Most Underrated General

[Elennsar]

I have been thinking that those early Corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac are an interesting bunch, and Sumner seems to stand out. Porter too. I have been browsing through the official records lately and, taking McClellan out of the equation, some of those guys could have been decent. Also, John Pope is interesting.

Pope seems like someone who wasn't as good as he thought he was, but the spirit he wanted to bring to waging the war (as far as "success and glory are in the advance") was the kind of stuff eastern Union generals showed too little of.

 

[rbasin]

I'm not going to say he was great at Charleston, but I don't get the sense you're even trying to give a fair rating here.



McClellan was not weakened by any appreciable degree by Lincoln's concern for the defense of Washington. Most of the troops under his control before the campaign (not counting those responsible for the Valley) were within him in the Seven Days or the Peninsula - I'm not sure another division or two at most would have changed his approach significantly.

When Halleck came east and met with Mac, Halleck was told that with another 20,000 troops, McClellan could take Richmond. Before Halleck gets back to D.C., MacClellan changes that to 30,000. Then I believe Mac changed that to 50,000. All within a day or so.

 

[Elennsar]

When Halleck came east and met with Mac, Halleck was told that with another 20,000 troops, McClellan could take Richmond. Before Halleck gets back to D.C., MacClellan changes that to 30,000. Then I believe Mac changed that to 50,000. All within a day or so.

I'm not sure how McClellan expected that to be just sent to his army without a hitch. That last figure is essentially every field-available soldier in what became the Army of Virginia from what I can tell.


http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...=waro0016;view=image;seq=7;page=root;size=100

That McClellan (page 9) honestly speaks of how troops from "the army of the West not required to maintain a strict defense there" as troops that are "available" to join his army says something about McClellan's understanding of anything outside the Army of the Potomac and its needs independently of Union operations elsewhere.

Its not unique - every general of the war wanted reinforcements concentrated on their area - but for example, Lee talked about having reinforcements from North Carolina or Beauregard's (SC, coastal Georgia, and Florida) coming up in his pre-Gettysburg correspondence with Davis - and even at that focused mostly on the former.

 

[rbasin]

Pope seems like someone who wasn't as good as he thought he was, but the spirit he wanted to bring to waging the war (as far as "success and glory are in the advance") was the kind of stuff eastern Union generals showed too little of.

Well, Lincoln called him east to be some sort of military advisor during the Seven Days prior to the Army of Virginia. I know that Halleck wasn't sad to see him leave the west.

I guess with Pope, did he get a fair deal while he led the Army of Virginia? His Corps commanders, for the most part, dispised him, McClellan was at best slow, maybe insubordinate. (He was insubordinate, but that's another thread)

 

[rbasin]

I'm not sure how McClellan expected that to be just sent to his army without a hitch. That last figure is essentially every field-available soldier in what became the Army of Virginia.

Right. Lincoln responding earlier to that same number, in effect that it was absurd, speaks volumes.

 

[Elennsar]

Well, Lincoln called him east to be some sort of military advisor during the Seven Days prior to the Army of Virginia. I know that Halleck wasn't sad to see him leave the west.

I guess with Pope, did he get a fair deal while he led the Army of Virginia? His Corps commanders, for the most part, dispised him, McClellan was at best slow, maybe insubordinate. (He was insubordinate, but that's another thread)

He (Pope) still seems to have been blind to what the enemy was doing and overtaxed his cavalry (Although major kudos to organizing it in brigades instead of how its organization under McClellan is - well - lacking), which didn't exactly help his situation.

Not sure he got an altogether fair deal, but he wasn't entirely a victim of others, either.


Edit: http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...l-level-orders-of-battle-second-bull-run-oob/

Per this, on August 1 Pope has 46,083 men present for duty. August 18 gives 7,411 for Burnside (well, Reno technically).

I don't know how

 

[Rebel from Finland]

McClellan was not weakened by any appreciable degree by Lincoln's concern for the defense of Washington. Most of the troops under his control before the campaign (not counting those responsible for the Valley) were within him in the Seven Days or the Peninsula - I'm not sure another division or two at most would have changed his approach significantly.

