Most Underrated General

[JohnnnyReb]

Given that Bragg's ability to get rid of the people he wanted to get rid of was essentially nonexistent, what do you expect?

And I think this might be the first time I've heard anyone describe Bragg as overrated.

He was overrated by the President of the Confederacy. His actions 15 years past, and his support of Davis back then obviously played a part in the roles he would be given during the civil war. Davis is putting too much faith in his past deeds and friendship rather than his actual ability.

 

[JeffBrooks]

He was overrated by the President of the Confederacy. His actions 15 years past, and his support of Davis back then obviously played a part in the roles he would be given during the civil war. Davis is putting too much faith in his past deeds and friendship rather than his actual ability.

Not sure if I buy this. If I recall correctly, Davis and Bragg were not close before the war and some (including Bragg) thought that Davis actually disliked him.

 

[BillO]

Not sure if I buy this. If I recall correctly, Davis and Bragg were not close before the war and some (including Bragg) thought that Davis actually disliked him.

Sorry but they had interacted during the Mexican war. Bragg's' flying artillery had pulled Davis' regiment of volunteers out of a bad spot and Davis had a high opinion of him.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Sorry but they had interacted during the Mexican war. Bragg's' flying artillery had pulled Davis' regiment of volunteers out of a bad spot and Davis had a high opinion of him.

This is true, but they also seem to have bickered a bit when Davis was Secretary of War in the Pierce administration and Bragg was a captain in the army. Something about horse artillery, apparently. Bragg was under the impression when the war began that Davis disliked him and was genuinely surprised to get his commission.

 

[Elennsar]

He was overrated by the President of the Confederacy. His actions 15 years past, and his support of Davis back then obviously played a part in the roles he would be given during the civil war. Davis is putting too much faith in his past deeds and friendship rather than his actual ability.

His actual ability resulted in more in the way of success than the actual ability of any other commander of the AoT did. Given the alternative candidates, the only possible viable alternative (since "Lee" just switches which army needs a commander) is Joe Johnston - not available at the time of Bragg's appointment due to his injuries.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Elennsar,
Bragg had a better showing as commander than J.E. Johnston. With Johnston as a commander, every thought of an offensive campaign against the Federals had to be abandoned. Bragg won at Perryville and had the tactical edge at Murfreesboro (Stones River). When reading about Bragg's campaigns, what makes me scratch my head is why did he fight battles and gain victories, when he wouldn't exploit them? Anyway, he kept the Federals outside of the heartland till Chattanooga. Johnston takes command after Bragg's relief and voila! In the early July, 1864, following Johnston's retreats, the Federals have reached the outskirts of Atlanta.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

Elennsar,
Bragg had a better showing as commander than J.E. Johnston. With Johnston as a commander, every thought of an offensive campaign against the Federals had to be abandoned. Bragg won at Perryville and had the tactical edge at Murfreesboro (Stones River). When reading about Bragg's campaigns, what makes me scratch my head is why did he fight battles and gain victories, when he wouldn't exploit them? Anyway, he kept the Federals outside of the heartland till Chattanooga. Johnston takes command after Bragg's relief and voila! In the early July, 1864, following Johnston's retreats, the Federals have reached the outskirts of Atlanta.
Civil War Scholar.

If you can name a victory Bragg had an army in a position to exploit, I would be a happy camper. Chickamauga is not one of those times, Kentucky saw his subordinates stab him in the back and Kirby-Smith do his own thing, and STones's River was a bloody draw/tactical defeat (from Bragg's POV.)

This aside from the difficulties of "exploiting" a victory for any and every commander (on both sides) - ACW armies had a tendency to fight themselves into a state of disorganization and exhaustion.

 

[Nytram01]

...Anyway, he kept the Federals outside of the heartland till Chattanooga. Johnston takes command after Bragg's relief and voila! In the early July, 1864, following Johnston's retreats, the Federals have reached the outskirts of Atlanta.
Civil War Scholar.

To say Bragg "kept the Federals outside the heartland till Chattanooga" while they "reached the outskirts of Atlanta" when Johnston was in charge as if responsibility for that rested solely on the individual in command of the Army of Tennessee is not a position I think sustainable.

