A Deceptive Victory

[NedBaldwin]

.... General Banks interpreted the movement as a Confederate withdrawal from the valley....

It was in fact a withdrawal from the valley -- Swift Run Gap is not in the Shenandoah Valley.

"I believe Jackson has left the valley yesterday. He is reported to have left Harrisonburg yesterday."

This message is 100% accurate.

Three days later Banks confirmed his report " Jackson has abandoned the valley of Virginia permanently, en route, for Gordonsville by way of the mountains.

Bank was mistaken that Jackson was going to Gordonsville or that the move was permanent, but otherwise he was right. Within a few days he was reporting that Jackon "may make a stand at Swift Run Gap" which is what Jackson did.

 

[StephenColbert27]

Before Grant crossed from the West side of the Mississippi below Vicksburg, he sent Grierson on an epic raid through the entire state of Mississippi. Thanks to Forrest being off chasing another Union raider, Pemberton had no cavalry at his disposal to deal effectively with Grierson, who wrecked havoc wherever he went, tearing up railroads, bridges, storehouses, etc, all the while distracting Pemberton from Grant's imminent crossing at Bruinsburg. From there, Grant would embark on what is in my opinion the greatest campaign of the war, defeating the Rebels in detail, and of course eventually trapping Pemberton in Vicksburg after Champion's Hill and Big Black River Bridge.

 

[War Horse]

It was in fact a withdrawal from the valley -- Swift Run Gap is not in the Shenandoah Valley.

Just over the hill, really does that count?

Bank was mistaken that Jackson was going to Gordonsville or that the move was permanent, but otherwise he was right. Within a few days he was reporting that Jackon "may make a stand at Swift Run Gap" which is what Jackson did.

Totally confused. Then you agree Banks was deceived right?

 

[NedBaldwin]

There was no sheltering in the Blue Ridge,

There was -- he spent about a week hunkered down in the gap. The move against Milroy wasnt immediate.

In fact Banks reported on 4/28-"Our force is entirely secure here. The enemy is in no condition for offensive movements...I think we are now just in condition to do all you can desire of us in the valley....." Two days later he reported "Jackson is bound for Richmond. This is the fact, I have no doubt" Just how wrong he was would have disastrous results.......

His incorrect assumption about Jackson leaving for Richmond didnt last long and had no disastourous result.
A few days later he reported correctly what Jackson was doing: "Jackson moved his army yesterday on the road to Port Republic, east of the Shenandoah. The signal officers report at 2.30 p. m. that they saw his army moving toward that place. His tents still standing this side Blue Ridge. His destination either Waynesborough or Staunton. If latter place, possibly to join Johnson and attack Milroy. General Ewell is said to be near Stanardsville."

 

[NedBaldwin]

Just over the hill, really does that count?

It makes what Banks wrote accurate. Jackson did leave the valley.

Totally confused. Then you agree Banks was deceived right?

I dont agree.

 

[War Horse]

It was in fact a withdrawal from the valley -- Swift Run Gap is not in the Shenandoah Valley.

I knew you were going to say that!

 

[War Horse]

It makes what Banks wrote accurate. Jackson did leave the valley.




I dont agree.

A distance of less than twenty miles. (I believe it was less than 12 miles but I don't have my sources present)

 

[War Horse]

Bank was mistaken that Jackson was going to Gordonsville or that the move was permanent, but otherwise he was right. Within a few days he was reporting that Jackon "may make a stand at Swift Run Gap" which is what Jackson did.

Really

 

[67th Tigers]

Challenging McPherson would require considerable knowledge and confidence.

Not really. McPherson was not a military historian, but a struggling social historian of race studies in America. He got the BCoF gig from his old PhD supervisor when the military historian contracted to write it dropped out. It's surprisingly error ridden, but is only meant to be a primer for early year undergraduates.

As to the Magruder issue - no-one in the literature ever really bothered to try and track the arrival dates of all the formations at Yorktown. I recently finished the survey and indeed Magruder has much stronger than he claimed - over 23,000 "effectives" in position*, and the report of Magruder's right wing artillery commander lists 15 batteries covering the river.**

Magruder's own report is in the OR. The only movement of troops of note after posting was pulling 2 Alabama regiments across the front to a threatened sector and then sending them back a few hours later.


* http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2015/07/effective-strength-of-opposing-armies.html This likely overestimates by 100 as the battery of Wilcox's bde didn't arrive until the 6th.

** http://civilwartalk.com/threads/why-did-mcclellan-decide-to-attack-yorktown.119020/#post-1224666

 

[Package4]

There was -- he spent about a week hunkered down in the gap. The move against Milroy wasnt immediate.


