10 Facts about Hampton Roads

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March 8-9, 2012 marks the 150th anniversary of the historic Battle of Hampton Roads. It was here at Hampton Roads that the true power of ironclad warships would be discovered. And it was here that the revolutionary USS Monitor, with its armored rotating turret would first enter combat. We hope that these ten interesting facts will help expand your knowledge and appreciation of this important Civil War naval battle.

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Closeup of the USS Monitor's turret (Library of Congress)​
Fact #1: The CSS Virginia and USS Monitor were not the first ironclad warships, but they were the first ironclads to battle against one another
The CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor were not the first ironclad warships. In November 1859, the French navy had launched La Glorie, the first ironclad battleship. The Royal Navy, in response to the new French warship, had launched HMS Warrior, an iron-hulled frigate, in October of 1861.
Even in the American Civil War, the Virginia and Monitor were not the first ironclads. To support Union naval operations on the rivers in the western theater, ironclad river gunboats (City Class gunboats) had been built, launched, and deployed by January 1862. These gunboats played an important role in the battles for Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February of 1862.

Fact#2: The Confederacy had great difficulty in sourcing the iron plating needed for the CSS Virginia
In October of 1861 it was determined that the CSS Virginia (the converted ex-USS Merrimack) would require two layers of two inch iron armor plate covering its entire casement. Requiring upwards of 800 tons of iron, there simply was not that much iron available. To make up for this painful shortage, the Confederacy was reduced to scavenging old scrap iron, melting down old smoothbore cannon and iron tools, and even ripping up hundreds of miles of railroad track. The delays in obtaining and shaping these iron plates gave the Union more time to construct their counters to the growing menace of the CSS Virginia.
Learn More About Hampton Roads

Fact #3: The first "trial run" of the CSS Virginia was its combat debut against the US Navy at Hampton Roads on March 8, 1862
On the morning of March 8, 1862, the CSS Virginia made steam and moved slowly out into the Elizabeth River for its inaugural voyage. The Virginia's engines had not been fully tested and the armored shields for its broadside gunports had not been installed, but these "minor details" did not greatly concern the ship's new captain, Franklin Buchanan. Buchanan, who had been selected by Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory for his aggressive tendencies, was determined to make the Virginia's first voyage an attack on the nearby Union navy.

Fact #4: The March 8, 1862 battle that pitted the Virginia against wooden US Naval vessels was the worst defeat in the history of the United States Navy until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

While much attention has been focused on the near bloodless duel between the USS Monitor and CSS Virginia on March 9, 1862, the action between the Virginia and the US Navy on the preceding day was a far bloodier affair. The CSS Virginia's attack on the USS Cumberland killed 121 out of 376 onboard and the subsequent attack on the USS Congress killed 27% of its crew – 120 out of 434. The CSS Virginia, on the other hand, suffered just two killed and a dozen wounded in its fight with the Union navy.

Over the two day battle, the Federal navy suffered 261 killed and 108 wounded in its struggle with the Virginia – more killed and wounded than any other sea battle in American history at that time. And March 8, 1862 would remain the bloodiest day in American naval history until December 7, 1941, when the Japanese navy struck the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.

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This comparison of the CSS Virginia and USS Monitor (in the foreground) shows the significant size differential between these two famous combatants. Where the Virginia was built on the hull of the Merrimack, the USS Monitor was built from the keel up. © James Gurney (jamesgurney.com)

Fact #5: Despite carrying twelve large caliber guns, one of the CSS Virginia's most lethal weapons was a simple 1,500lb iron ram projecting from its bow
Despite the many technological innovations that were on display during the Battle of Hampton Roads, one of the most lethal weapons employed was a large, 1,500lb iron ram attached to the bow of the CSS Virginia. This simple weapon, altogether similar to what one would have found on a Roman Trireme or Ottoman Galley, devastated the USS Cumberland. The Virginia steamed straight for the Cumberland and punched through its starboard bow with its mighty ram. Ironically, the mortal blow delivered by the Virginia's ram almost led to its own destruction. With its ram stuck fast inside the Cumberland, the Virginia risked be carried under by the sinking Federal ship. After some effort the Virginia was able to separate and back away, but is lethal ram had broken free.