Thanks for your answer! I was under impression that Lincolns actions, if not caused, at least helped Jackson to prevent some crucial artillery support for McClellan to not arrive on time, not to mention that some of those Union troops in the Valley (or near) were going to be sent to Mac.. After Kernstown there were concerns in DC, and when Banks men were chased across the Potomac, Abe got really fixated.. Have to look more into it.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Well, Lincoln called him east to be some sort of military advisor during the Seven Days prior to the Army of Virginia. I know that Halleck wasn't sad to see him leave the west.

I guess with Pope, did he get a fair deal while he led the Army of Virginia? His Corps commanders, for the most part, dispised him, McClellan was at best slow, maybe insubordinate. (He was insubordinate, but that's another thread)

Rbasin,
The chief reason Pope was called into the East was his tendency to the offensive. I don't consider him to be a good general. What he had as a background was Island Number 10, a Union victory claimed by Pope but accomplished by the navy. In Virginia, his incompetency showed itself. He concentrated the bulk of his army against Jackson and didn't reconnoiter to see if Longstreet had arrived. He suffered a devastating defeat at Second Manassas and if Lincoln hadn't intervened, his military career would be over.
The reason I despise him, apart from his military ineptitude and his blunders in managing his army, is his attitude towards Virginia civilians, a clear violation of all the rules of civilized warfare.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

Thanks for your answer! I was under impression that Lincolns actions, if not caused, at least helped Jackson to prevent some crucial artillery support for McClellan to not arrive on time, not to mention that some of those Union troops in the Valley (or near) were going to be sent to Mac.. After Kernstown there were concerns in DC, and when Banks men were chased across the Potomac, Abe got really fixated.. Have to look more into it.

Lincoln certainly delayed McDowell's march on Richmond to divert troops into the Shenandoah, but as far as the troops meant to go to McClellan that didn't because of the concern for the capital, here's the AotP counting the Washington defenses and the troops in the Shenandoah as of the beginning of April:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0055

McCall and Franklin from 1st Corps are addressed below:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0092 and Blenker's division (which McClellan refers to as 10,000 men strong).

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0297

Per McClellan here, the organization above consisted of 85,000 men (per his message here: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0029 ). But given that he felt that Johnston had 100,000 men and that Johnston had the advantages of fortifications - do you see him moving faster against a foe believed to be 100,000 men strong if he had (85,000+10,000+33,510) 128,510 men?

Also, see this: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0025


I'm not saying Lincoln did everything right - and trying to trap Jackson in the Valley the way he did was not as great an idea as it sounded in his head. But McClellan's own decisions seem to indicate that even if he had all the men he asked for he would not have advanced aggressively if his understanding of the enemy's strength went from Magruder having 15-20,000 men not counting Huger vs. his 58,000 ready to march on April 3 to "probably" 100,000 on the 7th.

McClellan might not have been an utter fool, but he was not the general to smash enemy armies like a hammer.

I hope that the number of messages here doesn't feel overwhelming.

 

[Rebel from Finland]

Lincoln certainly delayed McDowell's march on Richmond to divert troops into the Shenandoah, but as far as the troops meant to go to McClellan that didn't because of the concern for the capital, here's the AotP counting the Washington defenses and the troops in the Shenandoah as of the beginning of April:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0055

McCall and Franklin from 1st Corps are addressed below:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Franklin;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0092 and Blenker's division (which McClellan refers to as 10,000 men strong).

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=April 5;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0297

Per McClellan here, the organization above consisted of 85,000 men (per his message here: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=85,000;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0029 ). But given that he felt that Johnston had 100,000 men and that Johnston had the advantages of fortifications - do you see him moving faster against a foe believed to be 100,000 men strong if he had (85,000+10,000+33,510) 128,510 men?

Also, see this: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Magruder;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=0025


I'm not saying Lincoln did everything right - and trying to trap Jackson in the Valley the way he did was not as great an idea as it sounded in his head. But McClellan's own decisions seem to indicate that even if he had all the men he asked for he would not have advanced aggressively if his understanding of the enemy's strength went from Magruder having 15-20,000 men not counting Huger vs. his 58,000 ready to march on April 3 to "probably" 100,000 on the 7th.

McClellan might not have been an utter fool, but he was not the general to smash enemy armies like a hammer.

