Most Overrated General?

[cash]

1) As for Grant, I didn't claim that his successes didn't outmatch his failures. What I did say was that Grant made errors that are often overlooked, thus making him the most overrated Union General. He himself regretted the Cold Harbor attack, in which he suffered more than 7000 casualties and Lee less than 1500.

Wrong casualty figures. Look at Gordon Rhea's work on Cold Harbor.

Same applies to his assaults at Vicksburg. I wonder, since he once tried and failed to break through the city's defenses, why did he assault for a second time?

If one reads actual history books about it, then one would know.

As I said, Grant not much of a military genius as Lee or Jackson were, but surely he was not an idiot.

Grant was a better general than both of them.

2) Longstreet launched the assault on August 30, after delaying for one day. When he assaulted, the golden opportunity for destroying Pope's army had gone.

LOL ... No. Only people who haven't really studied the Civil War think a Civil War army could be destroyed.

In Gettysburg, he again sulked. Lee ordered him to assault Cemetery Ridge in the morning on July 2, 1863 but he assaulted in early afternoon.

Wrong again. That's a fabrication.

Meanwhile, Sickles had advanced his troops to the Wheatfield. I know that Sickles made many mistakes at Gettysburg, but his resistance bought time for Meade to concentrate his troops and stop the momentum of the attack.

Wrong again. Sickles almost lost the battle for the Union.

 

[cash]

I am aware of what Rhea said. Yet, most sources cite it at 7000, including Shelby Foote, Douglas Southall Freeman, E.B. Long and James McPherson.

Compare the dates. Also, it's foolish to rely on Shelby Foote.

Some say it was even more, since total casualties for the Union throughout the first three days of June, 1864 are just under 13000, while Lee suffered well under one third of that. Rhea, like any other writer, is not perfect while Boonekemper really rewrote history from his mind.

Wrong on all counts.

As for Longstreet, while the march his soldiers had to make was not their easiest, they had seen worst. Hood's men especially were the shock troops of the Army of Northern Virginia and had performed their duty under worst circumstances.
Having the attack been launched when Lee ordered it, it would have succeeded.

Once again, please refer to actual history books.

Yes, Sickles was wrong in repositioning his men, but admittedly he gained time for Meade at a cruel cost.

No, he didn't gain time. He endangered the entire Union position.

Having Sickles not redeployed, the element of surprise would have played a major role.

Wrong. Had Sickles been where he should have been he would have had his flanks anchored and the Union line would have been integrated. As a result of Sickles moving out, the Union position was broken apart.

 

[cash]

I have read Rhea's book, but why all other sources, Internet and books say it afterwards? This troubles me. The National Park Service gives Grant's total casualties as 13,000 and Lee's as 2500. Since the main attack was on June 3, at least half of the casualties must have occurred there.

You're simply guessing. Rhea has done the research, and you're not going to find the NPS contradicting him.

Grant himself stated that Cold Harbor was the only attack he regretted making.

No, actually he didn't. He said he regretted it was made. He didn't say he regretted making it.

Meade told his wife that after Cold Harbor Grant had started to understand that Virginia and Lee's army was not Tennessee and Bragg's army. Evidence points to the 7000 figure and not 3000 unless the latter figure concerns only killed and gravely wounded.

Wrong again. Evidence shows that the 7,000 figure is poppycock.

 

[cash]

If Rhea claims Grant lost only 3,000 men during the disastrous attacks of 3rd June, does he indicate where Grant lost the other 10,000 casualties during the nearly two week battle.

The rest of the entire two weeks.

 

[cash]

One note for Keyser Soze,
Rhea begins his history at May 26, right? The Battle of North Anna was over. It stopped during the previous day. The only engagements prior to Cold Harbor were some cavalry ones, Haw's Shop and Old Church which cost to both sides little more than 1500. The infantry clash at the Totopotomoy was also minor. The most those battles would have cost Grant is 6000, counting the clash on June 1. So, surely 7000 is the figure for the June 3rd assault.
Civil War Scholar.