During its battle with the USS Monitor the next day, the CSS Virginia sought to employ its ram, not knowing that this weapon now lay at the bottom of Hampton Roads.
See a painting of the sinking of the USS Cumberland by James Gurney: See the Painting
Expired Image RemovedCommodore Franklin Buchanan (Library of Congress)​
Fact #6: The CSS Virginia's commander, Franklin Buchanan, was seriously wounded by musket ball on March 8 and did not participate in the Virginia's famous March 9 duel with the USS Monitor
Per the well-established norms formed during the Age of Sail, it was customary for a defeated ship and its captain to formally surrender to their victorious counterparts. After viewing a white flag above the stricken USS Congress, Franklin Buchanan ordered that the Congress be taken as a prize. Unfortunately for the Confederates, Union soldiers on shore nearby knew or cared little for naval tradition and fired upon the exposed officers and men. Franklin Buchanan, who had gone on deck to supervise this surrender, was struck in the upper thigh by a bullet and was hastily taken back into the interior of the Virginia. Removed to shore that evening, Buchanan turned over command of the CSS Virginia to his executive officer, Lieutenant Catesby ap Roger Jones who would command the famous ironclad during its fight with the USS Monitor the next day.

Buchanan, who would recover from his wound, captained the CSS Tennessee in its battle with Rear Admiral David Farragut's squadron in the Battle of Mobile Bay. During that battle, Buchanan would suffer a broken leg and would surrender with his ship on August 5, 1864.

Fact #7: Sensing that their shells could do little damage, even at close range, the CSS Virginia ceased firing at the Monitor during the battle
Two hours of close-range naval gunfire finally convinced the Confederates of the futility of wasting shell and powder on the USS Monitor. Lieutenant John Eggleston onboard the CSS Virginia, when asked why his gun crews had stopped firing at the Monitor, stated that "[a]fter two hours of incessant firing I find that I can do her [the Monitor] about as much damage by snapping my thumbs at her every two minutes and a half."

The CSS Virginia's armor penetrating capabilities were further reduced by its carrying only explosive shells, rather than solid shot. At one point in the battle, crew members aboard the Virginia resorted to attempting to fire muskets into the open gunports of the Monitor.

Fact #8: If the USS Monitor had used larger gunpowder charges in its 11-inch guns, it's likely that it would have holed and sunk the CSS Virginia
The USS Monitor had been hurried down to Hampton Roads shortly after its launch and little time had been set aside for testing this new, radical weapon system. Despite being designed to carry two 12-inch Dahlgren naval guns, the Monitor launched with two smaller 11-inch Dahlgrens within its armored, rotating turret. To prevent any catastrophic gun bursting within the confined turret, each of the 11-inch guns was restricted to using 15-lb gunpowder charges. Even with this lower gunpowder charge, the 165lb solid shot projectiles did much to dent and disfigure the armor plating on the Virginia. Later tests conducted after the battle showed that if the Monitor had used 25lb or 30lb gunpowder charges that its 11-inch guns would have punctured the Virginia's hull with relative ease at close ranges.
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This illustration shows the USS Monitor and CSS Virginia firing upon one another at close range during the Battle of Hampton Roads (Library of Congress)

Fact #9: Ironically, as the CSS Virginia fired more of its onboard ordnance, the ship became more vulnerable to attack
Unlike the USS Monitor, whose belt of armor descended well below its waterline, the CSS Virginia's iron plating extended barely to its waterline when fully loaded. With each broadside, the Virginia would expend 350lbs of ordnance. And after two hours of firing upon the Monitor and other nearby ships, the Virginia had lightened its load by 5 tons. Ironically, as the ship became lighter it also became more vulnerable. As the ship lightened, its unarmored sides, below the iron casemate, were visible above water and could have been more easily punctured.

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Lt. John L. Worden, captain of the USS Monitor (Naval Historical Center)​
Fact #10 Franklin Buchanan and John L. Worden both became superintendents of the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland
John L. Worden, promoted to rear admiral after the war, was the commandant of the United States Naval Academy between 1869 and 1874. A drill field at the Academy is named for Worden.

Prior to the Civil War, Franklin Buchanan was the first superintendent of the Unites States Naval Academy (1845 - 1847). The stately Buchanan House, current residence of Academy superintendents, is named after this famous Confederate admiral.

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefield...ads-history/10-facts-about-hampton-roads.html
 
Good article.

The officers of the Virginia, particularly her commander on 9 March, Catesby Jones, wondered why the Monitor did not attempt to fire at the Virginia's waterline, where she was worryingly weak. The Southern ship lucked out on that one, either from the inexperience or possibly simply the exhaustion of the Northern vessel's crew (having nearly sunk a couple of times on the way from New York, the crew was extremely short of sleep).
 