His incorrect assumption about Jackson leaving for Richmond didnt last long and had no disastourous result.
A few days later he reported correctly what Jackson was doing: "Jackson moved his army yesterday on the road to Port Republic, east of the Shenandoah. The signal officers report at 2.30 p. m. that they saw his army moving toward that place. His tents still standing this side Blue Ridge. His destination either Waynesborough or Staunton. If latter place, possibly to join Johnson and attack Milroy. General Ewell is said to be near Stanardsville."

It did have a disastrous result, Banks felt that Jackson had left and scattered his army, some back east with Shields division joining McDowell. Banks had 1,000 at Front Royal, 4,476 infantry, 1,600 cavalry and 16 guns at Strasburg, 1,450 at Winchester, all of this had impact on what was to come. Banks had misinterpreted Jackson's intention and acted rashly and by the time he realized his mistake, it was too late. Jackson was able to move his army largely in secrecy 120 miles, in 10 days to attack Banks in detail (Robertson pp 391- 392 Stonewall Jackson)

 

[NedBaldwin]

It did have a disastrous result, Banks felt that Jackson had left and scattered his army, some back east with Shields division joining McDowell. Banks had 1,000 at Front Royal, 4,476 infantry, 1,600 cavalry and 16 guns at Strasburg, 1,450 at Winchester, all of this had impact on what was to come. Banks had misinterpreted Jackson's intention and acted rashly and by the time he realized his mistake, it was too late. Jackson was able to move his army largely in secrecy 120 miles, in 10 days to attack Banks in detail (Robertson pp 391- 392 Stonewall Jackson)

The distribution of Banks command in May was the result of directions from Stanton and Lincoln and not as a result of what Banks felt about Jackson. He had objected to the splitting up his command and had warned that "Enemy will not return unless small force in upper part of valley tempts them to try for a victory" but the Stanton and Lincoln seemed willing to tempt the enemy in that way.

As I pointed out above, he was aware of Jackson's movements from Swift Run Gap toward Port Republic and even guessed that this was in order to join with Johnson and attack Milroy. So that part of Jackson's move was not secret.

Jackson returned to the Valley in late May and Banks was informed of this, writing on May 21 that "General Frémont telegraphed me this morning that Jackson had moved from Shenandoah Mountain toward my front, and other information from different sources confirms these reports. I have no doubt that Jackson's force is near Harrisonburg". So that part of Jackson's move was not a secret.

The next day he wrote "The return of the rebel forces of General Jackson to the valley, after his forced march against Generals Milroy and Schenck, increases my anxiety for the safety of the position I occupy and that of the troops under my command. That he has returned there can be no doubt. We have information direct from the people of the neighborhood, from prisoners that we have captured from him, from deserters, and also from General Frémont, who telegraphs his march in this direction. From all the information I can gather--and I do not wish to excite alarm unnecessarily--I am compelled to believe that he meditates attack here. " So he did not misinterpret Jackson's intentions. [One of his staff officers, David Strother, wrote in his diary on May 22 that Jackson was reported at New Market, which was correct]

 

[Rebforever]

As I pointed out above, he was aware of Jackson's movements from Swift Run Gap toward Port Republic and even guessed that this was in order to join with Johnson and attack Milroy. So that part of Jackson's move was not secret.

Where the rub is on secrecy was Stonewall crossing the Blue Ridge at Browns Gap above Port Republic making Banks think he was going to Richmond but got on a train at Mechem River.
He met Johnson at West View a little West of Staunton and went to McDowell for a fight with
the Union Army May 8.

Banks pulled back to Strasburg from Harrisonburg thinking Jackson had left the Valley.
.

 

[Drew]

Oh, I have seen a few miracles in my life. My grandmother could be an Olympic sprinter when I needed to be convinced her point of view was law and not just a suggestion.

OK, that's it War Horse. Best thread of the month, if you ask me.

I have no doubt your grandmother was a convincing woman!

 

[Tom Elmore]

There was also what might be termed tactical deception, practiced by soldiers in the line. Members of the 27th Indiana employed a group technique in which one man raised a cap on a stick as a decoy - when a Confederate showed himself in response, the group was waiting for him with muskets at the ready.

 

[War Horse]

Not really. McPherson was not a military historian, but a struggling social historian of race studies in America. He got the BCoF gig from his old PhD supervisor when the military historian contracted to write it dropped out. It's surprisingly error ridden, but is only meant to be a primer for early year undergraduates.

As to the Magruder issue - no-one in the literature ever really bothered to try and track the arrival dates of all the formations at Yorktown. I recently finished the survey and indeed Magruder has much stronger than he claimed - over 23,000 "effectives" in position*, and the report of Magruder's right wing artillery commander lists 15 batteries covering the river.**

Magruder's own report is in the OR. The only movement of troops of note after posting was pulling 2 Alabama regiments across the front to a threatened sector and then sending them back a few hours later.


* http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2015/07/effective-strength-of-opposing-armies.html This likely overestimates by 100 as the battery of Wilcox's bde didn't arrive until the 6th.