I hope that the number of messages here doesn't feel overwhelming.

Thanks for those links, I put them on my bookmarks under CW statistics folder What i looked, I see your reasoning, and as I think it more, I don´t see McClellan moving faster.. I think his observation mission in Crimea really backfired on US at this campaign. So to not completely withdraw from my first comment on this thread, he still was a great organizer, and seemed to care of his men quite a bit, maybe even too much for a wartime commander

 

[Elennsar]

Thanks for those links, I put them on my bookmarks under CW statistics folder What i looked, I see your reasoning, and as I think it more, I don´t see McClellan moving faster.. I think his observation mission in Crimea really backfired on US at this campaign. So to not completely withdraw from my first comment on this thread, he still was a great organizer, and seemed to care of his men quite a bit, maybe even too much for a wartime commander

It might be a little harsh to say it backfired, but it seems to have instilled in McClellan notions on how war should be conducted that were ill suited to commanding an army in the American Civil War. Add that to his ego and his mistrust of the administration and I don't see him belonging on the "under-rated" list at all given what he did. He wasn't an utterly incompetent general, but he was not a winner.

 

[BillO]

I can't believe y'all are going to make me defend, even a little, a Yankee general. Little Macs' plans for a relatively bloodless investment and occupation of Richmond certainly weren't helped alot by Lincoln trying to learn how to be a commander by fiddling around with the campaign in the valley but that really didn't mess up Mac so much as Johnston getting himself wounded and having Lee take over on the other side. McClellan and Johnston were both following the book on how sieges and army movements were expected to be conducted. My take on Johnston during this time period is he was going to try to withstand a siege long enough to satisfy honor and then urge Davis or force Davis to sue for peace. Johnston could go back to being the QM general of the old army and the south would have showed the north that they should be respected. Proof? lord no just my take on the man based on his reports and his actions. Seven Pines was a hastily planned mess and was fought only because Davis and Lee demanded action.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Seven Pines was a hastily planned mess and was fought only because Davis and Lee demanded action.

I don't think so. It made perfect sense not to fight until Seven Pines. It would have been foolish to fight McClellan further down the Peninsula, since the Union army could easily use its naval power to outflank any Southern line by moving up the rivers. Moreover, if Johnston fought and defeated McClellan farther down the Peninsula, the Union army would have had a relatively easy time evacuating. By withdrawing towards Richmond and not launching a counter attack until Seven Pines, Johnston was able to engage McClellan at a place where the firepower of Union gunboats and the mobility provided by Union river transports could not be employed and where a Union defeat would leave the Army of the Potomac in an extremely precarious position (as it later was during the Seven Days Battles).

It's true that the battle plan was poorly executed (everybody was still learning how to manage a large army at this point), but that doesn't change the fact that Johnston's overall strategy was a sound one.

 

[Malingerer]

Benjamin Grierson doesn't really get the credit he deserves. He was a musician and teacher who had no prior military training before the outbreak of the war - as far as I know - and he became one of the Federals most successful Cavalry commanders. If he had been a Confederate he would be held in the regards that people hold John H. Morgan if not Nathan Bedford Forrest, but because he was a Federal he doesn't really get much attention.

Good points - he might be better remembered if he hadn't fallen down on the job at Bryce's Crossroads - really weak sauce on his part.

 

[KeyserSoze]

Early's great march, alongside Lee's heroic defense at Petersburg made many foreign, mostly British and French, observers to say that "The Confederacy is more formidable than ever".

Well they sure turned out to be wrong about that, didn't they?

 

[KeyserSoze]

Elennsar,
The observer who made the specific announcement was Captain Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards.

Then he made it long distance. Fremantle left the Confederacy and returned home around a year before Moocacy.

An article, containing a similar phrase, appeared in the "London Times" and in many other newspapers in Britain and France. It was a general sentiment that the Union would not succeed in subjugating the Confederacy.
Civil War Scholar.

Again, they sure turned out to be wrong, didn't they?