Guessing again, and guessing wrong.

 

[cash]

Keyser Soze,
You have told me what Rhea has stated. I again ask you, why do the Official Records of the US War Department say the figure was 13000? Did Grant and Meade want to maximize their losses? Sounds impossible to me ears.
James N. Grant supervised Meade's actions. Meade always deferred to the judgment of Grant. It was Grant who ordered the costly attacks at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. Meade's decision, either strategic or tactical was carried out with the approval of Grant. This makes sense, since Grant was the commander-in-chief and Meade an army commander.
Civil War Scholar.

Perhaps you should post the applicable part of the OR.

 

[cash]

It was Grant who ordered the costly attacks at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.

Meade was the commander of the Army of the Potomac, and thus he's the one who had tactical control of the army, meaning he is the one who ordered the attacks at Cold Harbor.

Meade told his wife he had command on the field the entire day on June 3. I think he would know whether or not he commanded that day.

Grant is the one who put a stop to the attacks.

 

[cash]

http://www.nps.gov/rich/historyculture/cold-harbor.htm

"During the two week period along the Totopotomoy and at Cold Harbor, the Federal army lost 12,000 killed, wounded, missing and captured while the Confederates suffered almost 4,000 casualties."

 

[Elennsar]

It strikes me that all this talk about how Forrest and Sheridan were bad cavalry leaders because they allegedly were failures at traditional cavalry roles of screening and scouting is flawed statement, and for reasons that would lead no actual cavalry officer to make it.

Keep in mind that all arms of a service like to think that they are capable of striking a decisive blow in battle, and not that they are merely supporting the arm that strikes that blow. What self-respecting horse soldier would ever pin the lion's share of his assessment of a fellow cavalryman on supporting the infantry, let alone all of it?

Buford and Stuart (who was careful never to strip the main army of sufficient cavalry to scout and screen when raiding, and never guilty of disobeying orders to go raiding) to name two. David Gregg and Hampton to name another two.

The quote on scouting and screening being their duty that I posted is from a cavalry officer with plenty of self-esteem, for God's sake. How on earth did that become something "no self-respecting cavalry officer" would use when weighing another cavalryman when we can show repeatedly that self-respecting cavalry officers - instead of infantrymen transferred into the cavalry (Sheridan) and nonprofessionals (Forrest and Morgan) - had no problem with it?

Of course, American military practice before the war treated cavalry as mounted infantry, and technology made massed charges of heavy cavalry for shock value a thing of the past. Yet dismissing fighting battles and raiding is basically to look at cavalry through a foot soldier's eyes: it discounts that which isn't useful to a different arm of the service, not what matters to the arm in question.

No, it is to look at cavalry through the eyes of its role to the army on the whole. If the "arm in question" is concerned about how it can work as part of the main army, Averell defined the role better than you or I can. If "the arm in question" is off for individual glory at the expense of the overall army, it will be noted as falling short of being good at its job because it has sacrificed doing its job as part of the whole for individual glory.

This would be akin to a historian of WW2 arguing that strategic bombing was a waste of resources, the generals who fought the campaign were therefore second-rate, and that the U.S. and British should have stuck with air superiority and close air support the way the Germans did. Some make that argument, but it's not one that gains a lot of traction, and certainly not one shared by the U.S. Air Force, even back when it was the U.S. Army Air Force.

Comparing the disregard for the role of cavalry in the 19th century to the debate over the proper use of aerial assets in WWII is misleading at best.

 

[CSA Today]

The rest of the entire two weeks.

?

Compare the dates. Also, it's foolish to rely on Shelby Foote.




Wrong on all counts.




Once again, please refer to actual history books.





No, he didn't gain time. He endangered the entire Union position.




Wrong. Had Sickles been where he should have been he would have had his flanks anchored and the Union line would have been integrated. As a result of Sickles moving out, the Union position was broken apart.

Not as foolish as relying on Gordon Rhea.
http://www.gordonrhealaw.com/

 

[dlofting]

?