During Bragg's tenure as commander of the AoT the Federal were still contesting the war in Mississippi and many thousands of men and many resources were dedicated to that theater and away from Bragg. When Johnston commanded that army the Federals were dominant in Mississippi and had transfered the majority of their resources and men in the West for use against the Confederates in Georgia. Johnston had to face a far stronger enemy than Bragg ever did.

To thus accredit the Federals successful advance on Atlanta to the change in command for the Confederates is, I think, completely diregarding the circumstance of the Atlanta Campaign itself. This is not to say that nobody could theorectically have done better than Johnston did in that campaign but I am trying to get the point across that the war had progressed from 1862/1863, and to try to compare Bragg's time in command favorably to Johnston would require actually recognizing that rather than just a implying that Bragg succeeded where Johnston failed as if nothing had changed.

 

[Elennsar]

Johnston's army was pretty consistently about 60% of Sherman's army group in the Atlanta campaign. Bragg's numbers relative to Federal numbers varied.

Otherwise, I agree with Nytram here - we may disagree on whether Johnston did the best job possible, but I couldn't agree more that "to try to compare Bragg's time in command favorably to Johnston would require actually recognizing that rather than just a implying that Bragg succeeded where Johnston failed as if nothing had changed."

Bragg did better at holding Tennessee than Johnston did at holding Georgia. But implying that Bragg would have done better at holding Georgia is not something I'd want to assert.

Especially given that - rightly or wrongly - the AoT would rather go to Hell than follow Bragg by the time he left the army. That will cripple its efforts.

 

[67th Tigers]

Johnston's army was pretty consistently about 60% of Sherman's army group in the Atlanta campaign. Bragg's numbers relative to Federal numbers varied.

I'm not convinced. Due to the differences in reporting strength, with Confederates being "effectives" and Federals being "present for duty" the gap is smaller than believed.

Hence when wargaming I'm able to create more balanced scenarios, like here:
http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2011/01/wargaming-battle-of-resaca-volley-and.html

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Nytram and Elennsar,
Bragg's subordinates stabbed him because of his decision to withdraw while they could keep advancing and whip up Buell, thus occupying Kentucky permanently. He had arguably won the tactical fight at Perryville and had freedom to exploit it. A large part of Bragg's army had not been engaged at Perryville and he could capitalize on his tactical victory.
At Stones' River, he initially won the fight. It was his error to wait for Rosecrans to retreat and didn't keep fretting and fretting him. Again, Bragg won a tactical victory, but failed to exploit it.
Who had charge of all Confederate commands east of the Mississippi in the Western Theater? Johnston. He could just go and reinforce Pemberton at Vicksburg. The Mississippi River would still be open for the Confederacy. If Johnston had managed his affairs well, he would not face such a huge army.
I didn't question Bragg's lack of popular appeal. Yet, being a disciplinarian and a believer in the offensive, he would not yield ground the way Johnston did. He would lurk for inflicting a terrible wound to his enemy.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

I'm not convinced. Due to the differences in reporting strength, with Confederates being "effectives" and Federals being "present for duty" the gap is smaller than believed.

That is with sides's numbers as PFD, per Richard M. McMurry's Atlanta 1864.

My copy is buried somewhere or I'd quote it directly, but I can probably find it if I have to keep looking (Edit: though no promises on when that will occur - my books are in a rather extreme state of disorganization at the moment).

Hence when wargaming I'm able to create more balanced scenarios, like here:
http://67thtigers.blogspot.be/2011/01/wargaming-battle-of-resaca-volley-and.html

"Balanced" and "realistic" are two different things when talking ACW battles. Or any other time's.

Nytram and Elennsar,
Bragg's subordinates stabbed him because of his decision to withdraw while they could keep advancing and whip up Buell, thus occupying Kentucky permanently.

No, they stabbed him because they didn't care - to use a phrase of another son of an orc - a pinch of owl dung for Bragg. They didn't keep him properly informed during the campaign, didn't even support him in the most rudimentary sense expected of subordinates after the campaign.

"Whipping up Buell" would have required Polk and Hardee to resemble Longstreet and Jackson or other loyal, obedient lieutenants - not refuse to obey Bragg's orders and fail to keep him informed.

He had arguably won the tactical fight at Perryville and had freedom to exploit it. A large part of Bragg's army had not been engaged at Perryville and he could capitalize on his tactical victory.

And how much of Buell's army was up? Frankly I have never see anything suggesting that Buell was in any state where whipping him up was possible.

