhat to my discretion if I thought it was necessary. I asked Captain Mack if he knew what that firing was we heard on the left in front; his reply was that the report came to headquarters that it was Captain Gay, chief of cavalry, reconnoitering and the enemy were firing upon him with artillery. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, again heard very heavy cannonading, and directed General Crittenden to send a staff officer to General Gilbert to know what that firing was. The sun was probably half an hour high when he returned. General Gilbert replied to General Crittenden by a short note, stating that he had met with some little resistance himself, but was then camping his troops for the night; that General Rousseau had been engaged--I think he said had been driven back slightly, but had regained his ground. The firing continued at intervals from about half past two till about an hour of sundown, but I am not positive."

It's pretty clear that no one in the right wing of the army had a clue what was happening on the left wing.

 

[Rhea Cole]

In his testimony to the court of inquiry, Thomas himself said, "I did not know that a battle had been fought on the left until after night-fall, when, as I was riding to my tent, Lieutenant Fitzhugh, of General Buell's staff, overtook me and told me. This must have been about 7 o'clock."

When asked if he had heard firing, Thomas answered, "I heard cannonading about the time that the bead of Crittenden's corps reached the position it was to take up, and I directed Captain Mack, my chief of artillery, to port to General Buell that I had arrived in position and with the head of the column, and would superintend the placing of troops in position, and requested the general to send me any orders by Captain Mack. Captain Mack returned about 12, with a plan of the ground and directions from the general to dispose the troops in a certain manner preparatory to an attack the next morning at Perryville but the arrangement was not positive; it left the arrangement of the troops somewhat to my discretion if I thought it was necessary. I asked Captain Mack if he knew what that firing was we heard on the left in front; his reply was that the report came to headquarters that it was Captain Gay, chief of cavalry, reconnoitering and the enemy were firing upon him with artillery. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, again heard very heavy cannonading, and directed General Crittenden to send a staff officer to General Gilbert to know what that firing was. The sun was probably half an hour high when he returned. General Gilbert replied to General Crittenden by a short note, stating that he had met with some little resistance himself, but was then camping his troops for the night; that General Rousseau had been engaged--I think he said had been driven back slightly, but had regained his ground. The firing continued at intervals from about half past two till about an hour of sundown, but I am not positive."

It's pretty clear that no one in the right wing of the army had a clue what was happening on the left wing.

If you get a chance to visit Perryville, the strange things associated with that battle will not seem so improbable anymore. My personal revelation came when I stood on the hill where Parson's battery was overrun. It became perfectly obvious how a mob of Confederate infantry could have popped up over the crest like rabbits out of a hat. Add the smoke & noise of battle to that convoluted terrain & chaos was guaranteed.