Not as foolish as relying on Gordon Rhea.
http://www.gordonrhealaw.com/

I only know Gordon Rhea from what I've read here on CivilWar Talk and the link you posted. After looking at his website I would characterize him as an experienced, successful lawyer and well recognized historian who has published several books on the Overland Campaign.

 

[Chattahooch33]

As much as I dislike the idea of "Longstreet the Slow.", I love how this expresses what happened when he showed up. Longstreet may not have been the Confederacy's fastest marcher or most enthusiastic attacker, but he hit like a hammer.

Thats because of all those Georgians in his corps.

 

[Elennsar]

Thats because of all those Georgians in his corps.

I'm not brave enough to argue with this, especially when my favorite by far Confederate officer at Gettysburg (Porter Alexander) was a Georgian.

They sure set a good example for the rest.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Dear cash,
Gordon Rhea's estimate of the casualties at Cold Harbor is not supported by ANY other source. I have read countless of articles and several books on Grant, but he is criticized for making the attack at Cold Harbor. If his casualties were only 3000 why is he criticized?
And what are the "actual history books"? Grant regretted the failure of those two assaults and the second was even costlier than the first.
Grant had all the resources he wanted and always could replenish his losses. Lee and Jackson never enjoyed that advantage, yet they gained victories that make military historians marvel at them.
When I said "destroyed", I meant thrown back with very heavy losses or forced to surrender, at least some parts. And Lee had the opportunity which Longstreet left unexploited.
Once again, which history books do you consider as "actual"?
Sickles was routed and his corps was badly mauled. But, he gained time for Meade to concentrate on Longstreet's attack and manage to repulse them.
Wait one minute. It is foolish to rely on Shelby Foote, the NPS is not sufficient or trustworthy to contradict Rhea, right? You cannot have it this way, by declaring all sources invalid and saying that Rhea has done research.
Grant regretted having made the assault. He ordered it to be carried out, which caused many of his subordinates, such as Hancock to get furious at him.
Let's get Grant's casualties at those engagements. Figures come from Wikipedia:
Haw's Shop: 365
Totopotomoy Creek: 731
Old Church: 90
Clashes on June 1, 1864 near Cold Harbor: 2200
Total:3386. Assuming that 13000 is the overall figure, how many men did Grant lose on June 3? More than 9000. Simple arithmetic.
Grant was the one who ordered Meade to "vigorously exploit any successful part of the assault". Also, Grant could stop Meade since he was Meade's superior.
Finally, you give me a link to the NPS, while you have stated it is not sufficient to contradict Rhea.
Thanks,
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

In the interests of informed discussion:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0067&node=waro0067:5&view=image&seq=198&size=100

So for June 2-15 - including but not limited to what is conventionally referred to as "the battle of Cold Harbor" (the assault on June 3) are a total of 12,738 per the Official Records.

The casualties for 6th Corps on June 1 are also included in that total.

The battle of Hawes's Shop, Topotomoy Creek, and Old Church are included in this total:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0067&q1=killed&view=image&seq=182&size=100 - not the June 2-15 total of "about 13,000".

Per Rhea, the amount for the assault on June 3 specifically - that Civil War Scholar refers to here

Elensar, I saw your points on both Generals. 1) As for Grant, I didn't claim that his successes didn't outmatch his failures. What I did say was that Grant made errors that are often overlooked, thus making him the most overrated Union General. He himself regretted the Cold Harbor attack, in which he suffered more than 7000 casualties and Lee less than 1500.

- was a third of that (June 2-15) total at most.

Sickles was routed and his corps was badly mauled. But, he gained time for Meade to concentrate on Longstreet's attack and manage to repulse them.

And finally:
No. He did not gain a minute of time for Meade. Meade, if Sickles had obeyed orders and been in position, would have held the position that historically required the diversion of Vincent's brigade (3rd Brigade/1st Division/5th Corps), Weed's brigade (3rd Brigade/2nd Division/5th Corps - the 2nd Brigade of that division being back at Washington) and the Pennsylvania Reserves (1st and 3rd Brigades of 3rd Division/5th Corps) to compensate for Sickles leaving it undefended. One might also want to count five of the six brigades of 12th Corps, which should have been in position to hold Culp's Hill and that flank - but due to the need for reinforcements to respond to Sickles's blunder were sent to the army's left.