At Stones' River, he initially won the fight. It was his error to wait for Rosecrans to retreat and didn't keep fretting and fretting him. Again, Bragg won a tactical victory, but failed to exploit it.
Civil War Scholar.

Fretting and fretting him would require Rosecrans to have actually retreated, not merely wondered if he should. The Army of the Cumberland (to use its best known name for consistency) was not on the brink of rout or collapse here.

 

[Deleted member 8452]

I have to say one General who get overlooked and underrated is General William "Little Billy" Mahone who lead his men to victory at Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and The Crater!

He is also a local hero, mostly lead men from South East Virginia.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Mahone, synonym for "hero" in my dictionary.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

No, they stabbed him because they didn't care - to use a phrase of another son of an orc - a pinch of owl dung for Bragg. They didn't keep him properly informed during the campaign, didn't even support him in the most rudimentary sense expected of subordinates after the campaign.

"Whipping up Buell" would have required Polk and Hardee to resemble Longstreet and Jackson or other loyal, obedient lieutenants - not refuse to obey Bragg's orders and fail to keep him informed.



And how much of Buell's army was up? Frankly I have never see anything suggesting that Buell was in any state where whipping him up was possible.



Fretting and fretting him would require Rosecrans to have actually retreated, not merely wondered if he should. The Army of the Cumberland (to use its best known name for consistency) was not on the brink of rout or collapse here.

What do you mean "they didn't care about Bragg"? Even if they didn't care about the individual, they cared about the Army of Tennessee and its being successful.
Polk obeyed Bragg's orders at Perryville. Hardee didn't do something bad, he just suggested Bragg to try a different approach in strategy and tactics and didn't insist when his commander said him a flat "No!"
Buell's army was also scattered, but judging the performance of the Confederates at the field of Perryville, they could at least inflict a wound on Buell's army and cripple it.
If Bragg did that fretting, Rosecrans would be forced to retreat. At the night of December 31, 1862, many of Rosecrans' subordinates were thinking of retreat. Having Bragg deliver a push, the scales would be tipped in that direction,
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Northern Light]

The ones I used (American Pageant & America: Past and Present) mentioned them.

Today's history texts are much less comprehensive that those of a few decades past, because that is no longer the way that history is taught. More emphasis is placed on projects and presentations, media resources, and field trips, where possible. Lists of battles, dates, and names are downplayed and the societal aspects of each era's history is chosen as having more relevance. This is true even at the post-secondary level. The idea is to engage the students at a level that is commensurate with their ability to relate the subjects to themselves, such as imagining yourself as a soldier, or a slave, or a woman on the home front.

Those of us who have spent years studying the ACW, or any other subject for that matter, sometimes forget that there are people out there that, dare I say it, really don't give a flying whatsit about it. I have a friend who grew up about 30 min. away from Gettysburg, had never been there, and had no interest in going. When I suggested that her sons, ages 8 to 12 might find it interesting, see looked at me as if I had suggested that she take them to the moon. Sigh!!!!

 

[Elennsar]

What do you mean "they didn't care about Bragg"? Even if they didn't care about the individual, they cared about the Army of Tennessee and its being successful.

If they cared about the AoT and it being successful, refusing to obey Bragg's orders when they didn't feel like obeying was not the way to show it.

Polk obeyed Bragg's orders at Perryville. Hardee didn't do something bad, he just suggested Bragg to try a different approach in strategy and tactics and didn't insist when his commander said him a flat "No!"

So when Bragg gave an order to give battle immediately (as dawn on the eighth), and Polk disobeyed orders and refused to tell Bragg what was going on, this is Polk being obedient?

With subordinates like that, who needs eternal enemies?

Buell's army was also scattered, but judging the performance of the Confederates at the field of Perryville, they could at least inflict a wound on Buell's army and cripple it.

In a word: How? Supersoldier serum issued to all the Tennesseans?

Bragg is outnumbered, not doing too well for supplies, and not in a good position strategically. Even before we consider being cursed with two generals (three if you count Kirby-Smith, but he's not present) who have no respect for his orders.

If Bragg did that fretting, Rosecrans would be forced to retreat. At the night of December 31, 1862, many of Rosecrans' subordinates were thinking of retreat. Having Bragg deliver a push, the scales would be tipped in that direction,
Civil War Scholar.