** http://civilwartalk.com/threads/why-did-mcclellan-decide-to-attack-yorktown.119020/#post-1224666

The truth be known we could challenge many of the accounts we read. Much is lost over time and translation. I've taken part in studies where a sentence is read by one person and passed verbally from person to person. When it finally reaches the last person what they recite from what was written is incredibly different. I believe the same is true with history unfortunately.

 

[War Horse]

At South Mountain, Private James Allen of the 16th New York single-handedly captured 14 enemy soldiers by employing a bit of cunning and panache. After becoming separated from his regiment, Allen came upon a small group of Southerners who proceeded to fire one or two volleys in his direction. At this, Allen began waving to an 'imaginary company' that was supposedly approaching from an area to his rear, all the while calling out, 'Up men, up!' Ordered by Allen to surrender and apparently believing they were cornered, the Confederates stacked arms and surrendered. Not taking any chances, Allen — his own musket in hand — immediately positioned himself between the Confederates and their rifles until help finally arrived and his befuddled prisoners could be taken away.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

Not exactly. He got a medal of honor for what he actually did, which involved one roar and no waving of arms to an imaginary company. But it is a deceptive action all right (although I think the citation should say "imaginative" rather than "imaginary" ruse. There was nothing imaginary about his brave subterfuge - it was real).

Medal of Honor: Private James Allen, 16th New York Infantry
As the regiment realigned itself in the tall corn, Allen and one of his comrades named Richards became separated, and suddenly found themselves alone near the stone wall. Richards turned to the Irishman, asking "Now what have we to do, Jim?". Allen replied: "Charge the wall, I reckon. That was what we came for."

They both charged forward at a group of Rebels behind the wall, who assumed the soldiers were part of a larger force. Much to the two Federals surprise, the enemy turned tail and fled. While pursuing the retreating Confederates Richards went down, struck with what would turn out to be a mortal wound in his left leg. Placing him against a tree, the Irishman continued to advance up the slope of the mountain. As the Rebels moved into the pass proper, one turned and fired, cutting Allen's coat and shirt and grazing the skin of his right arm. Undeterred by his narrow escape, Allen stopped to load his gun and continue the fight. At this point the Irishman suddenly realized how horribly exposed he was. He quickly sought cover behind a wall that ran along the pass, behind which lay the enemy. There James Allen pondered his next move, one which would be the most important of his life. Retreat was not an option, as it would expose him to Confederate fire, and would make clear to the Rebels that they were being assailed by a solitary soldier. He saw only one possible way out.

Allen decided that the best course of action was to continue to fool the Confederates into believing they faced superior numbers. In order to do this he had to maintain his confident display, and there was only one way to achieve this. No doubt after a deep intake of breadth, Allen threw himself over the wall and into the midst of the Confederates. Regaining his wits, he found himself confronted by 14 soldiers of the 16th Georgia Infantry. One of the men carried the regiment's colors, and Allen determined to take it as a prize. He roared at the Rebels to surrender, doing so in such an authoritative and threatening manner that all the men complied. He retrieved the colors, and ordered his prisoners to stack their arms and remove their cartridge boxes. Once this was achieved, the Irishman quickly interposed himself between the Confederates and their weapons

http://irishamericancivilwar.com/20...r-private-james-allen-16th-new-york-infantry/

The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to Private James Allen, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action at South Mountain, Maryland, 14 September 1862, while serving with Company F, 16th New York Infantry. Single-handed and slightly wounded Private Allen accosted a squad of 14 Confederate soldiers bearing the colors of the 16th Georgia Infantry (Confederate States of America). By an imaginary ruse he secured their surrender and kept them at bay when the regimental commander discovered him and rode away for assistance.

 

[FarawayFriend]

He got a medal of honor for what he actually did, which involved one roar and no waving of arms to an imaginary company

Well, who knows. I can't imagine that the sight of two men, one of them being hit immediately, would cause the Confederates to lay down their guns just upon a roar. A little waving of arms might have been involved, too.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

Less waving of arms and a lot more pointing a firearm would be my guess

And it was only one man. His friend was laying back in the field, dying of his leg wound

 

[FarawayFriend]

Less waving of arms and a lot more pointing a firearm would be my guess

And it was only one man. His friend was laying back in the field, dying of his leg wound

Still not convinced... the Confedeates would be used to having one single man point his weapon in their direction. The true threat (in my eyes) came from his feigning that a whole company was directly coming behind him... (I know because I did once a very similar thing. Only that I waved to imaginary "reinforcements" behind my "enemy" and turned around the corner, knowing he would not display any further interest by looking if there was someone behind him).

And I thought the two separated soldiers first charged together until one of them fell and the other did the trick alone?

Oh, sorry, @War Horse now I'm afraid we might have managed to damage your great little story by too much reasoning...