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Keyser Soze,
Early behaved splendidly in the Valley. With a weak force, he almost seized Washington, reaching the DC and almost penetrating the best fortifications in the United States.
The observers had ample ground for their comments, at least in the East, where they operated. Two of the three prongs of Grant's original offensive had been met, halted and turned back or bottled up. The main failed to either reach Richmond or abolish Lee's army. They had no better luck at Petersburg, with Lee defeating all their advances and inflicting heavy casualties. These, with Early's advance in the North for good measure, made the ground sufficient for that observation.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[KeyserSoze]

Keyser Soze,
Early behaved splendidly in the Valley. With a weak force, he almost seized Washington, reaching the DC and almost penetrating the best fortifications in the United States.

Almost is a relative word. He allowed himself to be delayed at Monocacy by a force one third his size and once he reached Washington and had a look around he went back south. Washington was never in danger.. Then after burning Chambersburg he had his behind kicked all over the Valley by Phil Sheridan.

The observers had ample ground for their comments, at least in the East, where they operated.

Yes, it is very easy to make observations from thousands of miles away.

Two of the three prongs of Grant's original offensive had been met, halted and turned back or bottled up. The main failed to either reach Richmond or abolish Lee's army. They had no better luck at Petersburg, with Lee defeating all their advances and inflicting heavy casualties. These, with Early's advance in the North for good measure, made the ground sufficient for that observation.

If you ignore the fact that the South was split in half, Sherman was about to take Atlanta, and Lee's army was being forced back into Petersburg then sure, the Southern chances never looked rosier.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Early won a great tactical victory at Monocacy, forcing Lew Wallace to flee. He attacked Fort Stevens and inflicted just under 500 casualties to the Union defenders, suffering just over 300 himself. Chambersburg was burned by John McCausland, not Early himself.
Sheridan's victories were results of his numerical superiority. Everything Early wanted to hold the Valley was men. It is easy to say you won a triumph when your opponent is nothing but a tub against your whale. Don't forget that, while Sheridan's loss was just over 23000, Early lost just under 10000, making great use of the troops he had.
Finally, I referred to the EAST, not the whole outlook. The observers operated in the East and were aware of the operations there, where the Confederacy was gaining victories and glory.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Nytram01]

My take on Johnston during this time period is he was going to try to withstand a siege long enough to satisfy honor and then urge Davis or force Davis to sue for peace. Johnston could go back to being the QM general of the old army and the south would have showed the north that they should be respected. Proof? lord no just my take on the man based on his reports and his actions. Seven Pines was a hastily planned mess and was fought only because Davis and Lee demanded action.

In April, Johston met with Davis, Lee, Randolph, Longstreet and G.W. Smith in Richmond to discuss what would become the Peninsula Campaign.

Lee wanted the Confederates to defend as far up the Peninsula as possible. He argued that it might be possible to attack from Yorktown, he argued about defending at Yorktown or Williamsburg, and conducting a withdrawal in stages. Any of these option, he claimed, would allow the Confederacy to train more troops to free up the veteran unit in Georgia and the Carolina's which could then be brought to Richmond as reinforcements for the AotP(C) - as it was then prior to being named the ANV - manufacture or puchase more weapons for the army and relocate the ships and guns from Norfolk to better positions.

Johnston, as the only man present who had actually been to Yorktown, said he couldn't attack because Magruder had flooded the area to his front and Yorktown was unsuitable for a sustained defend because its poor earthwork and the Federal dominance of the rivers. He couldn't argue against defending at Williamsburg because he hadn't there, nor could he oppose Lee on Norfolk for the same reason. Nevertheless he advocate an immediate withdrawal from Yorktown to the Richmond area where he would attempt a counter-attack to defeat the Federals.

Randolph merely commented on the preferability or evacuating anything of military value from Norfolk, Smith supporter Johnston for an hour before pleading illness to go lie down in the next room, while Longstreet didn't contribute at all after he was rudely interrupted by Davis at his first attempt and came to assume that only asked to be present out of curtesy, while Davis didn't take side during the debate but would make the final decision.

It was thus Lee vs Johnston over what strategy was eployed. At attack from Yorktown was ruled out, and Davis decided that the best course was Lee's stage-by-stage withdrawal. But the final decision was still clear - the decisive battle would not occur on the Peninsula but would only happened when the armies were closer to Richmond and the threat from the Federal navy negated.

From what was required of him Johnston commanded the Peninsula Campaign adequetly.