All Roads Led To Gettysburg

Started it, let's just say 'interesting'
The review: "Most Civil War battles took place along major roads, railroads, and waterways; the armies needed to move men and equipment, and they needed water for men, horses, and artillery. And yet this perspective hasn't been fully explored when it comes to Gettysburg."
This is a revelation? (edited to say)....that roads, RRs, waterways, horses, etc is a perspective that hasn't been fully exploited? Really? As you said @Hoplite, interesting.
 
Last edited:
I haven't read the book but probably will. I've seen videos of Troy Harman's presentations and he definitely knows what he's talking about. That doesn't mean that you have to agree with his theory but it is worth exploring.
 
I haven't read the book but probably will. I've seen videos of Troy Harman's presentations and he definitely knows what he's talking about. That doesn't mean that you have to agree with his theory but it is worth exploring.
I think the book is worthwhile- but then I think almost all books are!
It is very well researched and he makes you think, which is what you want.
I was particularly struck by his exhaustive detailing of the proposed Slocum right wing offensive, which I knew about but usually gets not much play.
That does not mean I agree with everything he says- he makes a point that water for drinking, animals , cannons played a part in selecting the battlefield- between Rock Creek and Marsh Creek,
 
Just finished reading this book.

The title is a bit misleading in that it implies, to me at least, that the author feels that the battle location was inevitable given that Gettysburg was a major road junction. Harman does show that when the ANV moved into the Susquehanna valley and the AOP into the area north and west of Washington and Baltimore that Gettysburg became one of three or four locations where they would do battle. The confluence of roads, the existence of railroads and significant sources of water determined this. He posited that a Civil War army could not remain in one place for more than 24 hours without road and/or rail access and a sufficient water source.

However, more of the book is about how the AOP positioned itself to take advantage of the environment, as Harman terms it and to protect access and water supply.

In addition there were a couple of things that were new to me. The first was Meade's plan to initiate an attack on his right using the 12th and 5th Corps, with the 6th Corps in reserve, provided it arrived in time. This option was not feasible once Slocum pulled those two corps back without consulting Meade.

The second was the sighing of McLaws division on its backtrack route north, by the signal station on Round Top. Meade mistakenly interpreted this as a possible move on his right flank, which led him to consider an assault there more likely than on his left.

There were roads from the Emmitsburg Road to the Taneytown Road south of the Round Tops, that could have been used by Longstreet for a tactical movement around the AOP left flank. Meade moved to protect this on July 3 by moving Merritt and Farnsworth into the area and by providing 6th Corps support. The point is that Longstreet's argument for a move around the Union left had more merit than I had believed.

Overall a good book and worth reading. It does require at least a basic understanding of the Battle of Gettysburg, though.
 
From the sounds of the review, @dlofting, this sounds like his many battle walks over the years on this subject that he has given to different groups on the battlefield. Troy always took us to some out of the way places. I may pick this one up. I have such a backlog of books.
 
OK, so I have the book and have read the first 3 chapters. As has already been noted, the author's thesis is that previous histories about Gettysburg have focused either on personalities, controversies, or tactical decisions, and have ignored "environmental" considerations. What Harman means is that the key explanation as to why the armies met and fought at Gettysburg was because of the intricate water, rail, and road networks that converged in and around the town, making it the logical place for armies to be nourished, supplied, and moved too expeditiously. Harman especially focuses on the Monocacy River headwaters such as Rock Creek, to which he believes Meade was attempting to disentangle the Union "fish-hook" perimeter to a more linear configuration that would also protect the AotP's right flank more effectively. More to come as I continue my reading.
 
Publisher's description for All Roads Led to Gettysburg:

I was making that point recently using this map I put together.
GB Map Mu.jpg
 
More to come as I continue my reading.
Yes. I'm part way thru chapter 3 and just hit the part where he dissects the traditional comic narrative of Humphreys' division's approach to the battlefield. Harman counters that Humphreys' approach route was significant - he was locating Lee's right flank and securing Reynolds' left flank. And goes on to talk about all the tactical/planning information that was lost when Reynolds was killed.
Stirring and stimulating stuff.
Even if it falls flat starting from where I'm at now - page 93 - just reading the author's take on Gettysburg historiography was worth the price of the book. The writing style is sometimes hair-pulling annoying, but the content is worth it.
Highly recommended!
 

Learn About Us
►About CivilWarTalk
►Contact the Webmaster
►Meet the Staff
►Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
►Register
►Browse Forums
►View Today's Discussions
►Search the Forum
Get Help
►FAQ
►Student Guide
►Forum Rules & Etiquette
►Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top