The officers of the Virginia, particularly her commander on 9 March, Catesby Jones, wondered why the Monitor did not attempt to fire at the Virginia's waterline, where she was worryingly weak. The Southern ship lucked out on that one, either from the inexperience or possibly simply the exhaustion of the Northern vessel's crew (having nearly sunk a couple of times on the way from New York, the crew was extremely short of sleep).

I haven't read through the naval reports directly so I'm relying on summaries of the engagement. I can suggest two possibilities: 1. The Federals perhaps didn't know or couldn't see this vulnerability. 2. It might have been challenging to depress the Monitor's guns sufficiently at the close ranges employed.

I've wondered if a better strategy would have been targeting grape or canister against gunports hoping to make it hot for personnel. Might even get lucky and perforate the stack where it passed through the gundeck. While smaller caliber damage like this in the stack could be plugged, it could open some possibilities.
 
Virginia displaced about 4000 tons and drew about 22', so five tons wouldn't even raise her an inch. A hit right at the waterline would be dangerous regardless, but it was more a matter of chance than the Monitor's gunners being able to aim that precisely. Sinking a ship with solid shot remained as difficult as it had been for the past couple of centuries. As noted, Virginia's armor was above the waterline; penetrating it could reduce or cripple her fighting power, possibly even force a surrender, but it would do little to sink the ship.

Given the lack of security in those days - the progress of both ironclads was well if not always accurately reported in newspapers of both sides - Buchanan probably realized he had a limited window of opportunity before the Union ironclad arrived. As it turns out, March 8 was the only chance he and the Virginia had to beat up the Union wooden fleet.
 
Virginia displaced about 4000 tons and drew about 22', so five tons wouldn't even raise her an inch. A hit right at the waterline would be dangerous regardless, but it was more a matter of chance than the Monitor's gunners being able to aim that precisely. Sinking a ship with solid shot remained as difficult as it had been for the past couple of centuries. As noted, Virginia's armor was above the waterline; penetrating it could reduce or cripple her fighting power, possibly even force a surrender, but it would do little to sink the ship.

Given the lack of security in those days - the progress of both ironclads was well if not always reported in newspapers of both sides - Buchanan probably realized he had a limited window of opportunity before the Union ironclad arrived. As it turns out, March 8 was the only chance he and the Virginia had to beat up the Union wooden fleet.
Shortly after the battle started the mechanism that controlled the rotation of the Monitors turret failed and they really couldn't do any fine aiming, the turret wouldn't stop slowly rotating! They were simply pulling the lanyard as the turret swung past the Virginia.
 
I thought that was because of problems with the gunport shutters; rather than try to open and shut them, they turned the turret away for loading, then rotated it, fired on the fly, and stopped when it was pointing away again to load the next rounds. Either way it didn't make for precise aim!
 
I've seen differing accounts on the Monitor's turret mechanism-- whether it actually partly failed during the battle, or whether it was not precise enough to begin with. Another difficulty was that the turret crew had no idea which way they were facing when the gunports were shut (and probably not much more idea when they were open); chalk marks had been drawn on the deck before the action commenced to aid them, but these were quickly obscured. And a final problem was that the Confederate gunners quickly learned to hold their fire until they could see the gunports, to try to get a shot into them, so there was definitely a motivation to keep the turret moving.

And yes, there were difficulties with the port stoppers; during the 9 March engagement, the crew hadn't yet figured out how to operate them effectively. (Notably, all succeeding classes of monitors had a different port stopper mechanism.)
 
There are those couple of dents near the gunport, and IIRC two of Virginia's guns had been knocked out the day before by hits on the muzzle, so aiming at the ports would seem to be a valid tactic, even if it was just luck that one out of how many?? shots might score. I expect on March 8 the Federals were following the old rule, even if you're outmatched, keep firing whatever you've got and hope something good happens.
 
I expect on March 8 the Federals were following the old rule, even if you're outmatched, keep firing whatever you've got and hope something good happens.

Yup. Catesby Jones stated that the Cumberland had actually done more overall damage to the Virginia on 8 March than the Monitor did the next day; although there was one place in particular where he said if the Monitor had hit more than once in that area, it would have come through the casemate.
 
Well, I could be very picky and say that that was the Continental Navy, rather than the United States Navy. :D

Actually, I'd never heard of that particular battle/operation... RevWar is a little beyond my usual horizon.
 

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