Had Sickles been in position, those brigades - plus those sent to the Wheatfield (the remaining four brigades of 5th Corps, and four brigades of 2nd Corps) would have been able to supplement his efforts instead of having to be thrown into repair a hole that only existed because of his failure to obey orders.

This does not even count troops sent to deal with the crisis from Humphrey's division being out of place, which lead to the sacrifice of the 1st Minnesota Infantry, for example.

For Sickles to have bought time for Meade, that would require him to buying time for Meade to do something. "sending troops to a position that had Sickles obeyed orders would have been occupied by Sickles's troops" does not count.

 

[JerseyBart]

In the interests of informed discussion:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0067&node=waro0067:5&view=image&seq=198&size=100

So for June 2-15 - including but not limited to what is conventionally referred to as "the battle of Cold Harbor" - the assault on June 3 - are a total of 12,738 per the Official Records.

The casualties for 6th Corps on June 1 are also included in that total.

The battle of Hawes's Shop, Topotomoy Creek, and Old Church are included in this total:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0067&q1=killed&view=image&seq=182&size=100 - not the June 2-15 total of "about 13,000".

Per Rhea, the amount for the assault on June 3 specifically - that Civil War Scholar refers to here

- was a third of that (June 2-15) total at most.




And finally:
No. He did not gain a minute of time for Meade. Meade, if Sickles had obeyed orders and been in position, would have held the position that historically required the diversion of Vincent's brigade (3rd Brigade/1st Division/5th Corps), Weed's brigade (3rd Brigade/2nd Division/5th Corps - the 2nd Brigade of that division being back at Washington) and the Pennsylvania Reserves (1st and 3rd Brigades of 3rd Division/5th Corps) to compensate for Sickles leaving it undefended. One might also want to count five of the six brigades of 12th Corps, which should have been in position to hold Culp's Hill and that flank - but due to the need for reinforcements to respond to Sickles's blunder were sent to the army's left.

Had Sickles been in position, those brigades - plus those sent to the Wheatfield (the remaining four brigades of 5th Corps, and four brigades of 2nd Corps) would have been able to supplement his efforts instead of having to be thrown into repair a hole that only existed because of his failure to obey orders.

This does not even count troops sent to deal with the crisis from Humphrey's division being out of place, which lead to the sacrifice of the 1st Minnesota Infantry, for example.

For Sickles to have bought time for Meade, that would require him to buying time for Meade to do something. "sending troops to a position that had Sickles obeyed orders would have been occupied by Sickles's troops" does not count.

And a position that had only one flank on that end of the field, now had a minimum of three...all of which led to the near disaster on Day 2, stopped by brave and in some cases, sacrificed men, including Sickles' own men who he personally sacrificed.

 

[ole]

?


Not as foolish as relying on Gordon Rhea.
http://www.gordonrhealaw.com/

So lawyers cannot be respected historians?

 

[JerseyBart]

Sickles was routed and his corps was badly mauled. But, he gained time for Meade to concentrate on Longstreet's attack and manage to repulse them.
Thanks,
Civil War Scholar.

Sickles' paranoia, lack of military ability and disobedience got his and many other men butchered, gaining nothing for the army except more holes to dig. If he had gained any time, there would have been a lot more than 47 members of the 1st Minnesota still around after they went into combat. He got back to D.C., smeared Meade as a coward, and deified himself as the hero of Gettysburg, so much so that he called the entire battlefield a monument to him. Decades later, his men still cheered him at a reunion...loyal men to a fault. That he never saw a hangman's noose is a miracle.

 

[suzenatale]

I'm curious what primary sources you guys are thinking of when you say Sheridan.

 

[Elennsar]

I think Eric (Wittenberg) can answer that better than I can. My statement is based on the facts he has presented in his writing.