"thinking of retreat" does not mean that the Union army was on the point of collapse or that the Army of Tennessee had the strength to force it to collapse.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

So when Bragg gave an order to give battle immediately (as dawn on the eighth), and Polk disobeyed orders and refused to tell Bragg what was going on, this is Polk being obedient?

With subordinates like that, who needs eternal enemies?


In a word: How? Supersoldier serum issued to all the Tennesseans?

Bragg is outnumbered, not doing too well for supplies, and not in a good position strategically. Even before we consider being cursed with two generals (three if you count Kirby-Smith, but he's not present) who have no respect for his orders.



"thinking of retreat" does not mean that the Union army was on the point of collapse or that the Army of Tennessee had the strength to force it to collapse.

Elennsar,
Polk made the attack on October 8. In fact, he was the only subordinate who did exactly what Bragg told him.
Bragg's soldiers at Perryille had to face: a numerically superior enemy, artillery and formidable heights. Yet, they won a great tactical victory and inflicted heavy casualties on their enemy. The soldiers were willing and eager to fight and defeat Buell. Bragg was wrong in ordering the retreat from Kentucky.
At Murfreesboro (Stones River), he could use psychological warfare. The element of panic is always prominent in warfare. Convincing Rosecrans he was gravely threatened, he could accomplish forcing him to retreat.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

Elennsar,
Polk made the attack on October 8. In fact, he was the only subordinate who did exactly what Bragg told him.

Okay, at this point I'm going to request your sources. My statement is based on Thomas Connelly's history of the Army of Tennessee.

Polk may have made "an" attack on October 8th, but he did not make the attack referred to, and did not even tell Bragg about what was going on in his front to the extent he knew about it.

Bragg's soldiers at Perryille had to face: a numerically superior enemy, artillery and formidable heights. Yet, they won a great tactical victory and inflicted heavy casualties on their enemy. The soldiers were willing and eager to fight and defeat Buell. Bragg was wrong in ordering the retreat from Kentucky.

"Great tactical victory"? "heavy causalities"?

Where in the name of Mars is that from?

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/perryville.html?tab=facts 4,220 out of 20,000 - nevermind the rest of Buell's 55,000 - is not the sort of thing that breaks an ACW army and sends it to the four winds.

At Murfreesboro (Stones River), he could use psychological warfare. The element of panic is always prominent in warfare. Convincing Rosecrans he was gravely threatened, he could accomplish forcing him to retreat.
Civil War Scholar.

And Bragg is supposed to do this how exactly?

 

[Nytram01]

Nytram and Elennsar,
Who had charge of all Confederate commands east of the Mississippi in the Western Theater? Johnston.

Theoretically. In practice the power in the West still rested with Davis and Johnston did little but quartermasters work. And for most of Grant's operations against Vicksburg, Johnston was forced to focus on the infighting in the Army of Tennesse - being called in to review Bragg's work and remove and replace him if he thought that needed, and even going there to take temporary command when Bragg was summoned to Richmond, though that never happened in the end due to illness with Bragg's wife and Johnston himself.

He could just go and reinforce Pemberton at Vicksburg.

With what?

The Mississippi River would still be open for the Confederacy.

No it wouldn't. It wasn't "open for the Confederacy" before Vicksburg fell. Vicksburg merely gave the South a superficial claim to contesting the Mississippi, in reality the Federals were dominant and the Confederates could do nothing about it.

If Johnston had managed his affairs well, he would not face such a huge army.

Unlikely. Grant needed to be defeated in Mississippi in 1863 to prevent the Federals focusing the efforts on Georgia in 1864 and I doubt anyone in the Confederacy had the ability to do that. Certainly it would never happen if Pemberton was in charge.

I didn't question Bragg's lack of popular appeal. Yet, being a disciplinarian and a believer in the offensive, he would not yield ground the way Johnston did. He would lurk for inflicting a terrible wound to his enemy.
Civil War Scholar.

He had no more success with that idea than Johnston did. Though for different reasons I will admit. Bragg failed because he couldn't follow a battle in motion and was unable to work well with his subordinates, Johnston failed largely because he was cautious and careful with his men and always had half-an-eye on the odds against him. Nonetheless, neither man had much success with "inflicting a terrible wound to his enemy" - Bragg edges it with Chickamauga, but all his other attempts failed.